Washington, D.C., June 29, 2005 - President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw India as a "Soviet stooge" during the South Asia crisis of 1971, downplayed reports of Pakistani genocide in what is now Bangladesh, and even suggested that China intervene militarily on Pakistan's side, according to startling new documentation from White House files and tapes contained in the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series and reposted today by the National Security Archive.
Some of the most fascinating documents in the volume concern Nixon and Kissinger's reactions to developments just before and during the war and their discussions of policy options. Among the highlights:
* Their reactions to Nixon's meetings with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on November 5, 1971. According to Kissinger, the "Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there … [W]hile [Gandhi] was a *****, we got what we wanted to … She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn't give her a warm reception and therefore in despair she's got to go to war."
* Their agreement that China could put pressure on India: " I think we've got to tell [the Chinese] that some movement on their part … toward the Indian border could be very significant." On December 8, Nixon and Kissinger agreed to transfer planes to Pakistan and to tell the Chinese that "if you are ever going to move this is the time." Kissinger noted the danger that may arise "if our bluff is called."
* The controversial CIA report that led Kissinger and Nixon to believe that India intended to dismember Pakistan and destroy its armed forces.
* On December 10, Kissinger delicately encourages the Chinese to take action against India guaranteeing U.S. support if the Soviets retaliate: "if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People's Republic."
LINK YOU PROVIDED said:President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw India as a "Soviet stooge" during the South Asia crisis of 1971, downplayed reports of Pakistani genocide in what is now Bangladesh, and even suggested that China intervene militarily on Pakistan's side, according to startling new documentation from White House files and tapes contained in the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series and reposted today by the National Security Archive.
The "1971 South Asia Crisis" refers to the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. This crisis was seen as a significant moment in international relations, especially in regards to the views of US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
Nixon and Kissinger saw India as a Soviet stooge because of their close relationship with the Soviet Union at the time. India had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971, and the Soviet Union had provided military and diplomatic support to India during the crisis. This led Nixon and Kissinger to believe that India was under Soviet influence and acting in their interests.
Yes, Nixon and Kissinger's views on India played a significant role in US foreign policy during the crisis. They saw India as a threat to US interests and attempted to ally with Pakistan, providing military and economic aid to the country. However, this policy ultimately failed, as India's victory in the war was a significant blow to US influence in the region.
After the South Asia Crisis, Nixon and Kissinger's views on India shifted. They recognized India's growing power and influence in the region and saw the country as a potential ally against the Soviet Union. This led to improved relations between the US and India in the following years.
The "Nixon/Kissinger Saw India as Soviet Stooge" narrative has been viewed as a reflection of the Cold War mentality and the US's fear of Soviet expansion. However, it has also been criticized for oversimplifying the complex dynamics of the crisis and overlooking India's agency and motivations. The narrative has also been challenged by recent declassified documents that shed new light on Nixon and Kissinger's views and actions during the crisis.