Is There a Clear Explanation for A-Consciousness?

[Bartholomew]

Loseyourname:
Consciousness is defined, in the strict sense of "defined," intuitively, and this definition is not available by default to the human mind. This is the "p-consciousness" that somebody was talking about earlier (Edit: it was Hypnagogue) and it is not questionable or debatable. If someone claims reasoning power is necessary for consciousness, they must support this; they can't define consciousness that way, because consciousness--meaning "p-consciousness" (which is a new term I like and I think I'll use in the future)--is already unquestionably defined.

The "generalization" is not an actual definition--it's an explanation. What is the general principle that unites perceiving the blueness of blue and the feeling of the texture of sand? And as with any explanation of the real world--especially since it can deal with only a single stream of experiences, varied though they might be--it is not going to be absolutely certain. But there are degrees of intuition that you can use with respect to consciousness explanations which you can't use for most other things; consciousness is so fundamentally different from everything else that any complicated explanation for it that involves specifying a lot of conditions is not going to ring true. Like, if you say thought is necessary, thought is just a mostly arbitrary set of neuronal patterns, which is just an arrangement of particles in such and such a way. Why should that particular arrangement produce anything as fundamentally removed from everything else as consciousness seems to be? It does not make sense. The true explanation must be relatively simple and... intuitive.

So in summary, the phenomenon of consciousness already exists and is not redefinable; it is not a math concept or a theory in physics. It can only be explained, and there are two tools to do this: examining the properties of your unquestionable p-consciousness, and using intuition to weed out bad explanations to a greater degree than is usual.

By the way, you have a cute picture, if that's you.

 

[loseyourname]

Consciousness is defined, in the strict sense of "defined," intuitively, and this definition is not available by default to the human mind. This is the "p-consciousness" that somebody was talking about earlier (Edit: it was Hypnagogue) and it is not questionable or debatable. If someone claims reasoning power is necessary for consciousness, they must support this; they can't define consciousness that way, because consciousness--meaning "p-consciousness" (which is a new term I like and I think I'll use in the future)--is already unquestionably defined.

As I said, there are people that will tell you that phenomenal experience is all there is to consciousness. I'm not so quick to agree just by considering the historical usage of the word. Especially if you look at the usage of the word "consciousness" in psychology texts as well as anthropological texts, we can see there is more to it, something that is unique to a brain organized, both by genetics and by memetics, the way the human brain is organized, something above and beyond the bare experiential character.

What is the general principle that unites perceiving the blueness of blue and the feeling of the texture of sand? And as with any explanation of the real world--especially since it can deal with only a single stream of experiences, varied though they might be--it is not going to be absolutely certain. But there are degrees of intuition that you can use with respect to consciousness explanations which you can't use for most other things; consciousness is so fundamentally different from everything else that any complicated explanation for it that involves specifying a lot of conditions is not going to ring true.

Again, I'm not so sure about that. It might not ring true to you, but to me, it doesn't ring true to say that your toes are conscious. If you say they are imbued with a raw experiential capacity, then I can see that. But when I read accounts of consciousness in various fields, there is clearly more to what is being talked about than raw experiential capacity. There is something that seems to be exclusively the capacity of higher mammals and maybe some birds.

Like, if you say thought is necessary, thought is just a mostly arbitrary set of neuronal patterns, which is just an arrangement of particles in such and such a way. Why should that particular arrangement produce anything as fundamentally removed from everything else as consciousness seems to be? It does not make sense. The true explanation must be relatively simple and... intuitive.

Well, I'm not sure how you can call thought an arbitrary set of neuronal patterns. Maybe some thoughts are arbitrary, but not all. Some thoughts are directed, some thoughts are intentional. It is this difference between raw thought and intentional thought that I think is the key to the rest of what consciousness is, aside from the raw experiential capacity. It isn't that intentional thought produces consciousness, but it is nonetheless an important element, without which you do not have consciousness. It takes intentional thought and experiential capacity.

By the way, you have a cute picture, if that's you.

Ha! I'm not a female and that picture is of Scarlett Johansson. I do agree that she's cute, though.

 

[Bartholomew]

Those other meanings of consciousness are not really fundamental. They are more on the order of "how does a car work" than "what is this special thing called consciousness which is somehow different from everything else." They are not the big question. The only important question--important meaning, "very, very important"--is the origin of p-consciousness.

Every thought is predetermined and not arbitrary by the meaning of "arbitrary" that you use, but what I meant by "arbitrary" is "having no clear physical characteristic to differentiate it from every other arrangement of particles."

Ha! I'm not a female and that picture is of Scarlett Johansson.

Dangit!

 

[loseyourname]

Those other meanings of consciousness are not really fundamental. They are more on the order of "how does a car work" than "what is this special thing called consciousness which is somehow different from everything else." They are not the big question. The only important question--important meaning, "very, very important"--is the origin of p-consciousness.

Not really. If conscious thought is indeed intentional, then there is something fundamental to the concept of intention that is not itself functional. Assuming panexperientialism, if it is this intentional capacity that makes our experience different from the experience of a rock, then I think it's important to consciousness.

Every thought is predetermined and not arbitrary by the meaning of "arbitrary" that you use, but what I meant by "arbitrary" is "having no clear physical characteristic to differentiate it from every other arrangement of particles."

Well, that's the question, isn't it? We don't know if every thought is predetermined. In fact, if we use your intuitive approach, then we can conclude that there are thoughts that aren't determined! If every thought is predetermined, maybe you're right, but that will require a huge overhaul of the word "consciousness." A lot of textbooks will need to be edited and common speech patterns will need to be changed.

 

[Bartholomew]

Every thought is predetermined because it comes from the brain, which is a part of the physical world. Welll, okay, because of uncertainty, all thoughts may have some element of randomness, but I don't think that makes any difference.

My "intuitive" approach is not the same as "accepting whatever concept you would have had before thinking about it." Intuition must be learned.

 

[hypnagogue]

As I said, there are people that will tell you that phenomenal experience is all there is to consciousness. I'm not so quick to agree just by considering the historical usage of the word. Especially if you look at the usage of the word "consciousness" in psychology texts as well as anthropological texts, we can see there is more to it, something that is unique to a brain organized, both by genetics and by memetics, the way the human brain is organized, something above and beyond the bare experiential character.

You're referring to what is called "access consciousness" or just "a-consciousness" in the literature. Whereas "p-consciousness" refers to the experiential nature of consciousness, "a-consciousness" refers to the cognitive/functional mechanisms that are normally attributed to the word. A mental object is said to be a-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action. As such, a-consciousness is roughly equivalent to what we mean by "awareness."

If you're familiar with Chalmers' work, he would probably say that understanding a-consciousness falls under the 'easy' problems of consciousness, whereas understanding p-consciousness is the hard problem. It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

 

[Bartholomew]

It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

You cannot determine definitely whether anything except yourself has p-consciousness. That's the point, and the reason you need a theory.

By the way, am I right in assuming that what you mean by p-consciousness includes things like memory and other kinds of awareness not covered under the conventional meaning of "sense"? Because those things are essentially the same as conventional senses and fall under the same "hard problem," as you call it.

 

[hypnagogue]

You cannot determine definitely whether anything except yourself has p-consciousness.

That's true, but the philosophical construct of the 'zombie' has no p-consciousness by definition. It's a hypothetical being that we use to help us reason about consciousness.

By the way, am I right in assuming that what you mean by p-consciousness includes things like memory and other kinds of awareness not covered under the conventional meaning of "sense"? Because those things are essentially the same as conventional senses and fall under the same "hard problem," as you call it.

The hard problem isn't about the senses, per se. It's just about subjective experience. Insofar as memory has an experiential aspect (it is 'like something' to experience a memory), it is part of the hard problem. But the cognitive mechanisms that make memory possible fall under the 'easy' problems. Understanding how sensory information is stored in the brain is in principle something that we should be able to figure out using standard scientific approaches (hence, an 'easy' problem) whereas understanding how/why that process of memory storage and retrieval is accompanied by subjective experience seems beyond standard scientific approaches (hence, a hard problem).

You might want to read a couple of Chalmers' papers to familiarize yourself a bit with the terminology and concepts. http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html are good places to start.

 

[loseyourname]

You're referring to what is called "access consciousness" or just "a-consciousness" in the literature. Whereas "p-consciousness" refers to the experiential nature of consciousness, "a-consciousness" refers to the cognitive/functional mechanisms that are normally attributed to the word. A mental object is said to be a-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action. As such, a-consciousness is roughly equivalent to what we mean by "awareness."

Well, I'm really referring to both, as I think it takes both to get what the common man would refer to as "consciousness."

If you're familiar with Chalmers' work, he would probably say that understanding a-consciousness falls under the 'easy' problems of consciousness, whereas understanding p-consciousness is the hard problem. It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

I'm familiar from second-hand sources, but I've never actually read anything written by Chalmers. I'll get around to it. I'd actually go a little further than Chalmers and say that I think a-consciousness is all but explained, or at least that I think the existing framework is enough with only a slight tweaking of competing models.