The Block Universe – Refuting a Common Argument
The “block universe” interpretation of SR has come up repeatedly in threads here on PF. Rather than link to them, I want to summarize a common argument that is made for the “block universe” being necessary, and then summarize the arguments I made in those threads to show why the common argument is not valid.
The common argument for the “block universe” comes in several forms, all logically equivalent; the one I’ll use here is the “Andromeda paradox”:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument
That Wikipedia entry quotes from Roger Penrose in The Emperor’s New Mind, which is where I first encountered the argument many years ago. Here’s what Penrose says:
[P]eople pass each other on the street [on Earth]; and according to one of the two people, an Andromedean space fleet has already set off on its journey, while to the other, the decision as to whether or not the journey will actually take place has not yet been made. How can there still be some uncertainty as to the outcome of that decision? If to either person the decision has already been made, then surely there cannot be any uncertainty. The launching of the space fleet is an inevitability. In fact neither of the people can yet know of the launching of the space fleet. They can know only later, when telescopic observations from earth reveal that the fleet is indeed on its way. Then they can hark back to that chance encounter, and come to the conclusion that at that time, according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past. Was there then any uncertainty about that future? Or was the future of both people already ‘fixed’?
We might summarize this argument in a single sentence as: relativity of simultaneity implies the block universe (i.e., it implies that all of 4-D spacetime must be fixed).
However, as just stated, the argument is not complete; we need an additional premise. Penrose gets at it indirectly when he says “according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past”. In other words, Penrose is implicitly claiming that every observer, at a given event, divides the universe into the “uncertain future” and the “certain past”, based on his “surface of simultaneity” through that event. “Surface of simultaneity” is a long-phrase to type, but several posters in the PF threads I referred to above have used a shorter term, “3D world”, which I’ll use henceforth. The added premise then becomes: events to the past of an observer’s “3D world” at a given event are fixed and certain.
With the added premise, we can now see the argument more clearly. At any given event, there can be observers moving on any timelike worldline through that event. The 3D worlds of all these observers are “tilted” with respect to each other because of the relativity of simultaneity. But if events to the past of any observer’s 3D world are fixed and certain, then the entire region of spacetime which is spacelike separated from the given event must be fixed and certain.
As you can probably see, the above argument at a single event is not enough to show us that *all* of 4D spacetime is fixed and certain; it’s only enough to show us that the region of spacetime which is spacelike separated from our chosen event is fixed and certain. In order to extend that to all of 4D spacetime, we need an additional premise: that the above argument holds at *any* event. In the Andromeda paradox, for example, we could run the argument from the Andromedan’s perspective: two Andromedans passing each other on the street will have 3D worlds passing through events on Earth’s worldline that may be separated by years. By the above argument, all events on Earth’s worldline that are spacelike separated from the chosen event on Andromeda’s worldline must be fixed and certain. But, since those events include events in the future light cone of the event we originally chose on Earth (where two people passing on the street disagree on whether the Andromedan space fleet has been launched), we can see that extending the argument to any event forces us to conclude that all of 4D spacetime, including our causal future as well as the region spacelike separated from us, is fixed and certain.
So we can summarize the Andromeda paradox argument as follows:
(1) Relativity of simultaneity + all observers’ 3D worlds are real at every event = block universe
(I’ve used the word “real” here because that’s the word that block universe proponents often use, but note that it’s really shorthand for “events to the past of any observer’s 3D world at any event are fixed and certain”.)
Now, in those PF threads I referred to on this topic, a lot of electronic ink was spilled in arguing for proposition (1). However, all of that was really a waste of time, because I already agree with the proposition (1)! (And so, I suspect, do others who posted in those threads expressing similar objections to mine.) Proposition (1), in itself, is not the problem. Nobody needs to be convinced that, given its premises, the conclusion of proposition (1) is true. The problem is the premises, specifically the second one.
Most block universe proponents spend no time at all on the second premise, apparently because they think it’s so obvious that it doesn’t need justification or argument. But, as the above shows, simply assuming the second premise is tantamount to assuming the conclusion! (Strictly speaking, you still need the first premise as well, but everybody also agrees on the first premise; relativity of simultaneity is an accepted fact. So the second premise is the one that’s doing all the work.) In other words, if your argument for the block universe basically consists of helping yourself to the second premise, you’ve avoided the real issue.
In a couple of those PF threads, when challenged on the second premise, block universe proponents did offer two proposed justifications for it:
(2-1) The only alternative to the second premise is solipsism (only my present event is real).
(2-2) 3D worlds can be directly observed.
Proposition (2-1) is false because there is another alternative to the second premise that accounts for all of our observations:
(3) All events in the past light cone of a given event are real (i.e., fixed and certain) for an observer at that event.
The reason this accounts for all of our observations is that information can’t travel faster than light, so anything we observe at a given event can only give information about the past light cone of that event. (More on this below.) Also, note that proposition (3) is obviously consistent with relativistic causality, whereas Penrose’s assumption that 3D worlds are what divide the universe into “the uncertain future” and “the certain past” is not. (It’s rather ironic, btw, that Penrose himself gives a good explanation of relativistic causality in the same book in which the above argument appears: he even has a diagram showing the division of spacetime into causal past, causal future, and “elsewhere”, the spacelike separated region. Our intuitions don’t really know how to deal with “elsewhere”; it’s neither fixed and certain, since we can’t predict what happens there with certainty based only on the data in our past light cone, nor changeable since we can’t causally affect what happens there; we can only causally affect events in our future light cone. Yet, even though Penrose explains all this, he appears to forget it when making the Andromeda paradox argument. This is an instructive example of why arguments from authority should not be given weight; you should always check up.)
Given the above, proposition (2-2) is obviously false as well; we can’t directly observe a 3D world because of the finite speed of light. (As a side note, this proposition has been agreed to be false repeatedly by block universe proponents; but in later threads, they forget they agreed and again present this invalid argument.) What we directly observe is our past light cone; 3D worlds are constructions from the data in our past light cones. But there is nothing requiring us to accept constructions from our data as fixed and certain, and there is at least one good reason not to: our constructions may end up being wrong because our information is incomplete.
When I raised this last objection in PF threads, (that 3D worlds are constructions from the data, which may turn out to be wrong), an argument against that was advanced:
(4) People can communicate the experimental results that show the relativity of simultaneity (as Penrose has the two people on Earth doing when they later make telescopic observations of the Andromedan fleet); this amounts to communicating their knowledge of 3D worlds, which therefore must be real.
However, this is also false, because, as I noted above, the information in our observations can only travel at the speed of light; and furthermore, in order to communicate, people must exchange information about their observations, which of course can only be done at the speed of light. So by the time the people have information about all the events that show the relativity of simultaneity, all of those events are in their past light cones, so there is no need to postulate entire 3D worlds in order to explain the observations; simply accepting their past light cones as real is enough.
So in summary: a common argument for the “block universe” view, based on a proposition (1), is invalid; but it’s invalid not because the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises (it does), but because the second premise is not established. Block universe proponents gloss over this by simply assuming the second premise; but when challenged, they are unable to give any cogent justification for doing so. So the block universe view is not established by this argument, and one should not take at face value pop-science books and TV shows that imply that it is.
- Completed Educational Background: MIT Master’s
- Favorite Area of Science: Relativity
“Picking a convention for different purposes is useful. But as soon as you recognize that, it becomes difficult to accept the reality of an objective present.”
Hi Paul:
I guess I am mostly indifferent to the difficulty regarding the objectivity of “present”. I am a pragmatist at heart. I particularly liked Peter’s response
[INDENT]None, as far as I’m concerned.[/INDENT]
to RUTA:
[INDENT]What difference does it make to your physics?[/INDENT]
Regards,
Buzz
“No, it wouldn’t; at least, not if both observers are “comoving”. Two comoving observers at different spatial locations in the universe will both see no variation in the CMB redshift with direction–it will look perfectly isotropic to both of them. But they are not at rest relative to each other.”
Hi Peter:
Thanks for correcting my oversight. When I responded to Smattering’s reply
[INDENT]For example because two distant observers are not at rest to each other when each of them observes isotropic CMB. Instead, they are moving away from each other.[/INDENT]
to my question
[INDENT]I am seeking a physical explanation of: Why the average temperature of the CBR in all directions can not be used as a common clock that establishes a basis for absolute simultaneity?[/INDENT]
I thought his point was that the Doppler would be in general different when “observers are not at rest to each other”. I has overlooked that the Doppler effect was not always present, as you pointed out w/r/t co-moving observers.
Regards,
Buzz
“As Peter points out, it follows from relativity of simultaneity + no preferred frame.”
No, it doesn’t. It follows from relativity of simultaneity + no preferred frame + all events to the past of any observer’s surface of simultaneity are fixed and certain. In the article, I used “relativity of simultaneity” to mean what you are calling “relativity of simultaneity + no preferred frame”. But the article makes clear that that by itself is not sufficient; you also need the additional premise I just gave.
“If you deny relativity of simultaneity (as Peter does by denying simultaneity at all, for example)”
I have done no such thing. Saying that events to the past of a given observer’s surface of simultaneity, but not in that observer’s past light cone, are not fixed and certain, is not at all the same as “denying simultaneity”. Unless, of course, when you say “simultaneity” you are implicitly smuggling in the additional premise I referred to above. But that additional premise is there, whether you want to admit it or not.
“What difference does it make to your physics?”
None, as far as I’m concerned. But you posted 5 articles about “blockworld”, which would seem to indicate that it does make a difference to you.
“The Doppler of CBR measurements effect for each of the two observers would be different”
No, it wouldn’t; at least, not if both observers are “comoving”. Two comoving observers at different spatial locations in the universe will both see no variation in the CMB redshift with direction–it will look perfectly isotropic to both of them. But they are not at rest relative to each other.
“I prefer presentism”
In what sense? Is the “present” just one event (whichever event I am at “now”), or is it more than that?
“Hi Paul:
I don’t mean to be flippant, but I would answer your question as follows. If the definition of a concept, like “the present”, depends on a context, then one should use the definition appropriate to the context that is relevant to the usage. I get that the fact that there are different definitions of “present” means that in an absolute sense, there is no absolute “present”.
Here is an example. Imagine two people, A and B, who are the last surviving members of a tontine, are living on different planets, say A in on Earth, and B is on a planet revolving around Proxima Centauri. Both A and B die, and the trustees of the tontine need to know who has died last, so the tontine assets can be given to the appropriate estate. It may well be that this issue cannot be resolved by “building as large as possible ‘near inertial frame'”. However, the CBR clock might be used for this context.
Regards,
Buzz”
But that all supports my point. Picking a convention for different purposes is useful. But as soon as you recognize that, it becomes difficult to accept the reality of an objective present. Note, that this is all orthogonal to whether or not BU is true. Disbelieving BU does not require a belief in a flowing present.
“Then I go back to requesting your definition of a Block Universe, because *mine* would basically be a 4D unchanging block of spacetime.”
Sure, that will work.
“If you accept that a certain past is applicable to a given event, bounded by a past light cone, and that no event has any special physicality (including those in the future) then all events are certain — period.”
Now you are assuming that “certain” is absolute, not relative. If “certain” is relative–in other words, if which events are “certain” is different for different events–then your argument here is not valid.
I’m wondering if you even read my article, since it discusses exactly this point.
“For example because two distant observers are not at rest to each other when each of them observes isotropic CMB. Instead, they are moving away from each other.”
Hi Smattering:
I do not understand why not being at rest w/r/t each other is relevant. The Doppler of CBR measurements effect for each of the two observers would be different, but by averaging averaging over the entire sphere of directions, that difference should cancel out. Or am I wrong about this?
Regards,
Buzz
“Since both are useful for different purposes, and both are purely conventional, how do you know which is the ‘real’ definition of ‘present’.”
Hi Paul:
I don’t mean to be flippant, but I would answer your question as follows. If the definition of a concept, like “the present”, depends on a context, then one should use the definition appropriate to the context that is relevant to the usage. I get that the fact that there are different definitions of “present” means that in an absolute sense, there is no absolute “present”.
Here is an example. Imagine two people, A and B, who are the last surviving members of a tontine, are living on different planets, say A in on Earth, and B is on a planet revolving around Proxima Centauri. Both A and B die, and the trustees of the tontine need to know who has died last, so the tontine assets can be given to the appropriate estate. It may well be that this issue cannot be resolved by “building as large as possible ‘near inertial frame'”. However, the CBR clock might be used for this context.
Regards,
Buzz
“I prefer presentism because of Occam’s razor, it minimizes what we have to assume to exits (now). As long as it is possible to have such a hypothesis, it should be preferable.
An even more serious point is the violation of Bell’s inequality. To explain it with presentism is easy – one needs, of course, a hidden preferred frame, but this is anyway a cost of presentism, and not a big one, because the only argument against the existence of hidden information is – hm, what? – wishful thinking that humans are somehow able to get all relevant information from Nature, because of … our belief.
The alternative is to give up realism as well as causality. Ok, if we accept a blockworld, we accept fatalism, thus, anyway causality becomes bogus and nonsensical. So, the argument with causality is not decisive.
But there is also a metaargument in favor of causality: Would there be any hope of successful science in a fatalist world?”
Ilja, does Presentism apply to non-local events?
“Personally, I find the B Theory preferable on the grounds of Occam’s Razor, based on the following argument. If we imagine the world as a growing block then we can always take the union of all such blocks, over all time, to get a fixed block, in which everything is ‘certain’. A pan-dimensional being that could see that fixed block could also see all the growing blocks arrayed before them in their different stages of development. Further, one needs the ‘current universe’ to extend at least a little into the future (ie for every point in it to have a neighbourhood that overlaps with the future) in order for the Riemann, metric and stress-energy tensors to be defined.
Given then, that the growing block implies an ultimate fixed block, and requires a block that extends at least a little into the future, why not just discard the intermediate stage from one’s picture and a have a simpler model in which we only imagine the fixed block?
But to repeat, I see this as entirely a matter of taste.”
I prefer presentism because of Occam’s razor, it minimizes what we have to assume to exits (now). As long as it is possible to have such a hypothesis, it should be preferable.
An even more serious point is the violation of Bell’s inequality. To explain it with presentism is easy – one needs, of course, a hidden preferred frame, but this is anyway a cost of presentism, and not a big one, because the only argument against the existence of hidden information is – hm, what? – wishful thinking that humans are somehow able to get all relevant information from Nature, because of … our belief.
The alternative is to give up realism as well as causality. Ok, if we accept a blockworld, we accept fatalism, thus, anyway causality becomes bogus and nonsensical. So, the argument with causality is not decisive.
But there is also a metaargument in favor of causality: Would there be any hope of successful science in a fatalist world?
“First, you are incorrectly assuming that “certain past” and “uncertain future” are the only two categories. They aren’t; there’s a third, “spacelike separated”, which I called “elsewhere” in the article.
Second, the boundaries of these regions do not require any “now”; they are the past and future light cones of a given event, which are invariant geometric properties of spacetime and require no arbitrary choice of “now”. So the concept of “now”, or any “special physicality” associated with it, is not needed at all.”
Then I go back to requesting your definition of a Block Universe, because *mine* would basically be a 4D unchanging block of spacetime. If you accept that a certain past is applicable to a given event, bounded by a past light cone, and that no event has any special physicality (including those in the future) then all events are certain — period. If you don’t recognize any “flowing of now” then I don’t understand how you can come to any other conclusion.
In other words, what are you arguing [i]against[/i] exactly?
“if there is no special physicality associated with “now” then how do you justify a differentiation between a certain past and an uncertain future?”
First, you are incorrectly assuming that “certain past” and “uncertain future” are the only two categories. They aren’t; there’s a third, “spacelike separated”, which I called “elsewhere” in the article.
Second, the boundaries of these regions do not require any “now”; they are the past and future light cones of a given event, which are invariant geometric properties of spacetime and require no arbitrary choice of “now”. So the concept of “now”, or any “special physicality” associated with it, is not needed at all.
“I don’t believe in a “flowing now” either, so why should I try to provide a definition of it?”
Agreed! But if there is no special physicality associated with “now” then how do you justify a differentiation between a certain past and an uncertain future?
“I don’t believe in any sort of “flowing now”, for the very reasons given. I was inviting you to provide a definition of such if you disagree. :)”
I don’t believe in a “flowing now” either, so why should I try to provide a definition of it?
“Okay, so what is your rigorous definition of this concept?
No, your post is dodging the question, by failing to give a rigorous definition of the concept that you said was the essence of the issue, after you had just said that rigorous definitions were needed. If you try to give your concept of a “flowing now” a rigorous definition, you will run right up against the issues I identified in the article.”
I don’t believe in any sort of “flowing now”, for the very reasons given. I was inviting you to provide a definition of such if you disagree. :)
“I believe the essence of the issue boils down to the concept of a “flowing now”.”
Okay, so what is your rigorous definition of this concept?
“Your argument is basically dodging the question”
No, your post is dodging the question, by failing to give a rigorous definition of the concept that you said was the essence of the issue, after you had just said that rigorous definitions were needed. If you try to give your concept of a “flowing now” a rigorous definition, you will run right up against the issues I identified in the article.
“I guess I just cannot realize the argument you are refuting as an argument at all.”
Believe me, I sympathize. :wink: But evidently a lot of people, including a lot of well-known physicists (for example, Brian Greene, who was quoted in a number of the previous threads I referred to in the article), think it is a valid argument. So I thought it was worth taking the trouble to point out the obvious flaw in it. That way, the next time someone tries to use it here on PF, we can just point at my article instead of having to refute it again. :wink:
“For example because two distant observers are not at rest to each other when each of them observes isotropic CMB. Instead, they are moving away from each other.”
Good, much simpler answer than mine.
“Hi Paul:
I am seeking a physical explanation of why the average temperature of the CBR in all directions can not be used as a common clock that establishes a basis for absolute simultaneity?
Regards,
Buzz”
That’s not based on any GR law. That’s analogous to saying we can choose to define absolute motion within the solar system by referring it to the sun. CMB based simultaneity is simply choosing a (useful) reference based on the state of matter in a particular solution. It also does not address finer grained simultaneity – e.g. the region near a binary neutron star, where dynamic spacetime geometry makes it impossible to have any well defined notion of simultaneity.
Finally, note that CMB simultaneity, as useful as it is for cosmological question, disagrees with a regional simultaneity that would result from building as large as possible ‘near inertial frame’ as you could. Since both are useful for different purposes, and both are purely conventional, how do you know which is the ‘real’ definition of ‘present’.
”
I am seeking a physical explanation of why the average temperature of the CBR in all directions can not be used as a common clock that establishes a basis for absolute simultaneity?”
For example because two distant observers are not at rest to each other when each of them observes isotropic CMB. Instead, they are moving away from each other.
PeterDonis, I read your synopsis and I respect what you’re saying but I think Block Universe (the subject being debated) needs a rigid definition. I believe the essence of the issue boils down to the concept of a “flowing now”. If we assign a special physicality to our local concept of now, what do we declare about such special physicality which is non-local? If special physicality exists, then events which are non-local to us either share this special physicality or they do not.
The fact of the matter is that when we are forced to rigidly define such a non-local special physicality when describing events, regardless of any definition I can conceive, we are forced to assign such special physicality to the entire Block Universe. Your argument is basically dodging the question by exposing that such a rigid special physicality definition is ambiguous and of course practically unverifiable; in any event my personal feeling is that to DENY the existence of a special physicality leads us to the same (Block Universe) conclusion.
-R
“Also note that there is no general way to carry simultaneity boundary of certainty to GR, since there is no generally preferred simultaneity possible.”
Hi Paul:
I am seeking a physical explanation of why the average temperature of the CBR in all directions can not be used as a common clock that establishes a basis for absolute simultaneity?
Regards,
Buzz
“Which post are you referring to now?”
This one:
[URL]https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-block-universe-refuting-a-common-argument-comments.843000/page-2#post-5290428[/URL]
Edit: I guess I just cannot realize the argument you are refuting as an argument at all.
“what were you referring to when you reminded me of the fact that information cannot be transmitted faster than light?”
Which post are you referring to now?
“Yes, of course. I said the same thing in the article. I still don’t understand what the problem is.”
So what were you referring to when you reminded me of the fact that information cannot be transmitted faster than light? Did you try to point out to me that the reports from the third-party observers will not arrive at me before I can make the observation myself?
“When those third-party observations are part of my past light cone, then the observers should have been able to report their observations to me, shouldn’t they?”
Yes, of course. I said the same thing in the article. I still don’t understand what the problem is.
“Roger Penrose is absolutely not a Blockworld proponent.”
It’s been a while since I actually went back and looked at The Emperor’s New Mind, but my memory is that, at least in the particular argument quoted in the article, Penrose was taking the “blockworld” position. I definitely don’t remember him pointing out in the book the logical flaw that I discuss in the article. It seems to me that discussing that argument without mentioning the logical flaw is leaving out something crucial.
“hypothetically, you could prove that the present (surface of simultaneity/3D world) could be directly observed”
You can’t; that contradicts the laws of SR, which say that information can’t travel faster than light. It’s pointless to make hypotheticals that contradict the laws of physics. (Also, the “block universe” interpretation explicitly says it accepts the laws of SR, so any hypothesis that contradicts the laws of SR also contradicts the “block universe” interpretation anyway.)
“Peter,
If, hypothetically, you could prove that the present (surface of simultaneity/3D world) could be directly observed, wouldn’t that negate your claim that your alternative premise ‘accounts for all observations’?
I just can’t shake the feeling that you’re argument basically hinges on the technicality that laws of physics prevent one from proving that the present exists. Sure, reality is unintuitive, but that feels like a stretch. And yes, I recognize the irony in my statement.”
In GR, there is no well defined notion of present at all. How do you account for that? Of course, it is easy and useful to use a BU interpretation with GR, but the motivating argument of ‘present must be real’ breaks down if present can’t even be defined.
Its a matter of how the observation is, distance, and also area which the explosion of the star eats way in the area. In both cases, this is somewhat a complex mathematical equation, and SR would not be a easy calculation. In space there is more to physics, than we could knowledge. We are in time here in this area of space, and more faster we go towards the center, time is fast and slow, it like a reflux of time dilation in over load. Until it slows down, and then faster and faster. When time becomes nothing.
I would say that Bob was unlucky….and Alice would move away faster than the speed of light!
block universe?
I’d just like to point out that Roger Penrose is absolutely not a Blockworld proponent. He does believe strongly in realism, and that the question of what is “fixed” is meaningful. The Andromeda argument was made to raise the question, to refute classical presentism, and in particular, to show that treating the EPR nonlocality as an influence that propagates faster than light (but forward in time) is inconsistent.
“Do you mean in this thread, or in the article?”
I was refering to this post of yours:
[URL]https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-block-universe-refuting-a-common-argument-comments.843000/page-2#post-5289354[/URL]
What I do not understand: When those third-party observations are part of my past light cone, then the observers should have been able to report their observations to me, shouldn’t they? I thought being part of my past light cone means exactly this: Being able to send me a light signal.
“I just can’t shake the feeling that you’re argument basically hinges on the technicality that laws of physics prevent one from proving that the present exists.”
This “technicality” is the core of the dispute.
Either you accept it, and BU does not make sense, or you don’t accept it, and BU is the only resolution.
“I do not know what you were trying to express with the past light cone stuff.”
Do you mean in this thread, or in the article?
“Then, I do not know what you were trying to express with the past light cone stuff.”
I am saying that we can adopt the view that, for a given observer at a given event on his worldline, the set of events that are “fixed and certain” is the set of events in the past light cone of the given event. This allows us to account for all the observations that show relativity of simultaneity (and all other effects predicted by SR), without having to adopt the “block universe” interpretation.
I’m not sure how else to respond because I don’t know how much context you have. Have you read the argument I quoted in the article for the claim that relativity of simultaneity requires the “block universe” interpretation?
“Nope. Nobody has ever claimed that information can travel faster than light. That is not what the argument I’m refuting says.”
Then, I do not know what you were trying to express with the past light cone stuff.
“I thought the claim in this Andromeda paradox was that some other observer can inform me of an event before I could have observed it myself.”
Nope. Nobody has ever claimed that information can travel faster than light. That is not what the argument I’m refuting says.
It’s true that, once you realize the argument I’m refuting doesn’t say that information can travel faster than light, i.e., it agrees that nobody can inform you of any event before you could, in principle, have observed it yourself, the argument starts to look pretty silly. That was part of my point in the article. :wink:
It seems these arguments are just too complicated.
In my opinion, the alternative to Block universe is:
“Events can only be observed in their past light cone.”
and the author of the original series just does not have the imagination to understand it.
I haven’t seen any other argument for BU in that series or this thread.
BU stays a possibility but not a necessity.
“Any event in your past light cone is an event you could have observed, since by definition light from that event could have reached you.”
Yes, I am aware of this. But this refers to events that I myself could have observed.
“If you happen not to have paid attention to those events, that doesn’t matter for the causal structure of spacetime.”
I thought the claim in this Andromeda paradox was that some other observer can inform me of an event before I could have observed it myself.
“You’ve lost me here; what counter argument do you think I am making?”
That these kind of “pre-notifications” by other observers do not necessarily “fix” (I hate this term) the complete future of the entire universe.
“So the claim is that my own past light cone contains third-party observations of events that I myself have not yet observed.”
No, at least not in principle. Any event in your past light cone is an event you could have observed, since by definition light from that event could have reached you. If you happen not to have paid attention to those events, that doesn’t matter for the causal structure of spacetime.
“As I understand, this is also your counter-Argument”
You’ve lost me here; what counter argument do you think I am making?
“Maybe not in the ordinary language sense of “causality”, but as the scenario was specified (the original version, not my alternate version with the alien ship), Bob’s observation is in the past light cone of Alice’s observation, so with respect to the causal structure of spacetime, Bob’s observation is in the causal past of Alice’s observation.”
O.k., at least I get the point now.
So the claim is that my own past light cone contains third-party observations of events that I myself have not yet observed.
Interesting, but are there any concrete examples how far this can be pushed? As I understand, this is also your counter-Argument: It is unclear if this really can be pushed so far that an event early in the history of the universe will determine the future of the entire universe completely.
“”I see this as entirely a matter of taste.”
“As far as “interpretations” in general go (not just of SR but any physical theory), I entirely agree.”
Interpretations are irrelevant if they have no consequences.
But interpretations with consequences are.”
If two “interpretations” predict different results for the same experiment, they aren’t interpretations anymore, they are bona fide physical theories.
BTW, this makes these discussions not entirely devoid of meaning – by looking at various possible scenarios, we may realize that we do have such an experiment.
“Bob’s observation does not cause Alice’s observation, and Alice’s observation is not an effect of Bob’s observation.”
Maybe not in the ordinary language sense of “causality”, but as the scenario was specified (the original version, not my alternate version with the alien ship), Bob’s observation is in the past light cone of Alice’s observation, so with respect to the causal structure of spacetime, Bob’s observation is in the causal past of Alice’s observation. This is true even if, in ordinary language terms, Bob’s observation did not “cause” Alice’s observation. The causal structure of spacetime is the important point for this discussion.
“If Bob observes a super nova then it is fixed for Alice.”
Can we please leave away this term “to fix something” and discuss this in strict terms of cause and effect?
Bob’s observation does not cause Alice’s observation, and Alice’s observation is not an effect of Bob’s observation.
If Bob observes a super nova then it is fixed for Alice. It is fixed even if it is in Alice’s future. It is fixed for the reason you mentioned. The laws of physics are consistent. Alice will not observe anything which contradicts Bob’s observation. This can be experimentally tested in a repeatable fashion. If Bob observes A then Alice will not observe that which contradicts A. When I say A is fixed I mean Alice can not observe anything which contradicts A. It does not exclude the possibility of the light never reaching Alice.
“Newton interpreted gravity as an instantaneous action at distance, while Einstein interpreted it as local spacetime curvature propagating at the speed of light. Those two models, or interpretations, have different consequences, so we are able to choose the better one according to experimental results.”
Correct. This means that they are not “interpretations” in the sense that we are discussing here. In the context of this thread, two interpretations of the same theory make the same predictions for anything that we can test experimentally, and are therefore indistinguishable experimentally. This is not the case for the Newtonian and Einsteinian theories of gravity.
“The paradox states that if A observes an event then it is fixed for B.”
I think this wording is somehow misleading as it implies a *causal* relationship between A’s current observation and B’s future observation. But A’s current observation is *not* the root cause for what B will observe. As long as we are not talking about quantum entanglement, but rather macroscopic observations (supernova, spacefleet leaving Adnromeda, etc. pp.), an observation does not fix anything that has not been fixed before.
“The paradox states that if A observes an event then it is fixed for B.”
Do you mean that if A observes an event on B’s worldline, then it is fixed for B? Fixed at what event on B’s worldline?
Once again, you keep on using the word “fixed” as it if has some absolute meaning–but that is precisely the point being disputed. So you can’t just assume it; you have to show that SR requires it. Continuing to make arguments that assume it does not do that; it just argues in a circle.
Note that your proposed “reductio ad absurdum” argument makes the same assumption implicitly. Your first premise is “assume the future is uncertain”. But if the “future” is different at different events, then “the future is uncertain”, as it stands, is not well-defined, so your argument can’t even be made. So before you can even set up your “reductio ad absurdum” argument, you need to first show that “the future is uncertain” makes sense without specifying a particular event. You haven’t done that.
“There will be an infinite number of future light cones who disagree.”
“Disagree” with what? I’ve already said the laws of physics are self-consistent, so given the past light cone of one event, there can be no past light cones of any other events which “disagree” with that data; that would violate the laws of physics. So I don’t understand what point you are trying to make.
“Is there actually any significant difference between believing in the block universe and believing in determinism?”
As a general thing, I would say no, there probably isn’t. But please bear in mind that in this thread, we are focusing on a specific claim (which my article refutes), which is that SR, and specifically the relativity of simultaneity, “requires” the block universe interpretation, which for our purposes here is the claim that the entire 4-d spacetime is “fixed and certain”. Whether or not this is equivalent to determinism is out of scope for this thread.
“This will be true in any scenario whatsoever. No two observers will ever see things that contradict each other; that would violate the laws of physics. But that says nothing about which of all of the physically possible things will happen, and it says nothing about what is or is not “fixed and certain”.”
The paradox states that if A observes an event then it is fixed for B.
“No, they will observe that, within their past light cone, only one of the infinite possible futures with respect to the past light cone of some previous event has come to pass. But there will still be an infinite number of possible futures that are consistent with the past light cone of the new event, and there will still be no warrant for claiming that any one of them is fixed and certain.”
There will be an infinite number of future light cones who disagree. Why would they be any less correct?
“To me it is like having arguments for or against ice cream, or Justin Bieber. The way I see it, metaphysical theories such as block universe are just stories that humans tell themselves and each other in order to come to terms with the world and to imagine it in a satisfying way.”+1 on this.
Any time I see someone ask “what REALLY is …” I immediately suspect that they are looking for a nice bedtime story.
“It is a reductio ad absurdum.
1. Assume the future is uncertain.
2. Show the contradiction “according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past.”
3. Conclude the future is certain (no destinction between the uncertain future and certain past).”
I never read the term “block universe” until very recently. So please allow me a naive question:
Is there actually any significant difference between believing in the block universe and believing in determinism? It sounds to me as if both was pretty much the same.
If the future is “certain”, then it is fully determined, isn’t it? And if it is fully determined, then it is certain. And of course, everyone who believes in determinism, implicitly believes in a static 4D universe where every event is fully determined.
So again: Where is the difference? Or is “block universe” only a modern word for the very old idea of determinism?
“Your scenario was explicitly forbidden in my scenario.”
So what? As I said, in the real world you can’t specify the scenario. And you certainly can’t make absolute claims about what is “fixed and certain” based on a particular scenario that you specified. You need to make an argument that applies in any scenario that is consistent with the laws of physics.
“Alice still would not see anything that contradicts what Bob saw.”
This will be true in any scenario whatsoever. No two observers will ever see things that contradict each other; that would violate the laws of physics. But that says nothing about which of all of the physically possible things will happen, and it says nothing about what is or is not “fixed and certain”.
“If Bobs fixed past is not fixed for Alice then it would be possible for Alice to observe something which contradicts Bobs observation.”
Non sequitur. As above, it is not possible at all for Alice to observe anything that contradicts what Bob saw; that would violate the laws of physics. But that fact is not a logical consequence of anything about what is or isn’t “fixed” for a particular observer. It’s a logical consequence of the fact that the laws of physics are self-consistent.
“Your counter argument seems to be “anything’s possible””
No, it is that, from the standpoint of any given event, anything that is consistent with the laws of physics and the events in the past light cone of that event is possible. So what is possible is relative: it depends on which event you pick.
“100 years later somebody may observe that only one of the infinite possible futures have come to pass.”
No, they will observe that, within their past light cone, only one of the infinite possible futures with respect to the past light cone of some previous event has come to pass. But there will still be an infinite number of possible futures that are consistent with the past light cone of the new event, and there will still be no warrant for claiming that any one of them is fixed and certain.
“This is not a preffered event.”
Exactly; which means that my argument, that at a given event there are an infinite number of possible futures that are consistent with the past light cone of that event, applies to every event.
“The explosion may be uncertain to Alice but the example with Tom shows it is fixed.”
You are assuming your conclusion. You can’t just state that it is “fixed” in an absolute sense. My contention is that “fixed” is relative; it depends on which event you pick. You can’t refute that by just claiming that “fixed” is absolute. You have to show how SR requires “fixed” to be absolute, and you haven’t done that.
“By fixed I mean Alice will not see something which contradicts what Bob saw”
That’s because you constructed the scenario that way: you stipulated that the events of the explosion, Bob seeing it, and Alice seeing it are all in the past light cone of Tom at some event. So of course they’re all “fixed”, by my definition.
But now suppose this: Bob sees the star explode. Bob also sees an image of Alice at that same event (i.e., the light from that image of Alice reaches him at the same event on his worldline as the light from the exploding star). Bob predicts, based on those images, that Alice will see the exploding star at the event on her worldline that intersects his future light cone at the event where he sees the exploding star and the image of her.
However, Bob’s prediction turns out to be wrong: what he does not know is that an alien spacecraft, coming in at high deceleration, took Alice aboard and flew off with her at high acceleration in the opposite direction, at an event on her worldline just outside Bob’s past light cone at the event where he sees the exploding star and the image of her. The alien ship’s acceleration is high enough, in fact, that both the past and the future light cone of Bob at the event where he sees the exploding star are behind the alien ship’s Rindler horizon. That means that no light from the approaching alien ship had reached Bob at that event, and the light from the exploding star that is passing Bob at that event will never reach Alice, because it can’t catch up with the alien ship.
You may object that you didn’t include all this in your scenario. But in the real world, you don’t get to choose the scenario. You picked a scenario in which nothing of interest happens except the exploding star; but in the real world, you don’t get to pick what things of interest happen. The point is that both “futures”–both sets of events involving Alice, the one you gave where she sees the exploding star and the one I gave where she gets taken away by the alien ship and never sees it–are consistent with what is in Bob’s past light cone at the event when he sees the light from the exploding star. And that will be true of any event. Even at the event where Tom has all of this in his past light cone, so he knows which of the “futures” that were consistent with Bob’s past light cone actually came to pass, there are still an infinite number of “futures” that are consistent with what is in Tom’s past light cone at that event, and there is no warrant for claiming that any one of them is “fixed and certain”.
The explosion may be uncertain to Alice but the example with Tom shows it is fixed. By fixed I mean Alice will not see something which contradicts what Bob saw such as the same star burning for another 100 years(assuming Bob and Alice are standing close and not moving at a high speed with respect to each other.). This experiment can be observed and repeated. Your refutation requires what is fixed to be relative not just unknown. The andromeda paradox describes a scenario where two people speak of a past event where one persons fixed past was another’s uncertain future. They now both agree that one persons uncertain future was the others fixed past. The contradiction is avoided by eliminating the destinction between uncertain future (not fixed) and certain past (fixed)
“Consider the following scenario. A star explodes. Bob stands closer to the star then Alice. Bob sees the explosion while it is still outside of Alice’s light cone. The explosion is an observed reality for Bob. Is it unreal for Alice?”
There is no scientific way to answer this question, since there is no experiment you can run that will tell you whether the answer is yes or no. So the question is off topic for this discussion. Again, please do not get sidetracked on “reality” or “real” or other unscientific questions. Please focus on the specific argument I refute in the article.
Consider the following scenario. A star explodes. Bob stands closer to the star then Alice. Bob sees the explosion while it is still outside of Alice’s light cone. The explosion is an observed reality for Bob. Is it unreal for Alice? Consider a third person Tom. The previous scenario is in Tom’s past light cone. Tom sees the light hit Bob and then Alice. What was real for Bob turned out to be real for Alice. This can be repeated by Tom. What’s real for Bob will also be real for Alice. Is there really a good reason to believe reality is relative?
“The problem with your past light cone approach is that it requires a preffered event.”
Or it requires admitting that what is “fixed and certain” is relative; it is different for different events.
“The alternative to a preffered event would be to declare reality to be relative.”
“Reality” is not a precise term, and I don’t want this thread to get sidetracked on philosophical issues like what is “real”. Saying that what is “fixed and certain” is relative–that it is different for different events–as I did above, is more precise and avoids all the baggage around words like “real” and “reality”. (It still does carry some baggage since the words “fixed and certain” are not completely precise either; but I think those words are easier to give a reasonably rigorous meaning in the context of a physical theory.)
“It is a reductio ad absurdum.
1. Assume the future is uncertain.
2. Show the contradiction “according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past.”
3. Conclude the future is certain (no destinction between the uncertain future and certain past)
The problem with your past light cone approach is that it requires a preffered event. Which event decides what is real and what is not. Consider 3 events. 1. happens in 1950. 2. happens on 1960. 3. happens in 1970. 2 is real according to 3 and unreal according to 1. The alternative to a preffered event would be to declare reality to be relative.”
Or conclude your boundary of past certainty is wrong if it is based on a purely conventional, unobservable construct. Note that this notion is a carryover from pre-relativity, where simultaneity is absolute, so it makes sense to consider this the boundary of certainty. Also note that there is no general way to carry simultaneity boundary of certainty to GR, since there is no generally preferred simultaneity possible.
I think that the ‘argument’ you are refuting is – in Pauli’s immortal words – ‘Not Even Wrong’, and hence not amenable to refutation.
The argument of the necessity of a blockworld is simply incoherent, because it assumes that the key terms like ‘certain’ (and its putative antonym ‘uncertain’) mean something, without saying what it is that they mean. When one focuses the microscope on those terms to try to pin down a clear meaning, they dissolve into nothingness.
The sort of constructions that Putnam et al get up to with ‘arguments’ like that are the sort of thing that JL Austin demonstrated to be mere word games in developing his ideas of Ordinary Language Philosophy.
“I don’t know what to make of things that are described as ‘arguments for (or against) the block universe’.”
In the particular case I describe in the article, the argument is that SR, specifically relativity of simultaneity, “requires” the block universe interpretation (in the sense that that interpretation is logically necessary given the postulates of SR). That is the argument I am refuting. More general or philosophical claims about whether the block universe is “real” are out of scope, at least for this particular discussion. I was only discussing a particular logical argument and why it is invalid.
“I see this as entirely a matter of taste.”
As far as “interpretations” in general go (not just of SR but any physical theory), I entirely agree. But again, I would like to keep this thread focused on the specific logical argument I refute in the article.
I don’t know what to make of things that are described as ‘arguments for (or against) the block universe’. To me it is like having arguments for or against ice cream, or Justin Bieber. The way I see it, metaphysical theories such as block universe are just stories that humans tell themselves and each other in order to come to terms with the world and to imagine it in a satisfying way.
One can imagine the world as a fixed block (McTaggart’s [URL=’https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-theory_of_time’]B Theor[/URL]y, aka blockworld), or as a growing block (McTaggart’s ‘A theory’, same ref) or as a sliver (‘[URL=’https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_presentism’]presentism[/URL]’), according to what one prefers. It is possible to devise metaphysical hypotheses for each of these that are consistent with known physics.
Personally, I find the B Theory preferable on the grounds of Occam’s Razor, based on the following argument. If we imagine the world as a growing block then we can always take the union of all such blocks, over all time, to get a fixed block, in which everything is ‘certain’. A pan-dimensional being that could see that fixed block could also see all the growing blocks arrayed before them in their different stages of development. Further, one needs the ‘current universe’ to extend at least a little into the future (ie for every point in it to have a neighbourhood that overlaps with the future) in order for the Riemann, metric and stress-energy tensors to be defined.
Given then, that the growing block implies an ultimate fixed block, and requires a block that extends at least a little into the future, why not just discard the intermediate stage from one’s picture and a have a simpler model in which we only imagine the fixed block?
But to repeat, I see this as entirely a matter of taste.
This has probably been addressed before, but so far I can’t find anything that captures it as I think it is.
The article says: “there is no need to postulate entire 3D worlds in order to explain the observations; simply accepting their past light cones as real is enough.”
It also says: “Penrose’s assumption that 3D worlds are what divide the universe into “the uncertain future” and “the certain past” is not”
Why is the assumption not consistent?
I understand the surface of simultaneity as being *just* Event B. Either you are conflating 'plane of simultaneity' with 'surface of simultaneity', or they are the same thing in jargon-world and I'm inventing things for myself. At any rate, I think my point still stands: the act of being an observer is an observation that exists outside of one's past light cone, and so your alternative premise does not account for all observations. Yes, this is much too philosophical to be considered to be a rigorous definition, and so again, I do agree with your general point. I just want to stress that your arguments are simply establishing that it is still possible remain silent on the issue. The argument is simply moving BU from being "the only possible interpretation", to, "the only possible interpretation unless you want to remain silent." You are completely justified in doing that, but pop-science people are equally as justified when they get up on the tele to say, 'our best understanding results in BU.'
Peter,Instead of a hypothetical, let me ask: is it unreasonable to say that the very language of 'observers' and 'past light cones' necessarily implies a 'surface of simultaneity'? By saying that it takes time for information regarding an event to get to an observer, we are necessarily stating that the observer of event A, is actually at event B. Event B, in this case, is the present, and though it is not being directly observed, its existence is implied simply because event A exists and is being observed.I do agree with your main thesis, that technically, one is not justified in saying that a block universe is *necessarily* implied by SR, but I'm playing devil's advocate here because it is not yet clear to me why the block universe interpretation is not, far and away, the most reasonable.Pardon my thickness if all this seems trivial.
I'm always surprised by the amount of energy people invest in arguing for and against blockworld (BW). As Peter points out, it follows from relativity of simultaneity + no preferred frame. If you believe there is a preferred frame, it doesn't follow. If you deny relativity of simultaneity (as Peter does by denying simultaneity at all, for example), then it doesn't follow. Of course, that doesn't mean it's *not* a BW either. It could still be a BW even if you deny the premises of this argument. Newtonian spacetime with absolute simultaneity could be a BW. What difference does it make to your physics? That's the meaningful question for physicists.
you're/your….
Peter,If, hypothetically, you could prove that the present (surface of simultaneity/3D world) could be directly observed, wouldn't that negate your claim that your alternative premise 'accounts for all observations'? I just can't shake the feeling that you're argument basically hinges on the technicality that laws of physics prevent one from proving that the present exists. Sure, reality is unintuitive, but that feels like a stretch. And yes, I recognize the irony in my statement.
Oy. I saw comment boxes on Mark Stuckey's "blockworld" series and prepared a lengthy comment in response to his ideas. But those boxes were not functional, comments were turned off for the whole series. Since the comment is related to the topic of this article and indeed refer to it, I post the comment here instead. If it is too irrelevant, feel welcome to delete it.****I have some problems with [Mark Stuckey's] article series. No doubt the block universe works in some generic schemes. But until it can be shown that static models can be as rich as dynamic models (doubtful, see e.g. differential equations of dynamics vs equations of statics), it seems to me to be a problematic proposition.And how would we test it? It is easy to observe and test time (clocks) as well as GR. To point to GR as a test of a "spatiotemporal global constraint" is all well and good, but the present [sic!] theory of time predicts more.I am also wary of the prodigious use of philosophy. For the problems with claiming "real" in general, I refer to Peter Donis's excellent article. [ https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/block-universe-refuting-common-argument/ ] For the specifics, first the discussion of 'real' in relativity of simultaneity. The latter says simply that you would expect only an agreement on physical laws. The existence of time is such a law.Then as for for 'local realism' it is more precisely a tested hypothesis of no hidden variables. (Tested locally in Bell tests but holds globally over the light cone in gauge theories.) All that it says is that some quantum systems aren't local in the sense of correlations, and that the philosophic idea of 'real' – as a superfluous add on on nature – doesn't hold for quantum properties between observations. Or if you insist they do, you have to adopt theories like Many Worlds that makes correlations _really_ non-local (holds over many universes).The discussion of cosmology and CTCs seems confused, with all respect for that the author has a PhD in general relativistic cosmology and I have not. Shrinking the cosmological scale factor to zero makes no sense, and it wouldn't be "one point". (I don't think that is what the author wanted to say however.) Inflation makes the era before the Hot Big Bang of indefinite duration, which accords with the problem of deriving a zero scale factor or a singularity out of semiclassical worldlines. [If you like the latest Planck data release, it may be that we are probing the inflation era so successfully that we can say inflation had a finite duration. The more or less model less fits of potentials sees them being steep.]CTSs are generally invalid solutions to GR, are they not? No one claims that GR solutions always are physical, no more than they claim quantization of fields are automatically such. They have to be tested for relevancy. Specifically here CTSs implies time travel, which seems to be forbidden. I refer to CS Scott Aaronson's paper on this: if time travel was physical, the universe would have such systems already and/or we could make time travel computers. Then the complexity measures of CS falls, and all physics is simple. But we observe it is not, hence no time travel – or CTCs – exist.
"I see this as entirely a matter of taste.""As far as "interpretations" in general go (not just of SR but any physical theory), I entirely agree."Interpretations are irrelevant if they have no consequences.But interpretations with consequences are.Newton interpreted gravity as an instantaneous action at distance, while Einstein interpreted it as local spacetime curvature propagating at the speed of light. Those two models, or interpretations, have different consequences, so we are able to choose the better one according to experimental results.
A. Your scenario was explicitly forbidden in my scenario.B. Alice still would not see anything that contradicts what Bob saw. C. You have only pointed out that the explosion may be unknown to Alice in a alternative scenario. If Bobs fixed past is not fixed for Alice then it would be possible for Alice to observe something which contradicts Bobs observation.My scenario shows Alice will observe what Bob sees or she will remain outside of the light cone. She will not observe anything that contradicts what Bob saw.There is no evidence showing that if Bob sees something then Alice will see that which contradicts Bobs observation.It can be experimentally observed and repeated that what Alice sees will either agree with Bob or the light may never reach her. Your counter argument seems to be "anything's possible" That argument works on anything.You said:"There is no warrent for claiming that any one of them is "fixed and certain"This is not a preffered event. 100 years later somebody may observe that only one of the infinite possible futures have come to pass.
It is a reductio ad absurdum.1. Assume the future is uncertain.2. Show the contradiction "according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past."3. Conclude the future is certain (no destinction between the uncertain future and certain past)