- #36
Opus_723
- 178
- 3
talk2glenn said:The question in Kitzmiller was whether or not intelligent design was an inherently religious theory, or a secular and/or scientific one. On the basis of the evidence, the judge decided that it was dogmatic. He did not grant plaintiffs motion on the basis that ID was "flawed" or "wrong", but that it violated the establishment clause.
My point was that the judge was able to decide that it WAS a religious theory, even though there is a lot of debate over that, and the legislature did not guide this decision. Similarly, a judge should be able to weigh the evidence and decide that fossil fuel emissions are distinct from cellular respiration emissions in their contribution to climate change.
talk2glenn said:Such a claim could not be made. CO2 once emitted is diffused into the atmosphere, and the functional effect on crop yields is poorly understood. No one could geographically link emissions from company x to specific crop failures on agrilcutral plot y.
If no other CO2 were being emitted, the defendant's CO2 would still warm the planet by the same amount. No geographical link is necessary.
talk2glenn said:Please don't confuse the defendants opinion with that of the court. In granting the motion to dismiss, the court affirms the arguments, but doesn't issue an opinion on the facts (which are assumed true in pre-trial hearing).
Not sure what you mean here. I've read the whole thing now, and the summary I read was indicative of the ruling.
talk2glenn said:Irrelevant. No matter how clear the causal distinction may be to you, firms cannot reasonably be expected to know this and inform their decisions given it. They rightly look to the legislature for guidance on conduct where the potential for harm is not reasonably obvious and apparent to an informed layman. There is no such guidance on this subject.
"Reasonably" is very subjective. Like I said about the Kitzmiller case, a court managed to make a very important distinction without guidance, because it was reasonably obvious that the distinction was valid. The judge did not need Congress to make a law saying that ID was a religion.
talk2glenn said:In this case, yes. Plaintiffs were alleging general harm. Courts would have to weigh the general benefit against the general harm when determining whether or not society, generally, would accept one for the other, again unless the legislature gives specific guidance. This is partly why you cannot sue car manufacturers just because cars kill people, even when used correctly - the risk of death is general to society, not the result of specific defect or neglience, and outweighed by their benefits.
There is no negligence on the part of the automaker. They sell a product and people use it. CO2 is not the product here, it is a waste material that the power company disposes of. It is the company's responsibility. Their irresponsible disposal of that waste is a specific negligence.
talk2glenn said:If there is a continuous marginal relationship between a one unit change in CO2 emissions and monetary damages to crop yields, then everyone, everywhere would have some finite X% liability. This is absurd.
This is fair. The company pays the full cost of their pollution. Just because it may be unappealing to some doesn't make it wrong.
Gah. This is turning into a quote war. Sorry, mods.