Nature of Time, Fundamental Basis of Physics
All current models of physics, are black box models. The question of what is "t", in the black model is one question. The second more interesting question is what is the physical nature of matter and space. It is surprising difficult to think independent of the black box models, to see the phenomena as clues as to what matter and space are.
The following is a discussion of those questions:
The foundation of physics is interpreted experimental data - the facts - and a set of conceptual primitives - force, field, particle, space, space-time, quark, gluon, dark matter, dimensions, dark energy, string, bane, magnetic monopole, and so on. Physicists have taken a subset of some of the possible primitives and connected them, using mathematical algorithms. Each set of primitives and the associated algorithm is a model. The models of physics are theoretical in that they do not provide a direct, complete, description of the physical world and its processes. For example, most twentieth century philosophers would support the assertion that the primitive force in Isaac Newton's particle/force model is only a mathematical abstraction. Newton, one of the firsts to apply the theoretic methodology, understood and acknowledged its limits.
"For I hence design only to give a mathematical notion of those forces without considering their physical causes and seats" and "consider those forces not physically, but mathematically." Isaac Newton (2)
The theoretical model has enabled physicists to record and analyze observations using a complex type of curve fitting. The laws of physics are a collection of generalized and formulated observations. The word law was used perhaps in an effort for the emerging science to reconcile theological conflicts. The power of the theoretic methodology is that through the use of black box type modeling, it allowed significant progress to be made, at a time when there was only limited knowledge of matter and space. As a result of over 300 years of successful application of the black box models, most physicists and many philosophers have a deep seated belief that the theoretic methodology is the only rational or perhaps the only practical approach to the problems of physics.
A methodology is a means in which to explore the facts. Methodologies unlike theories cannot be falsified. Methodologies are not true or false, but rather effective or ineffective depending on the nature of the problem to be solved. In most other fields of science, direct observation is possible which has enabled the development of models that closely match the physical world. For example, biologists have developed detailed, ontologically correct, models of life at a molecular level. The breakthroughs in biological engineering in the twentieth century were not the result of serendipitous experiments. The development of detailed, ontologically correct, biological models was a necessary prerequisite to allow advanced biological engineering.
I hear my adversaries shouting in my ears that it is one thing to deal with matters physically, and quite another to do so mathematically, and that geometers should stick to their fantasies and not get entangled in philosophical matters - as if truth could ever be more than one; as if geometry up to our time had prejudiced the acquisition of true philosophy; as if it were impossible to be a geometer as well as a philosopher - and we must infer as a necessary consequence that anyone who knows geometry cannot know physics, and cannot reason about and deal with physical matters physically! (5) Galileo Galilei
The Physical and Theoretical Worldviews
A worldview is an implicit and explicit set of interrelated and connected beliefs. Justification of the theoretical models was not necessary to apply the theoretical models and has unintentionally created philosophical barriers which make it difficult to understand and analysis the facts independently from the theoretical worldview. What is a physical worldview? To answer this question it is necessary to explore what it means to “reason about and deal with physical matters physically.”
Whether the physical worldview does or does not exist, and its correct form is absolutely dependent on what space and matter truly are. To understand the problem situation and to re-examine the facts from the perspective of a physical worldview, it is necessary to develop a hypothetical ontologically correct model and then to create a physical world view that is logically consistent with the hypothetical model. The model discussed is an extrapolation of Faraday’s suppositions and understanding of what space and matter are.
In a physical worldview ‘time’ is a concept that has been created to compare and describe physical processes. It is the small "t" that is part of the mathematical apparatus of the model. Time in a physical worldview is not part of physical space or matter. As in a physical worldview ‘time’ is not a primitive, in a physical worldview there is not and cannot be any physical connection between ‘time’ and physical space and physical matter. Physical matter cannot travel through ‘time’ in a physical worldview. Changing the small “t” in the model does not in any manner change the rate of physical processes and cannot cause them to reverse. Time in the physical worldview is not a river that flows. It is a concept. Time dilution and time contraction are not physically rational concepts within a physical worldview. Except for the small set of phenomena associated with Einstein's model all scientific analysis is based on a physical worldview of time. From a physical worldview any change in any process, is ultimately due to a physical change at an atomic or subatomic level. For example, a chemist would not state that the rate of time changed in a beaker, if the rate of a reaction in the beaker changed when an experiment is repeated. If the rate of the reaction changed, there must be a physical difference.
The physical worldview is by definition completely supportive of analyzing the facts using the physical methodology. It is not possible or necessary at the beginning of the physical path to prove the assertion that time is a concept, not part of physical space. The belief that time is a primitive and part of physical space is moved, without argument to the theoretical world view. Allow the two competing worldviews to co-exist in the mind. Now re-examine the facts from the perspective the physical worldview.
At the turn of the twentieth century, it was discovered that there are discernable physical differences between atoms or subatomic particles that are moving slowly from the same or the same type of atoms or particles that are moving rapidly. For example, the rate of atomic processes slows down, when matter moves. It is possible and likely as there are discernable changes at an atomic and subatomic level, which occur when matter moves, that there is a fundamental change at an atomic and subatomic level, when matter moves. The assertion that if there is a discernable difference then there is and must be a change at an atomic and subatomic level is what Leibniz (9) would have called the principle of discernable differences, which is the foundation of the physical worldview. The corollary to the principle of discernable differences is the principle of predictability or equivalence, which is the observation that matter reacts, in exactly the same manner for identical conditions at an atomic and subatomic level.
From the perspective of a physical worldview, the fact that matter changes when it moves is a clue as to what matter and space is. Is it possible that it is not the motion that causes atomic processes to slow down but rather the change in matter at a subatomic level that is associated with motion that causes the atomic processes to slow down? Is it possible that matter moves and continues to move due to a change at a subatomic level? Using the principle of equivalence, if it was possible to place constrained matter in the same subatomic state as moving matter, atomic processes in the constrained matter would slow down. What would happen when the constrained, sub-atomically altered matter was released?
From the physical worldview there is a difference between model space - which can be mathematically defined to have almost any form - and physical space. In Newton and Maxwell's models there are two general primitives, model “space” and model “particle”. In classical and modern physics the term particle has an abstract meaning that differs from the common macro understanding of a particle. A macro particle, such as a physical grain of sand, appears to have a surface. The appearance of a surface is an illusion. As was discovered at the turn of the 20th century, matter is comprised of atoms. Each atom consists of a nuclide of closely connected protons and electrons that is surrounded by a periodically changing 'cloud' of electrons. Fast moving free electrons (Lenard, 1903) and protons (Rutherford, 1913) readily pass through the electron cloud. There is no experimental evidence to support the proposition that free electrons or the electrons in the atomic cloud have a surface. Experimental evidence also does not support the existence of a protonic surface, however, as Ernest Rutherford's scattering experiment demonstrated; one proton cannot readily pass through another. Is it a fact that atoms, and their constituents, the electron and proton, do not have a surface? If it is, might they rather be called the electronic and protonic disturbance, as opposed to particles? What is the difference between a disturbance in the condition of space and a particle? A disturbance in the condition of space is a three-dimensional, time variant entity. It is not a static entity, such as Newton's corpuscles or a mathematical entity such as Boscovich's force points. Can the facts be used to determine if electrons and protons are time varying disturbances, corpuscles, or force points?
From the perspective of the classic models and the modern models, the model component “particle” is something that has the capability of carrying properties through space. Assume that electrons, protons, and photons are disturbances in the condition of physical space, as opposed to particles that carry properties through physical space. If that assumption is correct, Maxwell’s model’s charge and Newton’s model’s mass are theoretical concepts, as in the physical world there is nothing to carry charge, gravitational mass, or inertial mass.
The exploration of the possibility that physical space has properties and matter is a disturbance in the condition of space is blocked by the misinterpretation of the American scientists, Michelson and Morley’s mirror experiment which confirmed that there is not a space wind created as the Earth moves about the sun. At the time of the mirror experiment, physicists believed as they still do that matter is particular. If matter is particular and space is not empty there can be a space wind. If matter is a disturbance in the condition of space there is not and cannot be a space wind. The result of the mirror experiment confirms that there is not a space wind and that there is a change in matter, the Lorentz contraction, in the direction of motion.
Does, the observed physical change in matter the Lorentz contraction as well as the ‘time contraction’ and ‘mass changes’ associated with motion provide support for the assertion that matter is a disturbance in space not particular? Does, the conversion of particle pairs – proton and antiproton for example – to photons and photons to particle pairs also provide support for the hypothesis that matter is a disturbance in space? Is the conversion of matter to energy, the conversion of one type of disturbance to another, rather than the conversion of primitives?