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Research in relativistic quantum mechanics proves, through a series of no-go theorems, that localized three (or four) dimensional particles cannot be the basic elements of reality. It is claimed that a field ontology can explain the appearance of three dimensional particles, but this new idea hasn't (and in principle can't) be proven. It is sufficient for my question to realize, however, that we have proof that three dimensional particles are not the basic elements of reality. See "No place for particles in relativistic quantum theories?" at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/338939 or http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0103041 and other research at http://www.princeton.edu/~hhalvors/papers/.
The result that three dimensional particles can't be the basic elements of reality is important to mereology in that philosophers have typically assumed physics does claim that particles are basic. This can be seen, for example, in the beginning of Ted Sider's '07 paper responding to mereological priority monism (http://tedsider.org/papers/against_monism.pdf):
Typically mereology has been approached by asking what happens when we take an object and chop it up into smaller and smaller bits. Are objects made of infinitely divisible "gunk" or discrete indivisible atoms? It is (naively?) assumed that if you take something of homogeneous density and cut it in half, both halves will maintain the same density. This is supposed to hold true ad infinitum for gunk or until we can't divide anymore for atoms. But what are the implications when we know the basic elements of reality don't have such properties as localized mass or density? If fields or strings or whatever are all that exist, and they don't have such a property as mass, how is is that when we add them up we get an object that we would like to say has mass as one of its essential properties?
Is mass more akin to macroscopic properties like temperature than anything fundamental? If so, what business do anything but fundamental properties have in ontology or mereology?
Is this all just disproof of a particle ontology and further support for Schaffer's top-down priority monism as presented in "Monism: The Priority of the Whole" (http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~schaffer/papers/Monism.pdf )? Or are fields or strings perfectly acceptable mereological simples, even given the mismatch between field properties and the properties of macroscopic objects?
The realization that our three dimensional objects are not simply constructed from smaller three dimensional parts must have wide ranging implications for mereology. What are they?
More reference:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-field-theory/#PhiIss
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-holism/#QFT
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/
The result that three dimensional particles can't be the basic elements of reality is important to mereology in that philosophers have typically assumed physics does claim that particles are basic. This can be seen, for example, in the beginning of Ted Sider's '07 paper responding to mereological priority monism (http://tedsider.org/papers/against_monism.pdf):
Consider nihilism, the thesis that the only objects that exist are the partless elementary particles of physics.3 Although the nihilist says that tables and chairs do not exist, she is quick to add that there do exist “particles arranged tablewise”, “particles arranged chairwise”, and so on.4 Here are three reasons to take nihilism seriously, despite its revisionary nature. (1) Nihilism is not refuted by mere perception. If there were no tables, only particles arranged tablewise, our sensory experience would be the same. (2) Nihilism is not refuted by science. Evidence that leads chemists to posit molecules and economists to posit economies is just as well accounted for by the more cautious posits of the nihilist: particles arranged molecule-wise, particles arranged economy-wise. (3) Nihilists can count ordinary and scientific sentences as being in some sense “correct”, even if they are not strictly true. For instance, ‘there exists a table’ is “correct” iff there exist particles arranged tablewise.5
Typically mereology has been approached by asking what happens when we take an object and chop it up into smaller and smaller bits. Are objects made of infinitely divisible "gunk" or discrete indivisible atoms? It is (naively?) assumed that if you take something of homogeneous density and cut it in half, both halves will maintain the same density. This is supposed to hold true ad infinitum for gunk or until we can't divide anymore for atoms. But what are the implications when we know the basic elements of reality don't have such properties as localized mass or density? If fields or strings or whatever are all that exist, and they don't have such a property as mass, how is is that when we add them up we get an object that we would like to say has mass as one of its essential properties?
Is mass more akin to macroscopic properties like temperature than anything fundamental? If so, what business do anything but fundamental properties have in ontology or mereology?
Is this all just disproof of a particle ontology and further support for Schaffer's top-down priority monism as presented in "Monism: The Priority of the Whole" (http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~schaffer/papers/Monism.pdf )? Or are fields or strings perfectly acceptable mereological simples, even given the mismatch between field properties and the properties of macroscopic objects?
The realization that our three dimensional objects are not simply constructed from smaller three dimensional parts must have wide ranging implications for mereology. What are they?
More reference:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-field-theory/#PhiIss
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-holism/#QFT
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/
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