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Fra
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A frequently seen opinion, for example expressed by Popper in reflecting over what he calls the "the fundamental problem of chance in his classic "The logic of scientific discovery", is to reject the subjective interpretation of probability because he thinks it is not falsifiable.
This really seems to be a key point. I am curious on how other people reflect on this.
Popper IMO seems obsessed with requiring falsifiable strategies. But he seems far less fundamentally concerned with the problem of what do to when a theory is falsified. In an evolutionary perspective, this means that Popper requires lifeforms to be mortal, but is less concerned with evolution of life as a whole when a particular lifeform dies.
In the quest of trying to find a new evolutionary logic for fundamental physics, I think Poppers scientific philosophy of falsification is very crude. He doesn't provide a satisfactory model for the progressive evolution of life. He seems to always relate back to a fixed selection by corroboration, but doesn't consider the effiency of hypothesis generation. If I am not mistaken I think Popper said somewhere that he doesn't consider this latter problem a scientific problem, except possibly of psychology.
If you instead of falsification focus on correctability, then the subjective interpretation is not concerned with asking wether it is wrong, it is more focus on how to make a revision in case it's wrong. So the focus is on learning, rather than trying to kill false statements. If we are wrong, the interesting part isn't to go anal about concluding that we are wrong, it's how to recover a consistent opinion mixing the prior opinion with the new evidence.
I have acquired a disliking to much of Popper's reasoning here. He is much concerned with mortality/falsifiability but gives insufficient attention to the issue of flexibility/evolution/adaptive power.
I think we need a new logic also for science, that is more fit to face the moderns of modern fundamental physics.
I simply want to fire a simple question here, and probe how many the think the standard falsification/corroboration model is "up to date", or who think the new problems of fundamental physics and the quest for new logic that some people ask for (Smolin for example) does propagate down to the scientific method, and thus touches the philosophy of science (by definition)?
/Fredrik
This really seems to be a key point. I am curious on how other people reflect on this.
Popper IMO seems obsessed with requiring falsifiable strategies. But he seems far less fundamentally concerned with the problem of what do to when a theory is falsified. In an evolutionary perspective, this means that Popper requires lifeforms to be mortal, but is less concerned with evolution of life as a whole when a particular lifeform dies.
In the quest of trying to find a new evolutionary logic for fundamental physics, I think Poppers scientific philosophy of falsification is very crude. He doesn't provide a satisfactory model for the progressive evolution of life. He seems to always relate back to a fixed selection by corroboration, but doesn't consider the effiency of hypothesis generation. If I am not mistaken I think Popper said somewhere that he doesn't consider this latter problem a scientific problem, except possibly of psychology.
If you instead of falsification focus on correctability, then the subjective interpretation is not concerned with asking wether it is wrong, it is more focus on how to make a revision in case it's wrong. So the focus is on learning, rather than trying to kill false statements. If we are wrong, the interesting part isn't to go anal about concluding that we are wrong, it's how to recover a consistent opinion mixing the prior opinion with the new evidence.
I have acquired a disliking to much of Popper's reasoning here. He is much concerned with mortality/falsifiability but gives insufficient attention to the issue of flexibility/evolution/adaptive power.
I think we need a new logic also for science, that is more fit to face the moderns of modern fundamental physics.
I simply want to fire a simple question here, and probe how many the think the standard falsification/corroboration model is "up to date", or who think the new problems of fundamental physics and the quest for new logic that some people ask for (Smolin for example) does propagate down to the scientific method, and thus touches the philosophy of science (by definition)?
/Fredrik