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My first "active" encounter with the transactional interpretation happened when I tried to react to Ruth Kastner's criticism of consistent histories. My next encounter happened when I was fighting with reciprocity occuring for crystal effects in electron scattering, and hoped for help from time symmetric interpretations. Naturally, I started studying TI by studying John Cramer's initial version, and was seriously underwhelmed. Roderich Tumulka in his book "Foundations of Quantum Mechanics" provides a good explanation for why this happend. He discusses TI in the section on the Copenhagen Interpretation, with reference to what he wrote in the subsection "Narratives, But No Serious Ones":
However, I still have no idea whether interactions with Ruth Kastner's version of TI will play out similarly, or not. Can TI be a serious interpretation at all? But assuming Ruth Kastner's version would not exist, how could one describe TI? Perhaps as "an inconsistent interpretation"? Or as "a narrative", like Tumulka suggested? Can it make sense to take a mere narrative seriously? (The narrative told by Feynman diagrams suggests itself, which also attaches "some picture to each symbol in the calculation".)
He frames his explanation by writing: "In 2005, I met John Cramer at a conference in Sydney, and since we had both arrived a day early, we spent a pleasant afternoon at the zoo chatting about, among other things, the foundations of quantum mechanics. Let me describe my take on his view."Tumulka said:When calculating predictions that can be compared to experimental data, adherents of CI often tell a story about the physical meaning of the mathematical elements of the calculation. ... But this story is not intended to describe what actually happens. On the contrary, CI insists that such narratives should not be taken seriously. They are just metaphor, or allegory, or analogy; they just serve as a mnemonic for the calculation, as a help for remembering the correct formulas or for setting up the corresponding formulas in similar calculations.
I highlighted his description of how interactions like mine with Cramer's TI will likely play out.Tumulka said:That is, with the “transactional interpretation,” he did not intend to replace orthodox quantum mechanics with something else, he wanted to flesh it out further, and he wanted to provide further ones of these stories that help you remember the formulas and that attach some picture to each symbol in the calculation. ... If you read Cramer’s paper expecting a fundamental physical theory, i.e., a hypothesis about what happens in nature comparable to Bohmian mechanics, GRW, and many-worlds, then you will find a mess. It will remain unclear, for example, what the ontology is, what the unexplained notion of “transaction” means in terms of the ontology, or how those of his stories should be understood that involve several rounds of revision of space-time histories (...). But if the stories serve more as a visualization of the formulas, then they do not have to provide an unambiguous, coherent picture of events.
However, I still have no idea whether interactions with Ruth Kastner's version of TI will play out similarly, or not. Can TI be a serious interpretation at all? But assuming Ruth Kastner's version would not exist, how could one describe TI? Perhaps as "an inconsistent interpretation"? Or as "a narrative", like Tumulka suggested? Can it make sense to take a mere narrative seriously? (The narrative told by Feynman diagrams suggests itself, which also attaches "some picture to each symbol in the calculation".)