Philosophy of Nature. Time and Space

[heusdens]

V.
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
TIME AND SPACE

We now come to philosophy of nature. Here again Herr Dühring has every cause for dissatisfaction with his predecessors.


Natural philosophy "sank so low that it became an arid, spurious doggerel founded on ignorance", and "fell to the prostituted philosophistics of a Schelling and his like, rigging themselves out in the priesthood of the Absolute and hoodwinking the public". Fatigue has saved us from these "deformities"; but up to now it has only given place to "instability"; "and as far as the public at large is concerned, it is well known that the disappearance of a great charlatan is often only the opportunity for a lesser but commercially more experienced successor to put out again, under another signboard; the products of his predecessor". Natural scientists themselves feel little "inclination to make excursions into the realm of world-encompassing ideas", and consequently jump to "wild and hasty conclusions" in the theoretical sphere {D. Ph. 56-57}.

The need for deliverance is therefore urgent, and by a stroke of good luck Herr Dühring is at hand.
In order properly to appreciate the revelations which now follow on the development of the world in time and its limitations in space, we must turn back again to certain passages in "world schematism" {15}.

Infinity -- which Hegel calls bad infinity -- is attributed to being also in accordance with Hegel (Encyclopaedia, § 93), and then this infinity is investigated.


"The clearest form of an infinity which can be conceived without contradiction is the unlimited accumulation of numbers in a numerical series {18} ... As we can add yet another unit to any number, without ever exhausting the possibility of further numbers, so also to every state of being a further state succeeds, and infinity consists in the unlimited begetting of these states. This exactly conceived infinity has consequently only one single basic form with one single direction. For although it is immaterial to our thought whether or not it conceives an opposite direction in the accumulation of states, this retrogressing infinity is nevertheless only a rashly constructed thought-image. indeed, since this infinity would have to be traversed in reality in the reverse direction, it would in each of its states have an infinite succession of numbers behind itself. But this would involve the impermissible contradiction of a counted infinite numerical series, and so it is contrary to reason to postulate any second direction in infinity" {19}.

The first conclusion drawn from this conception of infinity is that the chain of causes and effects in the world must at some time have had a beginning:

"an infinite number of causes which assumedly already have lined up next to one another is inconceivable, just because it presupposes that the uncountable has been counted" {37}.

And thus a final cause is proved.
The second conclusion is


"the law of definite number: the accumulation of identities of any actual species of independent things is only conceivable as forming a definite number". Not only must the number of celestial bodies existing at any point of time be in itself definite, but so must also the total number of all, even the tiniest independent particles of matter existing in the world. This latter requisite is the real reason why no composition can be conceived without atoms. All actual division has always a definite limit, and must have it if the contradiction of the counted uncountable is to be avoided. For the same reason, not only must the number of the Earth's revolutions round the sun up to the present time be a definite number, even though it cannot be stated, but all periodical processes of nature must have had some beginning, and all differentiation, all the multifariousness of nature which appears in succession must have its roots in one self-equal state. This state may, without involving a contradiction, have existed from eternity; but even this idea would be excluded if time in itself were composed of real parts and were not, on the contrary, merely arbitrarily divided up by our minds owing to the variety of conceivable possibilities. The case is quite different with the real, and in itself distinguished content of time; this real filling of time with distinguishable facts and the forms of being of this sphere belong, precisely because of their distinguishability, to the realm of the countable {64-65}. If we imagine a state in which no change occurs and which in its self-equality provides no differences of succession whatever, the more specialised idea of time transforms itself into the more general idea of being. What the accumulation of empty duration would mean is quite unimaginable {70}.

Thus far Herr Dühring, and he is not a little edified by the significance of these revelations. At first he hopes that they will "at least not be regarded as paltry truths" {64}; but later we find:

"Recall to your mind the extremely simple methods by which we helped forward the concepts of infinity and their critique to a hitherto unknown import... the elements of the universal conception of space and time, which have been given such simple form by the sharpening and deepening now effected" {427-28}.

We helped forward! The deepening and sharpening now effected! Who are "we", and when is this "now"? Who is deepening and sharpening?

"Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and with regard to space is also limited. -- Proof: For if it is assumed that the world has no beginning in time, then an eternity must have elapsed up to every given point of time, and consequently an infinite series of successive states of things must have passed away in the world. The infinity of a series, however, consists precisely in this, that it can never be completed by means of a successive synthesis. Hence an infinite elapsed series of worlds is impossible, and consequently a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be proved. -- With regard to the second, if the opposite is again assumed, then the world must be an infinite given total of co-existent things. Now we cannot conceive the dimensions of a quantum, which is not given within certain limits of an intuition, in any other way than by means of the synthesis of its parts, and can conceive the total of such a quantum only by means of a completed synthesis, or by the repeated addition of a unit to itself. Accordingly, to conceive the world, which fills all spaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be looked upon as completed; that is, an infinite time would have to be regarded as elapsed in the enumeration of all co-existing things. This is impossible. For this reason an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be regarded as a given whole nor, therefore, as given at the same time. Hence it follows that the world is not infinite, as regards extension in space, but enclosed in limits. And this was the second thing" (to be proved).

These sentences are copied word for word from a well-known book which first appeared in 1781 and is called: Kritik der reinen Vernunft by Immanuel Kant, where all and sundry can read them, in the first part, Second Division, Book II, Chapter II, Section II: The First Antinomy of Pure Reason. So that Herr Dühring's fame rests solely on his having tacked on the name -- Law of Definite Number -- to an idea expressed by Kant, and on having made the discovery that there was once a time when as yet there was no time, though there was a world. As regards all the rest, that is, anything in Herr Dühring's exegesis which has some meaning, "We" -- is Immanuel Kant, and the "now" is only ninety-five years ago. Certainly "extremely simple"! Remarkable "hitherto unknown import"!
Kant, however, does not at all claim that the above propositions are established by his proof. On the contrary; on the opposite page he states and proves the reverse: that the world has no beginning in time and no end in space; and it is precisely in this that he finds the antinomy, the insoluble contradiction, that the one is just as demonstrable as the other. People of smaller calibre might perhaps fuel a little doubt here on account of "a Kant" having found an insoluble difficulty. But not so our valiant fabricator of "from the ground up original conclusions and views" {D. Ph. 525}; he indefatigably copies down as much of Kant's antinomy as suits his purpose, and throws the rest aside.

[TO BE CONTINUED]

 

[heusdens]

Philosophy of Nature. Time and Space (part 2)

[ CONTINUATION -- part 2]

The problem itself has a very simple solution. Eternity in time, infinity in space, signify from the start, and in the simple meaning of the words, that there is no end in any direction neither forwards nor backwards, upwards or downwards, to the right or to the left. This infinity is something quite different from that of an infinite series, for the latter always starts from one, with a first term. The inapplicability of this idea of series to our object becomes clear directly we apply it to space. The infinite series, transferred to the sphere of space, is a line drawn from a definite point in a definite direction to infinity. Is the infinity of space expressed in this even in the remotest way? On the contrary, the idea of spatial dimensions involves six lines drawn from this one point in three opposite directions, and consequently we would have six of these dimensions. Kant saw this so clearly that he transferred his numerical series only indirectly, in a roundabout way, to the space relations of the world. Herr Dühring, on the other hand, compels us to accept six dimensions in space, and immediately afterwards can find no words to express his indignation at the mathematical mysticism of Gauss, who would not rest content with the usual three dimensions of space [37] {See D. Ph. 67-68}.

As applied to time, the line or series of units infinite in both directions has a certain figurative meaning. But if we think of time as a series counted from one forward, or as a line starting from a definite point, we imply in advance that time has a beginning: we put forward as a premise precisely what we are to prove. We give the infinity of time a one-sided, halved character; but a one-sided, halved infinity is also a contradiction in itself, the exact opposite of an "infinity conceived without contradiction". We can only get past this contradiction if we assume that the one from which we begin to count the series, the point from which we proceed to measure the line is anyone in the series, that it is anyone of the points in the line, and that it is a matter of indifference to the line or to the series where we place this one or this point.

But what of the contradiction of "the counted infinite numerical series"? We shall be in a position to examine this more closely as soon as Herr Dühring has performed for us the clever trick of counting it. When he has completed the task of counting from - = (minus infinity) to 0 let him come again. It is certainly obvious that, at whatever point he begins to count, he will leave behind him an infinite series and, with it, the task which he is to fulfil. Let him just reverse his own infinite series 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 ... and try to count from the infinite end back to 1; it would obviously only be attempted by a man who has not the faintest understanding of what the problem is. And again: if Herr Dühring states that the infinite series of elapsed time has been counted, he is thereby stating that time has a beginning; for otherwise he would not have been able to start "counting" at all. Once again, therefore, he puts into the argument, as a premise, the thing that he has to prove.

The idea of an infinite series which has been counted, in other words, the world-encompassing Dühringian law of definite number, is therefore a contradictio in adjecto ["contradiction in definition" -- ed.] contains within itself a contradiction, and in fact an absurd contradiction.

It is clear that an infinity which has an end but no beginning is neither more nor less infinite than that which has a beginning but no end. The slightest dialectical insight should have told Herr Dühring that beginning and end necessarily belong together, like the north pole and the south pole, and that if the end is left out, the beginning just becomes the end -- the one end which the series has; and vice versa. The whole deception would be impossible but for the mathematical usage of working with infinite series. Because in mathematics it is necessary to start from definite, finite terms in order to reach the indefinite, the infinite, all mathematical series, positive or negative, must start from 1, or they cannot be used for calculation. The abstract requirement of a mathematician is, however, far from being a compulsory law for the world of reality.

For that matter, Herr Dühring will never succeed in conceiving real infinity without contradiction. Infinity is a contradiction, and is full of contradictions. From the outset it is a contradiction that an infinity is composed of nothing but finites, and yet this is the case. The limitedness of the material world leads no less to contradictions than its unlimitedness, and every attempt to get over these contradictions leads, as we have seen, to new and worse contradictions. It is just because infinity is a contradiction that it is an infinite process, unrolling endlessly in time and in space. The removal of the contradiction would be the end of infinity. Hegel saw this quite correctly, and for that reason treated with well-merited contempt the gentlemen who subtilised over this contradiction.

Let us pass on. So time had a beginning. What was there before this beginning? The universe, which was then in a self-equal, unchanging state. And as in this state no changes succeed one another, the more specialised idea of time transforms itself into the more general idea of being. In the first place, we are here not in the least concerned with what ideas change in Herr Dühring's head. The subject at issue is not the idea of time, but real time, which Herr Dühring cannot rid himself of so cheaply. In the second place, however much the idea of time may convert itself into the more general idea of being, this does not take us one step further. For the basic forms of all being are space and time, and being out of time is just as gross an absurdity as being out of space. The Hegelian "being past away non-temporally" and the neo-Schellingian "unpremeditatable being" are rational ideas compared with this being out of time. And for this reason Herr Dühring sets to work very cautiously; actually it is of course time, but of such a kind as cannot really be called time, time, indeed, in itself does not consist of real parts, and is only divided up at will by our mind -- only an actual filling of time with distinguishable facts is susceptible of being counted -- what the accumulation of empty duration means is quite unimaginable. What this accumulation is supposed to mean is here beside the point; the question is, whether the world, in the state here assumed, has duration, passes through a duration in time. We have long known that we can get nothing by measuring such a duration without content just as we can get nothing by measuring without aim or purpose in empty space; and Hegel, just because of the weariness of such an effort, calls such an infinity bad. According to Herr Dühring time exists only through change; change in and through time does not exist. Just because time is different from change, is independent of it, it is possible to measure it by change, for measuring always requires something different from the thing to be measured. And time in which no recognisable changes occur is very far removed from not being time; it is rather pure time, unaffected by any foreign admixtures, that is, real time, time as such. In fact, if we want to grasp the idea of time in all its purity, divorced from all alien and extraneous admixtures, we are compelled to put aside, as not being relevant here, all the various events which occur simultaneously or one after another in time, and in this way to form the idea of a time in which nothing happens. In doing this, therefore, we have not let the concept of time be submerged in the general idea of being, but have thereby for the first time arrived at the pure concept of time.

But all these contradictions and impossibilities are only mere child's play compared with the confusion into which Herr Dühring falls with his self-equal initial state of the world. If the world had ever been in a state in which no change whatever was taking place, how could it pass from this state to alteration? The absolutely unchanging, especially when it has been in this state from eternity, cannot possibly get out of such a state by itself and pass over into a state of motion and change. An initial impulse must therefore have come from outside, from outside the universe, an impulse which set it in motion. But as everyone knows, the "initial impulse" is only another expression for God. God and the beyond, which in his world schematism Herr Dühring pretended to have so beautifully dismantled, are both introduced again by him here, sharpened and deepened, into natural philosophy.

[End of part 2. TO BE CONTINUED]

 

[heusdens]

Philosophy of Nature. Time and Space (part 3)

[CONTINUATION - part 3]

Further, Herr Dühring says:


"Where magnitude is attributed to a constant element of being, it will remain unchanged in its determinateness. This holds good ... of matter and mechanical force" {D. Ph. 26}.

The first sentence, it may be noted in passing, is a precious example of Herr Dühring's axiomatic-tautological grandiloquence: where magnitude does not change, it remains the same. Therefore the amount of mechanical force which exists in the world remains the same for all eternity. We will overlook the fact that, in so far as this is correct, Descartes already knew and said it in philosophy nearly three hundred years ago; that in natural science the theory of the conservation of energy has held sway for the last twenty years; and that Herr Dühring, in limiting it to mechanical force, does not in any way improve on it. But where was the mechanical force at the time of the unchanging state? Herr Dühring obstinately refuses to give us any answer to this question.
Where, Herr Dühring, was the eternally self-equal mechanical force at that time, and what did it put in motion? The reply:


"The original state of the universe, or to put it more plainly, of an unchanging existence of matter which comprised no accumulation of changes in time, is a question which can be spurned only by a mind that sees the acme of wisdom in the self-mutilation of its own generative power" {78-79}.

Therefore: either you accept without examination my unchanging original state, or I, Eugen Dühring, the possessor of creative power, will certify you as intellectual eunuchs. That may, of course, deter a good many people. But we, who have already seen some examples of Herr Dühring's generative power, can permit ourselves to leave this genteel abuse unanswered for the moment, and ask once again: But Herr Dühring, if you please, what about that mechanical force?
Herr Dühring at once grows embarrassed.


In actual fact, he stammers, "the absolute identity of that initial extreme state does not in itself provide any principle of transition. But we must remember that at bottom the position is similar with every new link, however small, in the chain of existence with which we are familiar. So that whoever wants to raise difficulties in the fundamental case now under consideration must take care that he does not allow himself to pass them by on less obvious occasions. Moreover, there exists the possibility of interposing successively graduated intermediate stages, and also a bridge of continuity by which it is possible to move backwards and reach the extinction of the process of change. It is true that from a purely conceptual standpoint this continuity does not help us pass the main difficulty, but to us it is the basic form of all regularity and of every known form of transition in general, so that we are entitled to use it also as a medium between that first equilibrium and the disturbance of it. But if we had conceived the so to speak" (!) "motionless equilibrium on the model of the ideas which are accepted without any particular objection" (!) "in our present-day mechanics, there would be no way of explaining how matter could have reached the process of change." Apart from the mechanics of masses there is, however, we are told, also a transformation of mass movement into the movement of extremely small particles, but as to how this takes place -- "for this up to the present we have no general principle at our disposal and consequently we should not be surprised if these processes take place somewhat in the dark" {79-80, 81}.

That is all Herr Dühring has to say. And in fact, we would have to see the acme of wisdom not only in the "self-mutilation of our generative power" {79}, but also in blind, implicit faith, if we allowed ourselves to be put off with these really pitiable rank subterfuges and circumlocutions. Herr Dühring admits that absolute identity cannot of itself effect the transition to change. Nor is there any means whereby absolute equilibrium can of itself pass into motion. What is there, then? Three lame, false arguments.
Firstly: it is just as difficult to show the transition from each link, however small, in the chain of existence with which we are familiar, to the next one. -- Herr Dühring seems to think his readers are infants. The establishment of individual transitions and connections between the tiniest links in the chain of existence is precisely the content of natural science, and when there is a hitch at some point in its work no one, not even Herr Dühring, thinks of explaining prior motion as having arisen out of nothing, but always only as a transfer, transformation or transmission of some previous motion. But here the issue is admittedly one of accepting motion as having arisen out of immobility, that is, out of nothing.

In the second place, we have the "bridge of continuity". From a purely conceptual standpoint, this, to be sure, does not help us over the difficulty, but all the same we are entitled to use it as a medium between immobility and motion. Unfortunately the continuity of immobility consists in not moving; how therefore it is to produce motion remains more mysterious than ever. And however infinitely small the parts into which Herr Dühring minces his transition from complete non-motion to universal motion, and however long the duration he assigns to it, we have not got a ten-thousandth part of a millimetre further. Without an act of creation we can never get from nothing to something, even if the something were as small as a mathematical differential. The bridge of continuity is therefore not even an asses' bridge [37a]; it is passable only for Herr Dühring.

Thirdly: so long as present-day mechanics holds good -- and this science, according to Herr Dühring, is one of the most essential levers for the formation of thought -- it cannot be explained at all how it is possible to pass from immobility to motion. But the mechanical theory of heat shows us that the movement of masses under certain conditions changes into molecular movement (although here too one motion originates from another motion, but never from immobility); and this, Herr Dühring shyly suggests, may possibly furnish a bridge between the strictly static (in equilibrium) and dynamic (in motion). But these processes take place "somewhat in the dark". And it is in the dark that Herr Dühring leaves us sitting.

This is the point we have reached with all his deepening and sharpening -- that we have perpetually gone deeper into ever sharper nonsense, and finally land up where of necessity we had to land up -- "in the dark". But this does not abash Herr Dühring much. Right on the next page he has the effrontery to declare that he has


"been able to provide a real content for the idea of self-equal stability directly from the behaviour of matter and the mechanical forces" {D. Ph. 82}.

And this man describes other people as "charlatans"!
Fortunately, in spite of all this helpless wandering and confusion "in the dark", we are left with one consolation, and this is certainly edifying to the soul:


"The mathematics of the inhabitants of other celestial bodies can rest on no other axioms than our own!" {69}.

 

[quantumdude]

This thread may sink to page 2 before I get to reply (because the reading is longer than most), but I am printing this out.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Tom
This thread may sink to page 2 before I get to reply (because the reading is longer than most), but I am printing this out.

Perhaps you can best use the orignal source, which can be found http://csf.colorado.edu/psn/marx/Archive/1877-AD/p1.htm#c5" .

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Tom
This thread may sink to page 2 before I get to reply (because the reading is longer than most), but I am printing this out.

waitin' for your reply...

 

[quantumdude]

Well, your posts to LG suddenly make a lot more sense. I did not know what you meant by "taking one of Kant's arguments, while throwing the other one aside". It is easy to see how Duhring's argument falls apart, and how much the same it is to LG's.

A brief rundown of Duhring:

1. The absurdity of an infinitely long universal history proves that universal history is finite.

Wrong because finite history also has an associated absurdity, evidenced by the fact that things are moving now.

2. There is a continuum of states, at which the pure static state is at the base, which also contains all dynamic states. This makes it possible for the transition from motionlessness to motion.

Wrong because no such continuum exists. Mechanics (either classical or quantum) does not allow for such a connection between the static and dynamic.

The main points have been borne out in our other discussions with LG, I think. But, not having read Kant, I could be missing something. What I really want to do is read Kant's original arguments. The Kritik was referred to; is that the Critique of Pure Reason?

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Tom
Well, your posts to LG suddenly make a lot more sense. I did not know what you meant by "taking one of Kant's arguments, while throwing the other one aside". It is easy to see how Duhring's argument falls apart, and how much the same it is to LG's.

A brief rundown of Duhring:

1. The absurdity of an infinitely long universal history proves that universal history is finite.

Wrong because finite history also has an associated absurdity, evidenced by the fact that things are moving now.

2. There is a continuum of states, at which the pure static state is at the base, which also contains all dynamic states. This makes it possible for the transition from motionlessness to motion.

Wrong because no such continuum exists. Mechanics (either classical or quantum) does not allow for such a connection between the static and dynamic.

The main points have been borne out in our other discussions with LG, I think. But, not having read Kant, I could be missing something. What I really want to do is read Kant's original arguments. The Kritik was referred to; is that the Critique of Pure Reason?

Thanks for your comments. I hope that I made it clear that LG's arguments have been around in the philosophic debate for some time, and that it is in no way original (LG might not be aware of that, however, although I pointed this text of Engels several times for his nose and pointed him he used the same arguments as Duhring).

The work of Kant what was referred to is indeed 'Kritik der Reiner Vernunft' (Critique of Pure Reason).

 

[quantumdude]

Silly me, I forgot to mention the most important part.

While there are absurdities associated with both finite and infinite universal histories, we take the infinite history for two reasons because the alternative requires the existence of a god--which exists independently of time--to set things in motion.

Engels noted this, too:

"An initial impulse must therefore have come from outside, from outside the universe, an impulse which set it in motion. But as everyone knows, the "initial impulse" is only another expression for God. God and the beyond, which in his world schematism Herr Dühring pretended to have so beautifully dismantled, are both introduced again by him here, sharpened and deepened, into natural philosophy."

Here we have the one and only difference between Duhring and LG: Duhring is inconsistently arguing both for and against god, whereas LG believes in god fully.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Tom
Silly me, I forgot to mention the most important part.

While there are absurdities associated with both finite and infinite universal histories, we take the infinite history for two reasons because the alternative requires the existence of a god--which exists independently of time--to set things in motion.

Engels noted this, too:

"An initial impulse must therefore have come from outside, from outside the universe, an impulse which set it in motion. But as everyone knows, the "initial impulse" is only another expression for God. God and the beyond, which in his world schematism Herr Dühring pretended to have so beautifully dismantled, are both introduced again by him here, sharpened and deepened, into natural philosophy."

Here we have the one and only difference between Duhring and LG: Duhring is inconsistently arguing both for and against god, whereas LG believes in god fully.

And thank you for this note.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by heusdens
Thanks for your comments. I hope that I made it clear that LG's arguments have been around in the philosophic debate for some time,

Which ones? The causality-argument is as old as the hills. But some of my stuff is 'fresh', as far as I can tell. Regardless; they are my own arguments. I have not directly copied anyone. Therefore, you can rest-assured that my philosophy as a whole is my own.

and that it is in no way original (LG might not be aware of that, however, although I pointed this text of Engels several times for his nose and pointed him he used the same arguments as Duhring).

Will you please spell-out the problem, in plain English? What's the point of these three long posts? Which specific points do you want me to address?

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
Which ones? The causality-argument is as old as the hills. But some of my stuff is 'fresh', as far as I can tell. Regardless; they are my own arguments. I have not directly copied anyone. Therefore, you can rest-assured that my philosophy as a whole is my own.

Let us not discuss "ownership of ideas" and wether or not you intentionally copied ideas of others, that's besides the issue, I just tried to explain that some of your ideas stated on here, have been around for some time.
There is not so much original thinking in this arena as you might think, a lot has been thought about before.

I hold it however, you never came across these ideas before in literature. You might go and visit a university library some time, to look and see for yourself what already been thought about and written.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
Will you please spell-out the problem, in plain English? What's the point of these three long posts? Which specific points do you want me to address?

Your idea of proving that time must have had a beginning, because of the impossibility of an infinite history/causal-chain, which had been put forward by Kant previously. As you might have learnt, Kant not only prooved that, but also prooved the opposite, that time didn't have a beginning.

The point of this long post is that the text involves some very fundamental philospohical problems related to time and space, and these problems are dealed with excellently by Friedrich Engels. I hold it it has still value for current day readers interested in philosophy.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by heusdens
The point of this long post is that the text involves some very fundamental philospohical problems related to time and space, and these problems are dealed with excellently by Friedrich Engels. I hold it it has still value for current day readers interested in philosophy.

If you tell me the problem, I will give you my answer.

 

[quantumdude]

The problem is that both a finite and an infinite universal history are logically impossible. Evidently, these were Kant's arguments.

Proof of Impossibility of an Infinite History
Duhring copied Kant's argument here, so I'll just reproduce it from a few posts up:

Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and with regard to space is also limited. -- Proof: For if it is assumed that the world has no beginning in time, then an eternity must have elapsed up to every given point of time, and consequently an infinite series of successive states of things must have passed away in the world. The infinity of a series, however, consists precisely in this, that it can never be completed by means of a successive synthesis. Hence an infinite elapsed series of worlds is impossible, and consequently a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be proved. -- With regard to the second, if the opposite is again assumed, then the world must be an infinite given total of co-existent things. Now we cannot conceive the dimensions of a quantum, which is not given within certain limits of an intuition, in any other way than by means of the synthesis of its parts, and can conceive the total of such a quantum only by means of a completed synthesis, or by the repeated addition of a unit to itself. Accordingly, to conceive the world, which fills all spaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be looked upon as completed; that is, an infinite time would have to be regarded as elapsed in the enumeration of all co-existing things. This is impossible. For this reason an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be regarded as a given whole nor, therefore, as given at the same time. Hence it follows that the world is not infinite, as regards extension in space, but enclosed in limits. And this was the second thing" (to be proved).

Duhring stopped there, as if he had proven the thesis. What he was ignoring was...

Proof of Impossibility of Finite History
This rests on the impossibility of passing from a timeless (and therefore static) state to a dynamic state.

Firstly: it is just as difficult to show the transition from each link, however small, in the chain of existence with which we are familiar, to the next one. -- Herr Dühring seems to think his readers are infants. The establishment of individual transitions and connections between the tiniest links in the chain of existence is precisely the content of natural science, and when there is a hitch at some point in its work no one, not even Herr Dühring, thinks of explaining prior motion as having arisen out of nothing, but always only as a transfer, transformation or transmission of some previous motion. But here the issue is admittedly one of accepting motion as having arisen out of immobility, that is, out of nothing.

In the second place, we have the "bridge of continuity". From a purely conceptual standpoint, this, to be sure, does not help us over the difficulty, but all the same we are entitled to use it as a medium between immobility and motion. Unfortunately the continuity of immobility consists in not moving; how therefore it is to produce motion remains more mysterious than ever. And however infinitely small the parts into which Herr Dühring minces his transition from complete non-motion to universal motion, and however long the duration he assigns to it, we have not got a ten-thousandth part of a millimetre further. Without an act of creation we can never get from nothing to something, even if the something were as small as a mathematical differential. The bridge of continuity is therefore not even an asses' bridge [37a]; it is passable only for Herr Dühring.

Thirdly: so long as present-day mechanics holds good -- and this science, according to Herr Dühring, is one of the most essential levers for the formation of thought -- it cannot be explained at all how it is possible to pass from immobility to motion. But the mechanical theory of heat shows us that the movement of masses under certain conditions changes into molecular movement (although here too one motion originates from another motion, but never from immobility); and this, Herr Dühring shyly suggests, may possibly furnish a bridge between the strictly static (in equilibrium) and dynamic (in motion). But these processes take place "somewhat in the dark". And it is in the dark that Herr Dühring leaves us sitting.

Since things are in fact moving, we conclude that they must have always been moving (IOW, we accept the infinite history). The only way out of this is to posit a god to reach in from outside and get things moving, which is unacceptable.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Tom
The problem is that both a finite and an infinite universal history are logically impossible. Evidently, these were Kant's arguments.


Since things are in fact moving, we conclude that they must have always been moving (IOW, we accept the infinite history). The only way out of this is to posit a god to reach in from outside and get things moving, which is unacceptable.

I tried to bring this to the attention of Mr Lifegazer already three times. I am not sure if he will get this into his mind (which seems to be filled with ignorance... ehhhhh God) this time...

The other thread (about LG's hypthesis of 'Mind') was closed, since it was obiously leading to nowhere...ehhhhh God.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by Tom
The problem is that both a finite and an infinite universal history are logically impossible. Evidently, these were Kant's arguments.

Of course, I disagree. No surprise there then.
I will explain why in a moment...

Duhring stopped there, as if he had proven the thesis. What he was ignoring was...

Proof of Impossibility of Finite History
This rests on the impossibility of passing from a timeless (and therefore static) state to a dynamic state.

Since things are in fact moving, we conclude that they must have always been moving (IOW, we accept the infinite history). The only way out of this is to posit a god to reach in from outside and get things moving, which is unacceptable.

I now remember discussing this issue before, in another thread.
Firstly; let it be known that no conclusion is automatically "unacceptable" to reason/logic. Nobody can state (philosophically) that "This is acceptable.", or "This is not acceptable.", unless one can support such a conclusion with reason. At least, any proper philosophical-argument should conform to this rule. For if it does not, then ~acceptance~ is clearly dependent upon the individual's a priori state-of-mind. And this bares no relation to pure reason.
In other words, an unsupported-statement such as this, is not acceptable in a discussion such as this.

 

[quantumdude]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
I now remember discussing this issue before, in another thread.
Firstly; let it be known that no conclusion is automatically "unacceptable" to reason/logic.

Reason/logic has nothing to do with it. This is a matter of evidence. Where there is zero evidence of god, there is zero basis for assuming its existence.

Nobody can state (philosophically) that "This is acceptable.", or "This is not acceptable.", unless one can support such a conclusion with reason.

You've got it backwards: No one should be able to assume a premise unless that premise has evidence to support it. Of course, in the abstract world of mathematical objects, one can posit anything one likes. But this is about reality, and only things for which there is evidence are admissible. We have plenty of evidence for the laws of mechanics, and none for the existence of god.

At least, any proper philosophical-argument should conform to this rule. For if it does not, then ~acceptance~ is clearly dependent upon the individual's a priori state-of-mind.

No, it depends on evidence (see a theme developing here?). We can agree on things which the data supports. On those things for which there is no data, let us have nothing to do with them when discussing reality. Where there is no data, there is no knowledge.

And this bares no relation to pure reason.

"Pure reason" is mere logical form with no content added. One might even mistake it for mathematics.

In other words, an unsupported-statement such as this, is not acceptable in a discussion such as this.

It (edit: my statement) is supported by the lack of evidence. That could change one day, but for now the evidence count is holding steady at 'zero'.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by heusdens
The other thread (about LG's hypthesis of 'Mind') was closed, since it was obiously leading to nowhere...ehhhhh God.

That thread was hot. And the bit at the end about 'sense' gave a direct proof for God's existence. A proof which is now conveniently avoided.

 

[quantumdude]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
That thread was hot. And the bit at the end about 'sense' gave a direct proof for God's existence.

That is your unsubstantiated opinion, and it is wrong.

A proof consists of a deductively valid argument with true premises. Nothing of the sort appeared in that thread in support of god's existence.

A proof which is now conveniently avoided.

That's right, when you don't have a valid argument, suggest that it's being avoided.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by Tom
Reason/logic has nothing to do with it. This is a matter of evidence. Where there is zero evidence of god, there is zero basis for assuming its existence.

Evidence is the mirror of causality. Exactly like a criminal-proceeding.
When you say that there is no evidence of God, you conveniently overlook the very issue upon which this conversation is based: namely; "Since things are in fact moving, we conclude that they must have always been moving (IOW, we accept the infinite history). The only way out of this is to posit a god to reach in from outside and get things moving, which is unacceptable."

... If you want, we can have the discussion which proves that finite tangible-entites cannot be the yield of an infinite causality-chain.
From this, it is possible to state, definitely, that your acceptance of the infinite causality-chain is totally unreasonable.
After this - and given that, therefore, a finite causality-chain is a must - 'God' becomes an acceptable conclusion (philosophically).
Like I said, in a proper philosophical-discussion your stance is not acceptable. It reflects an a priori state-of-mind.

You've got it backwards: No one should be able to assume a premise unless that premise has evidence to support it.

What evidence do you have to support the existence of an infinite causality-chain? The only 'evidence' I have seen, is that "'this' must be the case, or else God exists. Therefore, 'this' is the case.".
That's not evidence. It's unreasoned bias.

We have plenty of evidence for the laws of mechanics, and none for the existence of god.

But what is the origin of that Law?
Philosophy is not so-much concerned with how the universe works, but why it works and where/how it started. You should take note of this distinction.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by Tom
That is your unsubstantiated opinion, and it is wrong.

I'm going to start a thread centred around that proof. I think it's an excellent argument (possibly my best)... and worthy of discussion.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
... If you want, we can have the discussion which proves that finite tangible-entites cannot be the yield of an infinite causality-chain.

Who is to claim that material existence consists of "finite tangible-entities", whatever that may be? It has never been proven that space, matter or time is finite in extend.

In fact, it can be reasoned that it is impossible that space, time and matter are finite in extend, and should therefore be considered to be infinite in extend.

From this, it is possible to state, definitely, that your acceptance of the infinite causality-chain is totally unreasonable.

Because it does not leave the option open for a Deity, to have "created" the world? What is reasonable about introducing this Deity?

It is because there exists no such Deity, that therefore we have to assume there was no such "beginning" of time, but the world is unfolding infinitely in time, without begin or end.

After this - and given that, therefore, a finite causality-chain is a must - 'God' becomes an acceptable conclusion (philosophically).

No way.

You are just trying to get rid of a profound absurdity (the contradiction of existence) by introducing a rigourous and even more profound absurdity. Which is inacceptable of course (philosophically).

Like I said, in a proper philosophical-discussion your stance is not acceptable. It reflects an a priori state-of-mind.

This is exactly the point what should be said to you. You don't have an open mind about the most reaonable conclusion we can have about the fact that material existence does not start, but unfolds in time eternally, without a begin nor end. And you are very stubborn in that. For obvious reasons, else there would be no place for introducing your mystical concepts in the first place.

Not accepting such an obvious fact, THAT is an a priori state-of-mind, because reasonable and profound evidence can be to support this point of view. It is what we discovered reality to be like.

Your point of view, in refusing the very obvious conclusion, is based on unsupported evidence that matter can arise out of nothing, and/or motion can arise out of no-motion. There is not, has not, nor will ever be one bit of evidence for that sort of thing happening.

What evidence do you have to support the existence of an infinite causality-chain? The only 'evidence' I have seen, is that "'this' must be the case, or else God exists. Therefore, 'this' is the case.".

We come to this conclusion in a very simple way. Since we know that things move now, and know that matter cannot be distinguished from motion, and we have never seen motion arise out of no-motion or matter to arise out of nothing, which is a very profound and basic and accepted point of view throughout all of physics and science, we conclude that that has always been the case. This negates the possibility of that (motion arise out of no-motion, or matter arise out of nothing) ever having happened. Therefore there was no begin of time, and hence we have the concept of infinite time. Or better said, the material world is unfolding in time endlesly, without begin or end.

That's not evidence. It's unreasoned bias.

Of course not. It's just a way of protecting philosophical reasoning from introducing arbitrary absurd entities, for which there is no ground, and no evidence.

You are pre-baised in that you seem to claim that the contradiction of existence (which is an ultimate reality, and no way of ever solving that) CAN be solved, but in doing that you introduce an absurd entity of which there can be no proof, and which offers NO solutuion to the contradiction as such, but transforms it into mythical proportions.

The end result is the origina contradiction of existence is not resolved, but just shapes it into another form, which is beyond normal reasoning and has mystical proportions. Appealing perhaps to some, but rejected by most reasonable persons.

But what is the origin of that Law?
Philosophy is not so-much concerned with how the universe works, but why it works and where/how it started. You should take note of this distinction.

This is a notion of philosophy that is at least partly incorrect. It could be better named meta-physics, but not philosophy as such.

I regard your "philosophy" as pure meta-physics by the way.

 

[quantumdude]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
Evidence is the mirror of causality. Exactly like a criminal-proceeding.
When you say that there is no evidence of God, you conveniently overlook the very issue upon which this conversation is based: namely; "Since things are in fact moving, we conclude that they must have always been moving (IOW, we accept the infinite history). The only way out of this is to posit a god to reach in from outside and get things moving, which is unacceptable."

Nothing for which there is evidence is overlooked there. We see mechanical systems in motion, and that is where the evidence ends. There is no need to assume that anyone put them there or that anyone started them moving. To assert that is to go beyond what is known and into what is not known.

... If you want, we can have the discussion which proves that finite tangible-entites cannot be the yield of an infinite causality-chain.
From this, it is possible to state, definitely, that your acceptance of the infinite causality-chain is totally unreasonable.
After this - and given that, therefore, a finite causality-chain is a must - 'God' becomes an acceptable conclusion (philosophically).
Like I said, in a proper philosophical-discussion your stance is not acceptable. It reflects an a priori state-of-mind.

I accept the argument that you describe. I also accept the argument that time cannot have had a beginning. That is a fundamental contradiction of existence. There are two ways out of that contradiction:

1. Appeal to knowledge (that is, knowledge of dynamic systems).
2. Appeal to ignorance (that is, assume there is a god).

Choosing 1 leads to the infinite history, and choosing 2 leads to the finite history. Since there is every reason to accept 1 and no reason to accept 2, it is apparent why accepting the infinite history is reasonable.

What evidence do you have to support the existence of an infinite causality-chain? The only 'evidence' I have seen, is that "'this' must be the case, or else God exists. Therefore, 'this' is the case.".
That's not evidence. It's unreasoned bias.

No, see above. It is assuming god's existence that is unreasoned bias.

But what is the origin of that Law?

Who says the law has an origin? All we know is that the laws exist. To posit an author for those laws is (again!) to go beyond what is known into what is not known.

Philosophy is not so-much concerned with how the universe works, but why it works and where/how it started.

You obivously have not read any philosophy, because if you have you would see that you are dead wrong here. Based on everything I have read so far, philosophy is indeed about making sense of what is known.

What you describe above is more in the realm of religion or metaphysics.

You should take note of this distinction.

Same to you.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by Tom
Nothing for which there is evidence is overlooked there. We see mechanical systems in motion, and that is where the evidence ends. There is no need to assume that anyone put them there or that anyone started them moving. To assert that is to go beyond what is known and into what is not known.

I observe/rationalise all physical entities/events as effects which cannot come to be without a cause. Even quantum-events require the prior-existence of spacetime, and are affected by the current state of that spacetime in any particular locality.
Hence, the physical-universe is a universe of effects. Thus, there must be a cause for all things-physical... regardless of what that cause may be.
You seem to be advocating a universe-of-effects where no initial cause is required. A universe of eternal-effects, and no cause. In my opinion, reason cannot support such a stance. Like I said, 'evidence' is merely the mirror of causality.

I accept the argument that you describe. I also accept the argument that time cannot have had a beginning.

But the point is that it makes sense that time (effects) had to have had an origin. You only accept that it cannot, because you must accept that it cannot. Or else, you find yourself having to seriously ponder the reality of 'God'.

That is a fundamental contradiction of existence. There are two ways out of that contradiction:

1. Appeal to knowledge (that is, knowledge of dynamic systems).
2. Appeal to ignorance (that is, assume there is a god).

Choosing 1 leads to the infinite history, and choosing 2 leads to the finite history. Since there is every reason to accept 1 and no reason to accept 2, it is apparent why accepting the infinite history is reasonable.

Time is either eternal or finite. It's an either-or situation.
Here's the situation as I see it:-
1. It is absolutely-unreasonable to think that universal-effects can exist without any initial primal-cause.
2. It is reasonable to accept that time had an origin. It makes sense.
3. Ultimately, '2' leads to the conclusion of a 'God'. Therefore, '2' cannot be correct because the idea of 'a God' is for religious needy-people who want comfort for their own imperfections and mortality, etc..
4. Given '3', '2' is thrown in the bin, and '1' is accepted - even though it makes no sense.

... Thus, given the two initial choices, you have discarded the 'sensible' option for the non-sensible option.

No, see above. It is assuming god's existence that is unreasoned bias.

You've admitted that God's existence is a conclusion of a reasoning-process. It's not an assumption.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
I observe/rationalise all physical entities/events as effects which cannot come to be without a cause. Even quantum-events require the prior-existence of spacetime, and are affected by the current state of that spacetime in any particular locality.
Hence, the physical-universe is a universe of effects. Thus, there must be a cause for all things-physical... regardless of what that cause may be.
You seem to be advocating a universe-of-effects where no initial cause is required. A universe of eternal-effects, and no cause. In my opinion, reason cannot support such a stance. Like I said, 'evidence' is merely the mirror of causality.

This is a popular misunderstanding here.

When one says "everything must have a cause" and then concludes: "so the universe must have a cause" you are really mixing up some things.

Let's give another example of that logic.
1. All football players of a football team have parents.
2. Therefore the football team must have a parent.

You see were the reasoning goes wrong?
A football team can come from "nowhere", yet we would be very suprised seeing footbal players popping out of the air.

Everything that exists IN the universe, is affected by the cause-and-effect-law. Yet the universe itself, as a whole, IS NOT.

The universe has infinite history. Therefore for all things in the universe the law of causality applies universally, through all of time.
And because of that, the universe itself cannot be caused by something, cause that would in fact mean the end of causality!

I hope this clearifies your misunderstanding.

And as a matter of fact, this also settles the debate. There is a way of ordinary understanding of the universe, that follows the normal paths of logic (but requires us on the other hand to use it in a dialectical way, cause the existing world and also reflected in our thoughs is ultimately contradictionary) and that go well with what science has discovered, and which does not neceesitate for introducing an arbitrary unknown/unknowable entity. You can be almost sure that the fact that this kind of conclusion comes up, simply means you have somewhere a misunderstanding.

 

[Lifegazer]

Originally posted by heusdens
This is a popular misunderstanding here.

When one says "everything must have a cause" and then concludes: "so the universe must have a cause" you are really mixing up some things.

Let's give another example of that logic.
1. All football players of a football team have parents.
2. Therefore the football team must have a parent.

You see were the reasoning goes wrong?
A football team can come from "nowhere", yet we would be very suprised seeing footbal players popping out of the air.

Actually, this example is back-to-front. Existence has yielded the effects (players) of the universe. Whereas the players (who themselves are effects of existence) are the cause of the football-team. A football-team does not come from nowhere. It has its own root-cause - the players themselves.

Everything that exists IN the universe, is affected by the cause-and-effect-law. Yet the universe itself, as a whole, IS NOT.

Ultimately, I agree with this. There must be a primal-cause... and it is not effected by anything else.
But you must remember that the term "the universe" is a term which represents existence-as-effects (in time). It is not a term which we associate with origins. In a lot of respects, the universe is not unlike a 'football team', since the universe is made-up of its effects. That's why I prefer to use the term "existence". This term embraces the essence of universe. Whereas you must be able to see that the term "the universe" is used as a refrence to existence-in-time?
That may appear like a trivial-point. But I think that it resides at the heart of your confusion here.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
Actually, this example is back-to-front. Existence has yielded the effects (players) of the universe. Whereas the players (who themselves are effects of existence) are the cause of the football-team. A football-team does not come from nowhere. It has its own root-cause - the players themselves.

Yes, and we would be surprised when it is stated that the football players themselves came from nowhere for no apearant reason.
That is what your claim is, when you claim the universe has a definite beginning in time.

Ultimately, I agree with this. There must be a primal-cause... and it is not effected by anything else.

Believe me or not, but I used this as an argument that there isn's a primal cause. Since that would be imply an effect without a cause.

But you must remember that the term "the universe" is a term which represents existence-as-effects (in time). It is not a term which we associate with origins. In a lot of respects, the universe is not unlike a 'football team', since the universe is made-up of its effects. That's why I prefer to use the term "existence". This term embraces the essence of universe. Whereas you must be able to see that the term "the universe" is used as a refrence to existence-in-time?
That may appear like a trivial-point. But I think that it resides at the heart of your confusion here.

My confusuon? I brought this up to show you were your reasoning went wrong. You stated: everything must have a cause, therefore the universe must have a cause.
Wether you name it existence makes no difference. Existence is the constant application of the laws of cause-and-effect. There is no origin to that law or to existence itself. So there can't be an "outside" cause. Everything is within existence. hence: no possibility for a "begin of time".
You simply refuse to see that, although you at one time admitted this, since from "nothing comes nothing", and therefore "something" must have been existing all the time, in all eternity. This "something" happens to be the universe we live in.

 

[quantumdude]

Originally posted by Lifegazer
You seem to be advocating a universe-of-effects where no initial cause is required. A universe of eternal-effects, and no cause. In my opinion, reason cannot support such a stance. Like I said, 'evidence' is merely the mirror of causality.

Well, it's a good thing that 'reason' is not limited by your opinion then, because if you do not dismiss the second of the two arguments (proof of impossibility of beginning of time), then reason can support the stance.

But the point is that it makes sense that time (effects) had to have had an origin. You only accept that it cannot, because you must accept that it cannot. Or else, you find yourself having to seriously ponder the reality of 'God'.

The flipside to the point is that it also makes sense that time cannot have had an origin. A figment of the imagination (god) is no solution to the contradiction.

Time is either eternal or finite. It's an either-or situation.
Here's the situation as I see it:-
1. It is absolutely-unreasonable to think that universal-effects can exist without any initial primal-cause.
2. It is reasonable to accept that time had an origin. It makes sense.
3. Ultimately, '2' leads to the conclusion of a 'God'. Therefore, '2' cannot be correct because the idea of 'a God' is for religious needy-people who want comfort for their own imperfections and mortality, etc..
4. Given '3', '2' is thrown in the bin, and '1' is accepted - even though it makes no sense.

This just ignores the other argument--again.

Yes, it is an either-or situation. It is equally plausible that time did and did not have an origin. The solution consistent with what we observe (which is a dynamic universe) is that time had no origin.

... Thus, given the two initial choices, you have discarded the 'sensible' option for the non-sensible option.

Your mind is tainted with your religious views. There is no sense in choosing god over a mechanical universe.

You are appealing to ignorance, and I am appealing to knowledge, as I explained before.

You've admitted that God's existence is a conclusion of a reasoning-process. It's not an assumption.

Wrong. Dead wrong.

True, I did deny that god's existence was the conclusion of a circular argument (contrary to Mentat), but I said that god's existence was the conclusion of a bad argument. It is a simple non-sequitur, and so yes, the conclusion is assumed.

There is no way around that.

 

[heusdens]

Wrong. Dead wrong.

True, I did deny that god's existence was the conclusion of a circular argument (contrary to Mentat), but I said that god's existence was the conclusion of a bad argument. It is a simple non-sequitur, and so yes, the conclusion is assumed.

There is no way around that.

{to Mr Lifegazer, of which we have the pleasure to go in endless and circular forms of debating with}

A stance can be made that both for materialism and for idealism is that there (from pure reason) can not be made a choice for one of them. Both can not proof their own premises, or you'll end up putting in the conclusion as premise (circular reasoning), like Tom said.

But - happily - our formal thinking system is not the only part of our reasoning being mind-body system, that could or can decide between the two.

Cause the case is then this:

What do you BELIEVE to be true. Either the physical / material world, of which you have DIRECT EXPERIENCE (you KNOW you are there, and your entire system reacts to that outside independ material reality as if it is there - since it is there) or do choose for NEGLECTING all this numerous (the collective experience of all human kind through all of history) evidence for the existing material world, and instead put your faith in an unexperienceable not directly witnessable Deity?

I know almost everything you are made of, go for the first interpretation. Either because they have no choice and don't know any better, or consciously make the choice for the only 'real' solution.
And I bet my whole fortune on it, that the most part of you, conforms to it's material beingness and reacts accordingly.

And the tiny part of you that doens't seem to agree with all those facts, well let's be honest with it, that tiny little bit we better just ignore then and put to silence. That is: we then bring into practice your own theory, and just "assume" that you're not even existing realy. Else this debate never comes to it's end!