Why consciousness is not reducible to nonconscious things

[pftest]

What do you think of the following argument about consciousness* (from now on called "C"):

________________________________________________

P1: The only things reductionism reduces, are our own misconceptions.
P2: Misconceptions require C.
C: To say that C is reducible, is to say that C is a misconception that requires C.
________________________________________________

As you see, the conclusion doesnt get rid of C. The statement "C is reducible" can be compared with the statement "C is dreamable". Even if C is dreamable, there is still a C that is dreaming it. That is why C is not reducible to non-C things.


* Btw my definition of C is "having experiences". Examples of experiences are for example pain, what it feels like to see a car, etc. This is my theoretically neutral definition of C. It doesnt state C is material or non-material, it just refers to our experiences, and we all understand what we mean when talking about them.

[vectorcube]

Your argument is pretty bad.

Here is my take on it. consciousness is a physical fact, but is not reducible to physical facts. The thing that is non-reducible is the subjective mood necessary to be conscious.

[pftest]

You say the argument is bad, can you point out where the flaw is (premise 1, 2 or the conclusion)?

[Mattara]

You say the argument is bad, can you point out where the flaw is (premise 1, 2 or the conclusion)?

Your argument is based on a false understanding of (hierarchical) reductionism. It is no misconception to say that water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even when further reductionism reveals that these atoms consists of protons, neutrons and electrons.

Here is an argument against your position.

1. Consciousness can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. Consciousness can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
5. Consciousness is a material phenomena (from 3&4).

[pftest]

Your argument is based on a false understanding of (hierarchical) reductionism. It is no misconception to say that water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even when further reductionism reveals that these atoms consists of protons, neutrons and electrons.The proton/neutron situation shows that the "2 hydrogen atoms and 1 oxygen atom" view is a flawed/incomplete view of the situation. Its the same as when you think a parked car is a solid, static, motionless object. Further investigation reveals the car to consist of a huge amount of moving atoms with lots of space between them. The initial idea of the car as being a solid motionless object, was a misconception and it has been reduced to a more accurate view of the physical situation.

Here is an argument against your position.

1. Consciousness can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. Consciousness can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
5. Consciousness is a material phenomena (from 3&4).Your argument is an argument for monism, of which materialism is just one type. It is not an argument for materialism in particular. There are other types of monism aswell (neutral monism, panpsychism, idealism, etc.).

Btw its important to note that im not saying consciousness is immaterial, since my definition is theoretically neutral. The argument merely says that C is not reducible to nonconscious things. If matter is considered void of consciousness, then C is not reducible to that.

[DaveC426913]

4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
Can you clarify? At face-value, this statement is false.

[apeiron]

Between the extremes of emergent monism and disconnected dualism, there is a futher ontic position - the dichotomy.

So in this view, anything real can always be reduced in two complementary directions. And these directions are bounding limits rather than fundamental states.

With the mind~brain issue for example, we can see that we can reduce it to the ancient dichotomy of substance~form. Or local constructive materials and globally constraining organisation.

So consciousness is not reducible to material causes, but it could be treated as a generalised form. An arrangement of material that has the organisation we would consider the essence of mindfulness. The challenge then is to develop mathematically rigorous descriptions of "mindfulness". Which is what people try to do with neural nets, or complex adaptive system theory, etc.

Again, emergence and dualism are poor choices, even if very common ones. If you get into mind science you can discover other positions to take.

[vectorcube]

You say the argument is bad, can you point out where the flaw is (premise 1, 2 or the conclusion)?



I don ` t even think you know what is a proposition. A proposition can be either true or false, decided upon by a state of affair. This is not commonly understood. You would not know this if you are not a philosopher.

[pftest]

I don ` t even think you know what is a proposition. A proposition can be either true or false, decided upon by a state of affair. This is not commonly understood. You would not know this if you are not a philosopher.The argument has 2 propositions and a conclusion. Which of them has a flaw in it?

[vectorcube]

The argument has 2 propositions and a conclusion. Which of them has a flaw in it?


I read Premise 2, and i can` t help but want to inflict pain on myself.

[Mattara]

The proton/neutron situation shows that the "2 hydrogen atoms and 1 oxygen atom" view is a flawed/incomplete view of the situation. Its the same as when you think a parked car is a solid, static, motionless object. Further investigation reveals the car to consist of a huge amount of moving atoms with lots of space between them. The initial idea of the car as being a solid motionless object, was a misconception and it has been reduced to a more accurate view of the physical situation.

No, both are accurate and neither is flawed. The reduced view is more precise in that particular area, though.

Your argument is an argument for monism, of which materialism is just one type. It is not an argument for materialism in particular. There are other types of monism aswell (neutral monism, panpsychism, idealism, etc.).

Idealism is certainly not materialism.

[Mattara]

Can you clarify? At face-value, this statement is false.

Do you not accept the conservation of momentum? If you kick matter, it kicks back. You can't kick matter if your foot is not material itself, because that would be a violation of the conservation of momentum.

[DaveC426913]

Do you not accept the conservation of momentum? If you kick matter, it kicks back. You can't kick matter if your foot is not material itself, because that would be a violation of the conservation of momentum.

Your statement is:
Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
Light can interact with matter yet it is not matter.

[vectorcube]

Your argument is based on a false understanding of (hierarchical) reductionism. It is no misconception to say that water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even when further reductionism reveals that these atoms consists of protons, neutrons and electrons.

Here is an argument against your position.

1. Consciousness can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. Consciousness can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
5. Consciousness is a material phenomena (from 3&4).

From 3 & 4, it follows that "consciousness is matter", and not material phenomena.
What this implies is that 1 is false. Intuitively, i think it is hard to make the case that matter is consciousness.

[vectorcube]

Your statement is:

Light can interact with matter yet it is not matter.


Pretty simple. Just change matter to physical facts.

[DaveC426913]

Pretty simple. Just change matter to physical facts.
:confused:

4. Anything that can interact with physical facts is by definition physical facts (from definition)


That makes no sense at all.

[vectorcube]

:confused:

4. Anything that can interact with physical facts is by definition physical facts (from definition)


That makes no sense at all.

It is like asking why not "2+2=5". I can` t help you. :surprised

Seriously, tho, materialism makes no distinction between particles with mass, and particles without mass. In either case, they both need to governed by some law to make it work.


As to why you think "physical facts" does not make sense is beyond me. "Physics facts" is supposed to make a empirical proposition true( or false). They are suppose to be completely mind-independent. Don` t argue. This is how philosophers set the relationships, and that is how i learn it.


In fact, i can think of a better way of express materialism:
Every process in the universe can be explained by physical laws, and constitutes.

[DaveC426913]

It is like asking why not "2+2=5". I can` t help you. :surprised

I wasn't asking for your help, I was asking Mattara to clarify his statement, which is false. Your modification makes no sense.


Seriously, tho, materialism makes no distinction between particles with mass, and particles without mass. In either case, they both need to governed by some law to make it work.


As to why you think "physical facts" does not make sense is beyond me. "Physics facts" is supposed to make a empirical proposition true( or false). They are suppose to be completely mind-independent. Don` t argue. This is how philosophers set the relationships, and that is how i learn it.


In fact, i can think of a better way of express materialism:
Every process in the universe can be explained by physical laws, and constitutes.
There's no way you're going to be able to express the original argument if the words and definitions are ambiguous, resulting in refutable premises.

I'm simply asking for the original argument to be written with acceptable premises.

[pftest]

No, both are accurate and neither is flawed. The reduced view is more precise in that particular area, though.Lets put it this way, the reduced view gives a full description of the physical nature of the object (for as far as we know), whereas the nonreduced view gives an incomplete description. The view that a car is a motionless solid object, is incomplete. If someone gave you such a description of a car, you would never know that it actually consists of zillions of physical ingredients moving rapidly, aswell as lots of empty space. Your understanding(concept) of the car would be incomplete.

Idealism is certainly not materialism.Neutral monism, panpsychism and idealism are types of monism, but they are certainly not materialism. Quite the contrary. Since your argument about interaction is only an argument for monism, it is not an argument for materialism in particular. This argument of mine would also be invalid, for the same reason yours is:

1. C can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. C can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that interacts with C, is conscious.
5. Matter is a conscious phenomenon.

[vectorcube]

I wasn't asking for your help, I was asking Mattara to clarify his statement, which is false. Your modification makes no sense.



Well, then you must not get it. It is crazy. It is like saying 2+2=42...
I just had to comment when your wrote "proton is massless", because matter could only interact with matter. It is sad, and funny at the same time.





There's no way you're going to be able to express the original argument if the words and definitions are ambiguous, resulting in refutable premises.

I'm simply asking for the original argument to be written with acceptable premises.

ok, if you say so.

[DaveC426913]

I just had to comment when your wrote "proton is massless", because matter could only interact with matter. It is sad, and funny at the same time.
I didn't write that. That would be false. Read it again. What I wrote is correct.

You seem to be having difficulty with your emotions. Science and philosophy should not make you feel sad.

[vectorcube]

I didn't write that. That would be false. Read it again. What I wrote is correct.

You seem to be having difficulty with your emotions. Science and philosophy should not make you feel sad.


No, no.. I love science and philosophy. That is not the problem. It`s just that reading about how photon is massless sounds crazy in a philosophy discussion about materialism. Don` t you think?

[DaveC426913]

No, no.. I love science and philosophy. That is not the problem. It`s just that reading about how photon is massless sounds crazy in a philosophy discussion about materialism. Don` t you think?I never mentioned photons. Nor did I mention mass. (I also didn't mention protons, so I'm not sure why, in post 20, you put those words in my mouth, then proceeded to mock me for it.)

It seems to me there's some dancing around the issue here. You're taking my words, mangling them, reattributing them to me, then calling them sad or crazy or whatever other derisive-yet-completely-unsubstantive adjective comes to your mind.

The original premise was:

"Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)"

This premise is false.

That's it. That's my whole case. Mattara made this statement in post 4. It was flawed; it contains a false premise. I asked for clarification.

BTW, it is not necessary for you to pick up this ball. It is really directed to Mattara. If you have some constructive input in his place that'd great.

[Mattara]

Lets put it this way, the reduced view gives a full description of the physical nature of the object (for as far as we know), whereas the nonreduced view gives an incomplete description. The view that a car is a motionless solid object, is incomplete. If someone gave you such a description of a car, you would never know that it actually consists of zillions of physical ingredients moving rapidly, aswell as lots of empty space. Your understanding(concept) of the car would be incomplete.

Neutral monism, panpsychism and idealism are types of monism, but they are certainly not materialism. Quite the contrary. Since your argument about interaction is only an argument for monism, it is not an argument for materialism in particular. This argument of mine would also be invalid, for the same reason yours is:

1. C can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. C can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that interacts with C, is conscious.
5. Matter is a conscious phenomenon.

That does not follow. Just because all consciousness can be explained in terms of mater does not mean that all mater can be explained in terms of consciousness.

(M (C))

[Mattara]

From 3 & 4, it follows that "consciousness is matter", and not material phenomena.
What this implies is that 1 is false. Intuitively, i think it is hard to make the case that matter is consciousness.

Just because all consciousness is matter does not imply that all mater is conscious. Just like that fact that some life is made of matter does not imply that all matter is alive. There is no contradiction.

[DaveC426913]

Mattara, can you follow up with my post 13 (http://physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=2401429&postcount=13)? It'd be great to get closure and not dilute the rest of this thread with the barely on-topic bickering between Vectorcube and myself.

[Mattara]

Your statement is:

Light can interact with matter yet it is not matter.

Yes, it is. I obviously do not mean Newtonian matter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass%E2%80%93energy_equivalence

Do you reject the conservation of momentum? If my immaterial foot kicks a ball and the ball keeps rolling, the change in (linear) momentum in the ball is mballvball and the change in linear momentum of my foot is mfootvfoot.

From the conservation of momentum we get that

mballvball + mfootvfoot = 0

However, since my foot is immaterial, the second product is 0 and you have a situation where the left hand side is nonzero and the right hand side is 0, which is contradictory. Thus, interaction between something immaterial and matter is a violation of the conservation of momentum. Perhaps a more clear argument is the following.

1. The conservation of momentum is valid (premise)
2. If something immaterial can interact with something material, the conservation of momentum is invalid (since something immaterial would have no mass, Newtonian or relativistic, it would have no momentum and you would get momentum out of nothing).
3. It is not the case that something immaterial can interact with something material (from 1&2)
4. The mind interacts with the brain (premise)
5. It cannot be the case that the mind is immaterial (from 3&4)

[pftest]

Yes, it is. I obviously do not mean Newtonian matter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass%E2%80%93energy_equivalence

Do you reject the conservation of momentum? If my immaterial foot kicks a ball and the ball keeps rolling, the change in (linear) momentum in the ball is mballvball and the change in linear momentum of my foot is mfootvfoot.The mass energy equivalence is an interesting bit. Note how in the following paragraph it is explained that energy is a purely conceptual phenomenon:

During a 1961 lecture[7] for undergraduate students at the California Institute of Technology, Richard Feynman, a celebrated physics teacher and Nobel Laureate, said this about the concept of energy:

There is a fact, or if you wish, a law, governing natural phenomena that are known to date. There is no known exception to this law; it is exact, so far we know. The law is called conservation of energy; it states that there is a certain quantity, which we call energy, that does not change in manifold changes which nature undergoes. That is a most abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that there is a numerical quantity, which does not change when something happens. It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange fact that we can calculate some number, and when we finish watching nature go through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same.
—The Feynman Lectures on Physics[7]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy#HistorySo the mass-energy equivalence actually shows that mental (conceptual) phenomena are equivalent to mass in motion. So too is the opposite true: all mass in motion is equivalent to a concept (energy). Because the statement E=MC2 is true on a universal scale, it is no longer materialism (materialism doesnt regard mind as a universal phenomenon). Of course this formula was never meant as a metaphysical statement about the mind-body relationship, but it shows how abstract concepts are right in the heart of physics.

Your statement was:
2. If something immaterial can interact with something material, the conservation of momentum is invalid (since something immaterial would have no mass, Newtonian or relativistic, it would have no momentum and you would get momentum out of nothing).If by "immaterial" you mean "consciousness", then statement 2 is false. The mass-energy equivalence does show that concepts can influence mass. If by immaterial you do not mean "consciousness", then the argument simply is not relevant to consciousness.

[apeiron]

1. The conservation of momentum is valid (premise)
2. If something immaterial can interact with something material, the conservation of momentum is invalid (since something immaterial would have no mass, Newtonian or relativistic, it would have no momentum and you would get momentum out of nothing).
3. It is not the case that something immaterial can interact with something material (from 1&2)
4. The mind interacts with the brain (premise)
5. It cannot be the case that the mind is immaterial (from 3&4)

Again, where the argument breaks down is the claim that matter is material - that its entire essence is that of substance. Matter also has an equally fundamental "immaterial" aspect, which is its form, its organisation, its relationships.

Information theoretic approaches to modelling have their problems, but at least they put form and substance on an equally atomistic footing and so they can be used in laws, both first and second laws of thermodynamics.

When we are talking about the mind~brain, we are also accepting that the wholeness of the system has both its formal aspects and its substantial aspects. It is dualism to speak of consciousness and matter - making a mystery of what is really not that mysterious, just complex and poorly modelled.

[Mattara]

Again, where the argument breaks down is the claim that matter is material - that its entire essence is that of substance. Matter also has an equally fundamental "immaterial" aspect, which is its form, its organisation, its relationships.

Information theoretic approaches to modelling have their problems, but at least they put form and substance on an equally atomistic footing and so they can be used in laws, both first and second laws of thermodynamics.

When we are talking about the mind~brain, we are also accepting that the wholeness of the system has both its formal aspects and its substantial aspects. It is dualism to speak of consciousness and matter - making a mystery of what is really not that mysterious, just complex and poorly modelled.

Matter is by definition material, so I see no problem with that claim.

[Mattara]

So the mass-energy equivalence actually shows that mental (conceptual) phenomena are equivalent to mass in motion. So too is the opposite true: all mass in motion is equivalent to a concept (energy). Because the statement E=MC2 is true on a universal scale, it is no longer materialism (materialism doesnt regard mind as a universal phenomenon). Of course this formula was never meant as a metaphysical statement about the mind-body relationship, but it shows how abstract concepts are right in the heart of physics.

The mass-energy equivalence universality is no threat to materialism; in fact, it is one of the great successes of materialism. Again, just because all minds are material does not imply that all matter forms minds.

If by "immaterial" you mean "consciousness", then statement 2 is false. The mass-energy equivalence does show that concepts can influence mass. If by immaterial you do not mean "consciousness", then the argument simply is not relevant to consciousness.

It is certainly relevant because it shows that anything that interacts with matter have to be by definition matter on pain of contradicting the conservation of momentum.

[apeiron]

Matter is by definition material, so I see no problem with that claim.

You are missing the point. I am challenging your definition of the material, not of matter.

There are many other problems with what you presume of course.

Even if we choose to frame the discussion in terms of conservation principles, it is clear that the material world has two aspects - the first and second law, closed and open systems.

The "material world", as you would put it, may be closed in terms of mass/energy/information. But consciousness - as a complex dissipative process - is open, gradient degrading.

If we just measure the quantitative aspects of brain activity, we can see that a conscious mind consumes more energy than a hard working muscle. So it is not an inertial process - conserving momentum - but an accelerative process - entropy generating.

You cannot then claim consciousness "just is" a "material closed system". Even in material terms, it "just is" an open system. Or more accurately, a dissipative structure - a form, an organisation, indeed.

So again you end up being forced to admit that irreduciably, materiality has two aspects. So the conclusion is correct. Mind and brain are "made of the same stuff" in some general sense. But that does not mean the formal aspects of a material realm can be reduced to its substantial aspects. Both are equally fundamental to existence.

This is not a panpsychic approach (all matter has a mind). But it is pansemiotic. Reality irreduciably involves meaning-making as well as information - or global form as well as local substance.

[vectorcube]

I never mentioned photons. Nor did I mention mass. (I also didn't mention protons, so I'm not sure why, in post 20, you put those words in my mouth, then proceeded to mock me for it.)

It seems to me there's some dancing around the issue here. You're taking my words, mangling them, reattributing them to me, then calling them sad or crazy or whatever other derisive-yet-completely-unsubstantive adjective comes to your mind.

The original premise was:

"Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)"

This premise is false.

That's it. That's my whole case. Mattara made this statement in post 4. It was flawed; it contains a false premise. I asked for clarification.

BTW, it is not necessary for you to pick up this ball. It is really directed to Mattara. If you have some constructive input in his place that'd great.



Discussion forum, remember? I am not mocking you. I made no mistake in understanding what you wrote, so you really sure stop playing this game of " you don` t understand me because i am too complicated for you". It is becoming very childlish( look, is another unsubstantive adjective:surprised).

[DaveC426913]

Yes, it is. I obviously do not mean Newtonian matter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass%E2%80%93energy_equivalence

Do you reject the conservation of momentum? If my immaterial foot kicks a ball and the ball keeps rolling, the change in (linear) momentum in the ball is mballvball and the change in linear momentum of my foot is mfootvfoot.
Again, you go off on a tangent instead of addressing my point.

If you don't mean "matter", don't use the word. Philosophy may be less rigorous than the sciences but you don't have license to make up definitions for existing words.

[DaveC426913]

I made no mistake in understanding what you wrote,

Then why did you come back with "protons"? I was talking about light. If you did not misunderstand then you are being deliberately obtuse.

so you really sure stop playing this game of " you don` t understand me because i am too complicated for you".

And AGAIN, you ascribe claims to me. You must stop doing that.

If you had a case here, you would be able to refer to factual content in this thread, rather than making things up.

It is becoming very childlish( look, is another unsubstantive adjective:surprised).
I've had it. I have absolutely no beef with you, so I have no idea why you keep trying to address this and turn it into some sort of fight. You can't speak for Mattara. Stop trying.

[vectorcube]

Then why did you come back with "protons"? I was talking about light. If you did not misunderstand then you are being deliberately obtuse.

ouch.. I mean photon. You know how similar the two words look? it s rediculous!

And AGAIN, you ascribe claims to me. You must stop doing that.

If you had a case here, you would be able to refer to factual content in this thread, rather than making things up.

Well, you did say "photon is massless " in a philosophy forum about materialism, right? Well, that `s pretty funny.

I've had it. I have absolutely no beef with you, so I have no idea why you keep trying to address this and turn it into some sort of fight. You can't speak for Mattara. Stop trying.

You are taking it too personal. You need to light up a bit.

[DaveC426913]

ouch.. I mean photon. You know how similar the two words look? it s rediculous!
You've wasted pages of posts because of this, despite my repeatedly pointing you at it. Rather lightening up, you should be a little more respectful of PFers who are trying to follow this. Ask the OP if any of this has enriched his answer.

[DaveC426913]

ouch.. I mean photon. You know how similar the two words look? it s rediculous!


You are taking it too personal. You need to light up a bit.Wow. A zillion needless posts - and you call it lightening up. Most PFers, including the OP, I'm betting, will call it an abuse of their time.

Well, let's not waste another post on it please.

[vectorcube]

You've wasted pages of posts because of this, despite my repeatedly pointing you at it. Rather lightening up, you should be a little more respectful of PFers who are trying to follow this. Ask the OP if any of this has enriched his answer.

Well,man. You need to calm down, because nobody is out to "get you" or fight you with unsubstantive adjective.

[vectorcube]

Wow. A zillion needless posts - and you call it lightening up. Most PFers, including the OP, I'm betting, will call it an abuse of their time.

Well, let's not waste another post on it please.


Don` t blame me because you did not understand my original post. You keep going on, and on about how it makes "no sense". It is funny, because you don` t know what i am telling you.

[DaveC426913]

Well,man. You need to calm down, because nobody is out to "get you" or fight you with unsubstantive adjective.VectorCube, you need to understand how dialogue on this forum is conducted. It is not necessarily like other fora you might be used to. You can't just say whatever you feel.

Now, please let's drop it so this thread can move on.

[pftest]

The mass-energy equivalence universality is no threat to materialism; in fact, it is one of the great successes of materialism. Again, just because all minds are material does not imply that all matter forms minds.Energy is purely conceptual and concepts require minds.

It is certainly relevant because it shows that anything that interacts with matter have to be by definition matter on pain of contradicting the conservation of momentum.The terms "matter" and "conscious" are not exclusive. Even if C = material, your argument does not show how C is reducible to nonconscious things. My argument shows that C is not reducible to nonconscious things, so if you say C is reducible to matter, then it follows that matter is conscious.

[Mattara]

Energy is purely conceptual and concepts require minds.

If you think energy is purely conceptional, try sticking your hand into a bucket of boiling water. If you think energy is purely conceptual, why has scientific models treating energy as real been so successful?

My argument shows that C is not reducible to nonconscious things, so if you say C is reducible to matter, then it follows that matter is conscious.

No, it follows that some matter in certain configurations are conscious, which is entirely consistent with my position.

[Mattara]

Again, you go off on a tangent instead of addressing my point.

If you don't mean "matter", don't use the word. Philosophy may be less rigorous than the sciences but you don't have license to make up definitions for existing words.

It is not a tangent. All matter has mass (Newtonian mass or relativistic). Please address the argument.

[DaveC426913]

It is not a tangent. All matter has mass (Newtonian mass or relativistic). Please address the argument.

I am directly addresing the argument. Again (as in posts 6, 13 and 26):

"4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)"

This premise is false. For example, light can interact with matter, yet it is not matter.

Please address directly instead of posing a red herring argument about my opinion on momentum.

[pftest]

If you think energy is purely conceptional, try sticking your hand into a bucket of boiling water. If you think energy is purely conceptual, why has scientific models treating energy as real been so successful?Dont take my word for it, look at the quote from Richard Feynman that i gave. Yes the equation is successful in physics, but that is something else from saying that energy (a mathematical concept) actually physically exists. You dont really think the number 9 can exist physically without mind either, do you?

No, it follows that some matter in certain configurations are conscious, which is entirely consistent with my position.The conscious part of it is not reducible, so it must be a fundamental property, not a configurational one. Configurational ones are all reducible, since they are directly descendent from its components.

[DaveC426913]

If light is not matter, how come it has momentum? How come matter has a wavelength? If light is not matter, how come it pair production can occur? If light is immaterial, pair production would be a violation of the conservation of energy. The notion that light is somehow magically immaterial falls on its own absurdity.
It is a big step to understanding that you're asking questions rather than just reiterating faulty claims.

We can discuss the differences and similarities, but first disabuse yourself of these misunderstandings.

Matter is not the only thing that has momentum. Energy does too.
Energy is not the only thing that has wavelength. Matter does too.
Pair production does not violate the law of conservation of energy because energy and matter can be cross-converted.
You have introduced another ambiguous term: immaterial. Without an agreed definition, this will simply compound the confusion.

There is nothing magical or absurd about it.

Your argument:
Light and matter share many of the same properties, including being cross-convertible and having momentum, therefore light is matter, by definition.

By the same logic:
Bill money and coin money share many of the same properties, including being cross-convertible and the ability to buy a coffee, therefore bill money is coin money, by definition.

See the flaw now?

[Mattara]

It is a scientific fact that there is an equivalence between matter and energy.

http://www.aip.org/history/einstein/voice1.htm
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equivME/

The fact that it is your faith that they are not equivalent does not somehow make them not equivalent.

This exact argument is made by physicist Victor Stenger PhD.

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Briefs/Real.htm

"So, I define something as real when it kicks back after you kick it. In simple terms, this describes the processes of everyday observations, but also the most sophisticated scientific experiments. When we look at an object with our naked eyes, light from some source bounces off the object into our eyes. Or, the object itself may emit light. In either case, the object and the light receptors in our eyes recoil from the momentum that is transferred in the process and generates an electrical signal that is analyzed by our brains.

Scientific observations are basically the same. Not only visible light, but the whole electromagnetic spectrum from radio waves to gamma rays are available to joggle reality, along with sensors far more precise than the human eye to detect the jiggles that are returned. What's more, other particles, such as electrons and neutrinos, are also available as probes and computers are utilized to supplement the analytic capability of our brains. In short, science is not some special method of learning about the world. It is an enhancement of the only method by which we humans, in fact, learn about the world--empirical observation. The stuff of reality that kicks back when you kick it is called matter. And, that's all there is."

There is nothing magical or absurd about it.

A belief in things being immaterial is not magic or absurd? Immaterial = that which is not material, not really difficult.

[DaveC426913]

It is a scientific fact that there is an equivalence between matter and energy.

The fact that it is your faith that they are not equivalent does not somehow make them not equivalent.
You didn't read anything I wrote did you?

Equivalency does not mean one is defined by the other.


A belief in things being immaterial is not magic or absurd? Immaterial = that which is not material, not really difficult.You cannot seriously suggest that a simple way to disambiguate a contested term is to simply state the opposite of its opposite - like "the definition of fnarg is simply the absence of unfnarg".

You must either admit you are being tongue-in-cheek or be stripped of credibility.

[Mattara]

Equivalency does not mean one is defined by the other.

Where have I claimed that I define one by the other? If X is equivalent to Y, X is Y (but not defined as Y).

You must either admit you are being tongue-in-cheek or be stripped of credibility.

If you don't accept that matter and energy are equivalent, you must reject the conservation of energy. In pair production, the energy before is equal to the energy after, but after, all you have is matter and kinetic energy. There must be some energy associated with this matter or you must reject the conservation of energy, which would be absurd.

[pftest]

Stenger thinks the total energy of the universe is 0, and that the universe came out of a negative energy, unphysical situation.

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Godless/Origin.pdf

[Mattara]

Stenger thinks the total energy of the universe is 0, and that the universe came out of a negative energy, unphysical situation.

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Godless/Origin.pdf

No he does not. Just reading the abstract shows that the claim you make is false.

"Abstract: A mathematical model of the natural origin of our universe is
presented. The model is based only on well-established physics. No claim is
made that this model uniquely represents exactly how the universe came
about. But the viability of a single model serves to refute any assertions that
the universe cannot have come about by natural means."

[pftest]

No he does not. Just reading the abstract shows that the claim you make is false.Read a bit further into it:

Note that zero energy is consistent with the universe coming from “nothing,” which presumably has zero energy, without violating energy conservation. In fact, current cosmological observations indicate that the average density of matter and energy in the universe is equal, within measurement errors, to the critical density for which the total energy of the universe was exactly zero at the beginning.

The simplified Hartle-Hawking model gives one possible scenario for the universe to come about naturally. In this picture, another universe existed prior to ours that tunneled through the unphysical region around t=0 to become our universe.

[Mattara]

Notice that the he is using the term nothing within quotation marks. Quantum mechanics is a material theory of the very small and does not claim that anything magical or immaterial is going on. He is not using the term "unphysical" as the term is used in laymen language.

[DaveC426913]

If X is equivalent to Y, X is Y

This statement is false. As in my coin/bill example: one loonie is equivalent to 1 dollar bill , but that does not mean a loonie is a bill.

X is YThis is a definition (though that does not mean it is a complete definition).

Bob is human. That is not an equivalance, like "Bob is equivalent to a human". That is defining that Bob is a subset of the human set.

Where have I claimed that I define one by the other?
Everytime you say "light is matter", you are defining light in terms of matter.


Light is not matter.
Light and matter are equivalent in terms of the energy contained, but they are NOT equivalent in all ways.
Light is not a subset of matter. Just like a loonie is a not subset of bills.

[pftest]

Notice that the he is using the term nothing within quotation marks. Quantum mechanics is a material theory of the very small and does not claim that anything magical or immaterial is going on. He is not using the term "unphysical" as the term is used in laymen language.The only clarification he gives about "unphysical" is that it is not amendable to observation. Whatever it may be, a negative energy situation is about as abstract a concept as one can get. There is no dichotomy between concepts and consciousness.

[DaveC426913]

If X is equivalent to Y, X is Y
This statement is false.

It occurs to me where your misapprehension may be coming from:

I suspect you are confusing the common logical statement of equivalency with physical equivalency. I suspect that you think the logical form of equivalency "If X is equivalent to Y, X is Y" is the same definition of equivalency as "120V1A is equivalent to 12V10A" or "a bet of $10 paying out a total of $11 is equivalent to a bet of $1000 paying out a total of $1001".

While this a philosophy forum and we are using formal logic, we are talking about physics. Do not confuse them when dicussing matter/energy equivalency.

[apeiron]

Light is not matter.
Light and matter are equivalent in terms of the energy contained, but they are NOT equivalent in all ways.
Light is not a subset of matter. Just like a loonie is a not subset of bills.

I would have to side with Mattara here. Energy and matter have been put on an equivalent footing in physics. Deeply equivalent. And future physics like supersymmetry would make it even deeper.

And in the philosophical sense he was talking about materiality, both energy and matter are substance-based concepts. So they are philosophically equivalent too, in the ways material to the argument.

My criticism still stands. Attempts to connect mind and brain have to be based on a dichotomous logic. Both form and substance are fundamental in this view. "Certain configurations" of matter/energy as Mattara concedes. But saying energy is different from matter does not hold in this discussion. Both are aspects of "materiality" - the idea that all that realy exist are varieties of substance (and form exists somewhere emergent, or dualistically in its own platonic realm).

[pftest]

To the OP argument (*see below) it is irrelevant whether C is material/physical. The argument works either way and is about C being irreducible to non-C things. So C cannot be "a configuration" of non-C ingredients, whether it be non-C matter, non-C energy, or non-C something else.

If we do accept that C is material (like mattara) and is reducible to matter, then the OP argument forces that matter to have a conscious aspect to it. If we want to avoid dualism and preserve monism, the most materialist friendly result of the argument is panpsychism.


*This is the OP argument:
________________________________________________

P1: The only things reductionism reduces, are our own misconceptions.
P2: Misconceptions require C.
C: To say that C is reducible, is to say that C is a misconception that requires C.
________________________________________________

[DaveC426913]

I would have to side with Mattara here. Energy and matter have been put on an equivalent footing in physics. Deeply equivalent. And future physics like supersymmetry would make it even deeper.
Look, I'm not refuting that there is a deep connection between the two. But that does not mean they are interchangeable in the argument.


And in the philosophical sense he was talking about materiality, both energy and matter are substance-based concepts. So they are philosophically equivalent too, in the ways material to the argument.Well, that's the beginning of the clarification I've been asking for. It's only taken 56 posts...

[magpies]

Ok um my thoughts on your thingy...

P1: The only things reductionism reduces, are our own misconceptions.
P2: Misconceptions require C.
C: To say that C is reducible, is to say that C is a misconception that requires C.

First thing I notice... C is a misconception that requires C. This is circular but I honestly have no problem with it but many could...

Then I see what your saying... Let me word it differently...
Misconceptions are reduced by reductionism.
Misconceptions require C.
Saying C is reducible is saying that C is a misconception.

Well... I don't see where it says misconceptions are C cept for in the last sentance.
So basicaly your conclusion is more of a statement... Also you didnt prove that C is reducible you just said that it was.


Ok so im gona give this a try and see how I do...

Consciousness requires an object to observe.
Objects to observe require a world.
Inorder to have a world of meaning consciousness must exist.
Therefor Consciousness gives objects to observe meaning.

[DaveC426913]

Inorder to have a world of meaning consciousness must exist.
Therefor Consciousness gives objects to observe meaning.

Well, meaning is a human creation so ... yeah.

[vectorcube]

Stenger thinks the total energy of the universe is 0, and that the universe came out of a negative energy, unphysical situation.

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Godless/Origin.pdf

If it is unphysical, then why do you care?

[pftest]

If it is unphysical, then why do you care?What do you mean?

[pftest]

Well... I don't see where it says misconceptions are C cept for in the last sentance.Premise 2 is: misconceptions require C. I dont think you or anyone would disagree with this. Or with premise 1 either.

So basicaly your conclusion is more of a statement... Also you didnt prove that C is reducible you just said that it was.It shows that no matter how far one reduces C, it wont go away. So C is not reducible to non-C things, such as for example a configuration of atoms.

Btw im not convinced my argument is solid, there is just something that doesnt feel right about it.

[vectorcube]

What do you mean?

i am curious why something "unphysical" would be of interest to anyone. Just curious, you know.

[arithmetix]

study tao
when you understand

[arithmetix]

the usual flow of conversation here is in physics, but these are questions for mystics

[pftest]

i am curious why something "unphysical" would be of interest to anyone. Just curious, you know.Because the person i responded to brought up Stenger and immateriality/magic.

[vectorcube]

Because the person i responded to brought up Stenger and immateriality/magic.

Ok. Well, i read stenger, and the last chapter of his book, and i can` t help but feel he was an idiot for making up metaphysical claims in the bases of speculative physical theory.

[magpies]

Can you give me an example of what reducing C would look like?

[pftest]

Can you give me an example of what reducing C would look like?The not possible version is something like "consciousness is just a complex configuration of physical ingredients".

[magpies]

Oh ok I guess I agree with you basicaly but I would take it a step beyond what you have. So I still don't think you can even reduce it at all.

I mean you could try to reduce it to something but that would just be a lie. If your ok with lies I guess thats kool.

[pftest]

Oh ok I guess I agree with you basicaly but I would take it a step beyond what you have. So I still don't think you can even reduce it at all.Why not?

[magpies]

Forgive me if this is committing a taboo but because consciousness is consciousness and any "reduction" of it is a lie for better or worse.

[pftest]

Ok. Well, i read stenger, and the last chapter of his book, and i can` t help but feel he was an idiot for making up metaphysical claims in the bases of speculative physical theory.Yes and even if his physical theory is correct, it doesnt support the metaphysical claim very well. The idea that the universe can come from a very simple mathematical principle, also allows the metaphysical possibility that a simple mind capable of simple mathematics can bring the universe into existence. The simpler the math gets the simpler any mind needs to be to think it.

[qraal]

Forgive me if this is committing a taboo but because consciousness is consciousness and any "reduction" of it is a lie for better or worse.

A rock is also composed of molecules, themselves composed atoms, which in turn are composed of electrons and nucleons, the latter being composed of quarks and gluons... yet a rock is still a rock. Likewise "consciousness" could be composed of lower level entities and still be distinct from them. It's not obvious that consciousness is irreducible and thus this present discussion.

Don't assert the conclusion - that consciousness is irreducible - without something to back up the claim. Else you're just stating your belief and not a fact obvious to us all. Because, at least to me, it's not obviously so.

[pftest]

Forgive me if this is committing a taboo but because consciousness is consciousness and any "reduction" of it is a lie for better or worse.One can have misconceptions (delusions) about oneself. Those can be "reduced" and gotten rid of.

[pftest]

A rock is also composed of molecules, themselves composed atoms, which in turn are composed of electrons and nucleons, the latter being composed of quarks and gluons... yet a rock is still a rock.What do you mean "its still a rock"? If its composed of atoms, quarks, etc. then isnt a rock just a configuration of atoms, quarks, etc.?

[vectorcube]

Yes and even if his physical theory is correct, it doesnt support the metaphysical claim very well. The idea that the universe can come from a very simple mathematical principle, also allows the metaphysical possibility that a simple mind capable of simple mathematics can bring the universe into existence. The simpler the math gets the simpler any mind needs to be to think it.



Well, he is a ****ing idiot. Even if there is some some equation that bring about the universe. It merely shifted the question to why those equations, and not others. It does not answer anything about ultimate origin.

[magpies]

Ok well if conciousness is reducible what would be an example of it being reduced?

The example of a rock is interesting. It may have quarks and atoms inside it but none the less the rock is the rock. The quarks and atoms are a subset part of the rock without the rock the quarks and atoms would be just that and not a rock.

[pftest]

Example: you are hypnotised into thinking you are a chicken. Or you dream you are one. You now have a misconception about yourself, and that can be gotten rid of (reduced). This is not the reduction as in "consisting of smaller components", but the reduction as in "having a misconception, improving your understanding and thereby getting rid of it".

There is no telling how deluded a state of mind we are in. We could be cows inside a milkfarm connected to a virtual reality computer to think we have a human life:biggrin:

As long as there is the ability to be deluded at all, one can in principle have any kind of delusion. But if there is no ability to be deluded (for example, non-conscious atoms do not have the ability to have delusions), then there will never be any delusion.

[qraal]

What do you mean "its still a rock"? If its composed of atoms, quarks, etc. then isnt a rock just a configuration of atoms, quarks, etc.?

A rock is a certain configuration of atoms, quarks etc. Just as any element is a certain, distinct configuration of electrons, protons and (optionally) neutrons. But lead isn't gold, nor are oxygen and fluorine interchangeable for purposes of breathing.

[magpies]

Is there a more true form to the rock? Is electrons protons neutrons better then say quarks or molecules or any other configuration of parts? I would go out on a limb and say the rock is the truest form of the rock would you agree? Of course this is just silly im being silly arnt I :)

[qraal]

Is there a more true form to the rock? Is electrons protons neutrons better then say quarks or molecules or any other configuration of parts? I would go out on a limb and say the rock is the truest form of the rock would you agree? Of course this is just silly im being silly arnt I :)

Rocks are, by definition, aggregates of crystals and other compounds, often many different kinds of crystals, thus defining what the 'true form' might be is probably pointless. But say we dissolve a rock in a solution. Where did the rock go? All its parts are still there and if we evaporate the solute we might get a 'rock' again, but not the 'same' rock. Similarly death might dissolve whatever it is that makes 'consciousness' and eventual consumption of the body's components might bring about another 'consciousness', but asking where it went in between the two might be as meaningless as where the rock went.

Might be. I'm posing this as one metaphysical possibility that no one has yet eliminated from consideration.

[pftest]

Is there a more true form to the rock? Is electrons protons neutrons better then say quarks or molecules or any other configuration of parts? I would go out on a limb and say the rock is the truest form of the rock would you agree? Of course this is just silly im being silly arnt I :)The rock can be described fully in terms of its components and their configuration. So those components give the full description, whereas the statement "its a rock" gives an incomplete description. The componental description also makes the "its a rock"-description redundant, whereas the "its a rock"-description does not make the componental description redundant (by reading the statement "its a rock" you would never know it consists of atoms and such).

So the more accurate form is the componental one.

[qraal]

The rock can be described fully in terms of its components and their configuration. So those components give the full description, whereas the statement "its a rock" gives an incomplete description. The componental description also makes the "its a rock"-description redundant, whereas the "its a rock"-description does not make the componental description redundant (by reading the statement "its a rock" you would never know it consists of atoms and such).

So the more accurate form is the componental one.

For a specific rock, yes, but rocks in general? Maybe not. Higher level descriptors are often more succinct than ultra-detailed decompositions, but of course one can do more with more details. Geology, for example, would be impossible if we left out too much detail, and would be too cumbersome if we left in too much detail. One can always be more accurate, but become less meaningful in the process. Coarse-grain descriptions make science communicable.

[pftest]

True, from a social perspective the higher level descriptions are useful and needed. Physically, ignoring all social requirements, the lower level descriptions are most accurate. "rocks in general" do not physically exist, since any rock is always a specific physical object. The "in general" part is an abstraction that takes place in human minds.

[qraal]

True, from a social perspective the higher level descriptions are useful and needed. Physically, ignoring all social requirements, the lower level descriptions are most accurate. "rocks in general" do not physically exist, since any rock is always a specific physical object. The "in general" part is an abstraction that takes place in human minds.

Thus the snake swallows its tail...

[apeiron]

For a specific rock, yes, but rocks in general? Maybe not. Higher level descriptors are often more succinct than ultra-detailed decompositions, but of course one can do more with more details. Geology, for example, would be impossible if we left out too much detail, and would be too cumbersome if we left in too much detail. One can always be more accurate, but become less meaningful in the process. Coarse-grain descriptions make science communicable.

This is the correct line of thinking. Substance opposed to form. But we just need to generalise "rock" further to really get there in this argument. And this can be done using the template of a spatiotemporal (or scalar) hierarchy.

So substance and form are at opposing limits of a hierarchy. One is the most local or smallest scale, the other the global or largest. Causality at the bottom scale is constructive, at the top scale it becomes constraints based.

Now with rocks, we can agree that a rock is a compound (constructed) of a mix of atoms. At this level of discussion, compounds and how they achieve their form, we need to find what is actually the organisational principles appropriate to this level.

A rock isn't. But a geological strata is. We can then see that this global scale view gives us sight of "rockness" formed over geological timescales, as the result of temperatures, pressures, large-scale mixing processes. It explains why a rock is mixed as it is, with perhaps quartz crystals and other inclusions. And also why the rock is cool, not hot lava temperature.

So it is always easy to win the "its just a configuration of substance" argument if the wrong scale of analysis is applied. We can take some real world object that interests us, like a rock, and reduce its substances towards their most local. But then we leave the formal aspects of the rock at the scale we found it, rather than "reducing it" - though it should seem more like expanding it, as we are increasing scale to head towards the global view.

Once you also expand the configurational or organisational principles of the object, you can then see how the global aspects are also fundamental. Rocks would not exist without rock-forming processes and contexts.

Of course, it can be tricky identifying where to stop in the stepping back to global scale. But atoms and geology seem fairly accurately complementary in this particular example.

Now the trick with consciousness and theories of mind is to do the same thing. To reduce the thing in itself, people who have what we label "consciousness" and "unconsciousness" as aspects of their being, towards both the local and global levels of explanation.

When discussing minds, the question becomes what are the atoms, what the geology, of this area of science?

[apeiron]

True, from a social perspective the higher level descriptions are useful and needed. Physically, ignoring all social requirements, the lower level descriptions are most accurate. "rocks in general" do not physically exist, since any rock is always a specific physical object. The "in general" part is an abstraction that takes place in human minds.

Incorrect as all knowledge is modelling. And all modelling is reduction - the shedding of particulars to extract generals.

So we generalise the notion of local substance to produce models of things like atoms and quarks. And we also generalise the notion of form to - eventually - produce fundamental laws such as the first and second law of thermodynamics, the laws of motion, etc.

What do you think an atom is? A little hard ball. A wave function (as physically demonstrated in twin slit experiments)? A compound of more fundamental particles (which have even less concrete existence)?

A rock is always an intermediate scale object - not yet reduced towards its complementary aspects of substance and form. But you are completely missing the point if you believe science does not generalise such real life entities towards local initial condition descriptions and globally constraining laws.

[qraal]

(snipped)

Now the trick with consciousness and theories of mind is to do the same thing. To reduce the thing in itself, people who have what we label "consciousness" and "unconsciousness" as aspects of their being, towards both the local and global levels of explanation.

When discussing minds, the question becomes what are the atoms, what the geology, of this area of science?

Nicely put apeiron. What are the "rocks" of consciousness? And what are the "strata"? Metaphysical monists who want it to all be 'mass/energy' or all 'mind/ideas' seem bent on ignoring such subtleties though.

[apeiron]

With consciousness, the rock might be some particular instance of attentive awareness. That is the intermediate level of explanandum. So over about half a second, the brain forms an organised state of meaningful comprehension in response to some event in the world, like a rock falling on the foot.

This state of attentive understanding then has both its material and formal aspects - is local or substantial causes, and its global or form type causes.

So substances are involved. All kinds of neural, synaptic, membrane pore and molecular level changes were part of the rock-scale attentional shift.

But also global forms. So we can talk about memory, anticipation, focus, suppression as strata-level organisational processes or forms. The kind of general things also needed to account for "a moment of awareness".

Both the atoms - neurons and synapses - are "non-conscious" scale of explanation or modelling. And so are the global forms like anticipation, memory, or whatever else we find useful to employ in the modelling. Anticipation, as a properly generalised idea, no longer equates to what we mean by consciousness, though captures of course some essential aspect of being conscious.

A satisfactory theory of mind would then be about having both the right atoms and the right configurations. We need substances and forms which are actually - in some strict sense we can specify - complementary as levels of explanation.

So with a "theory of rocks", we would have to be able to show that there is a deep duality between the local and global views. Is the atomic level of description actually related in a formal sense to the geological strata level? In fact, it seems only a crude and clumsy duality is represented here. But good enough to see that this is what we already do with more mundane entities.

In the same way, getting it right for explaining minds will need not just a local view and a global view, but a strict framework under which we can measure how well these two view are mutual or complementary.

So is a neural component view formally dual to a psychological process view? Is one the right atoms that makes the other the right forms?

Having accepted the basic idea - that reductionism needs to be dualistic to give a full account of reality and its contents - we have to be able to make the transition from a handwaving kind of connection between existing levels of scientific discourse (the neural component models, the psychological process models) to one that is completely formal. Mathematical. Logically universal in that it applies to the description of rocks, minds and every other kind of actual thing.

[qraal]

With consciousness, the rock might be some particular instance of attentive awareness. That is the intermediate level of explanandum. So over about half a second, the brain forms an organised state of meaningful comprehension in response to some event in the world, like a rock falling on the foot.

This state of attentive understanding then has both its material and formal aspects - is local or substantial causes, and its global or form type causes.

So substances are involved. All kinds of neural, synaptic, membrane pore and molecular level changes were part of the rock-scale attentional shift.

But also global forms. So we can talk about memory, anticipation, focus, suppression as strata-level organisational processes or forms. The kind of general things also needed to account for "a moment of awareness".

Both the atoms - neurons and synapses - are "non-conscious" scale of explanation or modelling. And so are the global forms like anticipation, memory, or whatever else we find useful to employ in the modelling. Anticipation, as a properly generalised idea, no longer equates to what we mean by consciousness, though captures of course some essential aspect of being conscious.

A satisfactory theory of mind would then be about having both the right atoms and the right configurations. We need substances and forms which are actually - in some strict sense we can specify - complementary as levels of explanation.

So with a "theory of rocks", we would have to be able to show that there is a deep duality between the local and global views. Is the atomic level of description actually related in a formal sense to the geological strata level? In fact, it seems only a crude and clumsy duality is represented here. But good enough to see that this is what we already do with more mundane entities.

In the same way, getting it right for explaining minds will need not just a local view and a global view, but a strict framework under which we can measure how well these two view are mutual or complementary.

So is a neural component view formally dual to a psychological process view? Is one the right atoms that makes the other the right forms?

Having accepted the basic idea - that reductionism needs to be dualistic to give a full account of reality and its contents - we have to be able to make the transition from a handwaving kind of connection between existing levels of scientific discourse (the neural component models, the psychological process models) to one that is completely formal. Mathematical. Logically universal in that it applies to the description of rocks, minds and every other kind of actual thing.

Hmmm... Would be quite an impressive mathematical "theory of forms+substances". Any suggestions on where to begin with such a thing?

Of course one curious aspect of all this that needs to be address by an "explanation of mind" is the very act of explanation or understanding, since it is an activity of mind. How do we avoid a potential pathology because of the "self-feedback"? Can any explanation which doesn't explain 'itself' really count as a complete theory of mind? Greg Egan's novel "Distress" posits an open-ended reality in which the "Theory of Everything" is kind of indeterminate until understood by a Mind or - as the protagonist discovers - ALL minds after the Theory becomes definite. Every conscious being after that point in time has an immediate intuitive grasp of the Theory as a 'precondition' of their being, thus closing the causal loop.

Does a theory of Mind need to explain 'explanation' then?

[apeiron]

Hmmm... Would be quite an impressive mathematical "theory of forms+substances". Any suggestions on where to begin with such a thing?


It is of course my project. And the approach I take arises out of hierarchy theory (Stanley Salthe's scalar hierarchy in particular). So there is some rudimentary math models already around. I also see Grossberg's anticipatory neural nets and dissipative structure theory as other angles on the same dilemma.

This is a "live" direction for biology and neuroscience.

Happy to respond to PMs for more detail.



Of course one curious aspect of all this that needs to be address by an "explanation of mind" is the very act of explanation or understanding, since it is an activity of mind. How do we avoid a potential pathology because of the "self-feedback"? Can any explanation which doesn't explain 'itself' really count as a complete theory of mind? Greg Egan's novel "Distress" posits an open-ended reality in which the "Theory of Everything" is kind of indeterminate until understood by a Mind or - as the protagonist discovers - ALL minds after the Theory becomes definite. Every conscious being after that point in time has an immediate intuitive grasp of the Theory as a 'precondition' of their being, thus closing the causal loop.

Does a theory of Mind need to explain 'explanation' then?

Yes it is essential that us observers be included in the final theory of everything!

So us knowing the world is somehow also the world knowing itself into coherent existence. Same "physical" (and mental) principles at work.

This is the thread of thought running through Peirce's semiotics, Maturana's autopoiesis, etc.

It is central to my own approach too.

So a mindless physics is one way to model reality. But ultimately it fails because minds got left out. So start again with fundamentals that include mind as well matter, form as well as substance, constraints as well as construction, etc.

[qraal]

It is of course my project. And the approach I take arises out of hierarchy theory (Stanley Salthe's scalar hierarchy in particular). So there is some rudimentary math models already around. I also see Grossberg's anticipatory neural nets and dissipative structure theory as other angles on the same dilemma.

This is a "live" direction for biology and neuroscience.

Yes it is essential that us observers be included in the final theory of everything!

So us knowing the world is somehow also the world knowing itself into coherent existence. Same "physical" (and mental) principles at work.

This is the thread of thought running through Peirce's semiotics, Maturana's autopoiesis, etc.

It is central to my own approach too.

So a mindless physics is one way to model reality. But ultimately it fails because minds got left out. So start again with fundamentals that include mind as well matter, form as well as substance, constraints as well as construction, etc.

Makes sense.

BTW did you pick "apeiron" as a user name because your view is monistic with an apeiron modified to give the contents of the world? What, in your opinion, is the 'boundless', the Absolute?

[apeiron]

Makes sense.

BTW did you pick "apeiron" as a user name because your view is monistic with an apeiron modified to give the contents of the world? What, in your opinion, is the 'boundless', the Absolute?

It is Anaximander's apeiron of course. I was very surprised to study these issues for about 20 years and to eventually find the very first philosopher of record got it spot on at the beginning.

Of course, it is quite difficult to be certain about what Anaximander really thought, however scholars like Kahn have done some careful work.

I myself equate the apeiron to Peirce's later (equally fragmentary and sketchy) notion of vagueness. And in turn to infinite symmetry.

So apeiron = vagueness = symmetry.

And it is a (vague) kind of monism. But which then separates dichotomously into polar opposites. So becomes dual in some crisply developed sense. And then the two become the three as the complementary things mix. You end up with the triadic state that is a hierarchy, where two levels of being have the thirdness which is their interaction.

So vagueness => dichotomies => hiearchies as things develop.

With Anaximander, the apeiron => the hot and the cold => the mixing of the hot and the cold. Though he had to add other secondary dichotomisations, such as the damp and the dry, the heavy and the light, to create enough complexity to account for our universe.

The modern view of the apeiron as the unbounded and the unlimited would seem to have more in common with quantum foams, hilbert spaces and non-commutative geometry. Places where there is action in all directions and so no directions clearly exist.

Do you have your own view about this?

[octelcogopod]

When I read this thread I can't help but think that there is a lot of information we are missing, and that it's completely off the mark.
First off, why are we talking about whether the mind can interact with the brain, or if energy is equivalent to matter, when we have no idea what neither of these actually are?
The definition of the mind, the subjective, and how it arises in the objective physical is still a big mystery, so you are just throwing darts in darkness imo.

This mystery can not be solved with Mattara's logic, nor can it be solved currently with ANY philosophy.
Do we really know enough about matter and energy to even start this discussion? I think not.
I suspect the solution to what consciousness is lies deep within physics, where not only the brain itself matters, but the environment it senses as well.
Of course, that's not actually a discussion, because it is not based on physical evidence, but it is my opinion.

[magpies]

Well I dont know about you but I do know what energy and matter are. Its not hard to tell what energy is once someone explains the basics of what it is... same with matter or mass.

[BigFairy]

wow, well that is something then :)

[qraal]

It is Anaximander's apeiron of course. I was very surprised to study these issues for about 20 years and to eventually find the very first philosopher of record got it spot on at the beginning.

Of course, it is quite difficult to be certain about what Anaximander really thought, however scholars like Kahn have done some careful work.

I myself equate the apeiron to Peirce's later (equally fragmentary and sketchy) notion of vagueness. And in turn to infinite symmetry.

So apeiron = vagueness = symmetry.

And it is a (vague) kind of monism. But which then separates dichotomously into polar opposites. So becomes dual in some crisply developed sense. And then the two become the three as the complementary things mix. You end up with the triadic state that is a hierarchy, where two levels of being have the thirdness which is their interaction.

The modern view of the apeiron as the unbounded and the unlimited would seem to have more in common with quantum foams, hilbert spaces and non-commutative geometry. Places where there is action in all directions and so no directions clearly exist.

Do you have your own view about this?

The idea of the undifferentiated primordial stuff becomes definite via differentiation appears in so many ancient accounts of reality, so it's hardly new to Anaximander. He tried to give the first non-mythological account based on the properties of the primordial stuff itself. I can see the appeal, but I am unsure it's even conceivable to test.

My own view. Take Shankaran advaita, mix with Whiteheadian pan-experientialism and filter it through Neo-Platonism. Roughly that. When I'm not focussing on the physical world and being a physicalist for the sake of the argument. Each perspective provides valid observations on the short-comings of the others.

[apeiron]

The idea of the undifferentiated primordial stuff becomes definite via differentiation appears in so many ancient accounts of reality, so it's hardly new to Anaximander. He tried to give the first non-mythological account based on the properties of the primordial stuff itself. I can see the appeal, but I am unsure it's even conceivable to test.
.

Agreed that Anaximander had Hesiod's Theogeny as a template for order out of chaos. And that Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-arising was very similar, and eastern ideas generally similar.

It is quite possible that the same ideas were obvious independently, or that ideas flowed from west to east or vice versa.

[apeiron]

Checking out Shankaran advaita reminds me of a key difference I would have to Anaximander and also Buddhist doctrines like pratîtya-samutpâda.

The usual idea is that the monadic indefinite gives rise to definite things, which can then dissolve back into that deep oneness. Things rise and then subside or decay again. The eternal cycle.

But my view is that once the one divides, it cannot go back. This is a second law approach. Once a symmetry is broken, it is divided in ways that it cannot repair. History could be reversed in a theoretical sense, but there would not actually be the "free energy" to do so.

My notes also remind me of the Kyoto School. A blending of east and west.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

Then Rivero, a string theorist on these forums, has speculated on the original possible east-west link.

http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0309104

[qraal]

Hi apeiron

I too am sceptical of claims of universal dissolution and self-renewal - like Steinhardt and Turok's various "Clashing Branes" attempts at "Phoenix universes" that endlessly expand and then blaze into life again. They seem to make time meaningless, which doesn't seem to accord with reality.

Shankara's advaita has meant different things to different interpreters. I take the oneness/non-duality to only be achieved at the very "highest" level of reality, with the merger of subject-object - a cosmic level unity -, but all lower levels experience differentiation. Multiplicity and flux aren't things to escape from in a "return to Godhead" kind of way. Moksha is more an attitude than an objective transformation of the subject, though it can be that too. I am too world-affirmative to take the path of renunciation that many of Shankara's admirers embraced.

Checking out Shankaran advaita reminds me of a key difference I would have to Anaximander and also Buddhist doctrines like pratîtya-samutpâda.

The usual idea is that the monadic indefinite gives rise to definite things, which can then dissolve back into that deep oneness. Things rise and then subside or decay again. The eternal cycle.

But my view is that once the one divides, it cannot go back. This is a second law approach. Once a symmetry is broken, it is divided in ways that it cannot repair. History could be reversed in a theoretical sense, but there would not actually be the "free energy" to do so.

My notes also remind me of the Kyoto School. A blending of east and west.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

Then Rivero, a string theorist on these forums, has speculated on the original possible east-west link.

http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0309104

Japanese theology I've only just recently opened a book on, but what little I have seen intrigues me. No doubt the philosophy will be similarly delightful in surprises of insight.

[apeiron]

Shankara's advaita has meant different things to different interpreters. I take the oneness/non-duality to only be achieved at the very "highest" level of reality, with the merger of subject-object - a cosmic level unity -, but all lower levels experience differentiation. Multiplicity and flux aren't things to escape from in a "return to Godhead" kind of way. Moksha is more an attitude than an objective transformation of the subject, though it can be that too. I am too world-affirmative to take the path of renunciation that many of Shankara's admirers embraced.


So many ways of dancing around this subject. I have to agree that this also expresses the same general thoughts probably.

The way I would phrase it is that what is possible is both stasis and flux, being and becoming, the passive and the active way. Always the dichotomies that together make for a complete mapping of what is possible.

So we want a world view that is both constantly changing yet also somehow eternally the same.

And one way of doing this is through the notion of equlibrium. The state where all is changing but change no longer looks like change.

So I would treat the apeiron, the vague monadic beginning, as an equilibrium (but a symmetry state that proved unstable - the old pencil balanced on its point analogy)

And then the final state of reality, its crisply broken development, would also be a return to equilibrium. But now a stable and final outcome because it has broken. The pencil has fallen.

So outcomes are also equilibriums. Monadic in that sense. But dualistic and triadic in their internal organisation. So overall there has been a change, an actual development.

If we were applying this to religious ideas (which I'm not, but Hegel and others might) then a return to a vaguer state of oneness might seem wrong. It is instead the developed state of oneness which is the natural way to go.

Of course, in cosmological terms, this final outcome for our universe is in fact likely to be its heat death. A cold dark void that is just empty space populated by a last fizzle of event-horizon radiation - photons with a wavelength of the visible universe as Lineweaver suggests.

Not exactly godhead in most people's view. But I actually like this vision.

What was the meaning of existence? To create precisely nothing. To dissipate all flux and multiplicity into as little as logically possible. Of course, there will still be a void. Three dimensions of space and one of time. Plus any wee string dimensions or other features which prove irreducible, like protons. So absolute nothing will not be achieve.

But as we know, the interesting question is why a something rather than a nothing. And the answer in this view is that, well, the universe was doing its best to get there!

[qraal]

So many ways of dancing around this subject. I have to agree that this also expresses the same general thoughts probably.

The way I would phrase it is that what is possible is both stasis and flux, being and becoming, the passive and the active way. Always the dichotomies that together make for a complete mapping of what is possible.

snip

Of course, in cosmological terms, this final outcome for our universe is in fact likely to be its heat death. A cold dark void that is just empty space populated by a last fizzle of event-horizon radiation - photons with a wavelength of the visible universe as Lineweaver suggests.

Not exactly godhead in most people's view. But I actually like this vision.

What was the meaning of existence? To create precisely nothing. To dissipate all flux and multiplicity into as little as logically possible. Of course, there will still be a void. Three dimensions of space and one of time. Plus any wee string dimensions or other features which prove irreducible, like protons. So absolute nothing will not be achieve.

But as we know, the interesting question is why a something rather than a nothing. And the answer in this view is that, well, the universe was doing its best to get there!

I am less accepting of such a fate for the Universe.

There's a lot in what you have said, but let's try to get back to consciousness/nonconsciousness. For me consideration of the Differentiation of the One, the apeiron, means that consciousness and the contents of thought, sprang from the same source as the physical Universe. John Wheeler's concept of "It from Bit" and the recent work on quantum information by Anton Zeilinger et al provides some validation that I am on the right track with this thought, but its origins lie in my readings of Kabbalah, the Greeks and the philosophical Church Fathers like Clement of Alexandria.

Considering these and the Subject-Object complex that has attracted so much thought and discussion in Hindu and Buddhist thought - thus Shankaran advaita, which I learnt of chiefly from Sharma's "A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy" - plus the question of the nature of Truth, especially mathematical truths, I have come to believe the Universe is evolving towards a state of Cosmic Mind. Akin to Tipler's "Omega Point" though I am unconvinced of his stance on physics. All truths will be known by the ultimate Observer, whatever He/She/It/They might be when that end-point is reached.

However that by no means that all truths are as yet set, like in a Parmenidean Eternity/Block universe. There's an open-endness to the Participatory Universe of Wheeler that I wholeheartedly agree with. But it may go deeper than he imagined - though I kind of doubt much escaped his physical intuitions - and that may allow surprises in the cosmic process, miracles if you will. Radical emergentism.

So the question of "consciousness from non-consciousness" may well miss the point, that consciousness may well underlay reality, but reality may in turn feedback into consciousness. Dual-structure producing triadic reality as you put it.

[apeiron]

Considering these and the Subject-Object complex that has attracted so much thought and discussion in Hindu and Buddhist thought - thus Shankaran advaita, which I learnt of chiefly from Sharma's "A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy" - plus the question of the nature of Truth, especially mathematical truths, I have come to believe the Universe is evolving towards a state of Cosmic Mind. Akin to Tipler's "Omega Point" though I am unconvinced of his stance on physics. All truths will be known by the ultimate Observer, whatever He/She/It/They might be when that end-point is reached.

However that by no means that all truths are as yet set, like in a Parmenidean Eternity/Block universe. There's an open-endness to the Participatory Universe of Wheeler that I wholeheartedly agree with. But it may go deeper than he imagined - though I kind of doubt much escaped his physical intuitions - and that may allow surprises in the cosmic process, miracles if you will. Radical emergentism.

So the question of "consciousness from non-consciousness" may well miss the point, that consciousness may well underlay reality, but reality may in turn feedback into consciousness. Dual-structure producing triadic reality as you put it.

I would have to disagree with the Omega Point approach. Although with Kurzweil's singularity and the recent rise of Evo-Devo, it is an idea very much in vogue.

My take is based on second law and entropy degrading, or dissipative system theory. Complexity in the form of life and mind arise as systems that merely accelerate entropification. And this kind of complexity must reach a peak at the middle scale of things. It does not exist at the end - where there is only an empty heat death.

So the second law gradient runs from simplicity to complication - the simplicity of big bang initial conditions and the messy disorder or complication of a heat death. Complexity in the form of stars, galaxies, planets and other stuff is localised order that arises along the way because globally it serves to acclerate the decline.


complexity
^
l
l
simplicity>------------>complication

(diagram won't format, but complexity is supposed to arise in the middle)

From this point of view, finding complexity at the end of things would be a "miracle" as once gradients are spent, complex stuff like mindfulness, however we defined it, would have no energy to drive it.

Any theory that wants to claim otherwise would have to either find some plausible source of energy (harnessing the cosmological constant?) or show that consciousness has nothing to do with energy-based realities. Which would then also be actual dualism rather than merely the differentiation~integration dichotomy that I have in mind as the basis of all things.

[imiyakawa]

If matter is considered void of consciousness, then C is not reducible to that.


Wow nice.
Then if C were reducible to microphysics/matter, wouldn't this suggest an emergent property and thus an escape from causality which we have no reason to believe has ever happened in this universe based on observations?

[qraal]

I would have to disagree with the Omega Point approach. Although with Kurzweil's singularity and the recent rise of Evo-Devo, it is an idea very much in vogue.

I admit it's speculative, but it's logical too.

My take is based on second law and entropy degrading, or dissipative system theory. Complexity in the form of life and mind arise as systems that merely accelerate entropification. And this kind of complexity must reach a peak at the middle scale of things. It does not exist at the end - where there is only an empty heat death.

In a Universe without a cosmological constant, entropy can go to infinity as can information. Depending on how you measure "information" that is.

[apeiron]

In a Universe without a cosmological constant, entropy can go to infinity as can information. Depending on how you measure "information" that is.

That is the point surely here? Max ent would be max disorder. So "information" would be as disordered as possible and thus as meaningless as possible.

Omega points and singularities depend on orderly information. So the second law just does not point in their direction. In the heat death, all order is maximally degraded by definition.

[qraal]

That is the point surely here? Max ent would be max disorder. So "information" would be as disordered as possible and thus as meaningless as possible.

Omega points and singularities depend on orderly information. So the second law just does not point in their direction. In the heat death, all order is maximally degraded by definition.

Not so. Entropy can go to infinity so long as there's a temperature gradient so useful heat-flow can still occur. In a Universe with a constant cosmological constant there is a finite ultimate temperature, and thus a heat death, but there's no guarantee that the cosmological constant will remain "constant".

[bjb34]

Isn't conciousness simple having the intellegence to be aware of ones own existance? Or is it more that conciousness is simply having an existance with or without a brain that is capable of conceptual thought.

[bjb34]

Or am I thinking in a box?

[apeiron]

Not so. Entropy can go to infinity so long as there's a temperature gradient so useful heat-flow can still occur. In a Universe with a constant cosmological constant there is a finite ultimate temperature, and thus a heat death, but there's no guarantee that the cosmological constant will remain "constant".

Not following. In the case of a cruising to a halt heat death scenario (no lambda) it is true that approach to maximum entropy would be asymptotic and so infinite in a sense. But it would get eventually so cold and spread-out that there would be no usable gradients to support even local islands of order, let alone the kind of global order of an omega point mind state. The finite temperature is absolute zero - nothing left but a quantum sizzle.

And a cosmological constant would simply accelerate that outcome.

What kind of gradients do you envisage at heat death that could be employed?