- #1
John Jones
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Science describes three types of object. The first two are those that can be hidden - material objects, and those that are necessarilly hidden - quantum objects. Thus, we have an independent source supporting Popper's* view that science is the domain of the empirically falsifiable, as hidden objects are a source of falsification and are the objects of science. Empirical is, in effect, the domain of the hideable.
There are other types of objects that are not hideable, hence not empirical or subject to falsification or Popperian doubt. Such objects are numerous, they include colours, sounds, and smells.
The third class of object of science is the supernatural object. This is a non-Popperian postulate of science that has been designed. There are two reasons for this design.
1) to discredit mystical practices and ideas,
2) to establish causal relationships on the basis of non-empirical associations.
The supernatural object is not a mystical object. The mystical object belongs to the class of objects that vanish and appear without empirical redress. On the other hand, the derogatory supernatural object of science changes its form between the mystical object, and the empirical or hideable object, and vice versa; for example, the idea that gods physically cause thunder.
The other, causal/associative, supernatural object of science also changes form supernaturally but finds a role in justifying certain studies of science, such as psychiatry where brain is said to cause mind in what is at root a supernatural causation.
Science, then, supports three types of object. Two of these are the hideables, the third is the supernatural object of which science describes two types.
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(* Popper:
But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience. (1959) )
There are other types of objects that are not hideable, hence not empirical or subject to falsification or Popperian doubt. Such objects are numerous, they include colours, sounds, and smells.
The third class of object of science is the supernatural object. This is a non-Popperian postulate of science that has been designed. There are two reasons for this design.
1) to discredit mystical practices and ideas,
2) to establish causal relationships on the basis of non-empirical associations.
The supernatural object is not a mystical object. The mystical object belongs to the class of objects that vanish and appear without empirical redress. On the other hand, the derogatory supernatural object of science changes its form between the mystical object, and the empirical or hideable object, and vice versa; for example, the idea that gods physically cause thunder.
The other, causal/associative, supernatural object of science also changes form supernaturally but finds a role in justifying certain studies of science, such as psychiatry where brain is said to cause mind in what is at root a supernatural causation.
Science, then, supports three types of object. Two of these are the hideables, the third is the supernatural object of which science describes two types.
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(* Popper:
But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience. (1959) )
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