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moving finger
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Whether “free will” is compatible with determinism or not depends crucially on one’s definition of free will.Eyesaw said:Moving finger, it's still unclear to me how you are concluding there can be free will in a purely deterministic universe, though I agree with you that the UP doesn't help explain it.
My suggested definition is :
Free will is the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate possible courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable.
Do you agre with this definition? If not, would you care to propose your preferred definition?
There is nothing in my definition of free will which is incompatible with a deterministic world (if you think there is, please do explain what you think it is).
The truth of your statement depends on how “me” is defined. A physicalist would say that neuron A and neuron B, and the causes of these neurons firing, are all integral parts of “me”, therefore whether neuron A fires or neuron B fires is a choice made by “me”.Eyesaw said:If the choices I make every day are a result of deterministic forces- for example, I decided to go to the gym instead of the cafe today because neuron A fired (because of the potato chip I ate last night), instead of neuron B- then that choice was not made by some by a "me" but by the fact that I ate the potato chip, which was further caused by some other biochemical existing conditions.
As I said, a physicalist would say that the neurons and the causes of these neurons firing are all tied up as an integral part of “me”. If you wish to say there is in addition to this another part of “me” which causes neurons to fire then with respect all you have done is to replace one deterministic process with another – all you are saying is that it is this other part of “me” which causes neuron B to fire, instead of something else causing neuron B to fire. “Me” is still part of the deterministic chain.Eyesaw said:I think the normal idea of free will is that there is a "me" inside of my body that, despite the fact that the potato chip will cause neuron A to fire in a deterministic biochemical chain, the "me" inside causes neuron B to fire because that's what "me" wanted to do at that time.
Whether “me” is identifiable or not is not really the issue (this relates to epistemology). What is the issue is whether “me” operates deterministically or not.Eyesaw said:Furthermore, this "me" would probably not be identifiable using an assay, through interferometry, x-ray diffraction, or other known methods.
Again, “the soul controlling the human body” does not eliminate determinism, it simply places the “soul” (whatever that is) in the deterministic chain of events.Eyesaw said:I guess if you redefined freewill the way you did, it would be consistent with a deterministic universe, but I always thought the only relevant definition of free will was that in terms of a spiritual material being its agent that was distinct from the physical material that was purely deterministic. You know, the soul controlling the physical body kind of stuff.
Why does a definition need to be empirically justified? A definition is simply that – a definition.Eyesaw said:This is not to say that I can prove nor agree that free will exists in the latter sense, only that this is the definition that has more political consequences. Of course since we haven't succeeded in building a conscious computer, free will under your definition is also not empirically justified.
Once free will has been defined in a particular way, one can then ask questions such as “is this definition compatible with determinism?” and “is this definition such that free will could actually exist?” and “what kind of free will is this anyway?”.
One can argue about the merits of a particular definition in this sense, but I do not see that it needs to be empirically justified.
MF
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