Can Zombies Exist? Overview of Philosopher's Zombie and Debate

[Q_Goest]

For a brief overview of what is a p-zombie, see also Chalmers:
http://consc.net/zombies.html

Per Susan Blackmore:

The philosopher’s zombie is defined by two statements.
1. The zombie is behaviourally indistinguishable from a conscious human being.
2. There is nothing it is like to be a zombie. That is, a zombie is not conscious.

When thinking about zombies, it is cheating if you allow your zombie to do things we would never do, or behave in ways we would not (then it would not fit statement 1). Equally, your zombie cannot have little bits of inner experiences or a stream of consciousness (then it would not fit statement 2). Could a zombie exist?

1) If you say yes, then you believe that consciousness is an inessential extra – we could do everything we do without it.
2) If you say no, you believe that we could not do everything we do without consciousness; any creature that could behave as we do would necessarily be conscious.

Todd Moody argues that zombies, although possible “if they grew up in our midst”, could not originate the same arguments about consciousness that humans do.

Even though the activities of talking about the philosophical dream problem or internal seeing do not require consciousness, the emergence of those concepts in a language community does. This means that at the level of culture there are necessary behavioural differences between zombies and non- zombies, because those differences are the result of the differences in the conceptual vocabularies available to each culture. At the level of culture, conscious inessentialism is false.

His arguments appeal primarily to our intuitions, using for example, the inverted spectrum problem. For the case of a zombie with no ability of internal seeing, how could this possibly be translated? One of the better arguments Moody gives IMHO, is this:

What is most interesting is the fact the zombie scientists would have to regard consciousness (not consciousness[z]) as something beyond the scope of their science. They would be forced to conclude[z] that consciousness is not consciousness[z]. But their science is methodologically just like ours.

Polger and Flanagan (P&F) on the other hand, point out that nothing Moody suggests is conclusive, and in fact, there is nothing physically impossible about a zombie. A zombie does not violate any known laws of physics. This alone seems a fairly strong statement at first, but remember that suggesting there are planet sized celestial bodies made from cheese similarly does not violate any known laws of physics, nor do many religious beliefs. Regardless, P&F provide an excellent rebuttal to Moody, starting with:

Let’s take the argument step-by-step. Step-one is to concede the possibility of Turing-identical zombies growing up in our midst. So, for example, one might imagine a dramatically improved robotic version of NET-talk, a connectionist machine, that learns the language in its surround as humans do, and then uses our language, including terms like ‘believe’, ‘dream’, ‘see’, and so on, just as we do.

I see no problem with this, and I believe even Moody would have to concede this possibility. But of course, step-two is more difficult. Step-two “involves denying that a zombie, or an isolated population of zombies, could “originate” our mentalistic vocabulary.”

For step-two, P&F would have us imagine a world where zombies have evolved and might try to communicate with each other. He asks us to “consider this possibility:”

In the beginning, informationally-sensitive zombies who detect (but don’t experience trees on Zombie Earth also notice that compatriot zombies sometimes bump into trees. Observation of this regularity leads to the invention of a warning locution such as “Watch out!” whose normal social function is to get zombies to turn around so that their photoreceptors receive the relevant message and dispose them to re-orient their motion. They start calling having one’s photoreceptors oriented in the right direction “seeing.” To be sure, it is seeing-z, the non-conscious zombie counterpart to our seeing.

In essence, P&F are suggesting that such terms as seeing, hearing, or even terms for qualia such as color, might in fact serve a function for zombies which corresponds to the function served by humans.

Why are we even concerned about all this talk about zombies? P&F summarize nicely:

And the reason these kinds of possibility matter, is that they push us to sharpen our theories about nature, function, and criteria of consciousness. If systems “just like us” could exist without consciousness, then why was this ingredient added? Does consciousness do something that couldn’t be done without it?- in addition, that is, to bringing experience into the world?

So what's your opinion? Could zombies exist?

References:
Moody argues that zombies could not have evolved.
http://faculty.uca.edu/~rnovy/Moody -- Conversations with Zombies.htm
Polger and Flanagan argue that zombies could have evolved.
http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-ZombiesJCS.pdf

 

[Moridin]

Can a zombie be distinguished from a person drunk enough?

 

[JoeDawg]

So what's your opinion? Could zombies exist?

Aren't we all zombies at one time or another? I mean this sincerely, even excepting the drunk example. Consciousness in a very real way is about self-reflection, when one is engaged in some dangerous or all encompassing, engrossing, task, are we not somewhat like a zombie? And if that's true, how fragile and dynamic consciousness must be.

 

[Q_Goest]

A p-zombie has nothing to do with drunkenness, acting drunk or stoned, nor absent-mindedness, being engrossed, etc…

If you’re interested in the philosophical implications of this concept, please read over Chalmer’s overview, or at least the cartoon with the dinosaurs here:
http://consc.net/zombies.html

 

[granpa]

if a zombie perfectly modeled every detail of our brains then would it not be human?

if our brains are entirely responsible for our consciousness then doesn't that make us zombies by your definition?

 

[JoeDawg]

A p-zombie has nothing to do with drunkenness, acting drunk or stoned, nor absent-mindedness, being engrossed, etc…

If you’re interested in the philosophical implications of this concept, please read over Chalmer’s overview, or at least the cartoon with the dinosaurs here:
http://consc.net/zombies.html

Or you could re-read that article and look at the note on the 'zombie within'. Unconscious action is exactly what p-zombies are about.

 

[JoeDawg]

if a zombie perfectly modeled every detail of our brains then would it not be human?

if our brains are entirely responsible for our consciousness then doesn't that make us zombies by your definition?

The p-zombie is a thought experiment about the nature of consciousness. Think about what the difference would be between a human and a functioning artificial intelligence. At some point could an AI have the complexity to fake passing a turing test for instance? And if it could fake it, simply by giving the correct responses based on rules, as opposed to having self awareness, how would we know?

 

[futurebird]

Aren't we all zombies at one time or another? I mean this sincerely, even excepting the drunk example. Consciousness in a very real way is about self-reflection, when one is engaged in some dangerous or all encompassing, engrossing, task, are we not somewhat like a zombie? And if that's true, how fragile and dynamic consciousness must be.

I agree. I think most people are "zombies" MOST of the time. It takes way too much energy to be "aware" at every moment. You'd be, crazy if you were that aware.

 

[futurebird]

Many proponents of computationalism, 1 the view that cognition is computation, are busy trying to practice what they preach: they are trying to build artificial persons...
http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/zombies.ppr.pdf​

This is from 2001! I'm shocked to find out that people are still doing this? I thought this agreement was over. I mean between complexity and still crude state of computing isn't this just... silly? But I see this paper is taking down Daniel Dennett... (good!) Hmm this zombie stuff is new to me. I'm going to read more.

 

[JoeDawg]

I agree. I think most people are "zombies" MOST of the time. It takes way too much energy to be "aware" at every moment. You'd be, crazy if you were that aware.

But could a being exist that functions like a human, but is completely unconscious... all the time? That is the p-zombie question. Basically, its a question about the nature of consciousness itself.

 

[futurebird]

But could a being exist that functions like a human, but is completely unconscious... all the time? That is the p-zombie question. Basically, its a question about the nature of consciousness itself.

I think I *know* people like that.

Okay, let me try to be serious. Okay, one of the papers on the site had the idea that if you can't tell the difference then what is the point? For the idea of a zombie to have meaning you need to be able to identify a zombie.


That said, I think that consciousness is a much more fleeting a rare occurrence then some of these papers describe. The majority of our actions are done without conscious thinking or real awareness.

The distinguishing feature of conciseness is the tension it creates between autopilot actions and thoughts. That tension, is the essence of a good play or movie-- it's what makes people seem human. It's going to be really hard to replicate, short of just cloning a person-- which I think misses the point for artificial intelligence people like Dennet.

And its not just about replicating the symptoms of a aware and conflicted minds, it's about making the process of conflict identical. Once you do that you're not writing a program anymore, your trying to make a functioning mind.

 

[JoeDawg]

It's going to be really hard to replicate, short of just cloning a person-- which I think misses the point for artificial intelligence people like Dennet.

Difficult to replicate I think is an understatement, however, not because I think true artificial intelligence would be impossible to create, but rather because any intelligence we create would likely have a completely different type, that is, a completely alien form, of consciousness. And really why do we need to recreate our own limited consciousness.

Our consciousness evolved, based on our limited senses and environment, we grow into it as we age, but what effect would the 'artificial' process have on the type of consciousness that is 'creatable'? If AI is doable, I think it will end up being very different from what we have.

As to zombies, I think its probably more of a spectrum type thing... differing levels of consciousness... to a degree it becomes impossible to make a clear demarcation between what is conscious and what isn't. Although of course examples of both exist.

 

[Q_Goest]

I think it might be helpful to understand exactly what a zombie is. As JoeDawg says, it is unconscious, but I think that can be misunderstood. A zombie experiences nothing more than a rock. Saying they are unconscious might imply that they can be conscious but they simply aren’t at the moment.

Zombies are hypothetical beings that simply don’t have any experience of anything, ever. We say that they can react to such physical cues in the environment such that we could not distinguish between a zombie and a sentient person. And we also say they can act so much like a real person that they could pass a Turing test. There would be no way to distinguish them from humans.

In fact, we can even propose to give these hypothetical beings a body that is identical physical body to ours, as granpa suggests. And if we say that brains are in fact what make us sentient, then we might get confused at this point and think that since these beings are physically identical to us, then either we are zombies or zombies are sentient.

The answer is neither.

We are different from zombies because we are sentient and they are not. And the only reason for creating this hypothetical being is as JoeDawg mentions, this is a thought experiment. Not a great one I suppose, but an interesting one. Once we’ve concocted this bizarre creature, we then ask the question, “Could such a thing exist?. What differences are there between humans and humans that have no experience of the world? Would there be any way of telling?"

If we accept there is no way of telling, we might also then ask if such a creature could evolve.

I would have to go along with the idea that they could be created, at least hypothetically, if not in practice. If we say as granpa suggests, that since these hypothetical creatures are identical to us in every way, then we have a problem since they are us and we must accept these things create the same phenomena as our own bodies and brains do, including consciousness or lack thereof. Ok, let’s get around this issue by suggesting they only communicate with us through some kind of holographic unit that makes it ‘seem’ as if they are physically identical, but they are not. Kinda like that one old Star Trek episode where Kirk wants to shag this hot babe who crash landed on some Maritain planet, and the Martians put her back together wrong and she really looks like the hunch-back’s bride but of course, Kirk has the Martian beer goggles on and thinks she’s hot.

- ok, end of tangent.

Let’s just say these zombies have some physical difference that we have no ability to identify.

Could they be created? Maybe. Not by humans in the foreseeable future perhaps, but maybe in a thousand years or a million or a billion. Maybe.

Could such things have evolved on another planet? This is where it gets sticky. I'm not sure. We have to ask ourselves what purpose consciousness plays in our evolution, but can we even suggest that consciousness plays some crutial role? If so, we have to accept that there is a difference between humans with and without consciousness. We may be forced to change how we model reality and accept that our objective understanding of nature is flawed. If not, we are forced to conclude that consciousness is an epiphenomena, and if you are Dennett, you might be forced to conclude we are all just zombies ourselves.

 

[Q_Goest]

Many proponents of computationalism, 1 the view that cognition is computation, are busy trying to practice what they preach: they are trying to build artificial persons...
http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/zombies.ppr.pdf
This is from 2001! I'm shocked to find out that people are still doing this?

Hi futurebird. Computationalism is the standard model used for studies on consciousness today. It is generally assumed that cognition is computation.

 

[Q_Goest]

I rather like Mike Kearns’ take on this:

Suppose you were Evolution and you were given a choice:
A. you can develop machines that compute with amazing rapidity and accuracy, but they aren’t aware of anything. Nothing means anything to them. They don’t believe anything. They don’t comprehend anything.
or
B. you can develop creatures that are conscious, that are aware of objects in the world around them. They believe things. Later, they comprehend things: many things. Before too long, they communicate with each other using symbols whose meaning they understand.
Which would you choose? If I were Evolution I’d say, "Well, Option B sounds a lot quicker. With the help of awareness (and other concomitant features) this line of development can move along pretty fast. And the resulting creatures sound like they have a lot more survival prowess. Intra-species linguistic communication especially appeals to me." And Evolution might add, "Option A sounds okay too, I do believe that computers could blanket the world if we could get them started, but that won’t happen without help. Wait! I’ve just thought of a way to develop them. I’ll choose Option B and then those conscious creatures will invent computers, and eventually those computers may even be developed into zombies, though even I may not be able to pull off this last step."

Ref: http://www.kearnsianthoughts.com/index.html

A zombie animal of any kind can have no understanding, no comprehension and nothing can ‘mean’ anything to it. So Kearns suggests that phenomena such as meaning or understanding is a survival advantage which evolution has taken advantage of.

I don’t see how such phenomena as meaning CAN’T be a survival advantage. Pain, pleasure and various qualia all exist for virtually all animals IMHO, even animals without proper brains such as clams or starfish. Thus, it seems every animal that has ever evolved has also evolved qualia along with it. Is it too much to suggest these phenomena lend animals some kind of survival advantage? What argument is there against qualia being an evolutionary advantage?

 

[futurebird]

Hi futurebird. Computationalism is the standard model used for studies on consciousness today. It is generally assumed that cognition is computation.

That's a really strong statement. Isn't it more like there's a huge debate about if cognition could be computation... and if that question even has a meaningful answer?

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi futurebird. Check out wiki :

The computational theory of mind is the view that the human mind is best conceived as an information processing system very similar to or identical with a digital computer. In other words, thought is a kind of computation performed by a self-reconfigurable hardware (the brain). This view is common in modern cognitive psychology and is one of the foundations of evolutionary psychology.

Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computationalism

and Chalmers:

Perhaps no concept is more central to the foundations of modern cognitive science than that of computation. The ambitions of artificial intelligence rest on a computational framework, and in other areas of cognitive science, models of cognitive processes are most frequently cast in computational terms.

Ref: http://consc.net/papers/computation.html

There are many more. That's not to say computationalism isn't debated - it is. But cognitive science, as Chalmers points out, bases cognition on computationalism (and perhaps to a lesser degre, functionalism).

 

[baywax]

We are different from zombies because we are sentient and they are not.

Our sentient nature is a result of the zombie-like characteristics of our neurons and glandular responses. These corporeal components that form the foundation of our "conscious awareness" have no more special ingredients than a rock. An AI machine can be built to mimic these functions but it is so far more efficient to pro-create and manipulate an offspring's upbringng with perpetual violence, bad food and poor education. There may be advantages for an institution to develop a work-force based on non-sentience and lack of conscience, the task is already attempted by-way of re-educating and re-training militants or raising children in a militant fashion. They don't bump into trees but they also don't appear to be able to stop killing or being killed either.

I'm not sure that sentience is the ultimate distinction between a zombie and a regular citizen of the planet. I might propose that a zombie is distinguishable from others by its genuine lack of respect for life.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi baywax,

Our sentient nature is a result of the zombie-like characteristics of our neurons and glandular responses. These corporeal components that form the foundation of our "conscious awareness" have no more special ingredients than a rock.

Yes, this is part of the standard model of computationalism. "Emergence" is often used to explain how all these "zombie-like characteristics" might produce the phenomenon of consciousness.

An AI machine can be built to mimic these functions but it is so far more efficient to pro-create and manipulate an offspring's upbringng with perpetual violence, bad food and poor education.

<grin>

There may be advantages for an institution to develop a work-force based on non-sentience and lack of conscience, the task is already attempted by-way of re-educating and re-training militants or raising children in a militant fashion. They don't bump into trees but they also don't appear to be able to stop killing or being killed either.

I'm not sure that sentience is the ultimate distinction between a zombie and a regular citizen of the planet. I might propose that a zombie is distinguishable from others by its genuine lack of respect for life.

All this is a perfectly legitimate way of looking at ‘brainwashing’ of people as is done by “militants” or any cult or religious group. But please understand, you are not talking about p-zombies here. P-zombies have a very specific definition which is not to be extended to people that have been brainwashed or otherwise made unaware of their surroundings in some way such as by drugs, alchohol, etc… as previously suggested in this thread.

Sentience is indeed the ultimate distinction between a p-zombie and a human. I’m only referring to the use of the term as is used in the philosophy of consciousness, and that has nothing to do with a lack of respect for life. In fact, p-zombies might be insulted-z that you are suggesting they are less respectful of human life than they are.

 

[baywax]

Hi baywax,

Yes, this is part of the standard model of computationalism. "Emergence" is often used to explain how all these "zombie-like characteristics" might produce the phenomenon of consciousness.<grin> All this is a perfectly legitimate way of looking at ‘brainwashing’ of people as is done by “militants” or any cult or religious group. But please understand, you are not talking about p-zombies here. P-zombies have a very specific definition which is not to be extended to people that have been brainwashed or otherwise made unaware of their surroundings in some way such as by drugs, alchohol, etc… as previously suggested in this thread.

Sentience is indeed the ultimate distinction between a p-zombie and a human. I’m only referring to the use of the term as is used in the philosophy of consciousness, and that has nothing to do with a lack of respect for life. In fact, p-zombies might be insulted-z that you are suggesting they are less respectful of human life than they are.

Oh... (red faced smirk) a p-zombie. Let's see, there's plenty of them in chronic care in the hospital. They don't feel it when you poke them with a needle or a catheter and they're pretty well unaware of the difference between individuals.

These are people who have served as citizens even heroically yet are now shells of their former selves with responses that don't match what they are experiencing. Some of them are actually killed with overdoses of morphine because the learned behavior of their facial expressions denote pain when they actually feel nothing at all.

But, for the most part, since a p-zombie is a tool that's been crafted for argumentative endevours and thought experiments it seems to be a superfluous creature.

The idea that "regular" zombies might evolve to become dominant in a universe that demands response to stimulus ie: cause and effect, is at most an impossibility. Zombies, like polititicans and other mal contents will always be shooting themselves in the foot or their friends in the face.

(A) p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, sentience, or sapience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "Ouch!" and so forth), but it does not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does.
The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly used in arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly arguments against forms of physicalism, such as materialism and behaviorism.

 

[easyrider]

Logically, you can't live if youre dead!

 

[JoeDawg]

Logically, you can't live if youre dead!

BRAINS!

 

[Greg Bernhardt]

Logically, you can't live if youre dead!

What if you are "undead" or are the "living dead"? ;)

 

[baywax]

What if you are "undead" or are the "living dead"? ;)

Logically, "undead" means alive. Living dead, on the other hand, describes a large segment of the population.-)