Doesn't the choice of measurement prove free will

[bhobba]

This is far from mumbo jumbo. Conway and Kochen have rigorously went through the results in their published paper on the free will theorem and the strong free will theorem

They haven't rigorously proven anything because it depends on what is meant by free will. If it is the opposite of determinism, as you and the authors claim, then it does not align with the common sense notion of free wiil - it is better described by unpredictable.

Of course the above is just opinion - as are the views on free will expressed in the paper. This is all nothing but semantics as a number of people have alluded to in this thread. We generally do not have long meandering threads on this forum based on semantics because they will not get anywhere. You have given your view, others have given theirs - if you continue in this vein you will attract the attention of the mentors in their official capacity - just a friendly bit of advice from a mentor.

As Peter explained - we do not care about arguments based on authority here. You can start, for example, by carefully explaining that quote I thought was mumbo jumbo.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

As I have already pointed out, this is just an argument from authority. It's out of bounds here. To put it bluntly, we don't care about any of these things. If you want to defend their arguments, you need to defend their arguments on the merits, as you have done in some of your previous posts by giving actual quotes from the paper and explaining why you think they support your position. You should keep doing that, not keep reiterating how they've published and haven't backed down, etc., etc.

I understand this, I only pointed it out this time as a way to refute the claim that what they were saying was mumbo jumbo. Ido think the Pedigree of the Authors of the theorem come into play in that instant. Throughout most of the thread, I have defended the results based on the merits as you have said and I will try not to appeal to authority. I only did so because their work was reduced to mumbo jumbo and philosophy.

 

[PeterDonis]

I only pointed it out this time as a way to refute the claim that what they were saying was mumbo jumbo. Ido think the Pedigree of the Authors of the theorem come into play in that instant.

No, they don't. "Mumbo jumbo" is just another way of saying "not convinced by their arguments". No amount of reiterating the Pedigree of the Authors is going to convince someone who isn't convinced by their arguments.

 

[entropy2information]

Of course the above is just opinion - as are the views on free will expressed in the paper. This is all nothing but semantics as a number of people have alluded to in this thread. We generally do not have long meandering threads on this forum based on semantics because they will not get anywhere. You have given your view, others have given theirs - if you continue in this vein you will attract the attention of the mentors in their official capacity - just a friendly bit of advice from a mentor.

I haven't talked about semantics. Most of my posts are on the merits of the theorem.

Others have talked about semantics and how they don't like the term free will. The Authors explain why they chose to call it free will. Again, I have not debated semantics, I briefly responded to post that said they didn't like the term free will.

 

[bhobba]

I understand this, I only pointed it out this time as a way to refute the claim that what they were saying was mumbo jumbo.

If you do not think it's mumbo jumbo explain why it isn't - simple. The explanation must not be an appeal to authority, but in your own words what its saying. For example it said - It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. I take science just as seriously if its deterministic or not because chaos theory tells us for all practical purposes you can't know the future anyway. If its not true in fact, just FAPP, does not worry me a bit.

Thanks
Bill

 

[black hole 123]

hi, this is slightly off topic, but can someone clarify wat free will is?

obviously determinism means no free will, but non determinism doesn't imply free will. u might then say free will is behaviour that's not deterministic nor conforming to the calculated probability distributions of the system (a human in this case), but that still doesn't capture the meaning of free will. I am not sure free will makes any sense...

 

[entropy2information]

No, they don't. "Mumbo jumbo" is just another way of saying "not convinced by their arguments". No amount of reiterating the Pedigree of the Authors is going to convince someone who isn't convinced by their arguments.

True, but nobody has shown why their arguments are wrong. They just have said that they don't like the term free will and this is philosophy. I have presented the theorem on it's merits as you said. Saying you're not convinced by their arguments is subjective, saying why their arguments aren't convincing is a scientific debate. So far, nobody has explained why they don't make a convincing argument, it 's just they don't like the term free will.

 

[bhobba]

hi, this is slightly off topic, but can someone clarify wat free will is?

I cant. That's part of the problem.

I think most would say if your actions are determined completely by things happening in the past then you do not have free will. But that does not mean the opposite of determinism is free will - I think not predictable is a better description. But I also have to ask in practice exactly what difference to physics does it make if we have free will or not?

Thanks
Bill

 

[PeterDonis]

nobody has shown why their arguments are wrong

You may be misinterpreting the responses. As I understand, for example, @bhobba, he is not saying their formal proof of the theorem is wrong. But their formal theorem only proves a hypothetical: If the experimenters' choices are free, then the results "chosen" by the particles being measured are also free. The additional claim that the experimenters' choices must be free because determinism is not a viable alernative is not proven in the paper; it's just asserted as the authors' opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

 

[entropy2information]

obviously determinism means no free will, but non determinism doesn't imply free will. u might then say free will is behaviour that's not deterministic nor conforming to the calculated probability distributions of the system (a human in this case), but that still doesn't capture the meaning of free will. I am not sure free will makes any sense...

Free will in the context of the free will theorem is two sided. They also say the particle has free will. In this sense, the history of the particle can't be restrained by any physical mechanism that determines the choice of the Experimenter. They say:

f the choice of directions in which to perform spin 1 experiments is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then the responses of the particles are equally not functions of the information accessible to them.

Why do we call this result the Free Will theorem? It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history. We make this assumption explicit precisely because our theorem deduces from it the more surprising fact that the particles’ responses are also not determined by past history.

 

[PeterDonis]

In this sense, the history of the particle can't be restrained by any physical mechanism that determines the choice of the Experimenter.

That's not what the theorem says. The theorem says (as given in the very passage you quote) that if the choice of the experimenter is not determined, then the particle's "choice" is not determined either. The theorem does not prove anything about what must or must not happen if the choice of the experimenter is determined.

 

[entropy2information]

You may be misinterpreting the responses. As I understand, for example, @bhobba, he is not saying their formal proof of the theorem is wrong. But their formal theorem only proves a hypothetical: If the experimenters' choices are free, then the results "chosen" by the particles being measured are also free. The additional claim that the experimenters' choices must be free because determinism is not a viable alernative is not proven in the paper; it's just asserted as the authors' opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

This is true and this is why Conway says at the beginning of his lecture that it's not his job to disprove determinism. In order for determinism to be a viable alternative though, it's on the shoulders of Determinists to show how their theory doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

 

[PeterDonis]

it's on the shoulders of Determinists to show how their theory doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

Determinism can't conflict with the free will theorem, because, as I pointed out in post #46, that theorem says nothing about what must or must not be the case if determinism is true. It only says what must be the case if determinism is false. So if determinism is true, the theorem is irrelevant.

 

[bhobba]

It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history.

It is? I know Gleason very well and can't find that assumption anywhere.

Just so my position is clear - what I am saying is the theorem is trivial. If free will is the opposite of determinism, since both particles and us are quantum objects, that we have free will implies quantum particles have free will is hardly surprising. But considering the usual usage of the term free will saying a particle has free will is rather strange.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

That's not what the theorem says. The theorem says (as given in the very passage you quote) that if the choice of the experimenter is not determined, then the particle's "choice" is not determined either. The theorem does not prove anything about what must or must not happen if the choice of the experimenter is determined.

Of course it does and Conway talks about this in his lectures.

If the choice is determined then the Determinist must explain what physical mechanism is determining what choice the experimenter makes which which would also restrain what history the particle can be in. It says:

It follows that we cannot prove our Free Will assumption – determinism, like solipsism, is logically possible. Both the non-existence of free agents in determism and the external world in solipsism are rightly conjured up by philosophers as consistent if unbelievable universes to show the limits of what is possible, but we discard them as serious views of our universe.

It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. Nature could be in an insidious conspiracy to “confirm” laws by denying us the freedom to make the tests that would refute them. Physical induction, the primary tool of science, disappears if we are denied access to random samples. It is also hard to take seriously the arguments of those who according to their own beliefs are deterministic automata

This is pretty clear. If the choice of the experiment is determined then it's incumbent on the Determist to explain the nature of this mechanism and why it doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

I have asked for evidence of this mechanism but no response so far.

 

[PeterDonis]

Of course it does and Conway talks about this in his lectures.

What Conway says does not contradict what I said: that his theorem does not prove anything about what happens if determinism is true. His claim that determinism is not viable has nothing to do with his theorem: it has to do with the opinion he states in the second paragraph of what you quoted. Which is just his opinion; it's not a logical proof of anything.

If the choice of the experiment is determined then it's incumbent on the Determist to explain the nature of this mechanism and why it doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

The mechanism can't conflict with the free will theorem. Conway even admits that in what you quoted; he says determinism is logically possible. If your claim were true, that would not be the case. You are coming close to a warning and a thread ban for failing to respond to what others are actually saying and continuing to make a demonstrably false claim.

As for "it is incumbent on the Determinist", again, that's Conway's opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

 

[bhobba]

If the choice is determined then the Determinist must explain what physical mechanism is determining what choice the experimenter makes which which would also restrain what history the particle can be in.

The determinist does not have to explain exactly what causes the action - they believe its all determined by the initial conditions. That's why to my mind the issue is irrelevant because the mechanism would be so complex we can never know it anyway. Indeed Chaos theory would say you can't in practice know it.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

Just so my position is clear - what I am saying is the theorem is trivial. If free will is the opposite of determinism, since both particles and us are quantum objects, that we have free will implies quantum particles have free will is hardly surprising. But considering the usual usage of the term free will saying a particle has free will is rather strange.

I don't think it's strange because the Authors wanted to go deeper than just unpredictability. You can see this in their lectures. They're not saying that this free choice is just the appearance of free choice and there's some physical mechanism that really determines the choice of the Experimenter.

What they're saying is, this free choice is more fundamental.

 

[bhobba]

What they're saying is, this free choice is more fundamental.

That may be their opinion, but it is not what they proved which is: The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the response of a spin 1 particle to a triple experiment is free—that is to say, is not a function of properties of that part of the universe that is earlier than this response with respect to any given inertial frame.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

What Conway says does not contradict what I said: that his theorem does not prove anything about what happens if determinism is true. His claim that determinism is not viable has nothing to do with his theorem: it has to do with the opinion he states in the second paragraph of what you quoted. Which is just his opinion; it's not a logical proof of anything.
The mechanism can't conflict with the free will theorem. Conway even admits that in what you quoted; he says determinism is logically possible. If your claim were true, that would not be the case. You are coming close to a warning and a thread ban for failing to respond to what others are actually saying and continuing to make a demonstrably false claim.

As for "it is incumbent on the Determinist", again, that's Conway's opinion. Others' opinions might differ.

What claim have I made that's false? I never said nor have Kochen and Conway that they disprove determinism. I have repeatedly said that throughout this thread. So of course determinism is logically possible but as they said so is solipsism.

My point is, the free will theorem does restrain any physical mechanism that can determine the choice of the Experimenter. In fact bhobba just said this:

The determinist does not have to explain exactly what causes the action - they believe its all determined by the initial conditions. That's why to my mind the issue is irrelevant because the mechanism would be so complex we can never know it anyway. Indeed Chaos theory would say you can't in practice know it.

Thanks
Bill

My point exactly. This isn't science. Saying mechanism is so complex we can never know it. How can we probe it? Again, I haven't misrepresented anything and I never made the claim that the free will theorem disproves determinism.

 

[PeterDonis]

The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the response of a spin 1 particle to a triple experiment is free

Actually, those axioms by themselves do not. Those axioms, plus the assumption that the experimenter's choice of which direction to measure in is free, imply that the response of the particle is free.

 

[PeterDonis]

What claim have I made that's false?

This one:

it's on the shoulders of Determinists to show how their theory doesn't conflict with the free will theorem.

I've explained why it's false at least twice now.

the free will theorem does restrain any physical mechanism that can determine the choice of the Experimenter.

This claim is also false. Apparently you haven't fully grasped what I said before: the free will theorem is irrelevant if determinism is true. It only applies to the case where determinism is false. So the theorem can't possibly impose any constrains on what physical mechanisms are present if determinism is true.

bhobba just said this

@bhobba said nothing of the sort. You need to read more carefully.

 

[PeterDonis]

This isn't science. Saying mechanism is so complex we can never know it.

So all of chaos theory isn't science?

 

[bhobba]

Actually, those axioms by themselves do not. Those axioms, plus the assumption that the experimenter's choice of which direction to measure in is free, imply that the response of the particle is free.

Of course. Thanks for picking it up.

Thanks
Bill

 

[entropy2information]

This claim is also false. Apparently you haven't fully grasped what I said before: the free will theorem is irrelevant if determinism is true. It only applies to the case where determinism is false. So the theorem can't possibly impose any constrains on what physical mechanisms are present if determinism is true.

The free will theorem is a clear refutation of determinism. Conway and Kochen makes this clear in their lectures. Here's how Conway ended 1 lecture.



He says there's no reason to believe in determinism because there's no evidence for it. Here's a full lecture:



Saying determinism is logically possible is meaningless. It's just saying determinism can't be disproved but neither can solipsism. Neither can Aliens living underground on Europa. Neither can the simulation hypothesis. These things are logically possible but there's no evidence to support these things as a true description of reality. This is why Kochen says it's not about theories anymore but it's about how the universe works.

“It’s not about theories anymore -- it’s about what the universe does,” said Kochen, a professor of mathematics and the associate chair of the Department of Mathematics. “And we’ve found that, from moment to moment, nature doesn’t know what it’s going to do. A particle has a choice.”

https://www.princeton.edu/news/2009/03/23/high-powered-mathematicians-take-free-will

This debate isn't about semantics of the term free will. This debate is about those who support determinism providing a shred of evidence that a physical mechanism can exist as an element of reality that determines the choice of the Experimenter before a measurement occurs.

bhobba already said this mechanism is too complex for us to know. That's like saying U.F.O.'s are Alien spacecraft but it's too complex for us to know.

It's clear that Conway and Kochen are doing 2 things with the free will theorem as it pertains to determinism.

1. They say determinism can't be disproved therefore it's logically possible. This is just common sense. You can't disprove determinism anymore than you can disprove the existence of Aliens. This doesn't mean there's any evidence to support it. This is why they talked about determinism and solipsism in the paper.

2. The free will theorem makes a physical mechanism that's an element of reality prior to measurement something that's as close to impossible as it gets. They clearly show any such mechanism can't be an element of reality prior to measurement. They say:

The fact that they cannot always predict the results of future experiments has sometimes been described just as a defect of theories extending quantum mechanics. However, if our physical axioms are even approximately true, the free will assumption implies the stronger result, that no theory, whether it extends quantum mechanics or not, can correctly predict the results of future spin experiments. It also makes it clear that this failure to predict is a merit rather than a defect, since these results involve free decisions that the universe has not yet made.

Wow, and this why I keep asking for evidence of a physical mechanism that can predict the choice of the Experimenter and the history of the particle prior to measurement. Determinism can't be true unless you provide evidence that such a mechanism exists.

It also says:

We remark that the Free Will assumption, that the experimenters’ choice of directions is not a function of the information accessible to them, has allowed us to make our theorem refer to the world itself, rather than merely to some theory of the world.

And again:

It follows that we cannot prove our Free Will assumption – determinism, like solipsism, is logically possible. Both the non-existence of free agents in determism and the external world in solipsism are rightly conjured up by philosophers as consistent if unbelievable universes to show the limits of what is possible, but we discard them as serious views of our universe.

We discard them as serious views of our universe. Again, saying something is logically possible requires meeting a very low bar. You can say this about almost any theory with no evidence is logically possible. But they make it crystal clear that there can't be a physical mechanism that can predict these future events prior to measurement if their physical Axioms are even approximately true.

 

[PeterDonis]

The free will theorem is a clear refutation of determinism. Conway and Kochen makes this clear in their lectures.

That's their opinion. They haven't proved it. "Discarding" determinism as a "serious view" is an opinion, not a proof.

bhobba already said this mechanism is too complex for us to know. That's like saying U.F.O.'s are Alien spacecraft but it's too complex for us to know.

Once again: so all of chaos theory isn't science? It's no different from saying UFOs are alien spacecraft ?

 

[cosmik debris]

hi, this is slightly off topic, but can someone clarify wat free will is?

obviously determinism means no free will, but non determinism doesn't imply free will. u might then say free will is behaviour that's not deterministic nor conforming to the calculated probability distributions of the system (a human in this case), but that still doesn't capture the meaning of free will. I am not sure free will makes any sense...

This paper by Scott Aaronson is a good starting point.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.0159.pdf

Cheers

 

[stevendaryl]

The free will theorem is a clear refutation of determinism. Conway and Kochen makes this clear in their lectures. Here's how Conway ended 1 lecture.

...

They say determinism can't be disproved therefore it's logically possible

To me, "refute" and "disprove" mean the same thing, so I don't know how they refuted determinism without disproving it.

 

[entropy2information]

To me, "refute" and "disprove" mean the same thing, so I don't know how they refuted determinism without disproving it.

Again, you're debating semantics just like you didn't like the term free will. I try to stay away from semantic debates and stick to the merits but here we go.

Conway is smart to say disproved because to disprove something is to show that it's false. You can refute an argument without showing that it's false. They have crippled determinism and made it essentially hard to accept while acknowledging it's still logically possible because the free will theorem doesn't disprove determinism.

Here's a recent article on the strong cosmic censorship conjecture.

Mathematicians Disprove Conjecture Made to Save Black Holes

Nearly 40 years after it was proposed, mathematicians have settled one of the most profound questions in the study of general relativity. In a paper posted online last fall, mathematicians Mihalis Dafermos and Jonathan Luk have proven that the strong cosmic censorship conjecture, which concerns the strange inner workings of black holes, is false.

https://www.quantamagazine.org/mathematicians-disprove-conjecture-made-to-save-black-holes-20180517/

Again, there's a difference between showing something is false Mathematically or through observed evidence and refuting something in a debate.

 

[PeterDonis]

You can refute an argument without showing that it's false.

I don't see how, any more than @stevendaryl does.

there's a difference between showing something is false Mathematically or through observed evidence and refuting something in a debate.

No, there's a difference between actually refuting something--proving it false--and just stating your opinion that you think it's false.

 

[PeterDonis]

This has gone on long enough. Thread closed.