- #1
imiyakawa
- 262
- 1
Was thinking about the paid parental leave schemes. I have come under the impression that they are unfair (unfair under any system) as they stand now.
The fact that it exists forces profit maximising firms to give lower wages to women - they incur a risk premium. This is because women, from the onset, are expected to get pregnant a certain % of the time, and in such a case they will have to have more (paid!) time off than men whose wives get pregnant, and thus incur the firm an economic (i.e. opportunity) and accounting cost. Thus, firms give them less $/hr, even if they are identically skilled.
Of course, we're assuming no price floor (no equal pay laws), but the argument still holds as those laws would just create unemployment among women. (See price floor on wikipedia).
Let's say that men's wage = Wm, women's wage = Ww = 0.99(Wm). Assume that this disparity is because of the risk-premium due to pregnancy.
The labour force can then be divided into 3 groups.
A) Men
B) Women that don't ever have kids.
C) Women that have kids.
A) and B) are economically identical. Yet, B) incurs the cost of 0.1(Wm)/hour as a direct result of the subsidisation of C). However, A) incurs no such cost, i.e. cost = 0(Wm)/hour.
Thus, women who don't have children are being discriminated against by legislation.
It is only equitable, in the spirit of all economic/social perspectives (incl libertarianism), to adjust economic legislation in some manner so as to spread the subsidisation of C) between A) and B) - indistinguishable economic agents.
Such a move will have to occur as a percentage of the wage rate of men, as is happening with B). (they are subsidising C) by incurring a 1% loss of wages).
So, all in all, B) is covering the costs of C), when A) and B) should be covering the costs of C).
Solution? No idea. Slightly higher taxes for men (in line with a correct economic formalization that spreads the subsidisation linearly between men and women), paid into women's superannuation account. Not much transaction costs.
Communication would be key. Explaining the economic logic, and why the new laws are not in fact discriminatory, but are correcting a previous systemic form of discrimination.
"What's the $ amount of risk premium that women incur because of the change of pregnancy?" A question that may not be able to be answered, and would thus nullify or greatly hinder any attempts at legislating something to solve this.
Could the risk premium be 0, or trivially close to it? Perhaps... though I like to think of HR as sensible. I know that if I was a manager who just wanted to maximise profits, I would pay an identically skilled woman slightly less than the man because the woman may get pregnant, and cost me more $ than if a man's wife would get pregnant. So I don't think the risk premium is trivially > 0. It could be small or it could make up a significant amount of the disparity. Dunno how we'd find out how much, though (a close estimation that we can be confident in is crucial before changing the law, for obvious reasons).
Stagnation is not fair. Policy stagnation has the same effect on B) as if a price ceiling was placed on B) at 0.99*(market rate). (albeit without the excess demand for B) as is consequential of price ceilings).
THOUGHTS?
EDIT: Sorry, this isn't a "solution", more "pointing out" the wrongness of the IR system as it is now (in Australia at least, and I'm guessing in pretty much every other first world coutry, except maybe hong kong).
The fact that it exists forces profit maximising firms to give lower wages to women - they incur a risk premium. This is because women, from the onset, are expected to get pregnant a certain % of the time, and in such a case they will have to have more (paid!) time off than men whose wives get pregnant, and thus incur the firm an economic (i.e. opportunity) and accounting cost. Thus, firms give them less $/hr, even if they are identically skilled.
Of course, we're assuming no price floor (no equal pay laws), but the argument still holds as those laws would just create unemployment among women. (See price floor on wikipedia).
Let's say that men's wage = Wm, women's wage = Ww = 0.99(Wm). Assume that this disparity is because of the risk-premium due to pregnancy.
The labour force can then be divided into 3 groups.
A) Men
B) Women that don't ever have kids.
C) Women that have kids.
A) and B) are economically identical. Yet, B) incurs the cost of 0.1(Wm)/hour as a direct result of the subsidisation of C). However, A) incurs no such cost, i.e. cost = 0(Wm)/hour.
Thus, women who don't have children are being discriminated against by legislation.
It is only equitable, in the spirit of all economic/social perspectives (incl libertarianism), to adjust economic legislation in some manner so as to spread the subsidisation of C) between A) and B) - indistinguishable economic agents.
Such a move will have to occur as a percentage of the wage rate of men, as is happening with B). (they are subsidising C) by incurring a 1% loss of wages).
So, all in all, B) is covering the costs of C), when A) and B) should be covering the costs of C).
Solution? No idea. Slightly higher taxes for men (in line with a correct economic formalization that spreads the subsidisation linearly between men and women), paid into women's superannuation account. Not much transaction costs.
Communication would be key. Explaining the economic logic, and why the new laws are not in fact discriminatory, but are correcting a previous systemic form of discrimination.
"What's the $ amount of risk premium that women incur because of the change of pregnancy?" A question that may not be able to be answered, and would thus nullify or greatly hinder any attempts at legislating something to solve this.
Could the risk premium be 0, or trivially close to it? Perhaps... though I like to think of HR as sensible. I know that if I was a manager who just wanted to maximise profits, I would pay an identically skilled woman slightly less than the man because the woman may get pregnant, and cost me more $ than if a man's wife would get pregnant. So I don't think the risk premium is trivially > 0. It could be small or it could make up a significant amount of the disparity. Dunno how we'd find out how much, though (a close estimation that we can be confident in is crucial before changing the law, for obvious reasons).
Stagnation is not fair. Policy stagnation has the same effect on B) as if a price ceiling was placed on B) at 0.99*(market rate). (albeit without the excess demand for B) as is consequential of price ceilings).
THOUGHTS?
EDIT: Sorry, this isn't a "solution", more "pointing out" the wrongness of the IR system as it is now (in Australia at least, and I'm guessing in pretty much every other first world coutry, except maybe hong kong).
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