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Jagella
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According to a recent published article, Physicist Leonard Susskind feels, along with Niels Bohr, that rather than try to come up with a mental picture of what objective reality is, scientists should limit themselves to creating hypotheses and testing them empirically. Susskind contends that a wariness about knowing reality is justified by some contradictions and paradoxes of modern physics.
One such paradox is the ambiguity about the fate of things that fall into a black hole. From the perspective of the object, it passes unaffected through the event horizon and is destroyed at the hole's center. An external observer, by contrast, sees the object incinerated as it passes the event horizon prior to reaching the center. Both viewpoints, although apparently irreconcilable, are considered by physicists to be valid. (1)
I'm wondering if anybody in this forum can explain this paradox. How sure are we that one of these interpretations are not wrong? If either one is wrong, then the paradox would be resolved.
Another question is one of epistemology: Do we really need to be sure we know what we think we know? Is physics properly a body of knowledge, or is it a methodology we can use for practical purposes?
I tend to lean a bit to the latter viewpoint. Rather than worry about how "right" modern physics is, I see physics as a way to solve problems. If it works for that purpose, then let questions of epistemology up to philosophers.
Jagella
(1) Peter Byrne, Bad Boy of Physics, Scientific American, July 2011, pp 80-81
One such paradox is the ambiguity about the fate of things that fall into a black hole. From the perspective of the object, it passes unaffected through the event horizon and is destroyed at the hole's center. An external observer, by contrast, sees the object incinerated as it passes the event horizon prior to reaching the center. Both viewpoints, although apparently irreconcilable, are considered by physicists to be valid. (1)
I'm wondering if anybody in this forum can explain this paradox. How sure are we that one of these interpretations are not wrong? If either one is wrong, then the paradox would be resolved.
Another question is one of epistemology: Do we really need to be sure we know what we think we know? Is physics properly a body of knowledge, or is it a methodology we can use for practical purposes?
I tend to lean a bit to the latter viewpoint. Rather than worry about how "right" modern physics is, I see physics as a way to solve problems. If it works for that purpose, then let questions of epistemology up to philosophers.
Jagella
(1) Peter Byrne, Bad Boy of Physics, Scientific American, July 2011, pp 80-81