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The phrase “Could Have Done Otherwise” (CHDO) often comes up in philosophical discussions on the existence or non-existence of “free will”. Many libertarians would claim “free will” means that, no matter what one does, if the act was a free will act then one could have done otherwise (CHDO) than what one actually did. This seems to be the libertarian definition of free will.
Firstly - Would any libertarians out there disagree with this? If yes, I would welcome your comments as to what you believe is the “correct” libertarian definition of free will.
Now to my question. What, exactly, are we to understand from the expression CHDO?
Does it mean CHDO in the counterfactual sense? In other words, does it mean :
A : CHDO = “If circumstances had been different, then it follows that I could have wanted to do something different, and it also follows that I could have done something different”
Or does it mean CHDO in some non-counterfactual (ie factual) sense, in the sense of either B or C below :
B : CHDO = “If circumstances had been exactly the same, then I could still have wanted to do something different, and it follows that I could have done something different”
or even :
C : CHDO = “If circumstances had been exactly the same and I had not wanted to do something different, then I could still have done something different”
Or does it mean something else entirely?
My understanding of libertarian free will is that the libertarian would reject both (A) and (C) above as explanations of the meaning of the phrase CHDO. Why? Because (A) is completely compatible with a deterministic account (in other words, we do not need to posit libertarian free will in order to claim counterfactual ability to have done otherwise under determinism); and because (C) is irrational – what rational reason could I have for suggesting that I could have done something different if I had not wanted to do something different?
This seems to leave us with (B) above as the meaning of CHDO according to a libertarian.
I welcome comments or criticism at this stage (before developing the idea further)
Best Regards
Firstly - Would any libertarians out there disagree with this? If yes, I would welcome your comments as to what you believe is the “correct” libertarian definition of free will.
Now to my question. What, exactly, are we to understand from the expression CHDO?
Does it mean CHDO in the counterfactual sense? In other words, does it mean :
A : CHDO = “If circumstances had been different, then it follows that I could have wanted to do something different, and it also follows that I could have done something different”
Or does it mean CHDO in some non-counterfactual (ie factual) sense, in the sense of either B or C below :
B : CHDO = “If circumstances had been exactly the same, then I could still have wanted to do something different, and it follows that I could have done something different”
or even :
C : CHDO = “If circumstances had been exactly the same and I had not wanted to do something different, then I could still have done something different”
Or does it mean something else entirely?
My understanding of libertarian free will is that the libertarian would reject both (A) and (C) above as explanations of the meaning of the phrase CHDO. Why? Because (A) is completely compatible with a deterministic account (in other words, we do not need to posit libertarian free will in order to claim counterfactual ability to have done otherwise under determinism); and because (C) is irrational – what rational reason could I have for suggesting that I could have done something different if I had not wanted to do something different?
This seems to leave us with (B) above as the meaning of CHDO according to a libertarian.
I welcome comments or criticism at this stage (before developing the idea further)
Best Regards
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