The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach

[Scientific Method]

The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, by Christof Koch

"Product Description:
Consciousness is one of science’s last great unsolved mysteries. How can the salty taste and crunchy texture of potato chips, the unmistakable smell of dogs after they have been in the rain, or the exhilarating feeling of hanging on tiny fingerholds many feet above the last secure foothold on a cliff, emerge from networks of neurons and their associated synaptic and molecular processes? In The Quest for Consciousness, Caltech neuroscientist Christof Koch explores the biological basis of the subjective mind in animals and people. He outlines a framework that he and Francis Crick (of the "double helix") have constructed to come to grips with the ancient mind-body problem. At the heart of their framework is a sustained, empirical approach to discovering and characterizing the neuronal correlates of consciousness – the NCC – the subtle, flickering patterns of brain activity that underlie each and every conscious experience."

 

[Canute]

Is there a question? If you want comments mine would be that the idea of NCC's is considered incoherent by many philosophers of mind, and that the last half sentence is as yet no more than a convenient assumption.

 

[Scientific Method]

Is there a question? If you want comments mine would be that the idea of NCC's is considered incoherent by many philosophers of mind, and that the last half sentence is as yet no more than a convenient assumption.

Philosophers of mind are not scientists or empiricists, they are just philosophers: free mental ponderings with no tangible evidence for the most part. On the other hand, this book is highly regarded in the scientific community, not that this automatically means its valid, but rather because the book uses the Scientific Method.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Philosophers of mind are not scientists or empiricists, they are just philosophers: free mental ponderings with no tangible evidence for the most part. On the other hand, this book is highly regarded in the scientific community, not that this automatically means its valid, but rather because the book uses the Scientific Method.

Scientists are not philosophers, they are just scientists free of . . . (I won't insult the scientists here by imitating your superficial evaluation).

Consider that keyboard you write on. Say your key strokes and your computer screen were all an alien in another universe could pick up about us from there. Because he could show a correspondence between the key strokes and the resulting actions on the screen, he concludes the keyboard is the source of the screen materials. In a way he'd be correct because the keys are necessary to what happens on the screen. But he'd be wrong in a bigger sense because he'd overlooked the consciousness choosing the keystrokes.

The theory Koch and Crick are presenting is nothing new. Everybody knows there is a correlation between conscious activity and the brain. It still doesn't solve the hard problem does it? And you can't prove that consciousness isn't simply associated with and assisted by the brain (i.e., rather than caused by the brain).

Yes, you can say the brain can be stimulated here or there and it produces corresponding behavior or experience in the human. But I can say, well, what if you were playing several electric instruments at once -- a harmonica, guitar, a bass drum with your foot, and tamborines between your butt cheeks -- and I gave you an electric jolt through each instrument, and as a result you blew the harmonica, or hit the drum, or struck the guitar, etc., would you claim music is being created by those instruments? Yes there is a direct relationship between the instruments and behavior in areas of the body, but that doesn't explain everything that is going on with the creation of music.

That's what all the mechanistic genuises keep insisting . . . that because you can explain the mechanics or the chemistry, you have explained everything. It almost seems like you don't realize you are the consciousness part of the body, but instead believe you are the computing part of the brain you (consciousness) are using to analyze everything.

 

[Scientific Method]

I am biased towards Occam's razor: I will choose the simplest scientific explanation with the most predictive value, not intricate unprovable philosophical ponderings of why something may happen.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am biased towards Occam's razor: I will choose the simplest scientific explanation with the most predictive value, not intricate unprovable philosophical ponderings of why something may happen.

Occam's razor can be a cover for someone's dubious strategy to win a debate. Let's see why someone would want to over-simplify a situation.

Consider the authoritarian father who insists hard, uncompromising discipline will make a man of his son. The mother tries to get the father to understand that his rigidity is freaking out his son, and that there are sensitive aspects to a child, male or female, worth preserving. The father says, "nonsense, you have to be tough to survive, so there is no room for sensitivy." His Occam's razor is designed to trim anything that doesn't meet his definition of a manly human, and not to get to the truth.

Similarly, your razor is designed to shave off all non-mechanistic aspects of humanness so you don't have to account for them. Nice try, but too many people have already noticed they exist.

 

[Scientific Method]

Consider the authoritarian father who insists hard, uncompromising discipline will make a man of his son. The mother tries to get the father to understand that his rigidity is freaking out his son, and that there are sensitive aspects to a child, male or female, worth preserving. The father says, "nonsense, you have to be tough to survive, so there is no room for sensitivy." His Occam's razor is designed to trim anything that doesn't meet his definition of a manly human, and not to get to the truth.

This is a poor example, too much subjectivity. Instead, provide an example of two explanations for a certain phenomena: one explanation being a scientific theory that was made theory because it adhered to the scientific method, and then another philosophical/supernatural explanation that has no evidence, no predictive value, and basically no scientific backing. Which explanation is then closer to "truth"?

, your razor is designed to shave off all non-mechanistic aspects of humanness so you don't have to account for them.

"non-mechanical aspects," or in other words, the supernatural. So, you believe people should explain the brain not based on mechanical processes, but based on supernatural explanations, like "The Force" from Star Wars or Christian divine intervention. Well, if that is how you choose to live, you do have that legal right. Personally though, superstition does nothing for me, rather, it's the scientific mechanical aspects that makes my life good: cars, planes, computers, medicine, the internet, etc. are all created by scientific/mechanical aspects, not supernatural explanations.

Nice try, but too many people have already noticed they exist.

Yes, many claim to have seen ghosts, UFOs, Big Foot, Chupacabras, Greys, etc. Who knows, I suppose . . .

 

[Les Sleeth]

"non-mechanical aspects," or in other words, the supernatural. So, you believe people should explain the brain not based on mechanical processes, but based on supernatural explanations, like "The Force" from Star Wars or Christian divine intervention. Well, if that is how you choose to live, you do have that legal right. Personally though, superstition does nothing for me, rather, it's the scientific mechanical aspects that makes my life good: cars, planes, computers, medicine, the internet, etc. are all created by scientific/mechanical aspects, not supernatural explanations.

I don't know what you talking about. The alternative to mechanistic/physicalistic models doesn't have to be supernaturalism. You might want to study up on the the physicalist-nonphysicalist debate.

 

[Canute]

This is a poor example, too much subjectivity. Instead, provide an example of two explanations for a certain phenomena: one explanation being a scientific theory that was made theory because it adhered to the scientific method, and then another philosophical/supernatural explanation that has no evidence, no predictive value, and basically no scientific backing. Which explanation is then closer to "truth"?

Whichever of them is more true of course.

Could you explain why you think a theory that consciousness is not caused by brains is less likely to be correct than the opposite theory? Ockam's razor is no use here since each theory contains the same number of hypothetical entities. Also, as science has no theory of consciousness then as yet there's nothing to which you can apply it.

So, you believe people should explain the brain not based on mechanical processes, but based on supernatural explanations, like "The Force" from Star Wars or Christian divine intervention.

What is about those who espouse scientism that leads them to class every other opinion as theism or supernaturalism? It baffles me. Can't you see that there are other options?

Well, if that is how you choose to live, you do have that legal right. Personally though, superstition does nothing for me, rather, it's the scientific mechanical aspects that makes my life good: cars, planes, computers, medicine, the internet, etc. are all created by scientific/mechanical aspects, not supernatural explanations.

We're not talking about your materialist preferences, but whether physics can explain consciousness. It's no good just saying that it can, or just mischaracterising all other explanations as superstitious or supernatural.

Yes, many claim to have seen ghosts, UFOs, Big Foot, Chupacabras, Greys, etc. Who knows, I suppose . . .

The discussion will go better if you stop inventing silly objections and make an argument.

 

[loseyourname]

The theory Koch and Crick are presenting is nothing new. Everybody knows there is a correlation between conscious activity and the brain. It still doesn't solve the hard problem does it? And you can't prove that consciousness isn't simply associated with and assisted by the brain (i.e., rather than caused by the brain).

Weren't they the first to provide evidence that 40 Hz brain activity is that which is accessible to consciousness. If I recall correctly, I think all they were trying to do was to figure out and describe the mechanisms responsible for making certain information accessible and putting it together to form a coherent conscious moment. I'm pretty sure they acknowledge that they don't even touch on the hard problem. It isn't like their work is of no value here.

 

[Scientific Method]

I don't know what you talking about. The alternative to mechanistic/physicalistic models doesn't have to be supernaturalism. You might want to study up on the the physicalist-nonphysicalist debate.

Keeping an open mind, I will be willing to read whatever proof you have to offer that super-natural forces play a part in the human brain.

Also, can you please take the time to give a good explanation of what non-physicalist is and what proof or rational arguments exist for this claim.

Thanks

 

[Doctordick]

Philosophy in the absence of scientific knowledge is mental masturbation.

At the heart of their framework is a sustained, empirical approach to discovering and characterizing the neuronal correlates of consciousness – the NCC – the subtle, flickering patterns of brain activity that underlie each and every conscious experience."

Together with this is a considerable volume of research related to brain damage of specific areas of the brain. There are many examples of very limited damage which yield very specific and bazaar consequences in behavior which, under conventional ideas interpretation of human behavior, could only be described as insane.

For example, if a patient has damage to his angular gyrus in the left hemisphere, he can no longer do arithmetic though he has no trouble seeing or identifying numbers correctly. He can converse fluently and will appear intelligent in all normal respects; however, he will not be able to add or subtract simple one digit numbers. This is only one of a large number of observable bazaar consequences of specific limited brain damage, many of which are directly related to awareness itself.

If the philosophers cannot explain these bazaar relations, how can intelligent people take them seriously.

Have fun – Dick

 

[Canute]

Doctordick

I really think you should do some reading on these issues. The relationship between science and philosophy is far more subtle than you seem to think, and in the end they cannot be considered separate modes of enquiry, but interdependent ones.

On consciousness you're way off. If the issues were as simple as you say they are then there wouldn't be a scientific 'problem of consciousness'. Professional scientists and philosophers are not such fools that they haven't considered the arguments that you're making here. They have considered them thoroughly and they don't work. Certainly you can't just say that doing things to brains affects conscious experience and this proves that consciousness is explicable by neuroscience. Would that it were so simple.

If you doubt this then try coming up with a means by which a we could demonstrate scientifically that consciousnesas exists, or coming up with a scientific definition of it. You'll find yourself in trouble almost immediately.

Crick, for instance, finds the definition problem so hard that he proposes that scientists should not try to define it until they know what it is. In the meantime we're stuck with 'what it is like', which is not a scientific definition.

At this time it is not necessary for anybody to prove that conscious has a non-physicalist explanation. Rather it is up to scientists to prove it possible that it could have a strictly physicalist explanation, whatever the technical details. So far all attempts have failed. They will always fail, because you cannot explain the existence of something using a method that is not capable of showing that the thing exists.

 

[Doctordick]

And I should take you seriously?

I am sorry but you people invariably misinterpret what I say. I really wonder if it is real misunderstanding or intentional misrepresentation.

The relationship between science and philosophy is far more subtle than you seem to think, and in the end they cannot be considered separate modes of enquiry, but interdependent ones.

Just what did you think the import of

If the philosophers cannot explain these bazaar relations, how can intelligent people take them seriously.

was if it wasn't exactly the importance of interdependence? And where did you get this idea that I have some position on "consciousness". In my head that is an open (and not a very well defined issue) Your comment, "On consciousness you're way off." implies you understand my position and nothing could be further from the truth. And exactly what issues do you think I oversimplify when anything I say seems to be too complex for anyone here to follow?

If the issues were as simple as you say they are then there wouldn't be a scientific 'problem of consciousness'. Professional scientists and philosophers are not such fools that they haven't considered the arguments that you're making here. They have considered them thoroughly and they don't work.

No one on Earth has made the slightest attempt to understand what I say and they certainly haven't "considered [my ideas] thoroughly"! They haven't considered them at all!

Certainly you can't just say that doing things to brains affects conscious experience and this proves that consciousness is explicable by neuroscience.

If you would take the trouble to read what I say, you wouldn't find such a stupid comment anywhere in my work.

If you doubt this then try coming up with a means by which a we could demonstrate scientifically that consciousnesas exists, or coming up with a scientific definition of it.

Whose position are you arguing anyway? This forum is just chock full of people who presume the issue is obvious (apparently you included); and that is explicitly not me!

Crick, for instance, finds the definition problem so hard that he proposes that scientists should not try to define it until they know what it is. In the meantime we're stuck with 'what it is like', which is not a scientific definition.

Then philosophers are not constrained to define what they are talking about? Have you ever heard of Cotard's syndrome? People with it think they are dead. It is very resistant to intellectual correction. All contrary evidence is warped in whatever way is necessary to maintain their belief. Their emotions override their intellect. It very much reminds me of the intellectual level of this forum.

At this time it is not necessary for anybody to prove that conscious has a non-physicalist explanation. Rather it is up to scientists to prove it possible that it could have a strictly physicalist explanation, whatever the technical details.

Then you are specifically saying that it is impossible that consciousness could have a physicalist (whatever that is) explanation. And your support for that position is that it is "up to scientists to prove it possible" or it must be impossible. "So far all attempts have failed", therefore it cannot be done! Boy, is that intellectually deep.

They will always fail, because you cannot explain the existence of something using a method that is not capable of showing that the thing exists.

I think you had better define "exists" before you make such a sweeping statement as that!

Have fun (as I am sure you are ) -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

Keeping an open mind, I will be willing to read whatever proof you have to offer that super-natural forces play a part in the human brain.

Also, can you please take the time to give a good explanation of what non-physicalist is and what proof or rational arguments exist for this claim.

Thanks

I appreciate your openness, but I most definitely am not suggesting that if there is something nonphysical which is significant to consciousness, it is "super" natural. If you follow the debates around here on the "hard problem" of consciousness, you'll get a sense of what isn't currently explained by brain physiology alone. Some of us believe there is "something more" needed to explain consciousness, but what the something more is . . . well, there isn't much consensus about it yet. Personally I am convinced there is "something more" and that it is natural in that it has to work through principles, order, gradual evolution, etc. and cannot circumvent them. So I don't believe supernatural is possible.

 

[Scientific Method]

Can anyone post examples of justifications that there is a non-physical aspect to consciousness?

A way I think for us to study consiousness is for scientists to stick probes in someone's brain and send shocks and see how the person responds. The human brain is modular, different parts do different things. Consciousness is said to have many different brain modules working together.

Also, what if consciousness is replicated on a computer and the computer thinks it's alive and is aware of its self-existance? Would you suggest that there is a non-physical aspect to it, instead of just saying that the consciousness is the result of the interaction between the hardware and software?

 

[Scientific Method]

Here is a good book explaining the evolution and biological correlates of consciousness: http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/wit.htm

And here is a book explaining why many philosophers believe that supernatural forces play a part in the human brain: http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/GodGene.htm

Cheers!

 

[ThoughtExperiment]

Can anyone post examples of justifications that there is a non-physical aspect to consciousness?

When you say "non-physical" does that mean something not bound by physical law? What one generally means by that is there can be an effect without cause. Example: creation of matter or energy, or something which defies known physical laws.

Some people have suggested quantum phenomena may have something to do with consciousness. Is that "non-physical"? I don't think so, though it may not be strictly computational.

The thought experiment I posted points to a possibility that consciousness is not strictly computational, but that doesn't mean "non-physical".

And here is a book explaining why many philosophers believe that supernatural forces play a part in the human brain:

The problem with supernatural forces is that it will never explain anything. And also, throughout history, religious leaders have tried to sell the concept of the supernatural (ex: creationism) and yet we find so much can be explained if we only apply the scientific method. Why stop now? Why stop because we haven't figured out consciousness yet?

The use of supernatural explanations only puts a roadblock at the end of each path we might otherwise go down in search of the truth.

 

[Canute]

Can anyone post examples of justifications that there is a non-physical aspect to consciousness?

How many do you want? Here's a few.

1. The existence of qualia
2. The inability of science to show that C is a purely physical phenomenon
3. The intractibility of the hard problem
4. The pain in my foot
5. The explanatory gaps in the scientific model of the universe
6. The existence of metaphysics
7. The ability of sentient beings to know things that cannot be proved
8. The scientists who argue that consciousness is not a scientific topic
9. The inability of science to prove that consciousness exists
10. The many people who argue that C can be reduced to matter
11. The inability of scientists to reduce consciousness to matter
11. The unfalsifiability of solipsism
12. The unfalsifiability of Taoism, Buddhism, Sufism, Advaita, etc.
13. The fact that I can imagine an elephant without my brain being crushed
14. And so on ad infinitum

 

[selfAdjoint]

How many do you want? Here's a few.

1. The existence of qualia

Not demonstrated.

2. The inability of science to show that C is a purely physical phenomenon

God of the gaps.

3. The intractibility of the hard problem

Only for those who believe there is one.

4. The pain in my foot

I have pain in my foot too, doesn't prove qualia.

5. The explanatory gaps in the scientific model of the universe

Again god of the gaps, plus I'll bet you think there are more gaps than there are.

6. The existence of metaphysics

Scuse me? Astrology exists too.

7. The ability of sentient beings to know things that cannot be proved

Penrose? This has been heavily criticised and even he isn't pushing it anymore.

8. The scientists who argue that consciousness is not a scientific topic

Some do, some don't. Cherry picking.

[/quote]9. The inability of science to prove that consciousness exists[/quote]

Just a rehash of #2. Same reply.

10. The many people who argue that C can be reduced to matter

Sorry? This is what you claim?

11. The inability of scientists to reduce consciousness to matter

Ah I see. 10 and 11 are one reason. Once more the god of the gaps. The current state of science is a contigent accident and proves nothing (aka god of the gaps).

11. The unfalsifiability of solipsism

Aw come on. This proves it? Why not drag in deja vu as well?

12. The unfalsifiability of Taoism, Buddhism, Sufism, Advaita, etc.

Or Astrology, Witchcraft, Ritual Magick, and UFOs.

13. The fact that I can imagine an elephant without my brain being crushed

This is entirely explainable in terms of neuronal representations (except you will say the qualia isn't but that in this case is petitio principi).

14. And so on ad infinitum

Yes, prating never does cease within the life of the owrld.

 

[hypnagogue]

1. The existence of qualia

Not demonstrated.

Qualia can't be demonstrated from a 3rd person perspective. But they are observed from the 1st person. The mere fact that you cannot provide a 3rd person demonstration already is evidence for the existence of a gap, and it's not a God of the gaps. Many (most?) physicalists even admit that there is an epistemological gap, if not a metaphysical one.

 

[Canute]

1. The existence of qualia

Not demonstrated.

Cf. Hypnagogue's response.

2. The inability of science to show that C is a purely physical phenomenon

God of the gaps.

What? Are you saying that science can prove that C is physical? And what's God got to do with it?

3. The intractibility of the hard problem

Only for those who believe there is one.

Obviously. However nobody has yet shown that there isn't one.

4. The pain in my foot

I have pain in my foot too, doesn't prove qualia.

A pain in your foot is a quale. You are agreeing that qualia exist.

5. The explanatory gaps in the scientific model of the universe

Again god of the gaps, plus I'll bet you think there are more gaps than there are.

How much? I'll bet you think there are fewer than there are.

6. The existence of metaphysics

Scuse me? Astrology exists too.

Yes, but astrology is irrelevant. Metaphysics is acknowledges to exist by physicists. Therefore it is acknowledged by science that there will always be gaps/unknowns in the scienctific model.

7. The ability of sentient beings to know things that cannot be proved

Penrose? This has been heavily criticised and even he isn't pushing it anymore.

Nothing to do with Penrose. It's quite obvious that we can know things that cannot be proved by demonstration. This is what 'self-evident' means in philosophy. But I do agree with Penrose that Goedel proved this mathematically.

8. The scientists who argue that consciousness is not a scientific topic

Some do, some don't. Cherry picking.

Of course I'm cherry-picking. I'm not saying that these people are right, I'm saying that many well educated and intelligent people working as scientists argue that consciousness is beyond science. This provides some justification for the view that it is.

9. The inability of science to prove that consciousness exists.

Just a rehash of #2. Same reply.

What reply? If science had shown that consciousness exists then there would be far less justification for believing that consciousness has a non-physical element. As it is there is some justification for believing it.

10. The many people who argue that C can be reduced to matter

Sorry? This is what you claim?

Someone who argues that consciousness can be reduced to matter clearly believes that consciousness is different to matter. Otherwise there would be no need to argue that it can be reduced to it. After all, nobody bothers to argue that brains can be reduced to matter.

11. The inability of scientists to reduce consciousness to matter

Ah I see. 10 and 11 are one reason. Once more the god of the gaps. The current state of science is a contigent accident and proves nothing (aka god of the gaps).

So science can be ignored, being permanently in just a contingent state? It is surely obvious that our continuing inability to reduce consciousness to matter offers some justification for the belief that it can't be. I did not suggest it was a proof.

11. The unfalsifiability of solipsism

Aw come on. This proves it? Why not drag in deja vu as well?

If solpisism is unfalsifiable then science will never show that consciousness reduces to matter. This could be a failure of the scientific method, but it could equally be because it doesn't. There is therefore some justification for believing that it doesn't. I can't see that this point is even contentious.

12. The unfalsifiability of Taoism, Buddhism, Sufism, Advaita, etc.

Or Astrology, Witchcraft, Ritual Magick, and UFOs.

Or materialism, physicalism and so on. You seem to be confusing my arguments for the justifiability of a belief that C has a non-physical element with a proof of it. I do not claim it can be scientifically proved, in fact I would strongly argue that it cannot be, because of the way science is defined. Also, while the examples you cite contradict the scientific evidence, the examples I cite do not.

13. The fact that I can imagine an elephant without my brain being crushed

This is entirely explainable in terms of neuronal representations (except you will say the qualia isn't but that in this case is petitio principi).

Sure, qualia don't exist. What does your neuronal representation of an elephant look like? Obviously you don't know. Yet you can imagine what an elephant looks like. Ergo your imagined elephant is not identical with an arrangement of neurons.

14. And so on ad infinitum

Yes, prating never does cease within the life of the owrld

Here we agree.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Qualia can't be demonstrated from a 3rd person perspective. But they are observed from the 1st person.

I deny that my perseptions are mediated by or consist of qualia. "What it is like to experience red" for me is to experience my physical brain working.

The mere fact that you cannot provide a 3rd person demonstration already is evidence for the existence of a gap, and it's not a God of the gaps. Many (most?) physicalists even admit that there is an epistemological gap, if not a metaphysical one.

I am not talking about third person demonstration. I am talking about my first person experience of reading philosophers, including Chalmers and GR where they tell me I have qualia and try to motivate me to believe that and every argument they makes sounds faulty to me. Not their derivations but their presentations of qualia themselves.

Some people believe they talk to angels; they would call it a gap that I can't agree that their angels are a part of my reality. Your qualia are no more real to me than their angels.

 

[JoeError]

This is just my two cents, as I consider myself not "well educated" in the topic but "not quite well educated", I expect corrections and cynicism, but... Is there a reason we cannot suggest consciousness to be both physical and non, perhaps neither physical or non-physical. If we were to say that consciousness is completely controlled by synaptic reactions and neurotoxins, whatever big fancy words you want to say, does this not ask the question, "What tells the physical forces to do this?" and does that question not add the ability to suggest a non-physically describable force allowing for a completely physical force to create consciousness? Perhaps also insinuating that a combined effort of a physical and non-physical force to be describable not by the theories of either, but the theories of a unified force, which encompasses that which is physical and that which is not. Not to suggest a simple cop out, but like I said, just my two cents...

 

[Canute]

Many people share the view that consciousness, or perhaps one should say the foundation of consciousness, transcends the distinction between material/immaterial. This doesn't prove anything of course , but at least you can know that you're not alone in thinking like this.

 

[Mentat]

Qualia can't be demonstrated from a 3rd person perspective. But they are observed from the 1st person.

How do you know? Do you experience qualia? If so, how do you know that's what you're experiencing, and not just an interpretation that someone has suggested, which you (currently) hold to be true?

Personally, I think the whole attempt to quantize consciousness and perception, be it in terms of qualia or any other terms, is mis-guided, since perception is clearly an on-going process.

The mere fact that you cannot provide a 3rd person demonstration already is evidence for the existence of a gap.

Or for the non-existence of the qualia.

 

[Mentat]

What? Are you saying that science can prove that C is physical? And what's God got to do with it?

Science can't prove that anything is physical, because that would be a matter for semantic philosophers, not for scientists. "Physical" is a word, and its definition is not a matter for scientists, but a matter for etymologists.

Obviously. However nobody has yet shown that there isn't one.

Negation does not bear the burden of proof. Only the proposing of a new assumption does.

A pain in your foot is a quale. You are agreeing that qualia exist.

Statement A need not be true. Statement B only follows from Statement A (IOW B if and only if A), and so lacks merit.

Yes, but astrology is irrelevant.

Says you.

Metaphysics is acknowledges to exist by physicists.

Ipse dixe, nothing more.

Therefore it is acknowledged by science that there will always be gaps/unknowns in the scienctific model.

Dead wrong. Science needn't acknowledge something just because some scientists do. Some scientists believe in the God of the Bible (in fact, a lot of them do), but that doesn't mean the scientific method can ever be used to prove it, or even to consider it.

It's quite obvious that we can know things that cannot be proved by demonstration.

Is it? And what does it mean to "know" such things. We're still asking that question, and have been since even before Sextus Empiricus.

Of course I'm cherry-picking. I'm not saying that these people are right, I'm saying that many well educated and intelligent people working as scientists argue that consciousness is beyond science. This provides some justification for the view that it is.

No it doesn't.

What reply? If science had shown that consciousness exists then there would be far less justification for believing that consciousness has a non-physical element. As it is there is some justification for believing it.

Science has post-dicted conscious interaction (in social and neurological terms). That it could not predict this is simply due to its being (relatively) new (science, that is).

Someone who argues that consciousness can be reduced to matter clearly believes that consciousness is different to matter. Otherwise there would be no need to argue that it can be reduced to it. After all, nobody bothers to argue that brains can be reduced to matter.

That's because nobody's saying it can't. If somebody said that the brain could not be reduced to matter, since its computations or intricate relations were of non-physical nature, then somebody would be arguing toward a reductionist view of the brain. As it is, nobody is foolish enough to make the first claim, therefore no one need protect the latter.

If solpisism is unfalsifiable then science will never show that consciousness reduces to matter.

If solipsism is unfalsifiable, it is equally unprovable. Thus science cannot consider it at all, since science is the business of falsifying, not of blindly accepting.

Sure, qualia don't exist. What does your neuronal representation of an elephant look like? Obviously you don't know.

Partially because he doesn't have eyes pointing inward, and partially because the term "representation" is metaphorical at best (misleading at worst) when referring to anything like computation.

Yet you can imagine what an elephant looks like. Ergo your imagined elephant is not identical with an arrangement of neurons.

There is no "imagined elephant", that's why we use the word "imagined". He can believe that he is perceiving an elephant (or something very much like it, or something that reminds him of it, or whatever) without any such perception actually taking place. "Belief" is nothing more than an algorithmic "basin of attraction" (to borrow Calvin's term) for your neural arrays to self-stimulate in a certain way. That I can imagine an elephant is no more surprising than that my cells can replicate.

 

[Canute]

I'm sorry that you're unable to imagine anything. Obviously there's no point in discussing consciousness under the circumstances.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I'm sorry that you're unable to imagine anything

Don't be silly Canute.

 

[Mentat]

I'm sorry that you're unable to imagine anything.

On the contrary. I can imagine a universe where you, and the rest of the Dualists, are right. That doesn't make it real (in any sense).

 

[quantumcarl]

Doctordick

I really think you should do some reading on these issues. The relationship between science and philosophy is far more subtle than you seem to think, and in the end they cannot be considered separate modes of enquiry, but interdependent ones.

On consciousness you're way off. If the issues were as simple as you say they are then there wouldn't be a scientific 'problem of consciousness'. Professional scientists and philosophers are not such fools that they haven't considered the arguments that you're making here. They have considered them thoroughly and they don't work. Certainly you can't just say that doing things to brains affects conscious experience and this proves that consciousness is explicable by neuroscience. Would that it were so simple.

If you doubt this then try coming up with a means by which a we could demonstrate scientifically that consciousnesas exists, or coming up with a scientific definition of it. You'll find yourself in trouble almost immediately.

Crick, for instance, finds the definition problem so hard that he proposes that scientists should not try to define it until they know what it is. In the meantime we're stuck with 'what it is like', which is not a scientific definition.

At this time it is not necessary for anybody to prove that conscious has a non-physicalist explanation. Rather it is up to scientists to prove it possible that it could have a strictly physicalist explanation, whatever the technical details. So far all attempts have failed. They will always fail, because you cannot explain the existence of something using a method that is not capable of showing that the thing exists.

Hi Canute, I'm not sure if you're the guy who told me about how its impossible to say the sky is blue due to the "problem of consciousness". I have capitulated somewhat toward your side of the plate on the matter in that:

Two choices: Experience is valid as evidence. Experience is invalid as evidence.

Consciousness is a result of experience/stimulation. (A brain is a big wad of mush without stimulation and furthermore, experience).

Individually, singularly and personally each person experiences a consciousness of, say, the barometer dropping, the VU meter jumping or the light changing colour or the cornflakes being stale.

This is the individual's experience. There's no way to prove the experience happened. You could hook up to an EEG or MRI or CT scan and you might see EEG needles moving and visual confirmation of areas of the brain at work but, there is no evidence that an experience has taken place or that a consciousness has been implemented. There's no picture of a stale Tony The Tiger, draped in milk, hovering over the cerebral cortex.

In fact there exists no proof that a VU meter has fallen, a barometer has risen, a light changed or cornflakes exist. Its all hear-say. Someone tells you the light changed; if you didn't see it yourself did it change? And if you did see the light change there's no telling whether or not you changed your perception of the light's colour by some subconscious desire. Does the light actually exist?

You have to prove, beyond the reasonable doubt, that evidence (interpretations, publications, verbal reports and so on) of experiences is proof that an experience happened and that a conscousness perceived the experience.

No one can do that. If they can, please explain.

 

[Canute]

I think it all depends on what you mean by 'proof'. Normally what we mean is 'proof by demonstration', by which definition you are right, we cannot demonstrate that experience/consciousness exists.

However we know from philosophers and mathematicians that certain knowledge is not attained via this sort of proof, but rather from self-evidence (as you say, we cannot prove the meter has fallen etc.) That is, our reasoning about the world must start from axioms or assumptions, and the very best we can ever hope to get for a secure axiom is one that is self-evident, one that is therefore not provable by demonstration.

So, as you say, it is true that we cannot demonstrate that experiences exist. However it is self-evident to us that they do exist, and therefore we can be more certain of their existence than we can of of the existence of anything else. (This is equivalent to saying that solipsism is unfalsifiable). So although we cannot derive a proof that experiences exist by deriving their existence from some axiom-set within a formal system of symbols and logical rules we can nevertheless verify with certainty that they do exist, i.e. prove it to ourselves.

Because of this it is not quite correct to say that nobody can prove beyond reasonable doubt that experiences exist. Nobody can demonstrate it, but anybody can verify it beyond possible doubt. By analogy, I know what a piano sounds like, but I can't demonstrate to someone else what it sounds like. Either they have had the experience of hearing one and know what it sounds like, or they haven't and don't. But one cannot argue from this that a piano doesn't have a sound.

You say that consciousness is the result of stimulation, by which I take it you mean caused by brain. I agree that the differences between our states of experience may be caused by differences between brain-states. We know that there is a high degree of correlation between brain and mind. However it does not follow from this that consciousness is caused by brain. This is because the consciousness that experiences all these different states is common to all of them and is therefore more fundamental than any of them. In other words, brain states may explain the contents of consciousness, what we are conscious of at any time, but as yet there is no evidence that they cause consciousness itself, the container of the contents, our ability to experience such states.

 

[quantumcarl]

I think it all depends on what you mean by 'proof'. Normally what we mean is 'proof by demonstration', by which definition you are right, we cannot demonstrate that experience/consciousness exists.

However we know from philosophers and mathematicians that certain knowledge is not attained via this sort of proof, but rather from self-evidence (as you say, we cannot prove the meter has fallen etc.) That is, our reasoning about the world must start from axioms or assumptions, and the very best we can ever hope to get for a secure axiom is one that is self-evident, one that is therefore not provable by demonstration.

So, as you say, it is true that we cannot demonstrate that experiences exist. However it is self-evident to us that they do exist, and therefore we can be more certain of their existence than we can of of the existence of anything else. (This is equivalent to saying that solipsism is unfalsifiable). So although we cannot derive a proof that experiences exist by deriving their existence from some axiom-set within a formal system of symbols and logical rules we can nevertheless verify with certainty that they do exist, i.e. prove it to ourselves.

Because of this it is not quite correct to say that nobody can prove beyond reasonable doubt that experiences exist. Nobody can demonstrate it, but anybody can verify it beyond possible doubt. By analogy, I know what a piano sounds like, but I can't demonstrate to someone else what it sounds like. Either they have had the experience of hearing one and know what it sounds like, or they haven't and don't. But one cannot argue from this that a piano doesn't have a sound.

You say that consciousness is the result of stimulation, by which I take it you mean caused by brain. I agree that the differences between our states of experience may be caused by differences between brain-states. We know that there is a high degree of correlation between brain and mind. However it does not follow from this that consciousness is caused by brain. This is because the consciousness that experiences all these different states is common to all of them and is therefore more fundamental than any of them. In other words, brain states may explain the contents of consciousness, what we are conscious of at any time, but as yet there is no evidence that they cause consciousness itself, the container of the contents, our ability to experience such states.

This is a very well thought out response. Thank you. I could only add that consciousness seems to need an environment to exist. The vessel of consciousness could be all of the physical universe, including neurons, neurotransmitters and regulating genes. It may be one of those things where the sum of the parts equals the whole (of consciousness).

However, your point about the self-evident reminded me that perception is required for self-evidence and perception is often mis-leading to the point of being down right incorrect. Cross-referencing can help but who's to say the references are not simply self-directed and biased illusions?

 

[Canute]

Perhaps consciousness needs an environment to exist. Certainly our human selves need such an environment. However it seems likely that there is at least one thing that exists that is capable of providing its own environment, otherwise nothing would exist. This is because the scientific evidence suggest that once space and time did not exist and, unless one accepts ex nihilo creation, this implies, or at least suggests, that there may be something that can exist without even spacetime for an environment.

I agree that on the evidence the physical universe as a whole could be a vessel for consciousness but then on the evidence, in principle at least, it could be the other way around.

To say that self-evidence requires perception is not correct. All it requires is a self and some experiential evidence. The evidence of our senses is not trustworthy, as you say, so inevitably any knowledge of the physical universe gained through our senses cannot be considered self-evident knowledge. However, having said that it seems self-evident that we have the ability to perceive, even if we are mistaken about what we are perceiving. For instance, everything that Neo perceives in the Matrix is an illusion, but his ability to perceive is not an illusion.

 

[Philocrat]

The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, by Christof Koch

"Product Description:
Consciousness is one of science’s last great unsolved mysteries. How can the salty taste and crunchy texture of potato chips, the unmistakable smell of dogs after they have been in the rain, or the exhilarating feeling of hanging on tiny fingerholds many feet above the last secure foothold on a cliff, emerge from networks of neurons and their associated synaptic and molecular processes? In The Quest for Consciousness, Caltech neuroscientist Christof Koch explores the biological basis of the subjective mind in animals and people. He outlines a framework that he and Francis Crick (of the "double helix") have constructed to come to grips with the ancient mind-body problem. At the heart of their framework is a sustained, empirical approach to discovering and characterizing the neuronal correlates of consciousness – the NCC – the subtle, flickering patterns of brain activity that underlie each and every conscious experience."

I am impressed by the brief review of this. Up till today many philosophers and scientists still regard JOHN LOCKE's maxim 'THE MIND IS LIKE A BLANK TABLET UPON WHICH EXPERIENCE WRITES' as intellectually naive or some sort of iddle talk. One issue that neuroscience must subsequently decide is how visual states are produced by these hierarchically structured classes of neurons and projected upon what may be vaguely construed as something equivalent to Locke's 'Blank Tablet Mind'. Infact, there is more to this than just being a single blank screen upon which neurally composed visual states are projected. Analogously, it is something equivalent to a blank screen or tablet, but scientifically it is MULTI-MODAL in scope and in substance.

"To me, the most astonishing aspect of this theory is that it is astonishing to anyone. Where else could the mind be but in the brain? Nevertheless, finding the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC) has proved elusive, so instead of concocting a grand unified theory, Koch and Crick undertook a very specific research program focusing on the visual system, to understand precisely how photons of light striking your retina become fully integrated visual experiences. Koch and his colleagues, for example, discovered a single neuron that fires only when the subject sees an image of President Bill Clinton. If this neuron died, would Clinton be impeached from the brain? No, because the visual representation of Clinton is distributed throughout several areas of the brain, in a hierarchical fashion, eventually branching down to this single neuron. The visual coding of any face involves several groups of neurons--one to identify the face, another to read its expression, a third to track its motion, and so on. This hierarchy of data processing allows the brain to economize neural activity through the use of combinatorics: "Assume that two face neurons responded either not at all or by firing vigorously. Between them, they could represent four faces (one face is encoded by both cells not firing, the second one by firing activity in one and silence in the other, and so on). Ten neurons could encode 210, or about a thousand faces... It has been calculated that less than one hundred neurons are sufficient to distinguish one out of thousands of faces in a robust manner. Considering that there are around 100,000 cells below a square millimeter of cortex, the potential representational capacity of anyone cortical region is enormous." Given that the brain has about 100 billion neurons, consciousness is most likely an emergent property of these hierarchical and combinatoric neuronal connections. How, precisely, the NCC produce qualia remains to be explained, but Koch's scientific approach, in my opinion, is the only one that will solve the hard problem."

If things are as so described here, you also need a SECOND-CATIGORY CLASS OF NEURONS that minitor and ochaestrate all the identified and described classess of neurons reponsible for the actual visual composition of all these mutli-modal visual states. Consequently, this would manifest into a MULTI-MODAL VISUAL COMPOSITION OF VISUAL DATA AND A MULTI-MODAL PROJECTION INTO MULTI-MODAL VISUAL SCREENS. For example, does the raw visual data obtained from the eyes neuro-computationally manipulated and projected back to the same eye for the final process of perceiving, recognising and understanding what is seen, or are they projected elsewhere? Are PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES (Awareness About Awareness), for example, created and projected in this way?

NOTE: The fundamental philosophical and scientific issue at stake here is not about how visual states, propositional attitudes and the lots are neuro-computationally composed in a multi-modal manner as so described, rather it is all about:

1) How the resulting visual states so composed are MULTI-MODALLY PROJECTED FOR PERCEPTUAL INSTANTIATION

and;

2) Identifying the actual MULTI-MODAL SCREENS UPON WHICH THEY ARE PROJECTED AND PERCEPTUALLY INSTANTIATED.

In my opinion, the researchers in neuroscience should home in on their search in these two directions. One of the issues that also need to be dealt with in the process is to scientifically determine:

3) Whether MEMORY is located in a single place in the body or whether it is POOLED FROM DIVERSE VISUAL/MEMORY CENTRES;

4) And how MULTI-MODALLY COMPOSED VISUAL DATA by all the successfully identifeid hierarchically structured classess of neurons are mapped onto such a Memory for creating and maintaining what I sometimes call 'LIFE-CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE BASE' for a successful and progressive life.