Is Apple's Argument Against Abortion Consistent with Other Ethical Stances?

[Tisthammerw]

The correct biological term that would apply to any stage from fertilization to birth is conceptus.

Hmm, it seems you're right. Makes me wonder why the term never came up in biology class.

Sort of. It's really not potential per se but the nature of the organism itself. Think of it this way: why allow a human newborn to live? It has no more intelligence then my pet cat, nor can it contribute much to society etc. Yet the fact is we have a life form with human DNA (genetically complete) that grows up to be an adult member of its species. So the life form is a person, even if the life form is not fully developed yet. To the very least it's a consistent set of criteria, arguably less arbitrary than the birth criterion.

I'm going to throw a new wrench into the discussion on this point. Currently, at least in some species, we have the ability to use somatic cells to produce clones (i.e., Dolly the sheep). Yes, it's currently inefficient, imperfect, and we still need an oocyte to accomplish it (though, the nucleus is removed, so all of the genetic material comes from the somatic cell). However, as technology progresses, it's quite possible given the current status of this research that the necessary factors in an oocyte for conferring totipotency can be isolated and identified and a somatic cell treated with those without need for any gametes. Regardless of whether we ever choose to use such technology, hypothetically speaking, if it became possible to use it, then any cell in your body would have the potential of being used to make a clone.

Ah, you're forgetting something. Both the fetus and the newborn naturally develop to become adult members of their species when given nourishment. Under the criterion I mentioned (playing devil's advocate, since I am not completely convinced of it), the cell by itself wouldn't be considered a human person. However, if the cell were used/transformed/etc. to create a biological entity that, when given nourishment, grows up to be an adult homo sapiens then it would be considered a human person just as a newborn would.

In other words, the term "potential" is very ambiguous. We are now approaching the level of technology where one could argue any cell in your body has "potential" to be another person.

Let's not forget the clarifying conditions I mentioned earlier: the biological entity is a genetically complete human and naturally develops to be come an adult member of its species when fed nourishment. Under the pro-life argument I am using, when those conditions are met, the biological entity is a human person. As I said earlier, to the very least it's a consistent set of criteria, and arguably less arbitrary than the birth criterion.

I would argue a consistent line be drawn at the beginning of life as for the end of life. That line would be the time at which life can be sustained independently of outside support of the circulatory and respiratory systems, two functions that are internally regulated and without which, survival cannot occur.

And now I get to throw a wrench into this discussion via the use of increasing technology: viability. Suppose we reach the technological point where the conceptus can be retrieved safely at any stage of the pregnancy (I believe this is only a matter of time). The conceptus can now live independently of the mother's circulatory and respiratory systems. Where does personhood begin now? Would you still use your criterion?

Additionally, it its technically true that life exists at conception. Cells are living organisms, and even human cancer cells are alive.

The same conditions would apply to someone choosing to suspend life support for a prematurely born infant as for a terminally ill adult, as for a conceptus still dependent upon maternal circulation. Any other criterion that allows for technological intervention and consideration of "potential" would be subjective relative to the current status of technology, thus is an insufficient criterion.

Agreed. So what criteria would you use? Whether or not the entity requires outside biological support (cardiovascular and respiratory)?

Something either is or is not a person, and the term "potential person," by definition, means something is not a person.

I didn't really use the term “potential person.” “Potential adult” would have been more accurate.

Another consideration if we use the "potential" argument rather than a viability without technological intervention argument, or if we make the case that viability with technological intervention should be considered, then to what extent are we obligated to provide technological intervention to sustain a miscarried conceptus? If a conceptus is considered a person from the earliest stage of development, and a woman miscarries in the first trimester, do we need to attempt to implant the embryo into another surrogate? What would make a miscarried conceptus different from an aborted conceptus? A miscarriage can occur due to a problem with the conceptus or with the woman's reproductive system, thus it is not always the case that miscarriage implies the conceptus has no potential per se, but that the woman carrying that conceptus has something wrong with the way her body functions in supporting a pregnancy. Thus, again, the only way to make this distinction would be to use the criterion of viable without technological intervention. I further specify respiratory and cardiovascular support as the deciding intervention, because those are the systems that distribute oxygen and nourishment to all the other tissues of the body, and without which, brain death is imminent (brain death being the generally accepted criterion for the end of personhood).

Okay, this seems to be the criterion you are using do determine personhood (correct me if I am misunderstanding you). Let’s test it with this hypothetical case: suppose a man suffers a medical condition as a result of a horrible accident that temporarily prohibits him from using many of his damaged organs. He is in a coma and needs to be hooked up to a machine to provide respiratory and cardiovascular support. Nonetheless, in nine months his body will recover and he can live a normal life. Is this man a person when he is in the coma?

 

[Moonbear]

The one problem I would find with your proposed cutoff point is that it doesn't seem to cover cases of higher-brain death, wherein a patient still retains all of their autonomic musculatory functions, but (as far as we can tell) loses sentience. The Schiavo case is a good example of that. Most people would agree that if her ability to feel and think and to have a personality is permanently gone, then her life should be ended, even if she could still maintain a heartbeat and breathe. The debate was about whether or not she was actually in such a state.

Right, it doesn't consider that, and that could use refining. In a way, it errs toward including some individuals that are not persons at either end of the spectrum, which factors in a substantial safety margin. However, my reasoning for that is based more on practicality; mainly because I couldn't come up with an objective criterion based on brain function, which I do think might be better than just viability.

The problem I ran into in considering brain function is that I don't know how much brain function is sufficient to maintain personhood. The challenge is that much of our brain functions do not distinguish us from other animals, thus I wouldn't consider them to confer personhood. The main aspect of brain functioning that would likely be related to personhood would be cognitive functions, but how much of those are needed to distinguish a person from any other vertebrate animal? What cognitive processes are unique to humans/personality, and what parts of the brain are necessary for those to occur? The difficulty is you can't just say a certain mass or volume of cortex is needed, because the organization is important too.

Further, if we did use higher cognitive functioning (a level above or distinctive from other vertebrates) as a criterion to identify personhood, that would put the cut-off several months post-natally. One could likely make a strong philosophical argument for that cut-off since cognitive functions in the early post-natal period are no more developed than in other species, so not unique to conveying personhood, but I don't think anyone would agree that it's morally acceptable to kill a newborn.

Anyway, I agree with you that the real question is, "How do we define a person?" The problem is that a variety of arguments may all be logical, but reach different conclusions, with none of them necessarily being "right," if the assumptions required to set up the premise cannot be supported.

I could take an even more radical approach, that of arguing there isnt' anything special about being human, we're just another animal, and the most important thing is ensuring species survival. From that argument, the value of any member of the species is dependent on their relative fitness for survival, their ability to reproduce, and the amount of parental investment (in as much as if offspring die after a great deal of parental investment, that is time and energy wasted on an unfit offspring instead of reproducing again and raising more fit offspring). Of course, if I were to use the "humans are no different than animals" argument, then I would have to be prepared to argue infanticide, as long as it is committed by the parents, would be morally acceptable. The reason being that if a parent is such an unfit parent as to kill their own offspring, then it is for the benefit of the species that they not pass their genes on to future generations. Likewise, anyone in their post-reproductive years who is not in some way contributing to the survival of new generations would be expendable. In other words, if you help raise your grandchildren or nieces and nephews, or even the neighbor's children through things like providing some contribution to food, shelter, protection from "predators," you are still contributing to the survival of the species. But, once others have to take time away from reproducing and nurturing offspring to care for the elderly (or any other ill adults), the elderly are then contributing negatively to the fitness of the species, and it would be morally acceptable to abandon them and not care for them.

Like I said, this would be a very radical view, but could be developed into a logical, morally justifiable argument (no, I'm not going to spend a lot of time doing that, especially since I cringe at it myself), but it doesn't mean it is going to be the right answer, especially since the main weakness still lies in the assumptions...that I have no strong basis to say humans are the same as all other animals, just as I have no strong basis to say they are different, or to say one definition of personhood is better than another.

 

[Moonbear]

Ah, you're forgetting something. Both the fetus and the newborn naturally develop to become adult members of their species when given nourishment.

Okay, what about if the conception occurred using in vitro fertilization rather than naturally occurring? Since it is not a natural conception, does that mean that fetus is different from one derived from intercourse? Also, the conceptus (do you really only mean fetus and newborn, or do you mean conceptus?) requires a fair deal more than just nourishment. It needs full life support. Of course a newborn requires only nourishment, which is why I distinguish between the newborn/late gestational fetus and early stages of intra-uterine development.

And now I get to throw a wrench into this discussion via the use of increasing technology: viability. Suppose we reach the technological point where the conceptus can be retrieved safely at any stage of the pregnancy (I believe this is only a matter of time). The conceptus can now live independently of the mother's circulatory and respiratory systems. Where does personhood begin now? Would you still use your criterion?

Yes, because my criterion states that life must be able to continue independently of technology/outside support. And, actually, your own argument contradicts this too, because if your requirement is that a conceptus naturally develops into an adult, then using unnatural means of support would revoke that status. Otherwise, including technological progress in the argument would also require that we hook up every elderly person to life support and keep them alive well beyond their natural lifespan because they're still people as long as technology can keep their cardiovascular and respiratory functions going.

Additionally, it its technically true that life exists at conception. Cells are living organisms, and even human cancer cells are alive.
Agreed.

Well, biologically, unless we're talking about a single-celled organism, a cell is not the same as an organism. An organism is the functional collection of cells organized into tissue and organ systems. I wouldn't consider cancer cells to be an organism either. Though, if you want to use the "life" criterion, human cancer cells are certainly life of human origin; should we not remove or destroy cancer cells? Do cancer cells have rights?

So what criteria would you use? Whether or not the entity requires outside biological support (cardiovascular and respiratory)?

That's what I proposed, yes. As I mention in my post above to LYN, there are some flaws in this choice of criteria, especially with regard to brain function/cognition, but among the criteria I would consider objective, it is the most conservative.

I didn't really use the term “potential person.” “Potential adult” would have been more accurate.

But that still relies on "potential." How do you know they are a potential adult? How do you know they won't be struck down by a very natural disease in early childhood and never reach adulthood? This is a major problem I see with the use of the term "potential." It confers a status to something based on an endpoint we cannot guarantee it will ever reach. Does that mean you would consider it acceptable to abort a fetus, or even kill an infant, if they are determined to have a genetic abnormality that is known to manifest itself in early childhood and is lethal before they reach puberty? They are not a potential adult, so are they not a person in childhood? Do they have less rights than other children based on that? At least with my criteria, they are still a person in childhood, until their disorder manifests itself to the point where they require cardiovascular and respiratory support, at which time the parents could decide to "pull the plug" without being accused of murdering their child. Though, if we use your criterion of potential adult, and we know that there is a genetic abnormality such that adulthood will never be reached, then would you agree it is morally acceptable to obtain an abortion under at least those conditions?

Okay, this seems to be the criterion you are using do determine personhood (correct me if I am misunderstanding you). Let’s test it with this hypothetical case: suppose a man suffers a medical condition as a result of a horrible accident that temporarily prohibits him from using many of his damaged organs. He is in a coma and needs to be hooked up to a machine to provide respiratory and cardiovascular support. Nonetheless, in nine months his body will recover and he can live a normal life. Is this man a person when he is in the coma?

By my criterion, no, while in the coma, he is not functioning as a person. What if in even 9 years he made no recovery at all, or was so severely brain damaged that he never leads a fully normal life again? The current status of something cannot be based on fortune-telling. By my argument, if he is in a coma and needs to be on life-support, then it would not be morally wrong to suspend life support. It does not mean his family would be forced to choose to take him off life support, it only means that if they made that choice, they would not be wrong to do so. They could take the gamble and keep him on life support (there are people who would keep a cat on life support in the hopes it would recover, so making such a decision doesn't require personhood), and if he fully recovered, at that time he would regain personhood status.

 

[Tisthammerw]

Ah, you're forgetting something. Both the fetus and the newborn naturally develop to become adult members of their species when given nourishment.

Okay, what about if the conception occurred using in vitro fertilization rather than naturally occurring?

The same principle applies, because the conceptus still naturally develops to become an adult member of its species when given nourishment (the origin of the conceptus is irrelevant). I believe you misunderstood me here.

Also, the conceptus (do you really only mean fetus and newborn, or do you mean conceptus?) requires a fair deal more than just nourishment. It needs full life support.

That, of course, would be included with its nourishment (food, water, oxygen etc.).

And now I get to throw a wrench into this discussion via the use of increasing technology: viability. Suppose we reach the technological point where the conceptus can be retrieved safely at any stage of the pregnancy (I believe this is only a matter of time). The conceptus can now live independently of the mother's circulatory and respiratory systems. Where does personhood begin now? Would you still use your criterion?

Yes, because my criterion states that life must be able to continue independently of technology/outside support. And, actually, your own argument contradicts this too, because if your requirement is that a conceptus naturally develops into an adult, then using unnatural means of support would revoke that status.

I believe you misunderstood me. The conceptus develops due to its own nature; where its nourishment comes from is irrelevant.

Well, biologically, unless we're talking about a single-celled organism, a cell is not the same as an organism. An organism is the functional collection of cells organized into tissue and organ systems. I wouldn't consider cancer cells to be an organism either. Though, if you want to use the "life" criterion, human cancer cells are certainly life of human origin; should we not remove or destroy cancer cells?

No, because cancer cells do not grow up to be people like e.g. newborns do.

So what criteria would you use? Whether or not the entity requires outside biological support (cardiovascular and respiratory)?

That's what I proposed, yes.

Ah, then it seems I have understood you correctly.

I didn't really use the term “potential person.” “Potential adult” would have been more accurate.

But that still relies on "potential." How do you know they are a potential adult? How do you know they won't be struck down by a very natural disease in early childhood and never reach adulthood?

In such cases it seems wisest to err on the side of caution. Note that I said that “potential adult” would have been more accurate, not completely accurate. And don’t forget the direction of the conditional: “If the biological entity possesses these characteristics…the entity is a human person.” And of course, let’s not forget the fallacy of denying the antecedent.

Does that mean you would consider it acceptable to abort a fetus, or even kill an infant, if they are determined to have a genetic abnormality that is known to manifest itself in early childhood and is lethal before they reach puberty?

See above on the fallacy of denying the antecedent. As for you question, I’m really not sure. I suppose it would depend on how horrible the abnormality is. If the death is quick and painless, perhaps it would be better to give the preborn child some life after birth rather than none at all.

Okay, this seems to be the criterion you are using do determine personhood (correct me if I am misunderstanding you). Let’s test it with this hypothetical case: suppose a man suffers a medical condition as a result of a horrible accident that temporarily prohibits him from using many of his damaged organs. He is in a coma and needs to be hooked up to a machine to provide respiratory and cardiovascular support. Nonetheless, in nine months his body will recover and he can live a normal life. Is this man a person when he is in the coma?

By my criterion, no

So would it then be morally acceptable to kill this individual? Would it not be murder because the life form is not (under your criterion) a human person even though it is known that he will recover in nine months?

If so, there seems to be something dreadfully wrong with this criterion.

What if in even 9 years he made no recovery at all

I still don’t think it would be ethical to kill this comatose man. Correct me if I’m wrong, but if I kill a person who was in a coma for nine years it will still be counted as murder (methinks rightly so).

or was so severely brain damaged that he never leads a fully normal life again?

Then we get into a debate regarding euthanasia and living wills, but I’m still not quite certain that personhood ceases here (unless he’s completely brain-dead).

By my argument, if he is in a coma and needs to be on life-support, then it would not be morally wrong to suspend life support.

Even if he left behind hard evidence that he would want to remain on life support, especially when it is known that he would recover in nine months? Doesn’t there seem to be something terribly wrong with your criterion if it allows us to kill this man in a coma?

 

[Smurf]

Here's a slightly different approach for you guys, assuming that a baby, in any stage of development, is to be considered a human being and is guaranteed all human rights:

1. Does the mother have an obligation to bring this baby to term? Is it ethical to force this woman (by law) to spend nine months in pregnancy and give birth to it?
1b. Even in cases of rape?

 

[Dawguard]

It seems to me that abortion comes down to one question only. Does a fetus have human rights? All the other points about are nearly irrelevant to this question, because if it does have rights then abortion is wrong, and if its doesn't then abortion is OK.
Consider this analogy: You grow a baby in an artificial womb that acts just like the real thing. If the fetus you grow has no rights, then after eight months of its growth you could take a gun and kill it with no moral harm being done. If your bullet missed and it fell out, could you still kill it? A premature birth at eight months could easily live, and by law once it leaves the womb it has rights. Then, if you missed and "gave brith" to it, you could not shoot it once its outside of the artificial womb.
What then is the difference between shooting it the first time while its in, or the second when its out? If the first, abortion, is okay so should the second, but if the second is wrong, so is abortion. If you claim that its okay to kill it once its outside the womb, then that is basicaly infanticide. What's the difference then if not location only? Killing is wong, no matter where the victim is.

 

[russ_watters]

Here's a slightly different approach for you guys, assuming that a baby, in any stage of development, is to be considered a human being and is guaranteed all human rights:
1. Does the mother have an obligation to bring this baby to term? Is it ethical to force this woman (by law) to spend nine months in pregnancy and give birth to it?
1b. Even in cases of rape?

Yes. If (remembering that that "if" is the entire point of contention here) a fetus is considered equivalent to an adult human, with identical rights, then it would have to be illegal to abort it for any reason short of a physical danger to the mother.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

This is, as far as I can tell, a pretty solid argument against abortion.
Feedback? Flaws in reason? Alternative perspectives? It seems to me that the only way someone can accept abortion would be to accept many other (currently illegal) acts as perfectly ethical, or to be relativist, which I think most people here don't support.
http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/abortion/ab0045.html

I don't see that this adds anything at all to the pro-life argument. In fact, if anything, it is the nearest to an admission that pro-choicers may be right that I think I've ever seen. He represents four possibilities:

The fetus is a person, and we know that;
The fetus is a person, but we don't know that;
The fetus isn't a person, but we don't know that;
The fetus isn't a person, and we know that.
[QUOTE/]

Ignoring the dubious accusation of manslaughter in the second case, he writes of the fourth case:

Only in Case 4 is abortion a reasonable, permissible, and responsible choice. But note: What makes Case 4 permissible is not merely the fact that the fetus is not a person but also your knowledge that it is not, your overcoming of skepticism. So skepticism counts not for abortion but against it. Only if you are not a skeptic, only if you are a dogmatist, only if you are certain that there is no person in the fetus, no man in the coat, or no person in the building, may you abort, drive, or fumigate.

And case 4 it is in most pro-choice arguments. His argument?

From the pro-life point of view, there are only three reasons for being pro-choice: scientific ignorance — appalling ignorance of a scientific fact so basic that nearly everyone in the world knows it; moral ignorance — appalling ignorance of the most basic of all moral rules; or legal ignorance — appalling ignorance of one of the most basic of all the functions of law.

So pro-choicers are wrong because they are ignorant because they do not know what pro-life people know because they disagree with pro-lifers. Wow, what a great argument. IN A SCHOOL YARD!

The whole argument is flawed.

The moral premise is that all humans have the right to life because all humans are human.

Okay, in principal, but the premise has no practical application. This would forbid execution of criminals, acts of war and killing in self-defense. If someone wanted to kill you then to defend their right to live you cannot defend your own. You cannot defend the right to live of your people if you are invaded.

The principle that morality depends on metaphysics means that rights depend on reality

Morality: subjective judgement of whether an act or property is good or evil. Rights: the activities and properties protected by legislation, i.e. an ethical judgement. A person may have the right not to be deported back to his country of origin, but if he is a known terrorist is this a moral issue or an ethical one?

There is no convincing argument here. Just a lot of nonsense.

 

[Smurf]

Okay, in principal, but the premise has no practical application. This would forbid execution of criminals, acts of war and killing in self-defense. If someone wanted to kill you then to defend their right to live you cannot defend your own. You cannot defend the right to live of your people if you are invaded.

Buy the conceptus has committed no crime, it is not attacking anyone, it is not at war with anyone, it is not invading anyone, ect.

See post 31, in all these cases we still recognize fundamental human rights. We merely justify the violation of them for various (and often controversial) reasons.

In the case of abortion, we should recognize the babies fundamental right to life, liberty and security of person (or the US equivalent) unless you can prove:
1. That babies are not, in fact, human and are not deserving of those rights, or
2. That there is adequate reason to violate those rights in their situation.

The reason the burden of proof is on the pro-choice position is because, firstly, we should err on the side of caution with matters where we may be causing murder. And secondly, because the argument has already been made, such as by the apple argument, that a baby does deserve all human rights at all times of pregnancy.

 

[Tisthammerw]

From the pro-life point of view, there are only three reasons for being pro-choice: scientific ignorance — appalling ignorance of a scientific fact so basic that nearly everyone in the world knows it; moral ignorance — appalling ignorance of the most basic of all moral rules; or legal ignorance — appalling ignorance of one of the most basic of all the functions of law.

So pro-choicers are wrong because they are ignorant because they do not know what pro-life people know because they disagree with pro-lifers. Wow, what a great argument. IN A SCHOOL YARD!

I think did not entirely summarize his argument adequately here. He attempted to justify all of the pertaining premises that the pro-lifers adhere to (e.g. the scientific premise that a conceptus is human).

The moral premise is that all humans have the right to life because all humans are human.

Okay, in principal, but the premise has no practical application. This would forbid execution of criminals, acts of war and killing in self-defense.

Not necessarily. In all these cases these were people who had rights, even if certain actions made killing morally justifiable. The execution of criminals is done because a serious crime was committed. In contrast, the preborn child has done no crime, and so there does not seem to be a morally justifiable reason to kill it if the preborn child is a person with the rights that everyone else has. I think you misunderstood what the author was saying.

The principle that morality depends on metaphysics means that rights depend on reality

Morality: subjective judgement of whether an act or property is good or evil.

That is not how the author would define morality, since the author believes in the existence of objective moral values (a similar thing goes for rights). Suppose for instance in my subjective judgment it is okay to kill you for fun. By ethical subjectivism I would be not acting unethically by killing you for fun. The author and other ethical objectivists would not accept that. (Note: I do not believe the author is making the distinction of morals and ethics you seem to have made in you post.)

 

[James R]

Smurf:

In the case of abortion, we should recognize the babies fundamental right to life, liberty and security of person (or the US equivalent) unless you can prove:
1. That babies are not, in fact, human and are not deserving of those rights; or
2. That there is adequate reason to violate those rights in their situation.

In (1), you make an assumption that people have human rights just by virtue of having a set of human genes. What makes a set of human genes so special, in your opinion? Why isn't the same right to life given to a chicken or a cow by the pro-life people? If you can convince me that human life is entitled to special protection just because it is human, then your argument might start to hold some weight.

The second problem with your argument is its black-and-white nature. You assume that every human being has either the full rights of an average adult, or no rights at all. You fail to consider the possibility that their may be a continuum of possible rights, so that, for example, a baby in the third-trimester might have a greater right to life than one in the first trimester.

Does a newborn infant deserve exactly the same right to life as a 50 year old adult? If so, why?

 

[Smurf]

Does a newborn infant deserve exactly the same right to life as a 50 year old adult? If so, why?

They're both human, thus deserve "Human Rights". Why not?

 

[russ_watters]

They're both human, thus deserve "Human Rights". Why not?

Well, there are plenty of rights that newborns don't have, Smurf, and you know that: They don't have the right to vote, the right to drink, the right to smoke, the right to marry, the right to privacy of any kind, the right to do - pretty much anything for themselves.

Until you become an adult, your rights are limited by your age. So you need another reason to say that a newborn infant should have certain rights.

The argument really boils down to 1.5 relevant points (1.5 because the second is a subset of the first, and relevant because people throw around a lot of irrelevancies for emotional impact):

1. Should a fetus, embryo, zygote, or sperm (if you're a Catholic, contraception is a sin) have any rights at all? And those may be separate cases to some people, so they may have separate answers.

1.5 If a fetus, embryo, zygote, or sperm has rights, what rights does it have and how do you reconcile conflicts between those rights and the rights of the undisputably full-fledged human carrying it?

For anyone not on either extreme, those are complicated questions.

 

[Smurf]

Well, there are plenty of rights that newborns don't have, Smurf, and you know that: They don't have the right to vote, the right to drink, the right to smoke, the right to marry, the right to privacy of any kind, the right to do - pretty much anything for themselves.
Until you become an adult, your rights are limited by your age.

So you need another reason to say that a newborn infant should have certain rights.

I do not. Ignoring the differenc between civil and human rights. Currently, the right to Life is given to all humans of all ages, except the undeveloped baby.

So, in a slightly different way than I said before:
The 1 month old baby is the exact same being that was in the mother's womb 10 months ago right after conception. Therefore the burden of proof is on "pro-choice" perspective to prove that the undeveloped conceptus does not deserve the right to life until a specific point in time/development.



To put it in your context. Every Citizen is said, under our constitution, to deserve the right to vote. However we violate this because persons under 18 are not seen as smart enough, so are restricted until a time as they are mature enough to handle the responsibility.

The same is said for marriage, smoking, drinking, ect.

 

[James R]

Smurf:

They're both human, thus deserve "Human Rights". Why not?

Yes, they do deserve human rights, but that's not what I asked. I asked if they deserve the same human rights.

The 1 month old baby is the exact same being that was in the mother's womb 10 months ago right after conception.

I dispute that. A week-old foetus is very different indeed compared to a new-born baby, in many ways.

Therefore the burden of proof is on "pro-choice" perspective to prove that the undeveloped conceptus does not deserve the right to life until a specific point in time/development.

I think it does have a right to life. However, I do not believe it should have the same rights as its mother.

The question is: if the rights of the mother and the foetus are in conflict for whatever reason, how are we to resolve that conflict?

Let's face it. Pro-lifers just aren't as smart as pro-choicers. They just can't see the nuances and subtleties of weighing up more than one set of rights at a time.

 

[loseyourname]

Let's face it. Pro-lifers just aren't as smart as pro-choicers. They just can't see the nuances and subtleties of weighing up more than one set of rights at a time.

Oh please, do you have an argument to present or are you just going to patronize us? What you've presented so far is an argument for veganism, not for abortion. Here is a nice post I made earlier this year, that addresses all of these 'subtle nuances' that we pro-lifers are too stupid to understand. Maybe you can point out where my idiocy has prevented me from seeing what is so obvious to you genius pro-choicers. No one else really ever addressed what I posted, so it would be appreciated:

This is a variation of the Violonist Argument made by Judith Jarvis Thompson. An overview of the argument and lecture notes can be found http://www.people.umass.edu/uril/phil164/lecture4.htm :

• The Famous Violinist
  “You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you *– we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.” (pp. 154-155)
  What is the analogy that Thompson has in mind?
  What premise of the argument is Thompson objecting to?
  What argument can we extract from this example?
  The Famous Violinist Argument:
  1. If Premise 4 of the Anti-Abortion Argument is true, then it is morally wrong for you to unplug yourself from the famous violinist.
  2. It is not morally wrong for you to unplug yourself from the famous violinist.
  3. Therefore, Premise 4 of the the Anti-Abortion Argument is not true.

A brief refutation of her argument can be found http://www.str.org/free/commentaries/abortion/unstrign.htm :

• The key question in any slippery slope appeal is whether the two situations are truly similar in a morally relevant way. If not, then the illustration is guilty of a logical slippery slope fallacy. The analogy fails and the argument falls apart.
  Are there important differences between pregnancy and kidnapping? Yes, many.
• Both Thompson and McDonagh treat the child—the woman's own daughter or son--like an invading stranger intent on doing harm. They make the mother/child union into a host/predator relationship.
  A child is not an invader, though, a parasite living off his mother. A mother's womb is the baby's natural environment. Eileen McDonagh wants us to believe that the child growing inside of a woman is trespassing. One trespasses when he's not in his rightful place, but a baby developing in the womb belongs there.
• Thompson ignores a second important distinction. In the violinist illustration, the woman might be justified withholding life-giving treatment from the musician under these circumstances. Abortion, though, is not merely withholding treatment. It is actively taking another human being's life through poisoning or dismemberment.

The above is a small sample of the disparallels drawn to invalidate Thompson's analogy. I urge anyone reading this post to read the full text of both pages. The refutation is fairly raw and has some flaws, but he does make some cogent points that I do believe invalidate the analogy that Thompson attempts to draw. We actually discussed this very argument in a Contemporary Ethics class that I had a few semesters back and I do have some points I can add myself later, but I'll be fairly busy all weekend and may or may not have the time.

A few more points from the page:

• Third, the violinist illustration is not parallel to pregnancy because it equates a stranger/stranger relationship with a mother/child relationship. This is a key point and brings into focus the most dangerous presumption of the violinist illustration, also echoed in McDonagh's thesis. Both presume it is unreasonable to expect a mother to have any obligations towards her own child.
  The violinist analogy suggests that a mother has no more responsibility for the welfare of her child than she has to a total stranger. McDonagh's view is even worse. She argues the child is not merely a stranger, but a violent assailant the mother needs to ward off in self-defense.
• Blood relationships are never based on choice, yet they entail moral obligations, nonetheless. This is why the courts prosecute negligent parents. They have consistently ruled, for example, that fathers have an obligation to support their children even if they are unplanned and unwanted.

Moonbear partially addressed this in her own words, though I feel her counterargument to parental obligation is fairly weak (something that, again, I will address when I have the time). Briefly:

• If it is moral for a mother to deny her child the necessities of life (through abortion) before it is born, how can she be obligated to provide the same necessities after he's born? Remember, Thompson concedes that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. If her argument works to justify abortion, it works just as well to justify killing any dependent child. After all, a two-year-old makes a much greater demand on a woman than a developing unborn.

Moonbear states that, once a child is born, the parents have the legal option of transferring their obligation toward it to another caretaker, thus absolving themselves of the burden they have placed upon themselves. Although this is true, I think that we can immediately draw a very strong prima facie disparallel between the transferring of legal obligation and killing. In fact, even if we should grant that the killing of the unborn is no different ethically from the tranferring of legal obligation toward the born, several questions are then raised. They are covered by the Lecture Notes that contain the Thompson argument:

• Question: Does this mean that all abortions should be performed by Cesarean section in order to give the fetus the chance of survival? Does it mean that when technology advances to such a state that a fertilized egg can be grown into a human outside the mother’s womb, then even early term abortions – in the sense of destroying the fertilized egg - are morally impermissible? What would Thompson say?

Just some things for the forum to chew on while I waste my weekend reading about the birth of nationalism and writing about Thomas Hobbes.

*I would like to add that I urge anyone to again consider the arguments put forth and not to add in any ad hominem attacks toward me or my sources. I have linked to a Christian web page, but I am not Christian myself (I am not religious at all), nor are the arguments presented Christian arguments. In fact, even if they were, that would not de facto disqualify them as arguments worth looking into.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

Buy the conceptus has committed no crime, it is not attacking anyone, it is not at war with anyone, it is not invading anyone, ect.

No, I'm sorry, you cannot make a pro-life argument based on the notion of a fundamental right for an unborn child to live and then pick and choose from the adult population who has that right. It's inconsistent. If all humans have the right to live, then all humans have the right to live. You can't dismiss special cases of pregnancy (such as the mother-to-be was a rape victim) and then introduce special cases of adult behaviour (such as the person is an invading soldier).

The argument put forward is that this right is fundamental and so must be observed in all cases including unborn foetuses. It does not allow special cases, since it does not address why abortion, as a special case itself, and special cases of abortion, should be covered by or exempt from that right. The reasons it does not do this are twofold: 1) it is a less emotionally powerful argument; 2) it is a trickier, perhaps impossible, point to argue.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

I didn't have time to finish my rant yesterday, but I'm not going to continue a point-by-point debunking of the article and instead make a counter-argument against certain broad notions.

I agree with James R's point above, and was one that I was going to make but had to split. One of the fundamental ideas in the argument is that humans have a fundamental right that other animals do not. It takes the point of view that humans are special and have some special place in the world. Last night on the news there was a piece on a breed of monkeys that had been taught trade. They were given coins which they used to buy food. There was an uprising in the monkey community when it transpired some were given more than others. Certain monkeys began forging coins (badly). It's hard to watch that and believe in the pervading religious view that humans are special.

So what am I saying? That we should afford the same rights to animals that we do to humans? All go vegetarian? No. What I'm saying is that these fundamental human rights are an illusion. The rights a human has are those observed and protected by society, be they traditional social mores or actual national or international legislature. The "rights" invoked in the article in the manner they are invoked are merely the by-product of religious belief, synonymous with "God-given rights". So he really is preaching to the choir. The only people who will accept that humans have special fundmental rights by virtue of their existence rather than their place in society are religious nuts, and religious nuts happen to be the most eager pro-lifers. I cannot take any pro-life argument seriously that invokes such notions, but I do believe that they believe that argument and that they don't believe it is a matter of religion. This is because there are aspects common to all religions that, to religious people, seem fundamental truths rather than beliefs. In fact, that is the exact why this particular 'truth' is presented by the author.

Another point brought up by Russ essentially pointed out that pro-choicers and pro-lifers are basically arguing over a cut-off point. Pro-choicers say a human is a human at the point of birth (this is where your age is measured from). Pro-lifers say a human is a human from the point of conception. But what is conception? The fertilisation of an egg by a sperm. Egg + sperm = human? So I will argue that a human is a human when the egg and sperm are created. It's an absurd argument. The egg is part of the woman's body. The sperm are part of the man's. You can't dictate these things.

Which brings me to what, I believe, is the strongest argument for abortion: the foetus is not a separate entity; it is part of the mother's body. You may chant "life is life" all you like, but until that umbilical cord is cut, the mother and child are one body. So anti-abortion law is legislating against specific parts of the female body, and that's just one totalitarian step too far.

Related to that, this article is written by a man, and as far as I am concerned since no man will ever get pregnant due to being raped, have to carry the child for 9 months, give birth to it, risking death, and either have to raise it or give it away, he can seriously get fvcked. His opinion is of no consequence. If we live in a society where men can dictate to women on issues they have no clue about based on principals convenient to them and them alone, then we live in a backward society. I believe most if not all pro-choicers are with me when I say men have no jurisdiction over a woman's womb.

As a final point, in the manner of the article, I state the following three possible truths:

1. The abortion issue is black and white and pro-lifers are right.
2. The abortion issue is black and white and pro-choicers are right.
3. The abortion issue is not black and white and there are arguments either way.

If (1) can be shown to be true, abortion should be illegal. If (2) can be shown to be true, abortion should be legally allowed. If neither (1) nor (2) can be shown to be true then the issue is not so black and white and (3) must be true. Also if (3) can be directly shown to be true, it is true. If (3) is true, then the person best placed to make a judgement, i.e. the mother, will decide. Since, if abortion is illegal, she cannot choose to have an abortion, abortion must be legalised. The fact that this argument goes on and on suggests to me the issue is not black and white to society as a whole, even if it seems black and white to me.

 

[russ_watters]

I do not. Ignoring the differenc between civil and human rights.

Could you define those terms please.

Currently, the right to Life is given to all humans of all ages, except the undeveloped baby.

That is not true! "Everyone agrees" that Terri Schaivo was a human, yet she did not have the right to continued medical care. "Everyone agrees" that condemned criminals are humans, yet they do not have a right to life. "Everyone agrees" that soldiers are humans, yet they do not have a right to life independent of the wishes of their CO.

So, in a slightly different way than I said before:
The 1 month old baby is the exact same being that was in the mother's womb 10 months ago right after conception. Therefore the burden of proof is on "pro-choice" perspective to prove that the undeveloped conceptus does not deserve the right to life until a specific point in time/development.

Once again, that's a premise that people who are pro choice do not agree wtih. You can't say "I assume XXX to be true, therefore so must you". That is not a valid way to argue. That's why these arguments tend to go nowhere - people's entire points are based stricly on assumptions.

To put it in your context. Every Citizen is said, under our constitution, to deserve the right to vote. However we violate this because persons under 18 are not seen as smart enough, so are restricted until a time as they are mature enough to handle the responsibility.

The same is said for marriage, smoking, drinking, ect.

ehh, it isn't just psychological development, it is physical as well. But otherwise, I agree. Regardless, you seem to be agreeing with me that differences in developmental stage matter when determining rights.

 

[russ_watters]

No, I'm sorry, you cannot make a pro-life argument based on the notion of a fundamental right for an unborn child to live and then pick and choose from the adult population who has that right.

That's what annoys me most about such arguments - not just about the abortion debate (we see it in the Politics forum all the time). Many people start with broad generalizations, then when the exceptions are pointed out, they simply say 'well, yeah, those are exceptions, but this isn't'. What kind of argument is that?!?

 

[Smurf]

Could you define those terms please. That is not true! "Everyone agrees" that Terri Schaivo was a human, yet she did not have the right to continued medical care. "Everyone agrees" that condemned criminals are humans, yet they do not have a right to life. "Everyone agrees" that soldiers are humans, yet they do not have a right to life independent of the wishes of their CO. Once again, that's a premise that people who are pro choice do not agree wtih.

And we have reasons for ALL of them. The soldier's reason is that he's defending his country (and he's not actually being killed, his life is being risked). The criminal's life is being taken because he's a threat to society (as far as I'm aware the US is the only western country that still has it). Terri Shiavo was killed because (i think, i didn't follow) she allegedly wanted to be let go (also, it wasn't 'killing' her, it was letting her die).

In all those cases it's very much their own fault that they are being killed too. The soldier voluntarily signed up, the criminal commited a crime, and Terri Shiavo wrote it in her will. The unborn baby is "innocent" so to speak.

The reason for abortion is that a woman doesn't want to take 9 months out of her precious life to take responsibility for her actions so she takes away the next 75 years of her babies life. That is wholly inadequate.

The argument put forward is that this right is fundamental and so must be observed in all cases including unborn foetuses. It does not allow special cases, since it does not address why abortion, as a special case itself, and special cases of abortion, should be covered by or exempt from that right. The reasons it does not do this are twofold: 1) it is a less emotionally powerful argument; 2) it is a trickier, perhaps impossible, point to argue.

The argument is actually very simple. We assume all humans have the right to life. Fundamentally. The only alternative is that we assume the right to life is an "achieved" right in which case there is absolutely nothing wrong with infanticide or murdering someone who hasn't met our conditions for being "alive". Which is just stupid.

We make exceptions only when we have damn good reasons to do it. In the case of abortions these reasons seem to be very lacking. (I'm still asking for one if you can provide it, btw)

 

[russ_watters]

And we have reasons for ALL of them.

Yes, of course there are reasons for all of them - including reasons for the fetus not having the right to life! The point of providing the exceptions is not to argue each of the exceptions, but to show that there are exceptions to what you first argued was an absolute. So say it with me: 'the right to life is not absolute.'

The argument is actually very simple. We assume all humans have the right to life. Fundamentally.

Yes, I know. "all humans" except, except, except, except, except... How many exceptions does it take before you will acknowledge that your "all" is not an "all"?

edit: that is an understandable slippery-slope that you're worried about: acknowledging some exceptions forces you to think of a reason not to acknowledge others. But claiming that 'there are exceptions but there are no exceptions' is doublethink (holding two mutually exclusive ideas in your head at the same time and accepting both to be true: Orwell, 1984). You really need to deal with the fact that there are exceptions and build an argument for why this should not be one of them.

The unborn baby is "innocent" so to speak.

Yes, but similar to Terri Schaivo, the fetus cannot survive without outside intervention. She was "innocent" as well.

The reason for abortion is that a woman doesn't want to take 9 months out of her precious life to take responsibility for her actions so she takes away the next 75 years of her babies life. That is wholly inadequate.

That's part of the problem here: you have a preconception about the mother's motivation that is affecting your viewpoint. Setting aside that you surely know that there is more than one motivation that can be had, the motivation of the mother is not relevant to whether or not the fetus has rights, and you shouldn't bring it up because no one is arguing it. That's a strawman.

The only alternative is that we assume the right to life is an "achieved" right in which case there is absolutely nothing wrong with infanticide or murdering someone who hasn't met our conditions for being "alive".

Which is just stupid.

That's another strawman - and a slippery-slope argument. Murder is by definition, the killing of someone who has achieved a right to life, so that's an invalid example. And just because our conditions for "achieving" a right to life (I like the way you put that) are not met by a 3-week old embryo does not mean that they are not met by a 3-week old infant. The criteria for distinguishing between fetus and baby could remain exactly as it is today: birth. I actually wouldn't draw the line there, but where I'd draw it isn't really relevant here - just the fact that I would draw such a line. In any case, I agree with your characterization of that argument.

We make exceptions only when we have damn good reasons to do it. In the case of abortions these reasons seem to be very lacking.

Yes - but you need to acknowledge that determining whether those reasons are acceptable is the entire point of the argument. Just saying 'no' every time another exception is pointed out is not a reasonable argument.

I'm still asking for one if you can provide it, btw [a reason for the exception]

You already know - you provided it! All rights, including the right to life, are conferred at different developmental stages, because prior to reaching a certain stage, one is simply not worthy of those particular rights. You probably consider it to be nonsensical to give a 2-week old infant the right to vote. For the same reason, I consider it nonsensical to give a 2-second old zygote the right to live.

edit: by the way, have you considered the irony of an anarchist arguing for something to be illegal?

 

[Smurf]

edit: by the way, have you considered the irony of an anarchist arguing for something to be illegal?

Have I been arguing that? I thought I was arguing that it was morally wrong to have an abortion. Perhapse I got off track, but that's what I meant to do.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

That's what annoys me most about such arguments - not just about the abortion debate (we see it in the Politics forum all the time). Many people start with broad generalizations, then when the exceptions are pointed out, they simply say 'well, yeah, those are exceptions, but this isn't'. What kind of argument is that?!?

More often than not, one stated without being thought through. In this case, I 'd say the argument is deliberately written such that it depends on the reader not questioning what 'seems' so obvious. Which is even more annoying, I think.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

The argument is actually very simple. We assume all humans have the right to life. Fundamentally. The only alternative is that we assume the right to life is an "achieved" right in which case there is absolutely nothing wrong with infanticide or murdering someone who hasn't met our conditions for being "alive". Which is just stupid.

It is stupid. It is stupid to state that this is the "only alternative". Those two are not exhaustive. In fact, you have missed the alternative that best fits real life: the right to life is something granted by default and removed by necessity by those who grant it - i.e. not a fundamental right.

We make exceptions only when we have damn good reasons to do it. In the case of abortions these reasons seem to be very lacking. (I'm still asking for one if you can provide it, btw)

Then it is not a fundamental right. How can, say, the state remove it if it is? As for abortions not having a good reason, that is entirely your opinion. I've given the reasons why I believe abortion should be legal, and they are IMO good reasons. You disagree, that's fine. See truth (3) in my last but one post. It is not a black and white issue, so we should err on the side of individual choice. And that choice will never have to be made by you, so you should ask yourself who you think you are to tell someone who will have to make that choice that they are right or wrong.

 

[James R]

loseyourname:

Oh please, do you have an argument to present or are you just going to patronize us? What you've presented so far is an argument for veganism, not for abortion.

Actually, I don't think I've presented an argument for abortion in this thread. What I have done is to suggest that pro-life arguments against abortion are inadequate.

Here is a nice post I made earlier this year, that addresses all of these 'subtle nuances' that we pro-lifers are too stupid to understand. Maybe you can point out where my idiocy has prevented me from seeing what is so obvious to you genius pro-choicers. No one else really ever addressed what I posted, so it would be appreciated [snip]

I've seen the violinist argument before, and I do not necessarily agree it is a good argument for the pro-choice side. If you are interested in perceived flaws and the possible resolution of those difficulties from a pro-choice perspective, you could do worse than to read Peter Singer's articles on that particular example. To repeat his arguments here would take a little more time and effort than I wish to devote to this thread right now, so I'm not going to do it.

Do you have any of your own pro-life arguments, or do you just want to swap references with each other?

 

[Ki Man]

everybody who supported slavery was free
everybody who supports abbortion was born

 

[Smurf]

is that off a bumper sticker?

 

[russ_watters]

Well, at least we're being up front, now about the argument-from-bumper-sticker.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

[Adopts scouse accent] "Don't start all that again!"

 

[moving finger]

The argument is perfectly valid, but either premiss may be attacked. An opponent could argue either:

1. A fetus is not human, or not "fully human".

or

2. Not all humans have a right to life, or the same right to life.

Personally, I think (1) is silly. A fetus is genetically human, and nobody can really argue that, provided you define "human" as "having a complete set of human genes".

An embryo immediately after the moment of conception "has the right genes" - but does that make it human at that point? I could argue that it does not.

(2) is a perfectly valid argument, though. Most pro-lifers are not vegetarian. Why not? Why are they happy to eat a cow, but regard a human child as sacrosanct? It seems to me that many regard human life as inherently special, and accord special rights to humans just because humans are members of the species Homo sapiens. Cows do not have a special right to life, because they are of a different species. There appears to me to be no good ethical reason to make this distinction, but maybe you can think of one...

There is a good ethical reason to respect the right to life of all other human beings - if one did not do so, where would one draw the line? Would it be acceptable for me to walk into your home, kill you and eat you? No of course it would not.

The question that remains then is whether, given the above, it is then ethical for humans to kill other animals. And vegetarians have a point here.

MF

 

[James R]

An embryo immediately after the moment of conception "has the right genes" - but does that make it human at that point? I could argue that it does not.

Why not? You must be using a somewhat convoluted definition of "human being".

There is a good ethical reason to respect the right to life of all other human beings - if one did not do so, where would one draw the line? Would it be acceptable for me to walk into your home, kill you and eat you? No of course it would not.

This is the "do unto others as you would have done unto you" argument for morality, which is at least a starting point.

Why is it ok to eat animals, but not humans, in your opinion? Actually, don't bother answering if you don't want to. It's really a diversion from the current topic of conversation. The point here is that many pro-lifers are actually morally inconsistent, in that they shout about how there is a general "right to life", while at the same time they chow down on a hamburger, showing that in fact they only believe in a right to life in very specific circumstances.

 

[moving finger]

Why not? You must be using a somewhat convoluted definition of "human being".

I could argue the same of your definition

Why is it ok to eat animals, but not humans, in your opinion? Actually, don't bother answering if you don't want to.

I'd love to answer. I have not suggested that it is ok to eat animals. I specifically said in my post “The question that remains then is whether, given the above, it is then ethical for humans to kill other animals. And vegetarians have a point here.”

It's really a diversion from the current topic of conversation.

OK, but I was simply replying to your own argument in the same thread.

The point here is that many pro-lifers are actually morally inconsistent, in that they shout about how there is a general "right to life", while at the same time they chow down on a hamburger, showing that in fact they only believe in a right to life in very specific circumstances.

You may have a very valid point here

MF