The Laws of Physics: Exploring Nature's Relationships

[brainstorm]

Originally Posted by Evo
Scientific laws are NOT approximations! They are not subject to interpretation.

For those that do not know the difference between a scientific law, theory, and hypothesis.

http://wilstar.com/theories.htm
I'd give up evo. This is philosophy, you won't win here by quoting these sort of truths . I personally can't stand it, but each to their own. Remember, this is the place people try to convince you that nothing really exists and you're a figure of your own imagination .

Maybe I can help. It depends on what you really mean by "approximation." In a sense, a photograph is less of an approximation of an object than a painting of it would be, yet in another sense the photograph can only approximate certain aspects of the tree like its size, texture, 3-dimensionality, etc. and so the photograph is an approximation too, not just the painting.

In the same sense you could say that while a law of physics describes a generalization that is always true when applied through testing, it is a partial rendering of the actual forces that causes it to be true in all cases. Conservation of matter-energy is always true, for example, but it does not fully describe all the situations in which matter and energy can be transformed in ways that transfers matter or energy without anything being lost or gained.

So I think you could say that a physical law is an approximation insofar as it is a reduction of the complexity of the reality it is derived from. This need not mean that it is inaccurate in terms of predicting measurements and outcomes precisely.

 

[thehacker3]

What about Newton's law F=ma.. Doesn't it break down at relativistic speeds??

 

[Redsummers]

I'd give up evo. This is philosophy, you won't win here by quoting these sort of truths . I personally can't stand it, but each to their own. Remember, this is the place people try to convince you that nothing really exists and you're a figure of your own imagination .

Yup, this is philosophy, but in this concrete thread we are dealing with philosophy of science, I personally think it is important for every single scientist to know what are the scientific methods used in our days. Nobody is talking here about our existence. No metaphysics here. I don't think a lot of people here would be posting if this was something to do with metaphysics.

And, if you read the latest posts, you would see how we are actually 'converging' to a final thought about the thread ;) Most of the times, in philosophy of science, people need to discuss a lot so that everyone can understand the real meaning of everyone's concepts and then develop these ideas logically. Just like the Vienna's circle did, ending up with the positivist movement.
But again, in metaphysics you would have other problems. So far I don't think we have entered in this realm

 

[wuliheron]

People do this to propagate their contextual meanings of choice. The only way for people to stop propagating context would be for them to stop communicating completely. As long as people are formulating communication, their words will procure certain meanings (provided its intelligible communication). Nothing as "eluded" philosophers. When philosophers claim to be eluded by a problem, they do it to set the stage for a rigorous exploration of the topic. They may not have the answer, but they've elaborated the question well enough to set and write about it. Why would you assume that all valid knowledge comes in the form of positive statements? Sometimes there's more value in knowing how to approach an issue than in being able to answer questions conclusively. Often the most conclusive answer is the least valuable one.

In this case the context of choice is self-evident and has nothing to do with whether or not all valid knowledge comes in the form of positive statements. This thread is about the meaning of scientific terminology and, therefore, it only makes sense to at least begin the discussion using a scientific analysis of scientific terminology. No doubt we could also choose an etymological or religious or any other approach to the subject, but I think going straight to the source and remaining as self-consistent as reasonable is usually the most productive way to begin.

 

[wuliheron]

Oh okay, I think I now see what you meant by philosophical assertions. And after having read functional contextualism I must say that it is a really sound philosophical model. Thanks for sharing.

And about this issue of utility, I didn't quite mean 'utility' in a sense of daily useful technology, but in a more 'need to know'-utility.

I don't understand what distinction you are trying to draw between "utility" and "need to know" or how it applies in the context of science. Science is a methodology while any perceived need to know or utility must be based on some sort of assumption.

Also, about laws being universal as Evo stated, I would partially agree with that. I mean in a sense, I see how laws are completely true (and if they are simple and beautiful, even better! but I'm not entering in mathematical beauty here), as F=ma for all masses and accelerations taken in a meticulously way (or by default in a platonic concept of the phenomena). But, you would have to agree that with the laws that we have nowadays we can't predict and describe every single phenomena yet (for instance, in the quantum realm we cannot use F=ma that easily; as well as we have to be careful which frame of reference are we using when taking into consideration high velocities). So if you take into account the definition of theories and hypothesis that Evo provided, you would see that I concur with what she is saying, because as we want to predict more things and made the law more complete, we have to augment our theories. And that's basically what I meant before by saying that we do hold not a unique and eternal truth, but a 'temporal' truth, since it's evolving step by step. (Here, again, you can see the analogy I did before with the logarithmic spiral. I think Evo would approve with that. Maybe not (?))

Well that's my two pennies' worth. Perhaps, as you said, I am splitting semantic hairs too much (I had to look up for this expression, never heard it before. Those are the inconveniences of not being a native english speaker), but that's where the discussion kind of lead us.

I certainly cannot speak for Evo, but I believe I understand the gist of what you are saying.

 

[brainstorm]

This thread is about the meaning of scientific terminology and, therefore, it only makes sense to at least begin the discussion using a scientific analysis of scientific terminology. No doubt we could also choose an etymological or religious or any other approach to the subject, but I think going straight to the source and remaining as self-consistent as reasonable is usually the most productive way to begin.

Nominalist logic is so compelling, isn't it? So what, according to you, is a "scientific analysis" of scientific terminology and what exactly is scientific about it?

 

[apeiron]

Science is a methodology while any perceived need to know or utility must be based on some sort of assumption.

The basics of epistemology are well explored - everyone ends up with some version of a modelling story. But I would say that the question of purpose is a big gap in most people's thinking. It is just sort of assumed that we know why we model, what the goal is, and so this aspect is not normally formalised.

Broadly, the goal of modelling can be divided into a search after truth vs a search after control. One is about knowing reality in some complete and objective fashion (but in a passive, contemplative, just lookin' at it way). While the other is a pragmatic, utiltarian, operational kind of knowing the world where it does not matter if our models are "true", just that they are functional - they allow us to act on the world and get results that matter to us for some reason.

The difference in goals is actually quite important. The utilitarian one can be argued to be the more natural (it is the way all other systems apart from human philosophers probably operate ).

Something else that is often missed is the importance of reductionism to this goal. A good model is the one that involves recording or otherwise handling the least amount of information.

Knowledge is usually viewed as "seeing every tiny detail". So more information is better. But effective modelling goes the other direction. It demands that you shed information (ie: you generalise to find universal rules, or physical laws). And even the other part of modelling, the predictions and measurements, are as reduced as possible. A good model is one that predicts everything you want from one (perhaps a few) very precise inputs.

Which is why we worship F = ma, for instance. A compact description powered by equally compact measurements. (And any alien culture would have to come up with the same formula, or at least a version of the formula that could be translated in the way that one human language mostly maps onto another in terms of its concepts).

But anyway, back to the quote above. It clearly drives a false wedge between scientific method and human purposes. Scientific method has always been grounded in philosophy (specifically epistemology). And purpose does not get discussed enough. It is a live issue. Particularly because there is this counter-intuitive aspect about modelling - that good models shed as much detail as possible and so tend to look "unreal" to those who wrongly expect science to be a passive kind of "all seeing perception".

For example in mind science, there is a constant lament about the hard problem and the failure of science to deliver "what is it like" type explanations. This just fails to get what modelling is actually ultimately about.

 

[wuliheron]

The basics of epistemology are well explored - everyone ends up with some version of a modelling story. But I would say that the question of purpose is a big gap in most people's thinking. It is just sort of assumed that we know why we model, what the goal is, and so this aspect is not normally formalised.

Broadly, the goal of modelling can be divided into a search after truth vs a search after control. One is about knowing reality in some complete and objective fashion (but in a passive, contemplative, just lookin' at it way). While the other is a pragmatic, utiltarian, operational kind of knowing the world where it does not matter if our models are "true", just that they are functional - they allow us to act on the world and get results that matter to us for some reason.

The difference in goals is actually quite important. The utilitarian one can be argued to be the more natural (it is the way all other systems apart from human philosophers probably operate ).

Something else that is often missed is the importance of reductionism to this goal. A good model is the one that involves recording or otherwise handling the least amount of information.

Knowledge is usually viewed as "seeing every tiny detail". So more information is better. But effective modelling goes the other direction. It demands that you shed information (ie: you generalise to find universal rules, or physical laws). And even the other part of modelling, the predictions and measurements, are as reduced as possible. A good model is one that predicts everything you want from one (perhaps a few) very precise inputs.

Which is why we worship F = ma, for instance. A compact description powered by equally compact measurements. (And any alien culture would have to come up with the same formula, or at least a version of the formula that could be translated in the way that one human language mostly maps onto another in terms of its concepts).

But anyway, back to the quote above. It clearly drives a false wedge between scientific method and human purposes. Scientific method has always been grounded in philosophy (specifically epistemology). And purpose does not get discussed enough. It is a live issue. Particularly because there is this counter-intuitive aspect about modelling - that good models shed as much detail as possible and so tend to look "unreal" to those who wrongly expect science to be a passive kind of "all seeing perception".

For example in mind science, there is a constant lament about the hard problem and the failure of science to deliver "what is it like" type explanations. This just fails to get what modelling is actually ultimately about.

It does not drive a false wedge, but is merely a statement of fact. Personally I'm not interested in creating a private language only I understand, so I tend to stick with the widely used definitions of words. In this case:

Science
noun
1. a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws: the mathematical sciences.
2. systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

These are the first two definitions listed because they are the most widely used and applicable. What both share is the emphasis on science as a methodology and what both do not address explicitly is anything about "modelling reality" or epistemology. If you wish to think of science in such terms that is all good and well, but is certainly not explicitly stated by the widely used definitions of the term. For example, others might argue from a consensual reality perspective that science is actually a creative act and instead of modelling reality we are creating reality. Such assertions are clearly philosophical and do not conform to the dictionary definition of the word.

 

[wuliheron]

Nominalist logic is so compelling, isn't it? So what, according to you, is a "scientific analysis" of scientific terminology and what exactly is scientific about it?

Relational Frame Theory is a good example and I have already provided a link. As I have also already indicated in the above post, I prefer to use the commonly used definitions of words whenever reasonable.

 

[apeiron]

If you wish to think of science in such terms that is all good and well, but is certainly not explicitly stated by the widely used definitions of the term.

If this is a demonstration of "functional" and "contextual" then it leaves plenty to be desired.

 

[wuliheron]

If this is a demonstration of "functional" and "contextual" then it leaves plenty to be desired.

I can, of course, post the definitions of those words too if you wish another opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with the English language.

 

[apeiron]

I can, of course, post the definitions of those words too if you wish another opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with the English language.

OK, it's just clicked that functional contextualism is part of a neo-Skinnerian therapy/proto-cult. I nearly died laughing! In this day and age we still have such an improverished view of human psychology?

No wonder that link you provided was just grandiose verbiage. I'll just stick to Peirce, Vygotsky and Mead if you don't mind.

 

[wuliheron]

OK, it's just clicked that functional contextualism is part of a neo-Skinnerian therapy/proto-cult. I nearly died laughing! In this day and age we still have such an improverished view of human psychology?

No wonder that link you provided was just grandiose verbiage. I'll just stick to Peirce, Vygotsky and Mead if you don't mind.

Instead of addressing my points you resort to vacuous insults? Please, do stick with whatever philosophers you prefer, Contextualism has a reputation to uphold.

 

[Phrak]

Dear argumentibles,

Are any of you aware that the designation "Law of Physics" is an historical artifact?

This turn of phrase has been passed down to us from an era when Newtonian physics was king, Newton was long dead, and the community of physics had nothing to do but refine the immutable F=ma while dusting and cleaning the pedestal upon which they had placed Newton's image.

(And if anyone wonders if my response is in anyway an insult or belittlement of the genius of Newton, it is not.)

 

[Pythagorean]

Dear argumentibles,

Are any of you aware that the designation "Law of Physics" is an historical artifact?

This turn of phrase has been passed down to us from an era when Newtonian physics was king, Newton was long dead, and the community of physics had nothing to do but refine the immutable F=ma while dusting and cleaning the pedestal upon which they had placed Newton's image.

(And if anyone wonders if my response is in anyway an insult or belittlement of the genius of Newton, it is not.)

Well, it may be an assault to those "dusting and cleaning". There were really not many fundamental contradictions (I actually know of none) with observation at the time because we couldn't see on the quantum or relativistic scale.

Also, I hope your'e not ignoring the intermediate studies of electromagnetism and thermodynamics that really lead, unavoidably, to relativity and quantum both.

Once you know Newton's three laws, everything isn't all the sudden solved either. We're still solving many classical problems today.

 

[brainstorm]

Relational Frame Theory is a good example and I have already provided a link. As I have also already indicated in the above post, I prefer to use the commonly used definitions of words whenever reasonable.

How do you distinguish this approach as scientific instead of merely sounding scientific because it's written in a scientific way?

 

[wuliheron]

How do you distinguish this approach as scientific instead of merely sounding scientific because it's written in a scientific way?

A) It is a recognized academic philosophy with a well established history.

B) A psychology based on the philosophy has been clinically tested, therefore there some empirical evidence to support the philosophy.

I'm not saying this is a well established science or that there are not competing theories, just that there are scientific approaches to linguistic analysis and this is one. Contextualism in general is interesting in that it resolves many of the classic paradoxes of philosophy that seem to defy common sense, while providing means for empirically testing its assertions.

 

[wuliheron]

Dear argumentibles,

Are any of you aware that the designation "Law of Physics" is an historical artifact?

This turn of phrase has been passed down to us from an era when Newtonian physics was king, Newton was long dead, and the community of physics had nothing to do but refine the immutable F=ma while dusting and cleaning the pedestal upon which they had placed Newton's image.

(And if anyone wonders if my response is in anyway an insult or belittlement of the genius of Newton, it is not.)

That is what contextualism asserts, that words like "laws" change meaning according to the context. This can also include such things as the psychological state of the individual using the word and who is speaking. For example, words like "I" are called indexicals because their meaning changes according to who is using them.

 

[brainstorm]

A) It is a recognized academic philosophy with a well established history.

Does academic recognition automatically equal scientific rigor? Remember Galileo had to fight against academic authority to establish scientific rigor, and he eventually gave up and renounced his views under persecution.

B) A psychology based on the philosophy has been clinically tested, therefore there some empirical evidence to support the philosophy.

What was tested exactly and how?

I'm not saying this is a well established science or that there are not competing theories, just that there are scientific approaches to linguistic analysis and this is one. Contextualism in general is interesting in that it resolves many of the classic paradoxes of philosophy that seem to defy common sense, while providing means for empirically testing its assertions.

I'm sorry but I think the interpretation of meaning in language is called hermeneutics and it is not a science. Etymology is the most valuable to me because it refers to longer-term meanings of roots whereas contextual definitions allow for popular culture to spin meanings this way and that. Just because a trend occurs to shift the meaning of a word doesn't mean that trend should define that word for future usage.

 

[nismaratwork]

Does academic recognition automatically equal scientific rigor? Remember Galileo had to fight against academic authority to establish scientific rigor, and he eventually gave up and renounced his views under persecution.

Actually, he had to fight against opression by the church, and gave up under threat of death or other harsh punishments.

What was tested exactly and how?



I'm sorry but I think the interpretation of meaning in language is called hermeneutics and it is not a science. Etymology is the most valuable to me because it refers to longer-term meanings of roots whereas contextual definitions allow for popular culture to spin meanings this way and that. Just because a trend occurs to shift the meaning of a word doesn't mean that trend should define that word for future usage.

Here I agree... definitely NOT a science... this is an art at best.

 

[wuliheron]

Does academic recognition automatically equal scientific rigor? Remember Galileo had to fight against academic authority to establish scientific rigor, and he eventually gave up and renounced his views under persecution.

What was tested exactly and how?

I'm sorry but I think the interpretation of meaning in language is called hermeneutics and it is not a science. Etymology is the most valuable to me because it refers to longer-term meanings of roots whereas contextual definitions allow for popular culture to spin meanings this way and that. Just because a trend occurs to shift the meaning of a word doesn't mean that trend should define that word for future usage.

So feisty.

Herneneutics is focused solely on the interpreation of language, here's a quote from wikipedia:

Most forms of contextualism, including social constructionism, dramaturgy, hermeneutics, and narrative approaches, are instances of descriptive contextualism...

Functional contextualists, on the other hand, seek to predict and influence events using empirically based concepts and rules.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_contextualism

I mention it's established academic credentials as merely a kind of "character reference" for the non-trivial and self-consistent nature of Functionalism. For more information on the empirical evidence I suggest you check out their webpage on the subject:

http://contextualpsychology.org/state_of_the_act_evidence

 

[Phrak]

Well, it may be an assault to those "dusting and cleaning".

It is an assault. Was the entirety of the physics community not able to see a single soft spot in their comfortable castle? The theoretical science of physics lives in confusion and misdirection punctuated on rare occasion by rare insight, whereupon the confusion and helter skelter sets-in again, as it is today and has been for some 80 years. On the other hand, the same harsh judgment of experimental physics cannot be made, having made immense strides in this same period of time.

I see it over and over again on this forum, where warn-out theory, falling apart in every portion, is taken taken as holy law, smugly cited and harshly defended.

There were really not many fundamental contradictions (I actually know of none) with observation at the time because we couldn't see on the quantum or relativistic scale.

Also, I hope your'e not ignoring the intermediate studies of electromagnetism and thermodynamics that really lead, unavoidably, to relativity and quantum both.

Once you know Newton's three laws, everything isn't all the sudden solved either. We're still solving many classical problems today.

 

[nismaratwork]

It is an assault. Was the entirety of the physics community not able to see a single soft spot in their comfortable castle? The theoretical science of physics lives in confusion and misdirection punctuated on rare occasion by rare insight, whereupon the confusion and helter skelter sets-in again, as it is today and has been for some 80 years. On the other hand, the same harsh judgment of experimental physics cannot be made, having made immense strides in this same period of time.

I see it over and over again on this forum, where warn-out theory, falling apart in every portion, is taken taken as holy law, smugly cited and harshly defended.

I do believe that you're selling theory short: in the absence of explanations for what experimentalists find the results of those experiments are often dismissed. Paul Dirac and contemporaries are a fine example of theoreticians who worked hand-in-hand with experimentalists to forward the agenda of BOTH.

Now, like it or not, we're at a point where experiment is most likely in the service of confirming theory, or opening new theoretical avenues. We're not going to be directly probing the Planck scale, so without the work of theoreticians, "helter skelter" as it sometimes is, Physics would be stagnant. I'm not dismissing experiment, anymore than String Theorists do, despite their sometimes disturbing faith in their theory. Rather, I think your grasp on the history and role of theory in the last 80 years is incomplete and biased.