Dualism & Consciousness: Exploring a New Perspective

[moving finger]

Ah, so you think that qualia are not representations of physical entities? Or at least don't have to be?

That depends on how you define a “representation of a physical entity”.
The “virtual plane” in the flight simulator could be said to be a representation of a physical entity, but that does not make the virtual plane “real”. In the same way, I believe that qualia are virtual entities constructed within the information processing system of the brain; these virtual entities can be interpreted as “representations” within the brain, but that doesn’t make the qualia “real’ any more than the virtual plane is real in a flight simulator.

I am not postulating that Plato's world of forms actually exists except in a logical sense.

[...] concepts and virtual objects can exist in a logical sense quite independently of any "mind" thinking about them, just as a circle can exist in a logical sense independently of any mind thinking about it. But it certainly does not follow from this (as you seem to think) that concepts, virtual objects and circles exist ONLY in a logical sense.

Aren’t the two last statements contradictory?

Not at all.
Statement 1 basically says that I believe Plato’s world of forms exists in a logical sense, and only in a logical sense.
Statement 2 says that concepts, virtual objects and circles can exist in a logical sense, but this does not necessarily preclude concepts, virtual objects and circles from also existing in other senses.
Where is the contradiction?

Just how do those unperceived circles exist? Or take triangles; any three rocks, if looked at by a human, will be seen to form a triangle. Does the triangle, as opposed to the rocks, exist when nobody is looking?

In the case of three rocks, these would describe a triangle in terms of their spatial relationship to each other. As long as the rocks exist, the triangle exists (whether or not anyone is looking at it).

Did Pythagoras “create” the mathematical rule/law that for any Euclidean right-angled triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of other two sides, or did he “discover” it?

If all observers are physical, and everything around the observer is physical, is the triangle a physical entity spawned by the observer looking at the rocks?

The triangle is a spatial relationship between physical entities.

At that point in time, there was no space, no time, no substance, or energy, or information (save that one bit), or concepts, or anything else which we might consider to exist, except for that ability to know and that one bit which it somehow came to know. The "consciousness" at that moment was truly primitive and primordial, thus "PC".

Simple “ability to know” is exceedingly complex in itself. It is easy for you to simply try and brush it under the carpet and claim “all it needs is the ability to know”, but this already assumes an exceedingly complex primordial entity.

(1) Why is it that there seem to be some common threads in the stories offered by religions mystics? Could there be something to them?

Common threads such as?

(2) Can the nonsense and contradictory stories offered by religions be interpreted in a way that makes sense?

Yes. Imho most relgious dogma is pure fantasy and make-believe.

(3) Is there a sensible explanation for credible paranormal reports such as the medical success of Edgar Cayce, or for the phenomenal mental abilities of people like Ramanujan or the severely mentally handicapped and blind guy who could play the piano without training or experience?

Each of these could be a thread in itself.

I tried to explain to you before that the basis of my judgment consisted of two major components: my personal experience of consciousness, and my personal experience with computers. Knowing what I know about those two experiences, I feel compelled to accept the notion that a machine cannot experience consciousness.

Paul, with respect we are getting nowhere. I accept that you do not believe, or you cannot accept, that a machine could experience consciousness. But what I am asking is why do you not accept this? What is the logical chain of reasoning which has led you to the conclusion that a machine could never be conscious? Or are you in effect saying “I can present no logical chain of reasoning which leads to this conclusion, I simply do not believe that a machine could ever be conscious, period.”?

Metzinger did not explain any mechanism of which I was not already well aware. I am confident that I could program a computer to do exactly as he specifies, and I am equally confident that when that program ran, it would not be conscious as I am.

Firstly, we have already disagreed on the issue of “your consciousness”. Why should it be necessary that another agent be “conscious as you are” in order to claim consciousness?

Have you ever programmed a computer such that it satisfies Metzinger’s necessary conditions for consciousness? I seriously doubt it. On what rational basis can you claim that it would not be conscious?

That confidence comes from my judgement, my background, and the case presented by Metzinger. I don't know how else to explain it to you.

A rational argument would do the trick. Not just “I don’t believe it”, or “it wouldn’t work”. Explain the rational argument that leads one to conclude that there is something missing or something wrong with Metzinger’s account. If you cannot do that, then on what basis should I believe you?

Yes, PC invented mathematics.

Thus the rules of mathematics did not exist prior to the PC coming along?
The mathematical rule which says that “for any Euclidean right-angled triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides” did not exist as a mathematical truth before the PC created it?

If the PC created mathematics, was it working within pre-ordained mathematical rules, or did it actually create those rules from a “blank slate”? If the latter, why did it create the particular mathematical rules that it did, and not some other rules?

(and by the way, we still have no idea what created the false vacuum, or the fluctuation, or whatever was truly primordial).

I agree every explanation has a “first cause” problem to face. But there is a world of difference between postulating a complex knowing/intelligent/conscious/intentional first cause (PC or God) and a simple, dumb, non-intelligent, non-conscious first cause. The PC option is metaphysically more complex, because it does NOT allow us to dispense with the other premises (you still have to assume the first bit came from nothing), it simply tacks one additional very complex premise onto the top of everything else.

But saying that the universe "obeys laws of physics", or "evolves according to laws" seems to imply that those laws must exist before the universe does.

Not necessarily. The (physical) laws of nature may be logically contingent, but created along with the Big Bang, which would now make them nomologically necessary.

And since the laws are concepts, that implies that the mind that originally conceived them must have existed prior to that conception. And thus the mind must pre-exist the universe.

You are saying that the PC created the laws, including mathematical laws?
Are you suggesting that all laws, including mathematical laws, are logically contingent (ie that there are logically possible worlds where these laws are different)?
If the PC can create any mathematical law it likes, why would the PC not create a law of mathematics that says for any Euclidean right-angled triangle, the cube on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes on the other two sides?
Could the PC do this?
If no, why not?
If yes, why did it choose not to?

So the modern PC is accessible from the material universe, maybe not as objectively as you would like, but it is certainly accessible.

In the same way that God is accessible to those that believe in God.

Maybe we can't measure it very precisely, but we certainly can detect it.

And I’m sure that a lot of people talk with God too. Sorry, Paul, I cannot take your assertion “we can detect it” seriously.

We know a lot about its properties, for example we know it can know, perceive, conceive, remember, recall, judge, feel, sense, etc. (This knowledge is not from speculation but from direct experience.)

How do you know that these are all properties of the PC, couldn’t some of them be properties of the physical agents?

That it also possessed desires, and wants, volitions, intentions?

Not at the outset by any means. Those things must have developed and evolved over who-knows-how-long a period of time.

According to pre-existing mathematical/logical rules/laws?

Yes, in principle, everything is an illusion constructed by the PC.

Everything?
Why did it need to wait billions of years to create intelligent organisms if the whole thing is an illusion and it creates everything from nothing, with no prior rules or laws? It makes no sense. Does the PC obey pre-existing laws, or does it make absolutely everything up, including the laws and rules which regulate its own behaviour?

Does it follow that the PC creates everything that is logically possible, or does the PC only create a subset of what is logically possible?

Only a finite subset. I explained earlier why I think the notion of "everything that is logically possible" leads to contradictions and thus is nonsense.

How does it determine which finite subset?
But the PC creates mathematical rules/laws, why should it be restricted to what is logically possible?

Because some work better than others. They lead to stable, interesting, fruitful universes.

So the PC may have tried many different universes before it got to our universe?
Indeed, why be restricted to a sequential series of experiments, why not try many universes in parallel, surely that would make more sense?

Yes. I think that the computer that is running the algorithm that drives the unitary quantum evolution in our 4D universe is running on hardware in the next higher substrate.

Hang on. Earlier you said that everything is an illusion created by the PC. Now you are saying that this hardware actually exists?

Or are you suggesting that algorithms can run “unattended” with no physical substrate?

No.

But the PC creates everything internally in its own mind, doesn’t it?

Yes. PC is not omniscient and is frequently surprised -- sometimes even dismayed.

Dismayed! That sounds like a fanciful anthropomorphic notion. Has the PC actually told you this personally?

I don't for many reasons. One is that the term 'God' has already been taken to mean something quite different in many respects. Another is that I would get myself in trouble from many quarters. From the scientific quarter, I would get shunned and/or derided.

Please understand that your idea will get shunned/derided for the very reason that it smells/feels/tastes very much like a god-idea. It doesn’t matter what you call it. If it walks like a duck…..

The big differences between PC and popular notions of God are that God is taken to be infinite, perfect, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, incorruptible, and omni-benevolent. PC is none of these.

Isn’t it? Why isn’t it omniscient? Since everything in creation is created by the PC……?

The PC receives input only from beings which are conscious?
Good question. I think the answer is, "no". I think there may be other input available.

I should hope so – otherwise it was “driving blind” for a few billion years of creation?

Paul, it’s been entertaining, but I have many pressing things I need to do and I’ll need to close now. Imho your idea makes for a nice fairy story, and if it gives you comfort or consolation then perhaps that’s a good reason for you to believe it. But I’m afraid it’s just too top-heavy with unjustified and unverifiable speculation for my taste, it seems to make more fundamental metaphysical assumptions than it provides explanations, and I don’t think we’ll ever agree on it.

Best of Luck,

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

It has been entertaining for me as well. Thanks again for your thoughts, energy, and time. These ideas do provide me with a small amount of comfort and consolation, but that is not the reason I believe them. I believe them because they make more sense to me than any alternatives do. I'll gladly change my mind as soon as I find better explanations.

Thanks again, and thanks again for collaborating with me on that old Goethe/Beethoven piece. I had forgotten that was you until I looked back at that reference to the sleep question. Maybe we can have some more fun later.

Warm regards,

Paul

P.S. I just went back and reviewed our conversations at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=790041#post790041 and I realize we have been over this ground before. I think it is fair to say that we will probably not reach agreement unless you happen to have a revealing religious experience, or I happen to meet a truly conscious robot. If your questions above were more than simply rhetorical, and you want answers to them, I think you can find them in that old thread. Anyway, it has been fun. Paul

 

[Lars Laborious]

Not at all.
Statement 1 basically says that I believe Plato’s world of forms exists in a logical sense, and only in a logical sense.
Statement 2 says that concepts, virtual objects and circles can exist in a logical sense, but this does not necessarily preclude concepts, virtual objects and circles from also existing in other senses.
Where is the contradiction?

Well sorry, but I thought you were talking about the same in both statements. As when you said:

The Platonic realm (to me) is simply the realm of “whatever is logically possible”. We do not invent mathematics, we discover it. Similarly, we do not invent concepts, we discover them. Concepts exist, in a logical sense, independently of any conscious experience of those concepts.

If you do believe that concepts and mathematics exist not only in a logical way, it’s meaningless to point out that we don’t invent mathematics but discover it, and at the same time compare that to the Platonic realm and “whatever is logically possible”.
Your right-angled triangle example in your response to SelfAdjoint, is simply an example of something that exists in a logical sense. So again, how can concepts and mathematics exist in more ways?

 

[moving finger]

Well sorry, but I thought you were talking about the same in both statements. As when you said:

The Platonic realm (to me) is simply the realm of “whatever is logically possible”. We do not invent mathematics, we discover it. Similarly, we do not invent concepts, we discover them. Concepts exist, in a logical sense, independently of any conscious experience of those concepts.

If you do believe that concepts and mathematics exist not only in a logical way, it’s meaningless to point out that we don’t invent mathematics but discover it, and at the same time compare that to the Platonic realm and “whatever is logically possible”.

Have I suggested anywhere that “mathematics” (in the sense of the laws or truths of mathematics) does in fact exist in any way apart from in a logical sense? Thus it is very meaningful to point out that we discover mathematics, we do not invent it.

Your right-angled triangle example in your response to SelfAdjoint, is simply an example of something that exists in a logical sense. So again, how can concepts and mathematics exist in more ways?

To me, Plato’s world of forms is simply a “set”, the set of all logical possibilities. In this set there “exists” (in a logical sense) everything that is logically possible. If a three-legged green Martian is logically possible, then this entity or concept exists as a logical concept within this set, whether or not there are in fact any three-legged green Martians in physical existence in our universe. Thus, the mere existence of a logical possibility does not entail the physical existence of anything in particular.

Now anything that is logically possible (exists within this set described above), may also physically exist (this is what I meant when I said that logical existence of something does not necessarily preclude existence of that thing in other senses apart from the logical sense).
The “triangle” that is described in space by three rocks (selfAdjoint’s post above) is an example of a physically existing triangle.

What is not clear to me (referring here to Paul’s concept of the primordial consciousness or PC), is whether this PC is constrained by the laws/rules of mathematics and logic (ie that these rules exist prior to the PC “thinking about them”, and the PC simply discovers these rules), or whether the PC starts with a completely blank slate and creates the rules as it goes along (which would mean the PC could create any rules that it likes – it could create a right-angled triangle in Euclidean space for example where the cube of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes of the other two sides).

Paul?

Best Regards

 

[Paul Martin]

To me, Plato’s world of forms is simply a “set”, the set of all logical possibilities. In this set there “exists” (in a logical sense) everything that is logically possible. If a three-legged green Martian is logically possible, then this entity or concept exists as a logical concept within this set, whether or not there are in fact any three-legged green Martians in physical existence in our universe. Thus, the mere existence of a logical possibility does not entail the physical existence of anything in particular.

Your use of the term "exists" (in a logical sense) is exactly the way in which the term is used in mathematics. There is no connection or implication from this type of existence to anything real. But, as I tried to explain before, the notion of a set of all possibilities leads inevitably to contradictions. Russell pointed this fact out to Frege and destroyed the man's life's work just as he was ready to publish. Later, Goedel generalized the same fact and with it, destroyed the prospect of Russell's and Whitehead's ambitious project of succeeding. The point is that it is nonsense to consider a set of all possibilities, and if you do consider such a thing, it will imply contradictions.

From that I think we should learn that not only is nothing in reality infinite, but that any notion that includes infinity should be excluded from mathematics because it will drag inconsistencies with it. Mathematics is limited to that set of concepts specifically developed by some mind.

What is not clear to me (referring here to Paul’s concept of the primordial consciousness or PC), is whether this PC is constrained by the laws/rules of mathematics and logic (ie that these rules exist prior to the PC “thinking about them”,...

Yes. The PC (or any other mind doing mathematics) is severely constrained if consistency is to be maintained. If inconsistency is allowed, then PC (or other mathematician) is constrained from having a consistent system. You can have consistency or inconsistency, but not both. That would be the first order constraint.

If consistency is chosen, then a second order constraint arises, and this is the one that seems to get ignored no matter how many times I bring it up. This is the constraint derived by Dr. Dick that proves that if a system is to remain consistent, then any explanations of anything in the system must conform to the laws of physics. The full impact (or even a slight impact) of this fact is not well known or acknowledged yet, but if enough young graduate students get the idea and make it official, I am sure it will revolutionize philosophy and physics. The implication is that PC is severely constrained in how it might configure and set into motion any universe: if it is to be consistent, then the laws of physics must apply.

The only rule that applies prior to the PC "thinking about them" is the law of non-contradiction. And this is not even a law. It is a deliberate and conscious choice by PC. PC can choose to be consistent, or choose to be inconsistent. No law prevents she/he/it from choosing either. But having chosen one, the other is excluded. If consistency is chosen, then mathematics is nothing but the set of tautologies (consistent statements all saying the same thing in different terms) that have been invented or discovered. PC, being the first to do so invented them. That put them into the Platonic world to be discovered by PC later, after having forgotten them or having them obscured somehow. Humans (appearing as if they are) doing mathematics are an example of PC re-discovering some of these results, or it could be that PC is actually inventing new results if they haven't been invented yet.

...and the PC simply discovers these rules)

Not unless they have been invented first.

or whether the PC starts with a completely blank slate and creates the rules as it goes along

Yes to both.

(which would mean the PC could create any rules that it likes

No, it does not mean that. A rule cannot be created that is both consistent and inconsistent. Otherwise it would be like inventing the game of chess, and then while playing, deciding to violate the rules. Look at it this way: Can I violate the rules when I play chess? Well, yes...nothing prevents me from moving my rook diagonally, unless my opponent is bigger and stronger than me. But if I do move my rook diagonally, am I playing chess? No. So I am constrained from violating the rules when I play chess. Similarly PC is constrained from creating arbitrary rules if consistency is to be maintained.

it could create a right-angled triangle in Euclidean space for example where the cube of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes of the other two sides).

Something like this might be possible. It would depend on the chosen geometry. The "real" geometry of even our 4D space-time is not known yet. The geometry of higher dimensional space is only guessed at at this point. (Calabi-Yau spaces are examples of how wild some of those guesses are at the moment.)

Of course, most of what I have just said are my own opinions, with which most mathematicians, physicists, and I suppose philosophers will disagree. But I am not going to change my opinions until someone shows me the errors in them, or shows me a more sensible alternative. I have engaged the people on this forum to debate the finite vs. infinite question, the geometry of space-time, and the veracity of Dr. Dick's conclusions, and I have not yet gotten a rebuttal that has changed my opinions. I am still open to suggestions, though.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Your use of the term "exists" (in a logical sense) is exactly the way in which the term is used in mathematics. There is no connection or implication from this type of existence to anything real. But, as I tried to explain before, the notion of a set of all possibilities leads inevitably to contradictions.

Could you perhaps provide the logical argument that shows the notion of a set of all logical possibilities inevitably leads to contradictions?

From that I think we should learn that not only is nothing in reality infinite, but that any notion that includes infinity should be excluded from mathematics because it will drag inconsistencies with it.

Why does this lead to the notion that nothing is infinite?

If consistency is chosen, then a second order constraint arises, and this is the one that seems to get ignored no matter how many times I bring it up. This is the constraint derived by Dr. Dick that proves that if a system is to remain consistent, then any explanations of anything in the system must conform to the laws of physics.

Are you saying that the laws of physics (as opposed to the laws of mathematics) are logically necessary, entailed by the condition of consistency?

The implication is that PC is severely constrained in how it might configure and set into motion any universe: if it is to be consistent, then the laws of physics must apply.

Thus the PC does not create the laws of mathematics or the laws of physics; whatever the PC does, it does under the constraint of these laws? Is this what you are saying?

The only rule that applies prior to the PC "thinking about them" is the law of non-contradiction. And this is not even a law. It is a deliberate and conscious choice by PC. PC can choose to be consistent, or choose to be inconsistent.

How does the PC choose this at the outset, when it has nothing (no logic) to work with?

If consistency is chosen, then mathematics is nothing but the set of tautologies (consistent statements all saying the same thing in different terms) that have been invented or discovered.

Invented, or discovered? Which is it to be?

PC, being the first to do so invented them.

Being the first to discover something does not mean that one has invented that something. Or are you defining “invention” as “to discover something for the first time”?

Your argument seems incoherent. You are saying that PC, having chosen to be consistent, is thereafter constrained by logic and the laws of mathematics and physics, which implies that the PC supervenes on logic and the laws of mathematics and physics, the PC does not create logic and the laws of mathematics and physics, it simply decides whether to be consistent or not, and everything else follows from that, which implies that these things exist prior to the PC’s choice of whether to be consistent or not.

How does the PC get to the state of choosing to be either consistent or inconsistent (if this is the first thing it ever does) if it has nothing (no knowledge, beliefs, information) on which to base such a decision? The "concept" of consistency cannot mean anything to the PC, since concepts require a foundation of other concepts, beliefs etc against which they can be interpreted and thus have meaning. The word "consistent" has no meaning in an absolute vacuum devoid of other foundational concepts, beliefs etc.

Before the PC can choose to be consistent, it surely must first develop a basic foundation-level of concepts and understanding, to enable itself to start making rational decisions.

...and the PC simply discovers these rules)

Not unless they have been invented first.

It seems you define invention as “to discover something for the first time”?

or whether the PC starts with a completely blank slate and creates the rules as it goes along

Yes to both.

You are saying the PC is constrained by the rules, but the PC also starts with a blank slate and makes up the rules? Do you not see the contradiction in such a view?
What comes first – the constraint imposed by the rule, or the making up of the rule?

No, it does not mean that. A rule cannot be created that is both consistent and inconsistent.

Thus there are pre-existing laws of consistency which determine whether a particular rule is consistent or not (and this is true in absence of PC). And having chosen to be consistent, the PC is now constrained to working within the set of consistent rules. Having decided to be consistent, the PC can now only “create” (or think that it creates) rules which are consistent, but in fact whether a rule that the PC thinks it has created is consistent or not is already determined before the PC thinks about it. The PC is not free to “create” just any rule it likes, it is constrained by the fact that the rules it “creates” are already determined from the rules of consistency. Correct?

it could create a right-angled triangle in Euclidean space for example where the cube of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes of the other two sides).

Something like this might be possible. It would depend on the chosen geometry.

That is why I specified Euclidean space. The geometry in this example is not a variable. Let’s tighten it up even more by specifying a 2-dimensional Euclidean space.
Given the constraint of operating in 2 dimensional Euclidean space (where by Euclidean space I mean the space complies with the 5 axioms of Euclid’s geometry, including the parallel postulate), do you think the PC could create a right-angled triangle where the cube of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes of the other two sides?

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

All though radical, I would say Paul's PC idea is a step in the right direction to examine the fabric of minimal consciousness, so that we can come to grips with what consciousness really is. Metzinger do not explain how the basic phenomenolgy of consciousness arise, or what it is. He sets a premise that there already exists a minimal concept of consciousness - a presence of the world - and from there derive how higher types of consciousness forms.

When “information” are processed in a way that creates a consciousness with a self-awareness, the "information" are actually already existing qualia as a presence of the world. This could be explained by dualism, or that a minimal consciousness is a property of the physical. One can claim that no such things as selves exist in the world, but a presence of the world needs a center (for the doing of the world-experiencing) that, spite the lack of an awareness of it’s first-person point of view, makes it a basic agent that could be concidered a basic self. It would not be the kind of thinking self that we are familiar with, but an experiencing self.

Metzinger's "minimal consciousness" and Rosenberg's "Natural Individual" needs to be addressed, and that's what Paul is doing. But Paul, could the "the ability to know" instead be "the ability to experience." Or is that too far from what you mean?

 

[Doctordick]

All explanations are based on some fundamental assumptions.

This statement seems to me to be quite absolute and I would like to understand your comprehension of its nature. The issue (the nature of explanations) is quite definitely a subject central to this thread (Paul is trying to present one) and yet little attention is apparently being directed towards a good understanding of that concept. It appears to me that you are a very rational person and that, ordinarily, you have a very low tolerance for absolute statements without defense.

Paul and I have been going back and forth on that very issue for almost many years already. He seems to understand at least a portion of my work but nevertheless presumes his explanations are exempt from my deductions (sorry about that Paul).

We “explain” one concept by invoking other “concepts”, but ultimately we have no fundamental explanation for any of these concepts except in terms of other concepts.

Here, I think you have expressed the basic essence of any explanation. Any explanation (to explain anything) consists of two very different parts: the things or concepts accepted as fundamentally existing (what I believe philosophers usually refer to as the ontology of the explanation) and the internal rules which allow one to deduce the consequences of the explanation (which most people seem to regard as the real foundation of their explanations; what philosophers seem to refer to as epistemology).

Your comment that we have no fundamental explanations seems to me to be a subtle recognition of the fact that "what exists" is also a fundamental component of any explanation (leading to further confusion between the concepts of "invention" and "discovery"). Was the electron invented or discovered? Is it not possible to see the electron as an ontological invention supporting the explanation achieved by modern theory?

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

Ah, but all beliefs are based the existence of an X'. And most people like to name what they think it is. My position is apparently quite strange to everyone as I merely think of it as a fundamental "unknown". That approach seems quite natural to me and I always find others abhorrence of the idea quite incomprehensible. I am curious as to what your reaction might be as I find very little in your post to suggest your thoughts are much different than my own.

There may be something more fundamental than the physical universe, which generates the physical universe, but if we have no way of knowing what this might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be. Given this, the epistemic buck must stop somewhere.

What I desire people to do is to overtly recognize that "we have no way of knowing what this might be" and work directly with that fact: i.e., working with unknowns is the central issue of the problem. Everything is unknown until a solution is promulgated and what people seem to miss is that the promulgation includes the ontology (it seems to me that they invariably presume their ontology is not part of their conclusions).

Are you saying that the laws of physics (as opposed to the laws of mathematics) are logically necessary, entailed by the condition of consistency?

I am certainly saying that and it appears that I have convinced Paul of its truth though he doesn't seem to want use it as a basis for his logic.

With regard to your issues concerning the nature of mathematics, I define mathematics to be the creation and study of internally consistent systems. As such, mathematic systems are both invented and discovered in the sense that the systems are invented constructs and are discovered by being proved internally consistent (i.e., all invented systems are not necessarily internally self consistent so the concept of "discovery" plays a role). My real interest in mathematics is the fact that great minds working over thousands of years have diligently worked at eliminating internal inconsistencies. Thus I have two tools of great use: first I can be pretty confident that mathematical deductions are dependable truths (as true as the axioms upon which they are based) and that specific procedures defined in mathematics are widely interpreted in exactly the same manner (it is a widely understood language with few vague concepts to fuel misunderstanding).

I await your reactions -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

All though radical, I would say Paul's PC idea is a step in the right direction to examine the fabric of minimal consciousness, so that we can come to grips with what consciousness really is. Metzinger do not explain how the basic phenomenolgy of consciousness arise, or what it is. He sets a premise that there already exists a minimal concept of consciousness - a presence of the world - and from there derive how higher types of consciousness forms.

It seems you misunderstand Metzinger's paper. He does not[/n] set a premise that there "already exists" any kind of consciousness; his hypothesis shows how consciousness arises where there was no consciousness before, and also how consiousness creates the ideas of qualia, and the idea of the conscious self.

Paul's "idea" on the other hand does not explain consciousness, it assumes something called "primordial consciousness" as an unexplained premise. Similarly, qualia would presumably need to be assumed but unexplained premises in Paul's theory.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

It seems you misunderstand Metzinger's paper. He does not[/n] set a premise that there "already exists" any kind of consciousness; his hypothesis shows how consciousness arises where there was no consciousness before, and also how consiousness creates the ideas of qualia, and the idea of the conscious self.

Metzinger might suggest how basic consciousness arises in the book Being No One, but in the 35 pages sketch he surely sets a premise that there already exists a minimal concept of consciousness. When he speaks of “globality” as one of the three basic notions that is needed to form a minimal consciousness, he suggests that phenomenally represented information is the process by which some biosystems generate an internal depiction of parts of reality (that is globally available for different processing capacities at the same time). Here’s the problem, “an internal depiction” needs a basic consciousness. Metzinger simply starts out by examining how individual phenomenal events are always bound into a global situational context, and not by examining the phenomenal events themselves.
Perhaps you do not believe that phenomenal events and consciousness are the same?

Paul's "idea" on the other hand does not explain consciousness, it assumes something called "primordial consciousness" as an unexplained premise. Similarly, qualia would presumably need to be assumed but unexplained premises in Paul's theory.

Well, as far as I can see, Paul tries to narrow it all down to “the ability to know”. While Metzinger, in his sketch, doesn’t even try to explain phenomenal events.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Doctordick

Thank you for a very rational, coherent and constructive post – it made me think more seriously about my beliefs, which is always good.

All explanations are based on some fundamental assumptions.

This statement seems to me to be quite absolute and I would like to understand your comprehension of its nature. The issue (the nature of explanations) is quite definitely a subject central to this thread (Paul is trying to present one) and yet little attention is apparently being directed towards a good understanding of that concept. It appears to me that you are a very rational person and that, ordinarily, you have a very low tolerance for absolute statements without defense.

Let me try to formalize the argument :
Premise 1 : A premise is a proposition which is assumed to be true (example : This premise 1)
Premise 2 : A tautology is a proposition which is true by definition (example : All bachelors are unmarried)
Premise 3 : A definition is a particular form of premise (example : A bachelor is defined as an unmarried man)
Premise 4 : Any sound logical argument either entails at least one premise, or is a tautology
Premise 5 : Any explanation may be reduced either to a sound logical argument, a premise, a tautology or a combination thereof
Inference : Thus, any explanation entails assumptions (from 1,2,3,4,5)

The inference is (imho) clearly valid, thus to show this argument unsound one would need to show that at least one of the premises is false.

The fact that all explanations rest on assumptions implies that different people may have different explanations (because we are each free to make our own assumptions). This leads to the idea that different beliefs about the world are simply due to differences in perspective. And this in turn explains why so many people are confused about the concept of knowledge - why many people reject the JTB definition of knowledge, and even claim that there is no acceptable definition of knowledge, or even that knowledge entails something mystical or impossible to understand. This attitude (imho) results from a misconception of what knowledge actually “is”. Everything we claim to know about the world is based on our beliefs about the world, and these beliefs are in turn based on our “pet” explanations and assumptions. Thus knowledge reflects epistemic perspective. There is no “objective” standard against which we can measure any claim to knowledge, because all such knowledge is based on a particular subjective perspective on the world. In other words, all knowledge is subjective. Once this subjective and perspectival nature of knowledge is understood, it can be seen that the JTB definition of knowledge is quite adequate, and all examples of so-called “inconsistency” with such a definition (eg so-called Gettier-style cases) may be explained very simply on the basis of a misunderstanding of the subjective nature of knowledge.

Paul and I have been going back and forth on that very issue for almost many years already. He seems to understand at least a portion of my work but nevertheless presumes his explanations are exempt from my deductions (sorry about that Paul).

My personal philosophy is based on the following : The fundamental purpose of any “good” explanation is not to show how primordial complexity can give rise to simplicity (this is a trivial exercise), but to show how complexity can arise from primordial simplicity. If our explanations must make assumptions (as the above argument shows all explanations must), then the best explanations are those which assume the minimum of complexity within their premises. Rather than “building in” a priori complexity within the premises, the best explanations assume the simplest possible premises and then derive observed complexity as an emergent property of the universe.

Paul’s “explanation” assumes, in addition to many other premises, the fundamental premise of the Primordial Consciousness. This PC is in fact an extraordinarily complex entity (despite Paul’s insistence that it is not), which not only possesses an innate “ability to know”, but also primordial intentions and desires, and (apparently) the ability to make intelligent decisions based on an understanding of the difference between consistency and inconsistency. This is why I reject Paul’s “explanation”. I also reject all dualistic, theistic and ID-based explanations for the same reason.

Thus, any explanation which produces consciousness as an emergent property of a fundamentally non-conscious and “simple” universe is (imho) a much more powerful explanation than one which instead posits consciousness as a fundamental and unexplainable a priori property of that universe.

We “explain” one concept by invoking other “concepts”, but ultimately we have no fundamental explanation for any of these concepts except in terms of other concepts.

Here, I think you have expressed the basic essence of any explanation. Any explanation (to explain anything) consists of two very different parts: the things or concepts accepted as fundamentally existing (what I believe philosophers usually refer to as the ontology of the explanation) and the internal rules which allow one to deduce the consequences of the explanation (which most people seem to regard as the real foundation of their explanations; what philosophers seem to refer to as epistemology).

Agreed. And this is what I have tried to capture within my “logical argument” above.

Your comment that we have no fundamental explanations seems to me to be a subtle recognition of the fact that "what exists" is also a fundamental component of any explanation (leading to further confusion between the concepts of "invention" and "discovery"). Was the electron invented or discovered? Is it not possible to see the electron as an ontological invention supporting the explanation achieved by modern theory?

I see where you are going with this, but if I follow along this path of reasoning I would rather say that the human concept of the electron (our explanation of the electron) is an epistemic, rather than an ontic, construction. We have no direct access to any “ontic reality”, all we can ever do is to construct epistemic concepts based upon other epistemic concepts (ie our explanations), which we then take to be some kind of interpretation of some fundamental reality that we perhaps believe exists but to which we have no direct access. Plato’s world of forms is an example of something to which we have no direct access. However I am also a determinist (see below), hence I believe that every one of our epistemic constructions already “exists” within spacetime, and as we “move through time” (don’t take that expression literally) we simply discover these constructions (in much the same way that Columbus discovered America).

Imho, within the “space” of all logical possibilities there are many logically possible worlds which we could inhabit (of which we inhabit only one). Within this “space”, all logical possibilities already exist (in a logical sense). Within our particular spacetime, we inhabit an infinitesimally small portion of the total “logical space” (and the entire infinitesimal spacetime that we inhabit is precisely determined). What we usually interpret as “time flowing” is an illusion, all our spacetimes past and future already exist within this logical space. This is why I interpret Paul’s notion of “invention” as another way of saying “discovered for the first time”.

Some words of explanation on my philosophy of determinism. I do not deny that the world may be stochastic at a fundamental level (as quantum mechanics suggests it might be), but I do deny that the assumption of ontic stochasticity “adds anything useful” to our explanation of how the world works. Ontic stochasticity is (imho) explanatorily impotent as an assumption about the world. We can just as well assume that the world is ontically deterministic but epistemically stochastic (via Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle we can generate exactly the same results as we do by assuming ontic stochasticity).

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

Ah, but all beliefs are based the existence of an X'.

I disagree. X’ (it seems to me) is defined as “the ultimate source of all reality, the ultimate source upon which everything else supervenes, but which itself supervenes on nothing”. The premise of X’ assumes that there is a fundamental source of everything. This premise may be false. There are possible explanations which do not assume an X’ (eg either “turtles all the way down”, or a self-referential or cyclic consistency – the “snake biting its own tail”). This is what I meant by “there need not necessarily be an X’”. Thus it is not the case that all beliefs are based on the existence of an X’.

And most people like to name what they think it is.

Perhaps so. But this is hardly a logical argument, since what we each “like” is based on personal perspective, and I am not “most people”. Even if I were to agree that X’ exists, it does not follow that we can correctly identify X’. The best we can ever do (I believe) is (a) to assume that X’ exists and (b) to assume what X’ is.

My position is apparently quite strange to everyone as I merely think of it as a fundamental "unknown". That approach seems quite natural to me and I always find others abhorrence of the idea quite incomprehensible. I am curious as to what your reaction might be as I find very little in your post to suggest your thoughts are much different than my own.

My earlier statement “(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is” should tell you. Whereas you say that you believe X’ is a “fundamental unknown”, I would go further and say “not only is X’ unknown, it is also unknowable, AND it also may not even exist”. (Here I am assuming the JTB definition of knowledge, and would claim that X’ is unknowable by virtue of the fact that no belief in any particular X’ can ever be adequately justified from a logical perspective, because as we have seen all logical explanation rests on assumptions).

I agree that your position and mine may be unpopular. Many people (scientists and theists alike) seem to want to believe in some fundamental source of everything (for scientists it is the Theory of Everything, for theists it is God).

There may be something more fundamental than the physical universe, which generates the physical universe, but if we have no way of knowing what this might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be. Given this, the epistemic buck must stop somewhere.

What I desire people to do is to overtly recognize that "we have no way of knowing what this might be" and work directly with that fact: i.e., working with unknowns is the central issue of the problem. Everything is unknown until a solution is promulgated and what people seem to miss is that the promulgation includes the ontology (it seems to me that they invariably presume their ontology is not part of their conclusions).

Agreed.

Are you saying that the laws of physics (as opposed to the laws of mathematics) are logically necessary, entailed by the condition of consistency?

I am certainly saying that and it appears that I have convinced Paul of its truth though he doesn't seem to want use it as a basis for his logic.

From Paul’s replies in this thread, it seems to me that he believes his PC creates the laws of mathematics and physics, but so far I don’t think he has acknowledged that these particular laws are logically necessary – such an assumption would make his PC impotent? All the PC is doing then is discovering the underlying logical laws, not creating them – a point I have been trying to establish all along.

I believe the laws of mathematics are indeed logically necessary, but I suspect that (most of) the laws of physics may be logically contingent. In other words, there exist logically possible worlds where the laws of physics are different to ours.

Can you provide a rational or logical argument which shows that (any of) the laws of physics of our universe are logically necessary?

With regard to your issues concerning the nature of mathematics, I define mathematics to be the creation and study of internally consistent systems. As such, mathematic systems are both invented and discovered in the sense that the systems are invented constructs and are discovered by being proved internally consistent (i.e., all invented systems are not necessarily internally self consistent so the concept of "discovery" plays a role).

Whereas I would say that (given the laws of physics) all internally consistent systems already “exist” as logical possibilities, and all we are doing when we think that we “invent” such a system is that we are discovering that system. (ie whether the system is internally consistent or not depends only on the laws of physics and logic and is independent of our discovery of it; our discoveries supervene on the logical consistency of systems rather than the other way about).

At the end of the day it probably comes down to semantics (ie given the laws of physics, I define “invention” of an internally consistent system as a particular form of “discovering that system for the first time”).

Some discussion is worthwhile here. “Invention” is simply a statement of our epistemic perspective. Invention is simply a particular form of adding to one’s knowledge of the world. Two or more people may independently “invent” the same thing (eg the telephone). If Antonio Meucci invented the telephone first (see http://www.telephonetribute.com/telephone_inventors.html) , does this mean that Bell simply discovered Meucci’s pre-existing invention? No, of course not. In fact, it is logically possible that 1,000 different people could have “invented” the telephone, Why? Because the act of invention is simply a particular form of adding to one’s knowledge of the world. But regardless of how many people invented the telephone, the fact remains that given the laws of physics, the internal consistency of the concept of the “telephone” existed prior to anyone individual inventing (knowing of) it.

Let me use a simpler example. Imagine that we are watching a young child playing and experimenting with a simple construction set. The child finds that if she puts together particular parts of the set in a particular way, she can build a simple device for lifting objects that most of us adults would call a “lever”. Has the child invented the lever? Yes. Has the child discovered the lever? Yes. What is the difference between invention and discovery in this case? The difference is perspective. We would say the child “invented” the lever if we wished to express the fact that she had managed to construct the lever based upon her own experimentation and reasoning (she had not been shown how the lever worked by someone with pre-existing knowledge of the principle of the lever); whereas we would say that the child “discovered” the lever if we wished to express the fact that the principle of the lever is a principle which exists independently of the child’s discovery of it.

My real interest in mathematics is the fact that great minds working over thousands of years have diligently worked at eliminating internal inconsistencies. Thus I have two tools of great use: first I can be pretty confident that mathematical deductions are dependable truths (as true as the axioms upon which they are based) and that specific procedures defined in mathematics are widely interpreted in exactly the same manner (it is a widely understood language with few vague concepts to fuel misunderstanding).

Agreed.

Best Regards

 

[Doctordick]

MF, thank you for the extensive and well thought out response. Again, I think the two of us are very similar in our outlooks; however, I would like to point out a couple subtle points I think you have overlooked.

The fact that all explanations rest on assumptions implies that different people may have different explanations (because we are each free to make our own assumptions).

My complaint is entirely with the assumption that we need to know what these assumptions are before we can discuss the issue of the validity of the proposed arguments. Of course, to show the argument is unsound, one would need to show that at least one of the premises is false; however, there is a subtle problem in that requirement. We must keep in mind that there does exist a possibility that we are misinterpreting exactly what that premise is: i.e., it is a mistake to omit the possibility of misinterpretation from our thoughts completely. What is important here is that we don't have to worry about that issue if we deal with those premises as unknowns.

Ontic stochasticity is (imho) explanatorily impotent as an assumption about the world.

That is the position of every scientific person I have ever heard of and is probably the very reason no one with any decent training in science even considers the issue. Believe me, not considering that issue is a major mistake. (Yeah, I know you won't believe it either but let's go on anyway as I think it is the only real disagreement between the two of us.)

The best we can ever do (I believe) is (a) to assume that X’ exists and (b) to assume what X’ is.

You are absolutely and incontrovertibly correct.

I would go further and say “not only is X’ unknown, it is also unknowable, AND it also may not even exist”.

Again, I agree with you completely and the arguments I am prepared to present even go through if X' vanishes.

Can you provide a rational or logical argument which shows that (any of) the laws of physics of our universe are logically necessary?

Yes I can. But it is not a trivial issue. My start position is a rather unique definition of http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm which can be used to translate the concept into pure mathematics. I am of the opinion that the concept of an explanation is the basis of everything. Most everyone finds my presentation very difficult to comprehend but I think you might be able to understand it. Please make a serious examination of that paper and let me know where you lose the thread of my arguments (I would be quite astonished if you could follow the arguments to their conclusion).

Looking forward to another response -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

Hi Doctordick

My complaint is entirely with the assumption that we need to know what these assumptions are before we can discuss the issue of the validity of the proposed arguments. Of course, to show the argument is unsound, one would need to show that at least one of the premises is false; however, there is a subtle problem in that requirement. We must keep in mind that there does exist a possibility that we are misinterpreting exactly what that premise is: i.e., it is a mistake to omit the possibility of misinterpretation from our thoughts completely. What is important here is that we don't have to worry about that issue if we deal with those premises as unknowns.

You’ve lost me here. Are you suggesting that we can safely assume an argument is sound when we do not know what the premises of that argument are? I hope not.

If you are suggesting that we can safely assume an argument is sound when we do not know the premises of that argument, then I strongly disagree. Such specious reasoning is at the heart of naïve but false concepts such as the notion of libertarian free will.

That is the position of every scientific person I have ever heard of and is probably the very reason no one with any decent training in science even considers the issue. Believe me, not considering that issue is a major mistake. (Yeah, I know you won't believe it either but let's go on anyway as I think it is the only real disagreement between the two of us.)

Which “issue” are you referring to here? The assumption that the world is ontically stochastic? If you believe such an assumption “adds” anything in the way of explaining how the world works, I’m all ears……

Please make a serious examination of that paper and let me know where you lose the thread of my arguments (I would be quite astonished if you could follow the arguments to their conclusion).

I’ll take a look and let you know.

Best Regards

 

[Doctordick]

You’ve lost me here. Are you suggesting that we can safely assume an argument is sound when we do not know what the premises of that argument are? I hope not.

Certainly not. What I am saying is that we can assume nothing if we really intend to investigate anything honestly and that can only be done if we set up a way of handling those premises in the absence of definition itself (outside analytic definitions that is). The subject of my paper is the establishment of a method of logically handling things which are undefined. I hold that the concept of "an explanation" is the most fundamental concept of science itself.

Which “issue” are you referring to here? The assumption that the world is ontically stochastic? If you believe such an assumption “adds” anything in the way of explaining how the world works, I’m all ears……

I don't know that I would use the word "adds" anything as it obviously "adds" nothing; however, if "nothing" (from an ontological perspective) is all that is required, it certainly reduces ontology to uncontroversial issue. But that is a deep and profound conclusion far down the line. (And one I would love to talk about to someone interested and rational.)

I’ll take a look and let you know.

If you want to understand my various comments, we will first have to establish a clear understanding of that paper as everything I have to show you arises from solutions to the equation at the end of the paper. Please don't be put off by anything in that paper; I am ready to explain the rational of any part of it. It may be a short paper but there is a lot there.

Dick

 

[Canute]

Certainly not. What I am saying is that we can assume nothing if we really intend to investigate anything honestly and that can only be done if we set up a way of handling those premises in the absence of definition itself (outside analytic definitions that is). The subject of my paper is the establishment of a method of logically handling things which are undefined. I hold that the concept of "an explanation" is the most fundamental concept of science itself.

That makes sense to me. But it sounds like you may be reinventing the epistemological scheme of Buddhism, Taoism et al., in which no assumptions are made and what is axiomatic is left undefined in the explanation (but not in practice). I think I'm right in saying that all formal systems of explanation must contain at least one undefined term to avoid circularity and must be able to handle it. One way of logically handling things which are undefined would be the 'different precise language' that Heisenberg suggests we need discuss quantum theory. Another would be by the use of complex values, as in (non-ordinary) equation theory. Is this anything like what you're getting at? (Your paper sounds interesting. Did you post a link earlier? If so I'll go find it.)


Hi Paul

I haven't read all the thread but want to quibble with the score you awarded to your principle assumption.

"At this point in my thinking, tautologies aside, there is only one proposition which I believe (90%) is absolutely true, and that is that "thought happens".

According to Buddhist doctrine (and the esoteric doctrine in general), this is not the case. Nagarjuna, whose theory of emptiness[i/] is the (philosophical) foundation of the Middle Way school of Mahayana Buddhism, is clear on this. Nothing really exists and nothing ever really happens. In this view it is because we normally think otherwise that we get confused about the origin of consciousness. Its origin is said to be prior to the psycho-physical features of the universe such as spacetime, pianos, ceiphids, neurons, concepts, human beings and so forth.

You may not agree with Nagarjuna, but I think 90% is unjustified considering that his view has not yet been falsified and still has widespread support.

 

[Doctordick]

I think I'm right in saying that all formal systems of explanation must contain at least one undefined term to avoid circularity and must be able to handle it. ... (Your paper sounds interesting. Did you post a link earlier? If so I'll go find it.)

You need to check out http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm . The problem is that you may not be able to follow it. If you let me know what you don't understand, I will try to help you; it is actually all quite straight forward logic but it is not trivial and may require considerable thought.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Hmm. You're right, I don't understand half of it. Still, I have a couple of comments, in case they're of interest.

The significant factor often omitted in any discussion is that a translation from one language to another (including translation of invented machine language representations used by computers) actually constitutes an explanation of what is being said in the original language.

That seems a very good and often overlooked point. A long time ago I read an introductory book on symbolic logic, about which I knew absolutely nothing. By the time I finished it I had decided, for the reasons you give here, that as a means of generating information it was a waste of time. All the information had to be known before it could be symbolised. I raised this with the then Head of Philosophy at Uni. of Bristol, expecting to be laughed at, and was astonished to learn that he agreed. This was the moment I realized that one didn't have to be as clever as Bertrand Russell to do philosophy.

Whatever it is that is to be explained, it can be thought of as information.

You don't define information and so I'm not sure what you mean by this. I'd rather say that whatever it is that is to be explained, it must be thought of as information, but this may be unimportant to your argument. I'm still trying to figure out if everything that can be known would qualify as information. I'm not sure. What I'm pondering is that information implies an information space (Shannon etc.) and thus something that is not information. This is far from irrelevant to the current something/nothing topic. David Chalmers equates the psychophysical features of the world with information states but fails to come up with an explanation of the information space, which by your argument, as I understand it, would not actually be explicable (except by a endless regress of such spaces).

That is, it seems to me that if all the information is known, then any questions about the information can be answered (in fact, that could be regarded as the definition of "knowing").

This is only statement that I both understood and really disagreed with. It seems easy to show that it is possible to know more than one can explain. (Consider the example of Mary the colour scientist, as often discussed in relation to the problem of consciousness). Ostensive definitions seem to qualify as explanations and this confuses the issue somewhat. How would you answer the question: What is 'red'? I know what it is, but I couldn't answer the question if asked by a blind man. Is this a problem? Or did I miss the point?

On the other hand, if the information is understood (explainable), then questions about the information can be answered given only limited or incomplete knowledge of the underlying information: i.e., limited subsets of the information. What I am saying is that understanding implies it is possible to predict expectations for information not known; the explanation constitutes a method which provides one with those rational expectations for unknown information consistent with what is known.

Likewise, I don't think you've shown that understanding and explicability are the same thing. I do agree that understanding implies the ability to extrapolate from the known to the unknown, but only if the unknown is logically supervenient on the known (i.e. only if the unknown is already analytically contained in the known and thus in a sense already known).

 

[moving finger]

Hi Doctordick

What I am saying is that we can assume nothing if we really intend to investigate anything honestly and that can only be done if we set up a way of handling those premises in the absence of definition itself (outside analytic definitions that is). The subject of my paper is the establishment of a method of logically handling things which are undefined. I hold that the concept of "an explanation" is the most fundamental concept of science itself.

Hmmmm. OK. But I believe any particular explanation entails assumptions.

Your statement that we can assume nothing if we really intend to investigate anything honestly would require, in the case of empirical investigation, access to “certain truth” about the world, which I do not think is possible.

To me, an “honest investigation” is one which places both rationality and logic above all else (certainly above any preconceived intuitions), which faces its assumptions head-on, and which has no aspects which are “off-limits” to investigation.

I tend to agree with your point that an explanation may be a very fundamental concept – after the concept of information. If we define an explanation as a mapping between two or more sets of information then it is the information which is fundamental. This definition of explanation accords with the idea that any explanation entails assumptions – an explanation is nothing more nor less than a mapping between two or more sets of information, we may call one or more of these sets the “assumptions”, and the explanation then maps from these assumptions to another set of information.

I don't know that I would use the word "adds" anything as it obviously "adds" nothing; however, if "nothing" (from an ontological perspective) is all that is required, it certainly reduces ontology to uncontroversial issue. But that is a deep and profound conclusion far down the line. (And one I would love to talk about to someone interested and rational.)

“Nothing is all that is required”? I believe in an underlying (ontic) reality, I cannot bring myself to believe that the phenomenal world of our experience is based on absolutely nothing. But I also accept that we can never have certain knowledge of what that underlying reality is, we can never know the “ding an sich”.

If you want to understand my various comments, we will first have to establish a clear understanding of that paper as everything I have to show you arises from solutions to the equation at the end of the paper. Please don't be put off by anything in that paper; I am ready to explain the rational of any part of it. It may be a short paper but there is a lot there.

I tried reading your paper and appendices. I’m hopeless at maths so I got lost when you started introducing equations. If understanding your argument entails understanding the maths then we’ll have to agree to let it go at that.

Before getting lost, I grasped the idea that you are modeling explanations in terms of a mapping between a potentially infinite number of sets of information, each set of information being of finite cardinality, and including the real-number time-dependency of each of these sets. And you show that these parameters can (obviously) be mapped to the 3D (x, tau, t) real number space. This defines a set of points in 3D space, and an explanation is then interpreted as a mapping of one finite subset of such points to another finite subset. Correct? This seems quite reasonable and straightforward.

Best Regards

 

[Doctordick]

Hmm. You're right, I don't understand half of it.

Rome wasn't built in a day. That paper has to be understood one point at a time and cannot be conquered by subconscious acquisition.

You don't define information and so I'm not sure what you mean by this.

You must understand that, except for mathematics and logic (which is used solely for communication as an understood well defined language) I am beginning from a position of absolute ignorance. The concept called "an explanation" (which I hold to be the central concept of all thought) is quite pervasive throughout the world of intellectual attempts at general communication. This alone suggests it is an important concept worthy of a decent definition. My comments in the opening of that paper are, in essence, an attempt to use English (an extremely vague and ill defined language) to corral the idea in common use.

Certainly the term "information" is not a well defined concept. I am using it as a simple name for "what it is that we want our explanation to explain". As such, my usage of the term is as analytical as is my definition of "an explanation". Again the arguments I put forth in English amount to little more than a demonstration that my usage is not totally inconsistent with common usage of the term.

I'm still trying to figure out if everything that can be known would qualify as information.

I am merely using it as a symbol for what is to be explained, making no constraint whatsoever on what that might be. You are trying to establish an underlying definition which implies the starting point you wish to use (the first thing defined) is not "an explanation".

That is, it seems to me that if all the information is known, then any questions about the information can be answered (in fact, that could be regarded as the definition of "knowing").

This is only statement that I both understood and really disagreed with. It seems easy to show that it is possible to know more than one can explain.

I think you misunderstood my meaning in that quote. When I said "all the information", I meant "ALL" the information; that would mean that absolutely nothing was "not known". In such a circumstance, certainly no questions could exist which could not be answered. Again, all I am doing is using English to corral the idea in common use as I am well aware of the fact that actual meanings of words in English are quite difficult to pin down exactly. The point of the paragraph was to illustrate the issue that explanations constrain our expectations with regard to facts we do not know. I think you did miss the point.

Likewise, I don't think you've shown that understanding and explicability are the same thing. I do agree that understanding implies the ability to extrapolate from the known to the unknown, but only if the unknown is logically supervenient on the known (i.e. only if the unknown is already analytically contained in the known and thus in a sense already known).

Once again, you are trying to establish underlying definitions which implies that your starting point (the first thing defined) is not "an explanation". I am afraid that the course you wish to take is a well trodden path known full well to lead nowhere except to infinite regress. What I am trying to show is that my analytic exact definition of the concept "an explanation" is unique in that it does provide a valid starting point which avoids the issue of infinite regress.

My definition is exactly expressible in the language of mathematics. I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information and I show you exactly how to express that definition as a mathematical relationship.

Hi MF,

Sorry to hear of your dislike of mathematics. As Feynman said, "mathematics is the distilled essence of logic". Without it, our ability to relate large volumes of information is insufficient to the task which confronts us.

OK. But I believe any particular explanation entails assumptions.

You are making the same mistake as Canute. Your comment implies the word "assumption" be defined before one can define an explanation. As I said to Canute, that path leads nowhere except to infinite regression.

Your statement that we can assume nothing if we really intend to investigate anything honestly would require, in the case of empirical investigation, access to “certain truth” about the world, which I do not think is possible.

I think you are confusing two very different issues. The concept "certain truth" implies you understand something whereas, the concept of explaining what you know need not include understanding of any kind. That is to say, you are presupposing an understanding of what that is about the world you do have access to. I, on the other hand, am simply stating that whatever it is that you have access to, in the initial state, you certainly don't understand any of it; a totally different statement. Would you go so far as to propose we have access to nothing about the world? That's pure Solipsism.

I tend to agree with your point that an explanation may be a very fundamental concept – after the concept of information.

Again, you head down that path of infinite regression. Exactly how do you propose to explain to me your concept of information without understanding "an explanation"?

If we define an explanation as a mapping between two or more sets of information then it is the information which is fundamental.

No because now you must define "a mapping", various sets of information and, explain these things. They cannot be more basic than the concept of an explanation.

“Nothing is all that is required”? I believe in an underlying (ontic) reality, I cannot bring myself to believe that the phenomenal world of our experience is based on absolutely nothing.

You just said above that "access to 'certain truth' is not possible. If that is the case, then what is your belief in the phenomenal world based on? I think that your thinking is embedded in that issue of infinite regression; essentially in the idea that some construct representing reality which was created by your subconscious is the starting point for your analysis. I want you to step back and consider the problem of generating that construct.

I tried reading your paper and appendices. I’m hopeless at maths so I got lost when you started introducing equations. If understanding your argument entails understanding the maths then we’ll have to agree to let it go at that.

Well, unless you are prepared to learn a little mathematics, we may have to let it go at that.

This defines a set of points in 3D space, and an explanation is then interpreted as a mapping of one finite subset of such points to another finite subset. Correct? This seems quite reasonable and straightforward.

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. The "given known information" is represented by a set of points in that [x,tau,t ] space. Unknown information is also represented as a set of points in that same [x,tau,t] space. Your expectations for the unknown information consists of the probability you assign to a specific case. The explanation is the method of obtaining that probability as a function of the specific set of points. So all explanations can be seen as a representations of a function and my fundamental equation is a universal constraint on all internally consistent explanations of any information (any set of points in the [x,tau,t] space).

The situation is that to understand anything at all, you must construct in your own head exactly what you think the communication symbols mean and your only source of information consists of the communication symbols themselves. Think of the nerve activity reaching your brain as your source of information; before you can understand anything, you must first give meaning to the activity of a nerve or set of nerves. How do you propose that problem should be approached? What is the basis for your explanation that a signal on the optic nerve yields information about what you see? Is it not the result of discovering a method of predicting consistent expectations based on given known information (the nerve activity previously detected)?

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Dick

As such, my usage of the term is as analytical as is my definition of "an explanation". Again the arguments I put forth in English amount to little more than a demonstration that my usage is not totally inconsistent with common usage of the term.

An analytical definition? Is such a thing possible? I'm not sure. Is not your definition of explanation a synthetic explanation of what you mean by explanation?

I think you misunderstood my meaning in that quote. When I said "all the information", I meant "ALL" the information; that would mean that absolutely nothing was "not known". In such a circumstance, certainly no questions could exist which could not be answered.

This is the central point it seems to me. You appear to ignore Godel, Church et al. Your definition of explanation seems to skim over some important issues.

I think you did miss the point. Once again, you are trying to establish underlying definitions which implies that your starting point (the first thing defined) is not "an explanation". I am afraid that the course you wish to take is a well trodden path known full well to lead nowhere except to infinite regress.

I don't agree (yet). I feel it's your (implied) circular definitions of information, explanation and knowledge that lead to a regress. Am I right in saying that for you knowledge = information = what can be explained?

What I am trying to show is that my analytic exact definition of the concept "an explanation" is unique in that it does provide a valid starting point which avoids the issue of infinite regress.

By your definition must an explanation be complete, consistent and in the form of an formal axiomatic system? If not, then how can one rely on the 'expectations' it generates? Would you count an ostensive definition as an explanation?

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information and I show you exactly how to express that definition as a mathematical relationship.

I have a problem with this. This is not the form (fundamental) explanations take in physics. These all start with axioms whose truth values are not known. Could you give an example of an explanation (theory, description) that starts with known information?

You are making the same mistake as Canute. Your comment implies the word "assumption" be defined before one can define an explanation.

Do you not have to make one or two assumptions in order to arrive at your definition of 'explanation', if we define 'assumption' as per the dictionary?

Would you go so far as to propose we have access to nothing about the world? That's pure Solipsism.

It seems to me that solipsism is a doctrine derived from our access to the certain knowledge that solipsism is unfalsifiable. Is it not the case that an explanation (theory, description etc.) which assumes or predicts that solipsism is true or false is undecidable?

You just said above that "access to 'certain truth' is not possible. If that is the case, then what is your belief in the phenomenal world based on? I think that your thinking is embedded in that issue of infinite regression; essentially in the idea that some construct representing reality which was created by your subconscious is the starting point for your analysis. I want you to step back and consider the problem of generating that construct.

Yes, I disagreed with that point also. But I see the problem as being with the idea that certain truth (upper-case 'Knowledge') is not possible. If solipsism is unfalsifiable then this is not the case.

Think of the nerve activity reaching your brain as your source of information;

Ah. Are we assuming here that all knowledge depends on nerve activity reaching our brains? If so then I think this should be made clear up front. Would this be how we know that we are conscious, and thus of the unfalsifiability of solipsism? I find this doubtful. You seem to accept Descartes' implied elision of thinking and being, but this would be to make an assumption.

Btw, just shooting the breeze - I'm aware your mathematical proof may stand up despite these objections.

Canute

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Could you perhaps provide the logical argument that shows the notion of a set of all logical possibilities inevitably leads to contradictions?

Yes. As I mentioned in my previous post, Russell presented this argument to Frege and by so doing, destroyed Frege's life's work. To make it easier for me, and also to acquaint readers who aren't familiar with Russell's challenge to Frege, I will quote Isaac Asimov's account of the affair, which includes the logical argument you asked for. This is found on page 518 of "Asimov's Biographical Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, Second Revised Edition", Doubleday, 1982:

"[Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob] Frege is...known for a colossal and unique intellectual catastrophe. In the 1880s he began the preparation of a gigantic work applying symbolic logic to arithmetic and attempting to build up the entire structure of mathematics, including the very concept of number, on a rigorous and contradiction-free basis. The first volume of his tremendous work appeared in 1893 and the second in 1903.

"While the second volume was yet in galleys, the young Bertrand Russell...addressed a query to Frege. How would Frege's system, asked Russell, deal with the particular paradox that we can here explain as follows: " 'Classes' are groups of similar objects. Some classes are themselves members of the class they describe. For instance, 'the class of all phrases' is itself a phrase. On the other hand there are classes that are not themselves members of the class they describe. Thus, 'the class of all cats' is not itself a cat. So one might speak of 'the class of all classes that are members of themselves' and 'the class of all classes that are not members of themselves.' "

"Well, then, asked Russell of Frege, is the "class of all classes that are not members of itself" a member of itself or not? If it is a member of itself then it is one of those classes that are not members of themselves. On the other hand, if it is not a member of itself then it must be a member of the other class of all classes that are members of themselves. But if it is a member of itself -- You can go on forever, you see, and get nowhere. On consideration Frege realized his system was helpless to resolve it and was forced to add a final paragraph to the second volume of his lifework, admitting that the very foundation of his reasoning was shattered and the books therefore worthless. He published no more after that."

From that I think we should learn that not only is nothing in reality infinite, but that any notion that includes infinity should be excluded from mathematics because it will drag inconsistencies with it.

Why does this lead to the notion that nothing is infinite?

(How do you guys nest these quotes like you do?)

I think we cannot reasonably claim that anything is infinite unless and until we clearly define the term 'infinite'. The ancients glibly used the term and declared many things to be infinite without a definition that is satisfactory, at least to me. Georg Cantor was the first to rigorously define the notion of infinity and to deduce the consequences of his definitions. He immediately encountered paradoxes. Rather than reject his notions, as Kronecker and Brouwer thought, and as I still think, mathematicians have instead tried to avoid the inconsistencies. If anything, real, conceptual, or otherwise, does indeed conform to Cantor's definitions, then we know that inconsistencies are inevitably introduced. This seems impossible and/or unacceptable to me. If there are other definitions for 'infinity' which do not introduce contradictions, I am unaware of any of them.

Are you saying that the laws of physics (as opposed to the laws of mathematics) are logically necessary, entailed by the condition of consistency?

Yes. I am convinced that Dr. Dick has proved this to be the case. IMHO, his work should be classified as a theorem of mathematics. I see it as a greatly generalized Noether's Theorem. She proved that symmetry implies conservation laws; Dr. Dick proved that consistency implies all the laws of physics.

Thus the PC does not create the laws of mathematics or the laws of physics; whatever the PC does, it does under the constraint of these laws? Is this what you are saying?

Not exactly. PC chooses this constraint by choosing to remain consistent. The constraint itself has two components: 1) there is the self-imposed constraint of the willful decision and resolve to abide by the rules of consistency, and 2) there are the constraints which are implicit in the logical consequences of sticking to the chosen rules. It is this second component which has been analyzed by Dr. Dick.

This is logically equivalent to you choosing to play chess. You willfully decide to play chess and to abide by the rules. If you do, then one consequential constraint is that your rook cannot move diagonally. If PC chooses to violate the constraint of remaining consistent, then inconsistencies will result. Since (we suppose) our physical universe is consistent, we can conclude that PC chose not to violate the constraint with respect to our physical universe.

How does the PC choose this at the outset, when it has nothing (no logic) to work with?

Good question. Maybe George Spencer-Brown or Chris Langan has worked out the details of how this evolved. My guess is that it developed slowly. The notions of logical consequence and consistency would have to be worked out way ahead of any such choice. It might have started by PC imagining and constructing many "bit sets", noticing patterns, making definitions, testing algorithms, etc.

When I ponder how this might have happened, it seems like the possibility of inventing music might have happened early in the process. It seems to me that bird songs, whale songs, and even human music, might be a recapitulation of that primordial music. Pythagoras might have had it right. From our Goethe/Beethoven conversation, we concluded that music is fundamentally vibrations, which can be seen as nothing but repeating patterns. As the patterns get more complex, secondary effects emerge, such as overtones, beat frequencies, and rhythms. The repetition occurs at multiple levels, from the basic tonal frequencies to the major themes of the composition. There would be much in such a scenario for PC to notice, discover, and know, all of which would add to the accumulating knowledge base. Notions as complex as logical consequence and consistency would not noticeably emerge, IMHO, until quite a complex repertoire of compositions had been composed, or invented. Of course you know this is all speculation. But then, I think that in your question, you asked me to speculate.

Invented, or discovered? Which is it to be?

Since you are trying to pin me down, I'll say, as I have before, invented by PC and discovered by "humans". I put "humans" in quotes to make sure you understand that it is not the human body or brain doing the discovering. It is still PC (or more accurately a significantly more evolved version of PC) doing the discovering via the limiting (i.e. constraining) process of working remotely through a human brain.

Being the first to discover something does not mean that one has invented that something. Or are you defining “invention” as “to discover something for the first time”?

I think it is a little more complicated than that. If the invention is the adoption of some arbitrary set of rules, then there may be some implications of following those rules. Those implications may not be known at the time the rules are adopted but may be discovered later as the implications of following the rules play out. So whether you call the first instance of such an implication a discovery, or part of the invention, I think is merely semantics. The rules are invented; the consequences are discovered by deciding to follow the rules.

Your argument seems incoherent.

Where?

You are saying that PC, having chosen to be consistent, is thereafter constrained by logic and the laws of mathematics and physics,

Yes.

which implies that the PC supervenes on logic and the laws of mathematics and physics,

Yes.

the PC does not create logic and the laws of mathematics and physics, it simply decides whether to be consistent or not, and everything else follows from that,

Yes.

which implies that these things exist prior to the PC’s choice of whether to be consistent or not.

No. That is not implied. As you said, "everything else follows" which does not imply pre-existence. Nothing prevents PC from making different choices at different times. Now Chess; now Checkers.

It seem you define invention as “to discover something for the first time”?

Not necessarily (see above) but first-time discovery happens too.

You are saying the PC is constrained by the rules, but the PC also starts with a blank slate and makes up the rules? Do you not see the contradiction in such a view?

No, I don't see a contradiction. PC is constrained only by the consequences of the rules it has chosen after making them up out of whole cloth. Dick showed that if consistency is chosen, laws of physics constrain the evolution of physical objects and relationships. The rules of chess constrain the bishop from occupying a square of a different color in the same way.

What comes first – the constraint imposed by the rule, or the making up of the rule?

Good question, but I'd say the making up of the rule comes "first". This gets into the messy arena of time. The notion of "first" makes sense only in the context of one specific temporal dimension.

I'm a little too tired right now to get into my view of multiple temporal dimensions, but let me just say that I think time, or a temporal dimension, is exactly, and nothing more than, a parameter measuring the progress of PC traversing a specific world line in some "physical" structure. The world lines themselves can be seen as geometric lines in a space of multiple spatial dimensions. This means that each world line has its own time, as SR has revealed in our particular physical world. It also means that the notion of "first" is relative to whose, or which, temporal dimension you are referring to. It also means that from some points of view, e.g. PC traversing no world line at some "moment", there is no time or action at all. This is the Buddhist's Nirvana.

Thus there are pre-existing laws of consistency which determine whether a particular rule is consistent or not (and this is true in absence of PC).

No. As I explained above, the laws are not "pre-existing".

And having chosen to be consistent, the PC is now constrained to working within the set of consistent rules.

Yes. You have stated a tautology here which must obviously be true. Choosing to be consistent is identically the same as choosing to be constrained to working within the set of consistent rules. So having chosen to be consistent, PC is now constrained to be consistent.

Having decided to be consistent, the PC can now only “create” (or think that it creates) rules which are consistent,

No. Nothing prevents PC from deciding to be consistent and then later "creating" rules leading to inconsistencies. But the moment those inconsistencies appear, PC is no longer consistent and the decision to remain so is revoked. PC cannot be consistent and inconsistent at once. (IMHO PC "creates" by thinking that it creates, as you seem to imply.)

but in fact whether a rule that the PC thinks it has created is consistent or not is already determined before the PC thinks about it.

No more than the rules for how a free throw is to be conducted was already determined before the game of basketball was invented or thought about.

The PC is not free to “create” just any rule it likes, it is constrained by the fact that the rules it “creates” are already determined from the rules of consistency. Correct?

Close. The PC is not free to "create" any set or combination of rules it likes. If one of the chosen rules is to remain consistent, then no inconsistent rule may be accepted in addition. And if consistency is chosen, then Dick's Theorem shows precisely what the concomitant constraints are.

Given the constraint of operating in 2 dimensional Euclidean space (where by Euclidean space I mean the space complies with the 5 axioms of Euclid’s geometry, including the parallel postulate), do you think the PC could create a right-angled triangle where the cube of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes of the other two sides?

No. But PC is not necessarily given that Euclidean constraint when it comes to constructing universes.

Good talking with you, MF. Sorry for the delay; we had a death in the family.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Lars,

But Paul, could the "the ability to know" instead be "the ability to experience." Or is that too far from what you mean?

Yes indeed. That's not far at all from what I mean. After thinking about what word to use, I think there is an even better one: "the ability to realize".

Somehow in the evolution of our language, 'realize' has acquired two meanings, both of which apply to the notion I am trying to convey. In the sense of suddenly understanding, or apprehending, or coming to know something, "the ability to know" is synonymous with "the ability to realize". In the other, more literal, sense, 'realize' is nearly synonymous with 'reify'. That is, "the ability to realize" is the same as "the ability to create" or "the ability to invent". I say "nearly synonymous" because whereas 'reify' means only "to treat (an abstraction) as substantially existing" (Webster), 'realize' means "to make real" (Webster again). It seems that the word 'realize' was coined specifically for my purposes. I think I will change my language and begin to talk about "the ability to realize" as the fundamental essence of consciousness and thus of reality.

In thinking about your question, Lars, it also occurred to me that I have been making an error of conflation that I should address here. MF has pointed this error out a couple of times, but I haven't faced it like I should have. The problem is that I sometimes conflate the ontological essence of reality with the primordial essence. I have claimed that consciousness, or the ability to know, or now, the ability to realize, is both the primordial starting point of all of reality, and also the fundamental ontological essence of the consciousness that we experience.

The example that shook me this morning while thinking about your question is the example of computers. If we asked what the ontological essence of a computer is, in the same way Goethe and Beethoven asked about the essence of music in my dialog with MF, we would have to say something like "logic gates". All computers are built up as a connected set of operational logic gates regardless of how those gates are implemented. But if we were to ask what was the primordial computer, or the very first instance of something that evolved into a computer, we would have to say that it was something like Babbage's Engine, or Jacquard's loom, or an abacus, or notches cut into a bone, or some other physical artifact. You could, of course, see those artifacts as embodying logic gates in a sense, but I would say that the respective inventors did not realize that anything like a logic gate was involved.

So in my two quests -- to identify the fundamental essence of consciousness, and to identify the primordial ontological essence -- the words I choose to express my guesses need not necessarily be the same.

By separating out the two questions, it should help me overcome MF's persistent objection that my primordial PC is too complex. The assumption he makes is that PC in its primordial state is endowed with many of the extremely complex capabilities that we seem to have as conscious humans. I, on the other hand, suppose that those complex capabilities evolved over immense stretches of time (and in multiple temporal dimensions at that) and that the primordial state of PC was extremely simple and limited.

Using my new terminology, I would suggest that the primordial PC was nothing but the most rudimentary ability to realize, in the sense of the ability to know. As soon as any bit of knowledge was acquired, the ability to know about it meant that the bit "existed" in some sense. In this sense, the bit was realized in the sense that it actually became real.

By contrast, the consciousness that we experience as humans is extremely complex and rich. Our ability to realize in both senses seem to be only a small part of our total mental abilities. I think now that it might be premature to suppose that all conscious aspects can be derived from a fundamental ability to realize, although that still seems to be a possibility.

I am rambling now, so I'd better stop. Thanks for your question, Lars. It made me think.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Canute,

I think you are missing the main issue of my presentation.

An analytical definition? Is such a thing possible? I'm not sure. Is not your definition of explanation a synthetic explanation of what you mean by explanation?

Sloppiness on my part. I should have perhaps not used the word "definition".

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information and I show you exactly how to express that definition as a mathematical relationship.

Let us change that to, "I consider the "method of developing expectations" to be the fundamental concept essential to understanding anything. Expressing that concept in English is not an easy thing. The word "developing" could be replaced by "determining", "acquiring", "thinking of", "coming up with", etc.; whatever makes more sense to you.

We certainly have expectations: what we think the facts are (true or false). And we have come to have them; therefore a method must exist for doing so. I am putting forth, as an "analytical truth" per Imanual Kant, that "an explanation" is the common name I will use for that method. Most of the English leading up to my conclusion concerning the proper way of approaching the problem is devoted to the issue that the concept I am talking about is essentially consistent with the common usage of the term "explanation". A is what is being explained and must remain totally undefined as its definition is part and parcel of the explanation: what you call it is of no real interest here. "Information" is no more than a name I use to refer to it (or rather pieces of it that the "method" is based upon).

One of the fundamental characteristics of "our expectations" is that they change. In common parlance, they change because we discover our expectations are wrong. Again, C is (again as an analytical truth) whatever it is that our explanation uses and B(t) constitutes that change (which adds to C as we, as could be said, learn more of A). Thus I only have two things here: C (whatever it is that we really know) and P(B(t)) what our expectations are. The only constraint I use is that, as C consists of the collection of all B(t) we know, P(B(t)) must be consistent with C.

One thing that Paul invariably seems to miss is that the consistency required here has nothing at all to do with any consistency in C. The consistency lies entirely with the method of obtaining P(B(t)). If that method is inconsistent, it is simply worthless as it clearly fails to provide one with expectations consistent with C. It's that simple.

I don't agree (yet). I feel it's your (implied) circular definitions of information, explanation and knowledge that lead to a regress. Am I right in saying that for you knowledge = information = what can be explained?

I would make but one simple but very important change: in any presentation by me on this subject, knowledge = information = what "is being explained".

By your definition must an explanation be complete, consistent and in the form of an formal axiomatic system?

No. All it need do is provide expectations consistent with C, (what you know or, more accurately, consistent with C+D, what you think you know). If your expectations are not consistent with what you think you know why would you think it reasonable to rely on your expectations? Would I count an ostensive definition as an explanation? As a method of obtaining expectations from given information, it certainly seems to be consistent with everything I am saying.

I have a problem with this. This is not the form (fundamental) explanations take in physics. These all start with axioms whose truth values are not known.

You are omitting (as understood) 99.99 percent of those fundamental explanations. They first assume you understand the language the professor is speaking, they then assume the axioms being stated are understood, that you understand that the truth values of those axioms are not known and, finally, they presume you understand the logic they use. They all start with lots and lots of "known" information; the issue just isn't raised.

Do you not have to make one or two assumptions in order to arrive at your definition of 'explanation', if we define 'assumption' as per the dictionary?

Well certainly. I have to assume you understand English, logic and at least a little mathematics. But that is a little beside the point. The real issue here is, what assumptions have I made to deduce my fundamental equation ; show me a single step in that deduction which assumes something about what C actually is.

It seems to me that solipsism is a doctrine derived from our access to the certain knowledge that solipsism is unfalsifiable. Is it not the case that an explanation (theory, description etc.) which assumes or predicts that solipsism is true or false is undecidable?

Yes, that is entirely true and the issue is embedded within my deduction. At no place do I contend that a difference between C and D can be determined. Solipsism, from the perspective of my deduction is no more or less than assuming that the set C vanishes. The entire deduction still survives as valid.

Ah. Are we assuming here that all knowledge depends on nerve activity reaching our brains?

No, it's even worse than that. The existence of those nerves and your brain is part and parcel of your an explanation of your expectations. We are making no such assumption; I only used it to direct your attention to the fundamental problem of explaining things.

You seem to accept Descartes' implied elision of thinking and being, but this would be to make an assumption.

No, once again you are bringing up a specific explanation (I presume you meant illusion or delusion as elision is "the omission or slurring over a vowel, syllable, etc. in pronunciation: often used in poetry when a word ending in a vowel is followed by a word beginning with a silent h or a vowel".) I simply don't worry about such advanced and complex things built from advanced and complex ideas already proposed as explanations of reality. That is exactly where my difficulty with Paul occurs.

To recapitulate, what I show is that any explanation (any method of obtaining expectations from one's knowledge) must obey my fundamental equation. I can show (if I ever find someone both interested and capable of following my algebra) that the fundamental elements of C must obey a number of known relationships. I can show that Schrodinger's equation is an approximation to my equation (and thus that classical mechanics, which can be deduced from Schrodinger's equation, must also be valid). I can show that Dirac's equation is an approximate solution to that self same equation and further, that E&M is no more than another approximation. I can answer the questions "Why does the world appear to be three dimensional?"; "Why is there no magnetic monopole?"; "Why is time travel impossible?"; "Why do advanced physics theories require additional dimensions?".

I can prove that modern physics is a tautology and, once you understand the tautology, the problem between relativity and quantum mechanics vanishes. This is exactly what Paul is referring to when he says

Yes. I am convinced that Dr. Dick has proved this to be the case.

Paul was a mathematician and he has gone through much of my work. What he seems to have missed is that the fundamental elements of any explanation must obey my equation. What that means is that absolutely any valid explanation of anything must be built from fundamental elements obeying the rules of physics. This is almost the definition of "emergent" qualities. That is to say, an explanation of consciousness, awareness, intelligence, thought or any complex phenomena, if it is to be valid, must be expressible in terms of fundamental entities obeying what we have come to call the "laws of physics".

You might ask, if I can show all that, how come I am an unknown? The answer is simple in view of the fact that I am a quack as evidenced by the fact that no one could possibly show such a thing. It follows, as the night the day, that any competent scientist is wasting their time looking at my work. No one has ever pointed out a real error in my presentation, but they are all quite confident it cannot possibly be correct.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Paul

It seems relevant to your point about complexity that traditionally the Sufis say that Knowledge is a dot, a singularity, and that it is conscious beings that create all the complexity. (I've seen this 'dot' discussed by one Sufi in terms of the BB singularity). I think the point here is that almost everything we normally call knowledge is of things the Sufis say do not really exist (appearances, Maya etc), and thus is not Knowledge but confusion. Putting it awkwardly omniscience, in this view, is more simple that physics. This seems to support your view.

Btw - How do you feel about Spencer Brown after all this time? Since we last discussed all this I've discovered Francis Bradley, whose argument supports Brown's. Do you know his writing?

Dick

I don't entirely follow them but I see you do have answers to my objections. Could you unpack this statement a little:

That is to say, an explanation of consciousness, awareness, intelligence, thought or any complex phenomena, if it is to be valid, must be expressible in terms of fundamental entities obeying what we have come to call the "laws of physics".

Is this an ontological or epistemilogical statement? I ask because according to one 'explanation of everything' there is no such thing as a fundamental entity. However, the rules of explanations demand there be such a thing, so even if one holds this view one is forced to refer to such an entity for epistemilogical/theoretical reasons. This confuses the issues somewhat, in such a way that your statement would be true, but only because of the rules of explanations do not agree with the rules of the universe. This relates to my woolly point about the possible difference between knowledge and information that can be explained. (I take it the 'laws of physics' here also include the laws of logic).

Would it be possible to briefly state in English what it is your proof proves?

Cheers
Canute

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Canute,

It seems relevant to your point about complexity that traditionally the Sufis say that Knowledge is a dot, a singularity, and that it is conscious beings that create all the complexity. (I've seen this 'dot' discussed by one Sufi in terms of the BB singularity). I think the point here is that almost everything we normally call knowledge is of things the Sufis say do not really exist (appearances, Maya etc), and thus is not Knowledge but confusion. Putting it awkwardly omniscience, in this view, is more simple that physics. This seems to support your view.

I agree. Everything you said here seems the same way to me. I think the Sufis are among a large number of people who have had a glimpse of a greater reality than the 4D physical world of science. I also think that none of those people can adequately express in language what they glimpsed and that all attempts to do so have resulted in little if any understanding and vast amounts of confusion and error. To be fair, I think those people do gain something in their glimpse which helps them lead a better life and which might provide a good example to others. But when it comes to explanations, or descriptions in language, I think it doesn't go much beyond admonitions like, "Love your neighbor as yourself", etc. Certainly nothing has been gained that has been useful in furthering our scientific understanding of the physical world.

But my guess as to what is going on in the biggest picture of reality is right in line with what you said here with maybe one exception. You mention "conscious beings" in the plural making it sound as if there are multiple conscious beings. As you know, I think that there is only one conscious being in all of reality, and that what appear to be multiple "conscious beings", such as humans or other animals, are in reality remotely controlled vehicles, all being driven by the one consciousness, or by a higher level vehicle which is ultimately driven by the one consciousness through a hierarchy of remotely controlled vehicles. So if you consider these vehicles to be "conscious beings", then I agree that they are directly responsible for the creation and construction of all complexity.

Among the constructions, our physical world since the Big Bang being only one such, there are world lines describing the activities of "conscious beings" (really remotely controlled vehicles) which exist in that structure, and when the one consciousness traverses one of those world lines and is attending to it, the life of that vehicle is experienced. Languages are part of that structure and any information encoded in languages is necessarily wrong or incomplete, so I would agree that what we call knowledge is really nothing but confusion at some level. Some of it might be useful, but it still contains errors and is incomplete. I think mathematics is the best way to minimize the errors, and I think that is the reason mathematics has been so useful in attempting to describe our physical universe. It is the approach we should continue to exploit. That is the approach of Dr. Dick and all successful physical scientists.

As for omniscience, I don't think it exists. I think that even that one consciousness doesn't and can't know everything possible, and doesn't and can't even know everything about all that has been constructed so far. Nevertheless, it must know a hugely staggering and impressive amount. Anyone who can rig up such a precise Big Bang that will result in the biological life we know deserves our utmost respect. On the other hand, IMHO, it is just us.

Btw - How do you feel about Spencer Brown after all this time?

I'm sorry to say that I haven't learned any more about Spencer-Brown or his ideas since we last talked. I still feel the same way: I suspect that he might have discovered how all of reality might have evolved (at least the very initial stages) from a knowledge base of only a single bit and only the most rudimentary ability to know, or realize, that that bit existed.

Since we last discussed all this I've discovered Francis Bradley, whose argument supports Brown's. Do you know his writing?

No, I don't. Could you possibly provide a link to an introduction?

Good talking with you again, Canute.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi again, Canute,

I am going to be a little presumptuous here and try to answer your question to Dr. Dick:

Would it be possible to briefly state in English what it is your proof proves?

I have been working with Dick for many years trying to understand his work and his result. I think I understand some of it, and I think Dick gives me credit for understanding some of it. On the other hand, Dick claims that I don't quite get it. I have made many attempts to "get it" including the approach of trying to write English prose which captures the essence of his result. Dick has agreed to help me correct and refine these attempts, but unfortunately, I have not spent the time it requires to get it right.

I have, however, started the project, and since my objective is to provide exactly what you have asked for, I thought it might be of some use to present this work in its unfinished and unofficial state. It might provide a starting point for some readers to engage in further dialog with Dick and thereby come to a more complete understanding than I was able to achieve myself. So, with all those caveats, you may take a look at five different attempts at describing Dick's work beginning with the following link:

http://paulandellen.com/ideas/tfor.htm

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Paul, thanks for your continued support. I do appreciate you even if I seem to give you a hard time sometimes. The only real complaint I have on your understanding is that you think the numbers represent physical things. They don't, they represent references to elements being explained (fundamental elements of the explanation), a subtle difference as "physical things" are not really a totally undefined concept. The issue is that your PC does not escape the proof.

By the way, you asked how to embed quotes within quotes. It's very simple. I will specify the method first with carrots as command limits and then write the same thing with square brackets as command limits.

<QUOTE=Paul Martin>But Canute, you already said "biggrin"
<QUOTE=Canute>Dick is a quack
<QUOTE=Doctordick>That is what everyone says! "rofl"</QUOTE>Well at least we all agree! "yuck"</QUOTE>That we all agree!</QUOTE>
Exactly the same thing with square brackets replacing the carrots and colons (:)replacing the quotes (")

But Canute, you already said

Dick is a quack

That is what everyone says!

Well at least we all agree!

That we all agree!

Does that clear the problem up?

Hi Canute,

It is entirely an epistemological statement! The ontological basis is the undefined set C which can be absolutely anything. The result (that the behavior of the fundamental entities is described by my equation) is thus totally independent of ontological considerations. It follows that the proof removes ontology from any serious interest (whatever ontology you happen to chose as the basis for your arguments, the behavior of the entities so designated can be described by the laws of physics if your explanation is internally consistent).

I ask because according to one 'explanation of everything' there is no such thing as a fundamental entity. However, the rules of explanations demand there be such a thing, so even if one holds this view one is forced to refer to such an entity for epistemological/theoretical reasons.

You are quite right, this problem does indeed confuse the issue quite a bit. What I have discovered was a logical way of handling that deep and profound difficulty: simply make sure that you can refer to the ontology without defining it no matter what it might be. That is the essence of my undefined sets A, B(t), C and D. That approach led me to what I call my fundamental equation (a relationship which must be true absolutely independent of the ontology).

When I started down that path, my only interest was to get an exact grasp on the problem which actually faced us: the problem of understanding a universe given absolutely nothing to go on (everything is embeded in what we are trying to understand: i.e., there exists no way to confirm our interpretations are correct outside consistency itself). I had proved that equation had to be true five years before I managed to solve it. When I finally discovered an attack capable of solving it, I was absolutely astonished by the solutions. I tried to publish but could find no journal even willing to send it to referees. The physics journals said it was philosophy, the philosophers said it was mathematics and the mathematicians said it was physics. The fact is (and I can show it explicitly) that most all of the so called "laws of physics" are no more than solutions to that equation.

(I take it the 'laws of physics' here also include the laws of logic).

In my mind, no. I regard logic as a branch of mathematics which I define to be the invention and study of internally self consistent systems. I consider it a relatively exact language for communicating complex relationships. In my head, the "laws of physics" constitute the rules of behavior governing the things which we think make up reality.

Would it be possible to briefly state in English what it is your proof proves?

With regard to that issue, I would like to quote your comment to Pit2 in the thread "Causality in the subjective world".

Of course, this begs the question of whether physical laws arise from the laws of reasoning or vice versa, but generally we automatically assume the latter. Personally, I find it more likely that the laws of reason are prior to the laws of physics.

I have proved exactly what you have stated as "more likely". It makes utterly no difference what the rules of the universe are (it can even be a totally indeterminate thing), its behavior can be explained by the laws of physics.

The laws of physics amounts to no more than a data compression mechanism to keep track of what has happened. The field and the results of their experiments is totally analogous to the Dewey Decimal system for keeping track of books in a library. That is to say, it is a tautology: the laws of physics are a direct consequence of the definitions upon which the field is built. These definitions clearly arose because our subconscious minds found those particular concepts useful for predicting what will happen. It turns out that the single most important fact upon which everything we know is based is, "the future will look a lot like the past" whether looked at in detail or in overview. That's essentially the hypothesis which generates my equation and it turns out that there is nothing in physics to suggest the issue goes any deeper than that.

I am afraid modern physics is indeed a religion. They think their experiments prove something about the universe in exactly the same sense that astrologers thought that their examples supported their beliefs. The facts are the facts and it is only our interpretation of those facts which provide us with explanations. My problem, is that people who have the training to follow my math, will not look at it because it threatens their expertise. You should take a look at a certain thread on this subject on http://www.scienceforums.net/forums/showthread.php?t=20615 if you really want to see how professionals respond to me. I think Severian (their physics expert) is probably actually a professor of graduate studies: however, I don't think his ability to think is anything to brag about. You might find what I said there interesting and maybe educational.

But of course, I am a "quack" -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Paul - great to be talking again. I see we still almost agree but not quite.

For example, I cannot agree with your disparaging remarks about Sufism. Have you read the literature?

When I spoke of 'conscious beings' I was speaking conventionally. I should have made that clear. There are of course no such things.

Among the constructions, our physical world since the Big Bang being only one such, there are world lines describing the activities of "conscious beings" (really remotely controlled vehicles) which exist in that structure, and when the one consciousness traverses one of those world lines and is attending to it, the life of that vehicle is experienced.

That makes sense. But are you sure these vehicles are controlled? Who is doing the controlling? If it is PC then it would have to be fantastically complex to control all these things at once. Yet to be fundamental it would have to be simplicity itself. This antimony suggest to me that your view is not quite right. I also doubt that the life of the vehicle is only experienced when PC traverses and attends to its world-line. I'd rather think that the world-lines are not separate from PC.

Have you come across Gurdjieff on free-will? His view was that if we are aware of who we are then we have free-will. If we are not then we are slaves to deterministic (psychophysical) forces. More generally, this is the esoteric view. Thus PC would have freewill but the remote vehicles would not, not unless they were aware of who they are, which in this view would be PC.

Languages are part of that structure and any information encoded in languages is necessarily wrong or incomplete, so I would agree that what we call knowledge is really nothing but confusion at some level.

It's worse than that, I think. If the mystics are right then the truth about consciousness is actually paradoxical in ordinary language. Does freewill exist? From the above you see that there are two points of view, the conventional and the ultimate. As a result the question does not have a yes or no answer. In the literature it is never given one. Natural language cannot cope with things like PC or wave-particles. (Of course, the question is actually more complex, since the whole idea of will, of any kind, is a can of worms).

But knowledge is not confusion by definition. If it is knowledge it cannot be confusion. What turns into confusion is theory and conjecture, not knowledge. Natural language cannot cope with a wave-particle, but this does prevent us from using them in theories, it just means that the theory has to have two contradictory aspects, just like the doctrine of Sufism. But certain knowledge does not come in form of natural language and theories, from which only provisional knowledge can be derived.

I think mathematics is the best way to minimize the errors, and I think that is the reason mathematics has been so useful in attempting to describe our physical universe. It is the approach we should continue to exploit. That is the approach of Dr. Dick and all successful physical scientists.

I agree inasmuch as mathematics is good way of thinking about the issues in the abstract and accurately. However, according to Brown, as you know, a fundamental mathematical theory of everything must have two aspects, like quantum theory. Otherwise PC has to be left out and the theory becomes less than a theory of everything. It would become a theory in which PC's dual-aspects were treated as two different entities rather than as dual-aspects of one 'thing'. Imagine a quantum theory in which waves and particles are treated as two different things in a ontological sense. It would be nonsensical.

As for omniscience, I don't think it exists. I think that even that one consciousness doesn't and can't know everything possible, and doesn't and can't even know everything about all that has been constructed so far.

This may just depend on what we mean by omniscience. There is a view that simply knowing who we are is a form of omniscience. (How to characterise the omniscience of a Buddha is a subject of continued debate among Buddhist philosophers, since only a Buddha knows. By the way, Spencer Brown told me he is a Buddha.) Equivalent to my comment earlier, the Sufis say omniscience is a dot. I suppose the question is really whether omnsicience consists in knowing and understanding the simple and fundamental principle underlying the existence of everything, or the set of principles, or whether it consists in knowing lots of the details.

Nevertheless, it must know a hugely staggering and impressive amount. Anyone who can rig up such a precise Big Bang that will result in the biological life we know deserves our utmost respect. On the other hand, IMHO, it is just us.

Yeah. I can't get the hang of the idea that this was a calculated outcome rather than one that is inevitable given the nature of PC. Lao Tsu says the laws come from 'the Tao being what it is'. This makes more sense to me.

I'm sorry that you haven't got to grips with Spencer Brown. However, whereas before I couldn't really explain what he was saying I probably can now, although I'm sure he wouldn't think so, so if you want to talk about him some time I'm up for it.

I suspect that he might have discovered how all of reality might have evolved (at least the very initial stages) from a knowledge base of only a single bit and only the most rudimentary ability to know, or realize, that that bit existed.

This may be about as well as it could be put without sounding mystical. However, as Aristotle remarked, true knowledge is identical with its object, and Brown's calculus deals with this problem.

I haven't got any links for Bradley unfortunately. The relevant text is Appearance and Reality. This is difficult to get hold of. I saw a s/h copy for sale recently at £180. Fortunately the local library tracked down a dusty and long forgotten copy. But I was only allowed to keep it for a fortnight, on pain of death. It's damn complicated, one of the hardest metaphysical texts I've ever read. He gives a logical proof that nothing exists, and implies that PC (which is not what he calls it) both exists and not-exists depending on how you look at it. Nagarjuna's proof is an easier read.

You would probably like him because he proves, or tries to, that all idea of plurality give rise to contradictions. This would include the idea that solipsism is false. I've got a few extracts somewhere. Online there is a site giving a clear and accurate chapter by chapter summary, but I've forgotten where. If I remember right from my search there are not many sites to trawl through.

Cheers
Canute

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Canute,

Your post was a superb example of understatement; I agree with everything you wrote.

It is great to be talking with you again, and I agree that we still almost agree.

For example, your taking my remarks about Sufism as "disparaging" is a little harsher than I intended. No, I have not read the Sufi literature, but I have a nodding acquaintance from reading about Sufism by various authors. I did not intend to single them out. If you take another look at what I wrote, you will see that I lumped them together with all other sagacious, prophetic, mystic, wise, enlightened, and otherwise insightful humans that ever existed. And I merely noted that they are subject to the same limitations of language as all the others. These are the same limitations that prevent you and me, or MF and me, or Dr. Dick and me, from eliminating the "almost" that persistently modifies our "agreement". I think we might be as close to agreement as we can get without "going mathematical".

When I spoke of 'conscious beings' I was speaking conventionally. I should have made that clear. There are of course no such things.

No problem; that's the way I took it. But I should have made myself more clear. I meant to imply that there are actually three ways to see "conscious beings": 1) the conventional way as individual human beings, 2) PC, or the ultimate and only conscious being, which if isolated from all thought-structures would not be conscious of anything at all (meaning that there is no such thing as a "conscious being", (This is when PC is in the state of traversing no world line, and consequently time does not move at all.) and 3) Natural Individuals in the sense of Gregg Rosenberg which occupy several levels of existence having different temporal and spatial dimensions from each other (our physical world being only one of them). These Natural Individuals are not actually conscious, but exhibit conscious behavior because they are driven, or controlled, or operated by some other Natural Individual (as it progressively attends to the world line of the first Natural Individual) from a higher level in the hierarchy. Only the very top Natural Individual is really conscious, subject to the comments in 2) above.

That makes sense. But are you sure these vehicles are controlled? Who is doing the controlling? If it is PC then it would have to be fantastically complex to control all these things at once.

I think reality is fantastically complex.

Yet to be fundamental it would have to be simplicity itself.

I think PC was simplicity itself in the very beginning. I think it evolved to its current complexity during stretches of time prior to our Big Bang that would make our mere 14 billion years only a fleeting moment by comparison.

This antimony suggest to me that your view is not quite right.

I agree that it does suggest an antinomy, but I think the resolution is in the possibility of multiple temporal dimensions and their relationship to PC's attention. If PC is attending to a particular world line, then time is flowing in that structure from the perspective of the Natural Individual defining that world line. Whether PC can back off one level and observe this activity of following multiple world lines at once, or in some multiplexing or time-sharing pattern is not clear. If so, then that observation would be yet a new world-line being followed by PC's attention and would thus create another dimension of time (I have referred to this as Cosmic Time in other communications). The specific mechanisms for achieving the multiplexing etc. could be at least as complex as the ones we are familiar with here in our physical reality, and there is no reason to suppose that there aren't even more clever and complex mechanisms at PC's disposal. After all, there are those multiple levels of Natural Individuals, each of which could play a different contributing role. But,...in the event that PC is not attending to any world line, then we have the situation described by the Buddhists of nothing but a dot of reality with no time, no consciousness, no movement, nor anything else. It's a mystery where all those thought-structures are then, but then again, in that circumstance there is no "then".

I also doubt that the life of the vehicle is only experienced when PC traverses and attends to its world-line. I'd rather think that the world-lines are not separate from PC.

I agree. This is a reasonable doubt. But I think the problem is nothing more than semantics and is part of the limitation of language that we both acknowledge. What do we mean by 'life' anyway? And what do we mean by 'experience'? And if the world lines are nothing but thought-constructions of PC, then you couldn't really say that they are separate from PC. I don't think we can get much closer using vernacular language.

Have you come across Gurdjieff on free-will? His view was that if we are aware of who we are then we have free-will. If we are not then we are slaves to deterministic (psychophysical) forces. More generally, this is the esoteric view. Thus PC would have freewill but the remote vehicles would not, not unless they were aware of who they are, which in this view would be PC.

I'm not familiar with his work, although I have heard of it. From what you wrote, his view seems consistent with my view of PC. The real question here is, "Who exactly do we think we are?".

But knowledge is not confusion by definition. If it is knowledge it cannot be confusion. What turns into confusion is theory and conjecture, not knowledge. Natural language cannot cope with a wave-particle, but this does prevent us from using them in theories, it just means that the theory has to have two contradictory aspects, just like the doctrine of Sufism. But certain knowledge does not come in form of natural language and theories, from which only provisional knowledge can be derived.

Exactly right! It is only when we try to express knowledge in language that the confusion enters. These attempts at expression are the "explanations" that Dr. Dick has analyzed and it is these that are subject to the constraints he has discovered.

This may just depend on what we mean by omniscience. There is a view that simply knowing who we are is a form of omniscience.

Right again. The view of omniscience as knowing all that can be known is, IMHO, nonsense for the same reasons I tried to argue with MF that any consideration of "all" of any set of possibilities is nonsense. If, however, we consider 'omniscience' to mean knowledge of everything known, then we must ask, "Known to whom?". Of course in my scheme there is only one knower, viz. PC, but in conventional usage we consider that individual humans can "know" in a certain sense. In my view, there is undoubtedly information stored in brain structures, in DNA structures, in libraries, and on hard drives. Should this be considered "known information"? Well, yes, it makes a certain amount of sense to do so. But it complicates the question of what we mean by 'omniscience'.

This takes me to another subject that I have thought and written about, but which I haven't discussed on this forum at all. I have called it the "Transfer of Omniscience" in some of my essays, but I realize that it is bad usage of the term 'omniscience'. Bad usage aside, what I mean is that in the biggest picture of reality there is an oscillation which has the lowest of all frequencies. That oscillation is the transfer of knowledge from PC to the various structures constructed by PC. These structures consist not only of the subordinate Natural Individuals, which vicariously provide PC with experience at that level, but also the "physical" information storage structures in that world of the type I just listed. At the largest scale, knowledge of what can and does go on in the various universes that have been tried out so far, gradually gets encoded into structures in those very universes. PC still has access to the knowledge, but it is increasingly vicarious involving increasingly complex mechanisms for communication. Eventually, all existing knowledge is encoded in physical structures and is available to the Natural Individual(s) at all levels which puts it (them) in a position to try for an even more complex experiment in constructing universes armed with the new knowledge. In a sense this could be seen as PC giving way to the physical Natural Individual and fading into the background. But in another sense, it is simply the addition of another level of remoteness between PC and the developing reality. As the new experiment unfolds (think of a new and different Big Bang) there are no Natural Individuals in the new structure, so all knowledge is now lodged in PC (with the help of the previous structures). Only after much evolution of the new universe does knowledge begin to build up in its structures and thus complete a cycle of oscillation.

I probably shouldn't have gone into that, but your interest and our near agreement sort of pushed the right button and I couldn't help it. Sorry if I put anyone off by going into it.

Yeah. I can't get the hang of the idea that this was a calculated outcome rather than one that is inevitable given the nature of PC. Lao Tsu says the laws come from 'the Tao being what it is'. This makes more sense to me.

I think it was a calculated outcome in exactly the same sense that the Mandelbrot Set is the calculated outcome of Benoit Mandelbrot's investigations of the algorithm he used to define the set. He certainly didn't predict the outcome and probably couldn't have imagined the resulting complexity. But nevertheless it is that algorithm which inevitably produces the complex nature of the set. I think PC constructs universes in exactly the same way. I'd say that the laws come from the Tao, being simply what PC chose them to be.

I'm sorry that you haven't got to grips with Spencer Brown. However, whereas before I couldn't really explain what he was saying I probably can now, although I'm sure he wouldn't think so, so if you want to talk about him some time I'm up for it.

Well, thanks, but I'm too old and tired to get too much deeper into Spencer Brown's math, or even Dick's math for that matter. Since I agree with what I think each of them has developed, I am not motivated to put a lot of effort into understanding it much better. If I were to go back to school and study some math subject, it would be to study the foundations of math seriously. As you know, I have some serious disagreements with most mathematicians in this area and as a result, I am motivated to put some energy into it. One of these years, when some of the pressures on my time are relaxed a little, I fully intend to go back to school and study foundations. I really think they have got some things wrong. But that's another subject.

Good talking with you, Canute.

Warm regards to all and thanks to all those who read these posts.

Paul

 

[Canute]

Dick

I don't understand your maths but seem to agree with much of what you say. I'll check out your's and Paul's link to try and get up to speed.

Paul

If you take another look at what I wrote, you will see that I lumped them together with all other sagacious, prophetic, mystic, wise, enlightened, and otherwise insightful humans that ever existed. And I merely noted that they are subject to the same limitations of language as all the others. These are the same limitations that prevent you and me, or MF and me, or Dr. Dick and me, from eliminating the "almost" that persistently modifies our "agreement". I think we might be as close to agreement as we can get without "going mathematical".

Sorry about this, but I feel our disagreement is more fundamental, not a matter of language at all. But the limitations of language certainly don't help. On the whole I've been too quick to make objections rather than gain a better understanding of your views, a habit of mine. A question then: Do you conclude that the view of the mystics is conjectural? Or do you conclude that they know the facts but cannot communicate them because of language (etc) problems? For a specific case take GSB. Do you think he is guessing or just trying to explain something he knows?

No problem; that's the way I took it. But I should have made myself more clear. I meant to imply that there are actually three ways to see "conscious beings": 1) the conventional way as individual human beings, 2) PC, or the ultimate and only conscious being, which if isolated from all thought-structures would not be conscious of anything at all (meaning that there is no such thing as a "conscious being", (This is when PC is in the state of traversing no world line, and consequently time does not move at all.) and 3) Natural Individuals in the sense of Gregg Rosenberg ...

I never did get the hang of GR's natural individuals. His ideas were too complex for me. Can we leave them out and include everything under 1 and 2?

I think reality is fantastically complex.

I think PC was simplicity itself in the very beginning. I think it evolved to its current complexity during stretches of time prior to our Big Bang that would make our mere 14 billion years only a fleeting moment by comparison.

This states that PC is subject to change and thus time. Do you really mean this? If so I disagree with you. Logically, it seems to me, whatever it is it still is and always will be, beginnless and without end. The idea of 'stretches of time' prior to the BB seems unscientific and logically dubious. The idea that what is fundamental has a beginning seems highly paradoxical to me.

I agree that it does suggest an antinomy, but I think the resolution is in the possibility of multiple temporal dimensions and their relationship to PC's attention.

Well, I'd say time does not flow at all unless someone is paying attention.

But,...in the event that PC is not attending to any world line, then we have the situation described by the Buddhists of nothing but a dot of reality with no time, no consciousness, no movement, nor anything else.It's a mystery where all those thought-structures are then, but then again, in that circumstance there is no "then".

Yeah, this is my problem of PC evolving in time. What time? The thought structures are 'mere appearances' for Buddhists, no more real than pianos and ceiphids. Btw, the Sufis say that the sign of a realized person is that for them there is no time other than the time they are in.

The idea that PC is sometimes paying attention to a world-line and sometimes not would contradict the idea that PC watches every sparrow that falls, thus your view contradicts that of Jesus. This may not bother you, but I suspect he knew what he was talking about. If all is One, as I think you suggest, then how could PC ever not be present?

The real question here is, "Who exactly do we think we are?".

I agree. Although I'd phrase it, 'Who exactly are we? I'd suggest that we can't know this by thinking about who we are, only by being who we are.

Exactly right! It is only when we try to express knowledge in language that the confusion enters. These attempts at expression are the "explanations" that Dr. Dick has analyzed and it is these that are subject to the constraints he has discovered.

I'm still trying to get to grips with his view so can't comment. I mostly agree about expressing knowledge but feel the problem is much more complicated than this. For example, the confusion is not necessarily in the explanation but may be just in the mind of the beholder of the explanation.

If, however, we consider 'omniscience' to mean knowledge of everything known, then we must ask, "Known to whom?". Of course in my scheme there is only one knower, viz. PC,

Exactly. It follows that we could say there is only one thing to know, since all else is logically supervenient on this. In other words, if we know our axiom is true then any further truths and falsities we derive from this axiom are already analytically contained within it.

but in conventional usage we consider that individual humans can "know" in a certain sense.

This may be the ideal starting point from which to disentangle our differences. Russell questioned whether human beings could know anything at all. It is impossible to demonstrate that they can. So how do we know anything? And how do we know we know we know it? Cetainly not by deriving theorems from uncertain axioms. But how can we know our axioms are true? According to Russell we can't. But Russell was a devout non-mystic, and thus could have no theory of knowledge. He assumed that knowledge was the same thing as explanation or proof by demonstration, and this assumption seems to underly some of what you are suggesting, and maybe also Dick. Can you give your views on the relationship between knowledge, proof and explanation? This might clear up some possible misunderstandings. (By 'explanation' I would mean also a description or a theory).

In my view, there is undoubtedly information stored in brain structures, in DNA structures, in libraries, and on hard drives. Should this be considered "known information"? Well, yes, it makes a certain amount of sense to do so.

Not to me. This is provisional information, true of false if, and only if, the axioms from which it is derived are known to be true, and only if we know our reasoning is sound (which of course we never can).

As an experiment try picking one piece of knowledge that you know with absolute certainty and then figure out how you know it. It will not be anything to do with explanations, theories, formal proofs, libraries, hard drives and so on.

This takes me to another subject that I have thought and written about, but which I haven't discussed on this forum at all. I have called it the "Transfer of Omniscience" in some of my essays, but I realize that it is bad usage of the term 'omniscience'. Bad usage aside, what I mean is that in the biggest picture of reality there is an oscillation which has the lowest of all frequencies. That oscillation is the transfer of knowledge from PC to the various structures constructed by PC.

Interesting. Is this the music of the spheres? In my view knowledge cannot transfered. As Zen master Hongzhi puts it, we cannot borrow knowledge. I cannot follow your omnsiscience idea through, partly because I'm still confused about 'natural individuals'. I would point out though that in one view PC is knowledge.

I think it was a calculated outcome in exactly the same sense that the Mandelbrot Set is the calculated outcome of Benoit Mandelbrot's investigations of the algorithm he used to define the set. He certainly didn't predict the outcome and probably couldn't have imagined the resulting complexity. But nevertheless it is that algorithm which inevitably produces the complex nature of the set. I think PC constructs universes in exactly the same way. I'd say that the laws come from the Tao, being simply what PC chose them to be.

As usual I half agree, but I'm sticking with Lao Tsu. I don't think PC constructs universes but rather that they are reified according to GSB's laws, as an inexorable consequence of what PC is. Although this is a sense a mystical view it also seems more scientifically plausible to me.

Well, thanks, but I'm too old and tired to get too much deeper into Spencer Brown's math,

The details of the maths are unimportant to your (and my) interests. The principles on which Brown builds his calculus are all that matter, and these are simple, even with very little knowledge of mathematics. I feel that you must know about these principles in order to solve the problems that arise in your PC theory. This is just an opinion of course. However, for example, these principles overcome your complexity/simplicity problem. They also resolve the dualism/monism antimony that will arise sooner or later as your ideas turn into a formal cosmology.

Now I'll go and check the link you gave. I'd like to discuss this in terms of Dick's proof, since it seems relevant, but I don't understand it yet.

Bye for now
Canute

 

[Canute]

Wow. I just read the introductory essays online at the address you (Paul) posted. I now have 5,867 questions. My interest in your (Dick) approach is this.

I have been trying for a while now to construct a proof that Buddhist doctrine is true. Yes, I know this sounds like a ridiculous project. I have had some success, but want to do better. Other people have succeeded, in my opinion, but their proofs are rather innaccesible. (E.g the complexity of Bradley's, or the Wittgestein-like brevity of Nagarjuna's).

It seems to me that your proof (Dick) might represent one way of doing it. I do not agree with some of your assumptions but that doesn't matter at all. If your proof holds, given the assumptions, then it is a successful proof. Perhaps by showing your proof is a reductio proof of the falsity of your assuptions I can prove that the universe is not consistent with your assumptions but with Buddhist doctrine.

Now, it might sound as if I want to pick holes in your proof, but this is not the case. There's a lot I don't understand about it, but it wouldn't surprise me greatly if it is a proof. If it were, this would be consistent with my view, that what you've proved is true given the assumptions.

So I would really like to understand more about this. I now see why you (Paul) connected this proof with your own ideas. Would you two be prepared to discuss a couple of those essays in detail? I can ask all my questions as they come up and hopefully gain a reasonable understanding of what this is all about. Unfortunately, I will not be able to understand the mathematics, but I'm hoping this won't matter. Can I start a thread? Perhaps I could post one the essays and ask questions arising from them. Or shall we just discuss it here? Or would this be boring for you since you've been talking about it for quite a while?

Canute

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Canute,

Sorry about this, but I feel our disagreement is more fundamental, not a matter of language at all. But the limitations of language certainly don't help.

Well Canute, to the contrary, I think this is about the only thing you wrote in your post with which I disagree. Not that I disagree that you feel that way, but that I disagree that we have a fundamental disagreement. I think the problem is only semantics.

Do you conclude that the view of the mystics is conjectural? Or do you conclude that they know the facts but cannot communicate them because of language (etc) problems?

I think they know some facts but they cannot communicate them because of language problems. I think that when they attempt to articulate what they know in language, they resort to some conjecture in order to make sense of what they know. That conjecture introduces some ambiguity, confusion, and error, and the language compounds the problem.

For a specific case take GSB. Do you think he is guessing or just trying to explain something he knows?

I can only guess at the answer since I am not very familiar with GSB or his work. But my guess is that he does know something (Even I know something; I know that thought happens). The fact that GSB uses the language of mathematics rather than vernacular English to try to explain what he knows (or guesses, as the case may be), is to his credit. I think his conclusions should be credible if he has done his maths right, which I suspect he has.

Speaking of GSB, you didn't comment on whether my assessment of his work is close to being right or not. I said, "I suspect that he might have discovered how all of reality might have evolved (at least the very initial stages) from a knowledge base of only a single bit and only the most rudimentary ability to know, or realize, that that bit existed." Am I far off?

No problem; that's the way I took it. But I should have made myself more clear. I meant to imply that there are actually three ways to see "conscious beings": 1) the conventional way as individual human beings, 2) PC, or the ultimate and only conscious being, which if isolated from all thought-structures would not be conscious of anything at all (meaning that there is no such thing as a "conscious being", (This is when PC is in the state of traversing no world line, and consequently time does not move at all.) and 3) Natural Individuals in the sense of Gregg Rosenberg ...

I never did get the hang of GR's natural individuals. His ideas were too complex for me. Can we leave them out and include everything under 1 and 2?

(Thanks, Dick. I learn a lot from you.)

Yes, we can leave them out. The hierarchy of conscious beings in other worlds is pure speculation on my part. It makes sense to me for several reasons, and I was delighted to learn that GR's notion of Natural Individuals described my imagined hierarchy and its occupants almost exactly. The only difference is that he imbues NIs with consciousness, whereas I claim that all consciousness resides only at the very top NI, viz. PC. So, yes, in reality, 2) is the only case that obtains, but 1) is useful to consider when conducting human affairs (along the lines taught by Nagarjuna, if I understood the lesson correctly). 3) would be useful only if my speculation is correct and if we were trying to explain what might be going on in those other worlds. Those are both huge "ifs" and are good reasons to honor your request to "leave them out".

This states that PC is subject to change and thus time. Do you really mean this? If so I disagree with you.

I'd say 'subject' is too strong of a word. Instead I'd say that PC is capable of change. Not that PC is capable of changing it's fundamental nature, but only in the sense that PC can change its thoughts. PC has free will to attend to particular thoughts or not to attend to any thoughts. If PC is not attending to any thoughts, then there is no change and thus there is no time. This is the state of Nirvana. I think enlightened meditators can achieve this state by eliminating all thoughts from their "mind". I put "mind" in quotes to emphasize the fact that we are not talking about a human mind, but the mind, which is synonymous with PC itself. That is the only mind used by humans anyway.

But,...it is also possible that PC does entertain thoughts and attend to them. (These are the two truths as taught by Nagarguna in the Madhyamaka School.) This thought is the mechanism which produces change, time, physical reality, and everything else that exists. It is only a matter of semantics whether or not you consider these things real. The Madhyamaka School views them as real in order that we can reasonably conduct human affairs. The Yogachara School views them as unreal, because they really are unreal in the physical sense people usually think of reality. I think we all agree (you, me, science, and Buddhism) except for semantics.

Logically, it seems to me, whatever it is it still is and always will be, beginnless and without end.

Yes, I agree. But it must also seem to you that some things change, for example things in our physical world. Those constitute the "two truths".

The idea of 'stretches of time' prior to the BB seems unscientific and logically dubious.

I can't speak for science, but it seems to me that cosmologists are getting awfully close to accepting some notion of time outside of the temporal dimension in our BB generated world. Hawking, for example, talks about "imaginary time".

As for being logically dubious, it depends on how 'time' is defined. In my definition, where time is a parameter marking the progress of PC's attention along some world line, there is no logical reason why all world lines must exist in our BB generated 4D world. Thus there could be world lines traversed by PC in hyperdimensional space defining long stretches of time prior to the BB.

My notion is also consistent with SR in that time is relative to the motion of the clock, or the observer (which in all cases is ultimately PC). If the motion of photons can construct world lines which PC can traverse and attend to (the exact scenario Einstein wondered about when he pondered what it would be like to travel at the speed of light), and if PC does (or did) attend to a particular photon produced by the original CMB radiation, by my definition, no time would have passed for PC from the BB until that photon entered our COBE instrumentation. That is consistent with SR, and it also fairly well describes the Buddhist notion of Nirvana. The whole notion may seem logically dubious at first blush, but I think it makes perfect sense and ties many disparate ideas together.

The idea that what is fundamental has a beginning seems highly paradoxical to me.

It does to me too. But that conundrum appears, as I have said many times, in each and every and all attempts, by philosophers, scientists, theologians, mystics, quacks, and anyone else, to describe the ultimate beginning of reality.

Well, I'd say time does not flow at all unless someone is paying attention.

I agree completely. In my view, there is only one candidate for the "someone" who is paying attention, and that is PC. So my definition of time -- a parameter marking the progress of PC paying attention to a world line -- seems exactly equivalent to what you said here.

Yeah, this is my problem of PC evolving in time. What time? The thought structures are 'mere appearances' for Buddhists, no more real than pianos and ceiphids. Btw, the Sufis say that the sign of a realized person is that for them there is no time other than the time they are in.

Maybe the problem can be fixed by noting that it is not PC that is evolving, but instead only the thoughts of PC evolve. The rest, I think we have already covered.

Can you give your views on the relationship between knowledge, proof and explanation? This might clear up some possible misunderstandings. (By 'explanation' I would mean also a description or a theory).

I'll try. Bear in mind all of the following is prefaced by a big IMHO.

You didn't include 'information' in your list, but I'll add it because I think it plays a role in what we are trying to express. I think Shannon's definition of 'information' is good, but incomplete. He essentially says that information is a difference that makes a difference. He left out the thing or entity or person to whom the difference makes that difference. In my view, there are two types of candidates: information can make a difference to some conscious entity, or it can make a difference to some non-conscious entity. These two match exactly with Gregg Rosenberg's two principles inherent in a Natural Individual.

The receptive principle allows the NI to receive information, and thus to "know". Using this principle, a conscious entity can notice the difference embodied by a bit of information, and thereby come to know that there is that difference. (Of course in my view there is only one such conscious entity, and that is PC).

The effective principle allows information to induce changes which make a difference to non-conscious entities. For example, when two particles interact, the information content of each, such as position, spin, charge, etc., induce changes, and thus make a difference, to the system of particles involved in the interaction. You could say that the other particles "know" about the influential particle, and maybe particles are indeed conscious entities. But I don't think so. I think they are non-conscious entities which are influenced by information that they receive via the effective principle.

As I said somewhere before, I see these two principles as the two sides of the coined word 'realize'. The effective principle (unconsciously) "realizes" physical changes as a result of information flow, and the receptive principle (consciously) "realizes" knowledge in the sense of "knowing" (the acquisition process being "learning") information.

Information can make a difference unconsciously to physical things, and it can make a difference to a conscious entity by adding to its accumulating store of knowledge.

So, to deal with the first of the concepts you asked about, knowledge is information acquired by a conscious entity.

Moving on to "explanation", this is the attempt to express knowledge in language. Langauge is a system of coding which allows for the transfer of knowledge from one conscious entity to another (or to the same one) with a non-conscious medium facilitating the transfer. That transfer may take a long time if the medium is something like a book, or it may not take long if it is patterns in vibrating air.

In order to be effective, i.e. not introduce errors into the transfer, not only must the transmission be error free, but the rules of the language must be unambiguous to the sender and the receiver. Wittgenstein has demonstrated that this last cannot be achieved. So all explanations are thus left with this problem of ambiguity. They are also subject to the limitations and constraints discovered by Dick and expressed in his theorem.

Moving on to "proof", we have at least two types. One is the type used in courtrooms and in ordinary use of language. The ambiguities inherent in language make all such proofs controversial.

The other type is that used in mathematics. The rules of the language of mathematics have been specifically chosen to minimize the ambiguities and errors that are inherent in all languages. In mathematics, (if the rules are followed) all such errors and ambiguities inhere in the undefined primitives and in the chosen axioms. If one assumes that the primitives and the axioms are consistent and make some kind of sense, then one can be assured that the theorems also are consistent and make some kind of sense. But that is all that can be said. Moreover, the assumption can not in principle be verified. In the mathematical context, a proof is simply a demonstration that all the rules have been followed in the derivation of a theorem.

Interesting. Is this the music of the spheres?

I think it is part of the music of the spheres. I think it is the lowest frequency tone. I think the light that Les Sleeth and others talk about is the highese frequency tone. All the rest of reality is composed of tones in between.

In my view knowledge cannot transfered. As Zen master Hongzhi puts it, we cannot borrow knowledge.

I agree. I explained above why I think so.

I cannot follow your omnsiscience idea through, partly because I'm still confused about 'natural individuals'.

I hope that what I have written here helps a little.

I would point out though that in one view PC is knowledge.

Yes, I am aware of that view. However to me there is a distinction between the knower and the known. In fact, it occurs to me that this very distinction may be one of the first ones acquired by PC thus kicking off the evolution according to GSB's formulas.

As usual I half agree, but I'm sticking with Lao Tsu. I don't think PC constructs universes but rather that they are reified according to GSB's laws, as an inexorable consequence of what PC is. Although this is a sense a mystical view it also seems more scientifically plausible to me.

I can't find the half where we disagree. I agree completely with what you said. I don't think PC constructs universes in the usual materialistic sense, but rather, as you said, reifies the chosen concepts in order to construct purely imaginary universes in the sense of Berkeley and of the Buddhists. And, I agree that this reification is done according to GSB's laws as an inexorable consequence of what PC is. I think we agree completely here.

Although this is a sense a mystical view it also seems more scientifically plausible to me.

Me too. Now, if we could only get some scientists to open their minds enough to consider these ideas as real possibilities, they might be able to make some more progress toward an understanding of consciousness, human behavior, the initial BB conditions, the remaining mysteries of biology, etc.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Canute,

Thanks for visiting my website and reading those essays. You have my permission to quote anything there in part or in whole as long as you provide a reference link to where you got them.

I am willing to discuss anything you would like, although I can't defend (or even describe) Dick's results very well. I'm sure he will help us, though.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

OK. But I believe any particular explanation entails assumptions.

You are making the same mistake as Canute. Your comment implies the word "assumption" be defined before one can define an explanation. As I said to Canute, that path leads nowhere except to infinite regression.

And you, with respect, are making the mistake of assuming that explanation can be defined without tautology or infinite regress.

I have not said that one cannot define an explanation in absence of assumptions. The definition of an explanation does not necessarily entail assumptions – it only entails a definition (but try to define a term without using other terms – one ends up either in infinite regress or tautology).

An explanation in absence of any assumption is meaningless. In your paper, you (effectively) define an explanation as a mapping of one set of information (assumptions) to another. Clearly the mapping can exist in absence of the information; but in absence of all information the mapping has no meaning. In other words, the mapping (the explanation) needs to be grounded in information (assumptions) to give it any meaning.

Your statement that we can assume nothing if we really intend to investigate anything honestly would require, in the case of empirical investigation, access to “certain truth” about the world, which I do not think is possible.

I think you are confusing two very different issues. The concept "certain truth" implies you understand something whereas, the concept of explaining what you know need not include understanding of any kind.

I am simply saying that any investigation entails assumptions in the form of information. I have said nothing about understanding. You seem to claim that investigation is possible without any assumptions (information).

That is to say, you are presupposing an understanding of what that is about the world you do have access to.

I am presupposing nothing of the kind. I am saying that to investigate anything we must start with information. Nothing in this entails understanding.

I, on the other hand, am simply stating that whatever it is that you have access to, in the initial state, you certainly don't understand any of it; a totally different statement.

You, on the other hand, seem to be saying that one does not need anything at all in the “initial state”.

Would you go so far as to propose we have access to nothing about the world? That's pure Solipsism.

You seem to have the wrong end of the stick. I am saying just the opposite – what we have access to is information.

I tend to agree with your point that an explanation may be a very fundamental concept – after the concept of information.

Again, you head down that path of infinite regression. Exactly how do you propose to explain to me your concept of information without understanding "an explanation"?

Is infinite regress worse than tautology? Your own definition of an “explanation" is “a method of obtaining expectations from given known information”, and your definition of “information” is “what it is that we want our explanation to explain”. Not very enlightening, is it?

If we define an explanation as a mapping between two or more sets of information then it is the information which is fundamental.

No because now you must define "a mapping", various sets of information and, explain these things. They cannot be more basic than the concept of an explanation.

And your definition of explanation is “a method of obtaining expectations from given known information” – can you define “method”, “expectations”, “given”, “known” and “information” without either tautology or infinite regress?

“Nothing is all that is required”? I believe in an underlying (ontic) reality, I cannot bring myself to believe that the phenomenal world of our experience is based on absolutely nothing.

You just said above that "access to 'certain truth' is not possible. If that is the case, then what is your belief in the phenomenal world based on? I think that your thinking is embedded in that issue of infinite regression; essentially in the idea that some construct representing reality which was created by your subconscious is the starting point for your analysis. I want you to step back and consider the problem of generating that construct.

One can believe that there is an underlying reality, and at the same time deny that it is possible to know with certainty what that reality is. This does not involve any contradiction.

I fail to see how you can generate the phenomenal world from “nothing” – if this is indeed what you are saying?

This defines a set of points in 3D space, and an explanation is then interpreted as a mapping of one finite subset of such points to another finite subset. Correct? This seems quite reasonable and straightforward.

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.

Ooops, there it is again. I thought the concept of explanation was fundamental, and did not require any prior concept of information?

The "given known information" is represented by a set of points in that [x,tau,t ] space. …… Is it not the result of discovering a method of predicting consistent expectations based on given known information (the nerve activity previously detected)?

“given known information”? I thought explanation preceded everything? Why then must information be “given”?

"[Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob] Frege is... He published no more after that."

This shows simply that we cannot answer all possible questions about the naïve idea of the set of all sets (ie some questions are unanswerable). Naïve set theory was superceded by various axiomatic set theories (of which Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory is the most well known) which avoid Russell’s paradox. Godel later showed that no system of set theory can be shown to be both consistent and complete, but even this does not entail paradox. It entails only that the set of all logical possibilities cannot be shown to be complete if we also wish it to be consistent. What does this mean? It means simply that the set of all logical possibilities cannot be a complete set.

From that I think we should learn that not only is nothing in reality infinite, but that any notion that includes infinity should be excluded from mathematics because it will drag inconsistencies with it.

One cannot legislate against the question that Russell asked. One cannot simply say “we will prohibit consideration of infinite sets” and then blindly hope the paradox goes away. The problem highlighted by Russell remains – there are some questions which cannot be answered. Even if legislation is introduced to exclude infinity from mathematics, one can still ask the question “is the class of all classes that are not members of themselves a member of itself?”, and the question is still unanswerable.

Why does this lead to the notion that nothing is infinite?

I think we cannot reasonably claim that anything is infinite unless and until we clearly define the term 'infinite'. …… If there are other definitions for 'infinity' which do not introduce contradictions, I am unaware of any of them.

I have my own thoughts about the paradoxes introduced by the concept of infinity in conventional number theory – it has to do not with the concept of infinity itself, but with the rather strange notion that mathematicians seem to have of an integer. For some strange reason, in conventional number theory we choose to define an integer as an arbitrarily large number, with every integer representable by a finite string of digits. But it is impossible to uniquely identify every member of an infinite set with finite strings, which implies that an infinite set of integers must contain members of infinite length, which in turn contradicts the definition of an integer.

Are you saying that the laws of physics (as opposed to the laws of mathematics) are logically necessary, entailed by the condition of consistency?

Yes. I am convinced that Dr. Dick has proved this to be the case.

I haven’t seen it myself.

IMHO, his work should be classified as a theorem of mathematics. I see it as a greatly generalized Noether's Theorem. She proved that symmetry implies conservation laws; Dr. Dick proved that consistency implies all the laws of physics.

Where has he done this?

Thus the PC does not create the laws of mathematics or the laws of physics; whatever the PC does, it does under the constraint of these laws? Is this what you are saying?

Not exactly. PC chooses this constraint by choosing to remain consistent. The constraint itself has two components: 1) there is the self-imposed constraint of the willful decision and resolve to abide by the rules of consistency, and 2) there are the constraints which are implicit in the logical consequences of sticking to the chosen rules. It is this second component which has been analyzed by Dr. Dick.

OK, so the PC makes a choice, and thereafter the PC is constrained by the laws of mathematics and physics, yes? Apart from “making the choice to be consistent”, the PC does not actually create these laws, the laws follow on as a necessary consequence of the PC’s consistency decision?

This is logically equivalent to you choosing to play chess. You willfully decide to play chess and to abide by the rules. If you do, then one consequential constraint is that your rook cannot move diagonally. If PC chooses to violate the constraint of remaining consistent, then inconsistencies will result. Since (we suppose) our physical universe is consistent, we can conclude that PC chose not to violate the constraint with respect to our physical universe.

This indeed seems to confirm that the PC does not actually create the laws, the laws follow on as a necessary consequence of the PC’s consistency decision. Correct?

How does the PC choose this at the outset, when it has nothing (no logic) to work with?

Good question. Maybe George Spencer-Brown or Chris Langan has worked out the details of how this evolved. My guess is that it developed slowly. The notions of logical consequence and consistency would have to be worked out way ahead of any such choice. It might have started by PC imagining and constructing many "bit sets", noticing patterns, making definitions, testing algorithms, etc.

OK, so the first thing the PC did was in fact NOT that it chose to be consistent. It first had to experiment with many different possibilities, until it gained enough information about the world to then make a rational decision to be consistent?

When I ponder how this might have happened, it seems like the possibility of inventing music might have happened early in the process……. Of course you know this is all speculation. But then, I think that in your question, you asked me to speculate.

It seems that your PC is becoming less and less primordial as we go along. We are already now speculating about some kind of background environment in which the PC learns (about logic, consistency etc), and we also seem to think that the laws of logics, mathematics and physics are constrained to be necessary by virtue of consistency, quite independent of the experimentation by the PC.

Being the first to discover something does not mean that one has invented that something. Or are you defining “invention” as “to discover something for the first time”?

I think it is a little more complicated than that. If the invention is the adoption of some arbitrary set of rules, then there may be some implications of following those rules. Those implications may not be known at the time the rules are adopted but may be discovered later as the implications of following the rules play out. So whether you call the first instance of such an implication a discovery, or part of the invention, I think is merely semantics. The rules are invented; the consequences are discovered by deciding to follow the rules.

We’ll have to agree to disagree. To me, all invention is simply a particular form of discovery.

which implies that these things exist prior to the PC’s choice of whether to be consistent or not.

No. That is not implied. As you said, "everything else follows" which does not imply pre-existence.

If the PC supervenes on, and does not create, the laws of logic and of mathematics, then it follows that these laws EITHER exist prior to the PC coming along, OR that they spontaneously come into existence at the moment of creation of the PC. Which?

No, I don't see a contradiction. PC is constrained only by the consequences of the rules it has chosen after making them up out of whole cloth.

But you have just said that the PC supervenes on the laws of logic and mathematics. Now it seems you are saying the reverse.

Dick showed that if consistency is chosen, laws of physics constrain the evolution of physical objects and relationships.

Sorry, where has he shown this?

What comes first – the constraint imposed by the rule, or the making up of the rule?

Good question, but I'd say the making up of the rule comes "first".

But this implies that the rules (of logic and mathematics) supervene on the PC, not the other way about (which is the reverse of what you agreed above).

This gets into the messy arena of time. The notion of "first" makes sense only in the context of one specific temporal dimension.

OK, I shall try to avoid reference to time by using supervenience instead. Do the rules supervene on the PC, or does the PC supervene on the rules? (you seem to have claimed both so far).

And having chosen to be consistent, the PC is now constrained to working within the set of consistent rules.

Yes. You have stated a tautology here which must obviously be true.

Not if the PC creates the rules. If the PC creates the rules of consistency then it is not constrained to anything in particular. You clearly do not believe the PC creates the rules, therefore the statement is (to you) tautological.

IMHO PC "creates" by thinking that it creates, as you seem to imply.

That is interesting. Perhaps the PC only thinks that it is inventing as well?

but in fact whether a rule that the PC thinks it has created is consistent or not is already determined before the PC thinks about it.

No more than the rules for how a free throw is to be conducted was already determined before the game of basketball was invented or thought about.

The analogy rests on the fact that the rules of basketball are logically contingent and not necessary - someone invented or “made up” the rules of basketball.
Are you now saying the rules of logic and mathematics are contingent and not necessary, and that the PC invented or “made up” the rules?

Given the constraint of operating in 2 dimensional Euclidean space (where by Euclidean space I mean the space complies with the 5 axioms of Euclid’s geometry, including the parallel postulate), do you think the PC could create a right-angled triangle where the cube of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the cubes of the other two sides?

No. But PC is not necessarily given that Euclidean constraint when it comes to constructing universes.

Understood (the Euclidean constraint is not a law, it is an assumption or axiom – as I keep pointing out to Dick, we cannot make any progress without assumptions), but the fact remains (if I now understand you correctly) that the laws of mathematics are not under the PC’s control. This is where the analogy with basketball falls down. The PC is free to create/invent/make up any law of basketball as it feels like, but the PC is not free to create/invent/make up the laws of mathematics “as it feels like”.

Good talking with you, MF. Sorry for the delay; we had a death in the family.

Very sorry to hear that – my condolences and best wishes

That is to say, an explanation of consciousness, awareness, intelligence, thought or any complex phenomena, if it is to be valid, must be expressible in terms of fundamental entities obeying what we have come to call the "laws of physics".

Sorry, but that doesn’t seem much of an insight to me – that any valid explanation must be expressible in terms of entities “obeying” what we have come to call the “laws of physics”? I could have told you that (though I would stop short of using the word “obey”).

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

Well Canute, to the contrary, I think this is about the only thing you wrote in your post with which I disagree. Not that I disagree that you feel that way, but that I disagree that we have a fundamental disagreement.

What confuses me is that you agree with me far more often than I agree with you. Never mind, it'll all come out in the wash.

The fact that GSB uses the language of mathematics rather than vernacular English to try to explain what he knows (or guesses, as the case may be), is to his credit. I think his conclusions should be credible if he has done his maths right, which I suspect he has.

Actually he says most of what's important in prose. For example:

From 'Laws of Form' -G. S. Brown

"The position is simply this. In ordinary algebra, complex values are accepted as a matter of course, and the more advanced techniques would be impossible without them. In Boolean algebra (and thus, for example, in all our reasoning processes) we disallow them. Whitehead and Russell introduced a special rule, which they called the Theory of Types, expressly to do so. Mistakenly, as it now turns out. So, in this field, the more advanced techniques, although not impossible, simply don’t yet exist. At the present moment we are constrained, in our reasoning processes, to do it the way it was done in Aristotle’s day."

[However, says Brown, we need not be so constrained.]

"What we do … is extend the concept to Boolean algebras, which means that a valid argument may contain not just three classes of statement, but four: true, false, meaningless and imaginary. The implications of this, in the fields of logic, philosophy, mathematics, and even physics, are profound."

That pretty much says it all for me.

Speaking of GSB, you didn't comment on whether my assessment of his work is close to being right or not. I said, "I suspect that he might have discovered how all of reality might have evolved (at least the very initial stages) from a knowledge base of only a single bit and only the most rudimentary ability to know, or realize, that that bit existed." Am I far off?

In my opinion (!) this is not quite right, but not far off. It's the 'rudimentary ability to know' that bothers me. Also, the term 'existed' here would be incorrect. The existence/non-existence distinction is ultimately a category error in Brown's view (and Nagarjuna's).

But,...it is also possible that PC does entertain thoughts and attend to them. (These are the two truths as taught by Nagarguna in the Madhyamaka School.)

Do you mean by this that PC thinks and not-thinks, depending on how you look at it?

The Madhyamaka School views them as real in order that we can reasonably conduct human affairs. The Yogachara School views them as unreal, because they really are unreal in the physical sense people usually think of reality.

Are you sure? The Middle Way doctrine states that mental and corporeal phenomena are 'empty', in the sense that they have no essence or inherent existence. As far as I know this goes for all schools, but I have not looked into them all so may be wrong. My feeling is that to think otherwise would contradict the sutras, which none of the schools knowingly do.

I can't speak for science, but it seems to me that cosmologists are getting awfully close to accepting some notion of time outside of the temporal dimension in our BB generated world. Hawking, for example, talks about "imaginary time".

Yes, but then Edward Lear talks about jaberwockies.

I just can't get the hang of the idea of time outside spacetime or stretches of time 'prior' to the beginning of spacetime.

It does to me too. But that conundrum appears, as I have said many times, in each and every and all attempts, by philosophers, scientists, theologians, mystics, quacks, and anyone else, to describe the ultimate beginning of reality.

What conundrum? The idea that what is fundamental is beginnless? I should have thought this very reasonable. Bear in mind that for Brown and Nagarjuna it is incorrect to say that what is fundamental exists. For the latter emptiness itself is empty. This puts a different complexion on the 'beginning' question.

I agree completely. In my view, there is only one candidate for the "someone" who is paying attention, and that is PC. So my definition of time -- a parameter marking the progress of PC paying attention to a world line -- seems exactly equivalent to what you said here.
Maybe the problem can be fixed by noting that it is not PC that is evolving, but instead only the thoughts of PC evolve.

I'm ok with that. (However, I'm going along with your idea of PC here. In reality I suspect it's not quite the right idea or, rather, a slightly misleading term). Also, sticking to your metaphors, I can't see how a world-line can exist unless someone is paying attention to it.

I think it is part of the music of the spheres. I think it is the lowest frequency tone. I think the light that Les Sleeth and others talk about is the highese frequency tone. All the rest of reality is composed of tones in between.

Hmm. Sounds like the emanations of Krishna. I have no thoughts on this one.

However to me there is a distinction between the knower and the known. In fact, it occurs to me that this very distinction may be one of the first ones acquired by PC thus kicking off the evolution according to GSB's formulas.

Yes, here I do agree, and I suspect Brown might also. Equivalently, this distinction may be between self and other, or subject and object. True knowledge, however, would be the identity of these dualities. This takes us on to knowledge, proof etc. I struggled a bit with your outline of these things, so I'll give my view and see what you think.

Information - as per your view (Shannon et al. - differences that make a difference). However in order for information to exist an information space must exist. The space cannot exist prior to the information nor vice versa. Thus there is something inherently paradoxical about the notion that information is all that exists. (Imo this is Chalmers' problem with his double-aspect theory of information/consciousness - do you know this? It is very relevant to your ideas). This seems also to be a problem for Dick, unless I have misunrstood something, since only information can be represented by numbers, not the space within which it arises, which is Brown's nondual void.

Proof - For me there are four kinds of proof. Inference by induction or deduction, and abduction (in C. S. Peirce's and Sherlock Holmes's sense - as infererence to the best explanation, ideally the only one not falsified). The fourth would be proof by direct experience, which might be called verification or ostensive proof. This latter is Aristotle's knowledge by identity.

Knowledge - Two kinds, relative and absolute. Relative knowledge (provisional, contingent) would be that 2 + 2 =4, or that the Earth orbits the sun. Absolute knowledge would be knowledge by identity, e.g. the unfalsifiability of solipsism, the 'I am' of the Sufis, the void spoken of by Brown).

Explanation (theory, description etc) - a formal system of terms and symbols in which relative truths and falsities are demonstrated to be derivable from axioms. The axioms may be postulates or they may be known facts. ('Known facts' would have to be absolute knowledge). Explanations would normally be subject to the limits of the incompletenss theorem. No explanation could communicate certain knowledge, although they may point towards it, or explain where it can be found.

What do you think?

I can't find the half where we disagree. I agree completely with what you said. I don't think PC constructs universes in the usual materialistic sense, but rather, as you said, reifies the chosen concepts in order to construct purely imaginary universes in the sense of Berkeley and of the Buddhists. And, I agree that this reification is done according to GSB's laws as an inexorable consequence of what PC is.

Perhaps it's a matter of language. The way you speak of PC sometimes suggests Creationism to me, that PC creates universes by intention and lays down the laws by which they will evolve. But if spacetime universes follow directly from what is, then no intention or will can be involved.

I've thought about our agreement/disagreement. The notion of nonduality or advaita seems to be missing from your view, yet it is central for Brown, Lao Tsu, Bradley, Buddha etc. (and could be said to be one meaning of 'Middle Way'). Perhaps this is the source of the problem. Could this be it?

For example, I think you said that your position is dualism.(?) Yet (metaphysical) dualism is false in mysticism, so is monism and pluralism. If your view is any of these three then we have a fundamental disgreement. (Hooray -there's nothing to talk about if we don't disagree)

I see I still write too much. Sorry.

Regards
Canute