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I have never been particularly impressed with Tim Mauldin's general take on Bell and QM. I am reading an article of his at the moment. Here is an excerpt (lightly edited by Grammarly to have correct punctuation, etc).
Start Quote
But for expository purposes, the point is most clearly made by an example later developed by Daniel Greenberger, Michael Horne and Anton Zeilinger (as exposited by David Mermin). This later example uses a triple of entangled particles sent off to Alice, Bob, and Charlie in arbitrarily widely separated labs. The separation ensures that in a local theory, Alice’s, Bob’s, and Charlie’s decision about how to arrange their experimental apparatus cannot be communicated to—or have any influence on—the way the particles in other labs interact with their apparatuses or what the outcomes of those experiments are.
What we now know—due to Bell’s proof and the experimental tests—is that the physics of the actual world must somehow violate Einstein’s proscription on “spooky action-as-a-distance”.
Alice, Bob, and Charlie can choose between two experimental arrangements, which we will call “x-spin” and “z-spin”. Practically, that means orienting a certain magnet in either the x-direction or the orthogonal z-direction. Since there are three labs with two possible experimental arrangements each, there are 8 possible global experimental conditions on each experiment run (after a central source delivers one of the three entangled particles to each lab). By a convenient and obvious notation, we will refer to these eight possible global arrangements as XAXBXc, XAXBZc, XAZBXc, ZAXBXc, XAZBZc, ZAXBZc, ZAZBXc, and ZAZBZc. Whenever Alice, Bob, or Charlie experiment on their particle, they get one of two possible results. They pass the particle through the magnetic field, and it is either deflected towards the north pole of the magnet (called an “up” result) or away from it (a “down” result). Regarding the experimental situation, that’s all you need to know.
Now, for a particular prepared initial quantum state (which is referred to as an “entangled” state because it cannot be expressed as just the sum of independent separate states of the two particles), the quantum formalism makes some 100% sure-fire, absolute predictions. These predictions play the same role in this argument as the EPR correlations play in their argument. Of course, the theory makes predictions for all eight possible experimental arrangements, but only four concern us: XAXBXc, XAZBZc, ZAXBZc, and ZAZBXc. Here are the predictions:
1) If all three orient their magnets in the x-direction (XAXBXc), then there will be an odd number of “up” outcomes. There might be one or three, but it will certainly be odd.
2) If exactly one orients her or his magnet in the x-direction (XAZBZc, ZAXBZc, or ZAZBXc), then there will be an even number of “up” outcomes. There might be zero and two, but it will certainly be even.
That’s it. These are predictions of the quantum formalism, and (more importantly!) they are what actually occurs in the lab. We will now show that no local theory can make these predictions.
The first part of the argument recapitulates EPR. Note that in any of these four cases, the results of any two experiments allow one to infer with certainty the result of the third. If the total number of “up”s must be odd, for example, given any two outcomes, there is only one acceptable value for the last. From this perfect correlation, we arrive at the EPR conclusion: if the physics is local, it must also be deterministic. If something irreducibly chancy happens in (say) Alice’s lab, then the particles in Bob’s and/or Charlie’s must be somehow sensitive to how it came out to ensure the correct number of “up” outcomes. Just as in the EPR argument, this determinism is not assumed but inferred from the locality and the correlations.
End Quote.
'If something irreducibly chancy happens in (say) Alice’s lab, then the particles in Bob’s and/or Charlie’s must be somehow sensitive to how it came out to ensure the correct number of “up” outcomes.'
Come again. Certainly, something irreducibly chancy happens in, say, Alice's lab. QM is irreducibly chancy (in most interpretations anyway - certainly in mine). Fine. But what also happens is entanglement is broken, i.e. the Quantum state changes. That can be instantaneous - no problem - if the state is considered just a tool to help predict probabilities. I am not saying that is true, but it is a valid interpretation. Then his whole argument falls to pieces, or to state it more carefully, one must be careful what one means by locality. QM is non-local in the Bell sense of probability correlations - but in other definitions of locality, there is no mystery, i.e. if, as I do, you think of the state as just a calculation device implied by Gleason's Theorem.
Tim is a well known researcher in the field, so I am opening up the question to what others think.
Thanks
Bill
I have never been particularly impressed with Tim Mauldin's general take on Bell and QM. I am reading an article of his at the moment. Here is an excerpt (lightly edited by Grammarly to have correct punctuation, etc).
Start Quote
But for expository purposes, the point is most clearly made by an example later developed by Daniel Greenberger, Michael Horne and Anton Zeilinger (as exposited by David Mermin). This later example uses a triple of entangled particles sent off to Alice, Bob, and Charlie in arbitrarily widely separated labs. The separation ensures that in a local theory, Alice’s, Bob’s, and Charlie’s decision about how to arrange their experimental apparatus cannot be communicated to—or have any influence on—the way the particles in other labs interact with their apparatuses or what the outcomes of those experiments are.
What we now know—due to Bell’s proof and the experimental tests—is that the physics of the actual world must somehow violate Einstein’s proscription on “spooky action-as-a-distance”.
Alice, Bob, and Charlie can choose between two experimental arrangements, which we will call “x-spin” and “z-spin”. Practically, that means orienting a certain magnet in either the x-direction or the orthogonal z-direction. Since there are three labs with two possible experimental arrangements each, there are 8 possible global experimental conditions on each experiment run (after a central source delivers one of the three entangled particles to each lab). By a convenient and obvious notation, we will refer to these eight possible global arrangements as XAXBXc, XAXBZc, XAZBXc, ZAXBXc, XAZBZc, ZAXBZc, ZAZBXc, and ZAZBZc. Whenever Alice, Bob, or Charlie experiment on their particle, they get one of two possible results. They pass the particle through the magnetic field, and it is either deflected towards the north pole of the magnet (called an “up” result) or away from it (a “down” result). Regarding the experimental situation, that’s all you need to know.
Now, for a particular prepared initial quantum state (which is referred to as an “entangled” state because it cannot be expressed as just the sum of independent separate states of the two particles), the quantum formalism makes some 100% sure-fire, absolute predictions. These predictions play the same role in this argument as the EPR correlations play in their argument. Of course, the theory makes predictions for all eight possible experimental arrangements, but only four concern us: XAXBXc, XAZBZc, ZAXBZc, and ZAZBXc. Here are the predictions:
1) If all three orient their magnets in the x-direction (XAXBXc), then there will be an odd number of “up” outcomes. There might be one or three, but it will certainly be odd.
2) If exactly one orients her or his magnet in the x-direction (XAZBZc, ZAXBZc, or ZAZBXc), then there will be an even number of “up” outcomes. There might be zero and two, but it will certainly be even.
That’s it. These are predictions of the quantum formalism, and (more importantly!) they are what actually occurs in the lab. We will now show that no local theory can make these predictions.
The first part of the argument recapitulates EPR. Note that in any of these four cases, the results of any two experiments allow one to infer with certainty the result of the third. If the total number of “up”s must be odd, for example, given any two outcomes, there is only one acceptable value for the last. From this perfect correlation, we arrive at the EPR conclusion: if the physics is local, it must also be deterministic. If something irreducibly chancy happens in (say) Alice’s lab, then the particles in Bob’s and/or Charlie’s must be somehow sensitive to how it came out to ensure the correct number of “up” outcomes. Just as in the EPR argument, this determinism is not assumed but inferred from the locality and the correlations.
End Quote.
'If something irreducibly chancy happens in (say) Alice’s lab, then the particles in Bob’s and/or Charlie’s must be somehow sensitive to how it came out to ensure the correct number of “up” outcomes.'
Come again. Certainly, something irreducibly chancy happens in, say, Alice's lab. QM is irreducibly chancy (in most interpretations anyway - certainly in mine). Fine. But what also happens is entanglement is broken, i.e. the Quantum state changes. That can be instantaneous - no problem - if the state is considered just a tool to help predict probabilities. I am not saying that is true, but it is a valid interpretation. Then his whole argument falls to pieces, or to state it more carefully, one must be careful what one means by locality. QM is non-local in the Bell sense of probability correlations - but in other definitions of locality, there is no mystery, i.e. if, as I do, you think of the state as just a calculation device implied by Gleason's Theorem.
Tim is a well known researcher in the field, so I am opening up the question to what others think.
Thanks
Bill