- #36
vanesch
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Hurkyl said:Again, I'll point out MWI as a counterexample, since it does not make that assumption. Probabilistic predictions are made through other means. (and, I think, how to get probabilities is one of the main topics of research in MWI. Maybe vanesch can clarify if he appears)
It is in fact the "holy grail" of MWI, as indeed, there doesn't seem to be an obvious way now to generate probabilities. There are different MWI flavors and they often diverge on the details on how to see probability.
However, there is one red line through all these views: that is: instead of QM generating probabilities for events, it generates probabilities for observers.
That is, for each thing we call a "measurement", it is a measurement wrt to an observer, that is, a psycho-physical link to a subjective experience (that is what is, ultimately, an observer). You have to make a distinction between the "physical degrees of freedom" of the material carrier of an observer, and the observer itself (which is a subjective experience that goes with it). For a human, for instance, the physical degrees of freedom correspond to the quantum mechanical description of his body. Now, if these physical degrees of freedom occur in different terms in the wavefunction, which are entangled with other systems and have a certain stability in time and all that (it is on these points that different views on MWI differ), then that means that to the same set of physical degrees of freedom, can be associated different observers ("copies of them"), and the wavefunction generates in one way or another (again, different views here correspond to different flavors of MWI) a statistical ensemble of "observers".
In other words, by simply applying the Schroedinger equation, you arrive at a state which can formally be represented as:
|my-body-sees-dead-cat> |dead-cat>|stuff> + |my-body-sees-live-cat>|live-cat>|otherstuff>
The physical degrees of freedom of my body occur in two terms, entangled with other stuff. This generates a statistical ensemble for subjective experiences ("observers") to be attached to my body. MY personal subjective experience being one of them, I draw my subjective experience from that ensemble, which gives me the probabilistic impression.
Now, it is mostly disturbing to have to talk about "subjective experience" in a physical theory. This is what turns off most people from the start in MWI. But we have also to realize that the only way of knowing that there is in fact a kind of measurement problem in QM, is through subjective experience ! If it weren't because we "know" that we cannot be "at the same time" walking in the park and shopping in the grocery store, by our experience, then this would not be contradictory! All things you could calculate to both of these states in superposition would still be correct (they would happen then "simultaneously"). So it seems that the only objection against superposition comes from our subjective experience - in that case one shouldn't be surprised that it is also part of the proposed solution.
EDIT: let me clarify a bit more the last bit.
We have a serious problem in considering "ourselves in superposition". Nevertheless, if we say that we are to have a quantum description (a vector in hilbert space), then it should be obvious that the superpositions of "ourselves here" and "ourselves there" is entirely part of the description. So the problem is already introduced from the very start: if our bodies are to have a genuine quantum description, there's no way to exclude these superpositions.
You might hope somehow that some dynamical instability will remove these states, and quickly bring them to the "me here" state, or the "me there" state, but unfortunately, with a unitary time evolution, that's impossible to achieve (THIS is the fundamental problem):
if some initial state leads to "me here" and another initial state will lead to "me there", then the superposition of these two initial states will lead to a superposition of "me here" or "me there".
So logically, there are only 3 ways out:
- quantum descriptions don't apply to things like human beings, or we don't have to take them literally. Ok, but then QM is not a universal theory, and the question is then: what is a universal theory ? This includes essentially all "shut up and calculate" views, who only see the quantum formalism as a technique that allows to calculate outcomes of observations, as well as alternatives to QM (local or nonlocal realist theories...).
- the unitary evolution is not strictly correct, and the corrected dynamics WILL include these kinds of instabilities. This is very well possible. GRW is one such approach ; Penrose thinks that gravity in one way or another plays this role.
- these superpositions really do occur. In that case we have to say why we don't experience life that way. That's essentially MWI.
EDIT II:
for a (very good) overview of the ideas behind MWI, look here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/
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