What is Evidence? How to Handle It Beyond Our Minds

[Iacchus32]

Evidence? What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates? Doesn't that in effect suggest it's not possible to know anything outside of what the mind knows? If so, then how do we present the evidence outside of "the context" of what our minds perceive? I mean how exactly are we to handle it, in what we determine what is admissable and, what isn't? It is after all, a part of "our experience."

 

[RingoKid]

If we all but share one mind and that mind knows everything then what more is there to know?

Our intellect according to our genetic/cultural makeup and a bit of training allows some of us to experience more of this mind than others and project it more effectively.

The evidence is in cross referencing conclusions form various sources whether they be indigenous old world, nu age western or alien remnants then putting it all on the net and letting people come to their own conclusions.

Natural selection using logic, reason, intuition and instinct will decide on the best answer and collectively it will resonate with people until critical mass is achieved in our awareness then it's all happy families

paradigm shifted

 

[Iacchus32]

Well I guess what I'm trying to say is what is evidence (or truth) without a mind to witness it? Doesn't that in effect suggest the evidence is wholly subject to that which does the interpreting? Where does one find any objectivity in that? But then again, maybe this is the whole lesson which needs to be learned, that we can't know the truth unless we "experience" it? And, that maybe we shouldn't be so quick to discount those things which seem to arise solely from the mind, since it is after all the only means we have by which to know anything.

 

[Philocrat]

There is a school of thought which holds that:

The Senses are the suppliers of evidence!

I am not quite sure if the mind ever dictates. But one thing that I have personally observed is that the mind is always extrapolating and making estimates from what the senses supply. Would you call the product of this 'EVIDENCE'?

 

[Iacchus32]

There is a school of thought which holds that:

The Senses are the suppliers of evidence!

I am not quite sure if the mind ever dictates. But one thing that I have personally observed is that the mind is always extrapolating and making estimates from what the senses supply. Would you call the product of this 'EVIDENCE'?

Yes, the evidence has to be extrapolated or, at the very least "witnessed" ... which, is accomplished by means of an "experiential mind."

 

[Philocrat]

Yes, the evidence has to be extrapolated or, at the very least "witnessed" ... which, is accomplished by means of an "experiential mind."

What do you think of the sort of mind that has never been exposed to any information from the external world...that is from outset completely disconnected from the senses? Call it a 'HUMOID' if you like. Do you think that such a mind would comprehend, let alone appreciate, the notion of 'EVIDENCE?

 

[Iacchus32]

What do you think of the sort of mind that has never been exposed to any information from the external world...that is from outset completely disconnected from the senses? Call it a 'HUMOID' if you like. Do you think that such a mind would comprehend, let alone appreciate, the notion of 'EVIDENCE?

About as close as I could get to that would be somebody who was in a coma. In which case we have to ask, why do these people appear as if nobody is home? Where did their personality (and/or identity) go in other words? And yet quite often, if and when they're revived, they have these remarkable stories to tell, about existing in some other dimension or state.

As for someone who is born in a vegetative state, without their brain hooked up, I don't see how it's possible to develop the mind, without some sort of stimulus. Unless of course it's possible to do so by means of stimulus from this other dimension? But then again, if such a thing were possible (or, such a state existed), it would probably involve a different format, and couldn't be communicated directly to this world, if the person could be revived at a later date. I suspect it would be more akin to delaying the birth experience ... albeit maybe this is what entertains the fetus (which appears to be asleep) through its development?

 

[Mentat]

Evidence? What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates? Doesn't that in effect suggest it's not possible to know anything outside of what the mind knows? If so, then how do we present the evidence outside of "the context" of what our minds perceive? I mean how exactly are we to handle it, in what we determine what is admissable and, what isn't? It is after all, a part of "our experience."

This is all on the lines of David Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding". What it leads you to is Solipsism, and the only way to salvage objectivity without changing the premises is to add the "veil of mind" (as Rorty calls it). Kant added this concept, for that very purpose. Kant made it so that we don't just have our experiential mind, but that is just a biased representation of an objective sensory input. IOW, on the way from *object* to *conscious representation*, there is a filtering, of sorts, which causes you to represent something one way and someone else to represent it some other way.

This was, IMHO, the pivotal insight/mistake(?) that caused philosophy to go down the road it's been going down since. Philosophy now only concerns itself with a theory of knowledge which will refine the accuracy of our representations.

But it didn't have to be that way. We don't have to take all of Hume's premises for granted. You talk of evidence (which is justification of belief), and the only thing you can think of is the difference between what is real and what is perceived as such. This proves that the Hume/Kant bias is already deeply ingrained in you (as it is in most philosophers). But what if you were offered a completely different concept? What if, instead of accurate representation in the mind, what mattered for "evidence" or "proof" would simply be social convention? IOW, what if what counted as "justification" was simply what arguments would allow you to make the claim in public without being successfully countered?

Thus, "evidence" isn't (or doesn't have to be) "what the experiential mind dictates". It could simply be what justifies a claim in argument.

Think about it. Ever since Plato, philosophers have been concerned with "truth" as a function of how compelled we are to believe something. Before Plato, winning an argument (so to speak) was the more important thing. Truth equalled your ability to support your belief in rational argument. It did not equal some compulsion that physical objects place on you to perceive things a certain way. It also didn't equal the things about which an introspective inquiry would leave you incorrigible (that was Descartes' doing). But what if those were the wrong paradigm shifts?

Oh well, I've babbled enough. Gotta go.

 

[honestrosewater]

What if, instead of accurate representation in the mind, what mattered for "evidence" or "proof" would simply be social convention? IOW, what if what counted as "justification" was simply what arguments would allow you to make the claim in public without being successfully countered?

What counts as "a claim", "an argument", "being made in public", and "being successfully countered"? (Because I want to know:) Can it be determined whether, say, "meaning" has the same meaning for all arguers? Can all arguers be forced to follow the same rules? Can an arguer form new beliefs by arguing with itself? Can an argument end in all claims being successfully countered? I guess I should also ask what counts as "an arguer".

 

[Canute]

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really. There is no intrasubjective means of ascertaining what is true (in any absolute sense). Nor can we trust our senses, which are inevitably theory-laden. Nor can we trust our reason, by which nothing can be known for certain. As Mentat says, solipsism may be the case as far as the evidence of our senses and of our reason goes. This doesn't mean we cannot know things, but it does place tight restrictions on what we can know and how, and what we should count as convincing evidence.

 

[Mentat]

What counts as "a claim"

A proposition.

, "an argument"

Reasoning that supports that proposition.

, "being made in public"

If the proposition takes the form of utterance or text, and other members of the same "group" (peers) hear/read it, it is public.

, and "being successfully countered"?

Simply losing in argument.

(Because I want to know:) Can it be determined whether, say, "meaning" has the same meaning for all arguers?

No. But isn't it common-sensical that the meaning assigned to "meaning" which withstands argument the best will be the most socially accepted (i.e. the currently true) one?

Can all arguers be forced to follow the same rules?

Not any more than all chess-players can be "forced" to follow all the rules of chess.

Can an arguer form new beliefs by arguing with itself?

What does "arguing with oneself" entail?

Can an argument end in all claims being successfully countered?

Sure it can. The "truth" would then be that you hadn't yet discovered the truth about whatever it is you are discussing.

I guess I should also ask what counts as "an arguer".

Anyone player in a particular language-game who will play by the rules.

 

[Mentat]

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really. There is no intrasubjective means of ascertaining what is true (in any absolute sense). Nor can we trust our senses, which are inevitably theory-laden. Nor can we trust our reason, by which nothing can be known for certain. As Mentat says, solipsism may be the case as far as the evidence of our senses and of our reason goes. This doesn't mean we cannot know things, but it does place tight restrictions on what we can know and how, and what we should count as convincing evidence.

This is all very fine, if we take up the biases of both Locke and Kant.

What if, instead of thinking of "knowledge" as the accuracy of our mental representations relative to the physical things they are supposed to represent, we could at least consider the social/linguistic alternative.

As a thought-experiment, try to think about what knowledge and truth are, without any reference to Lockean or Kantian concepts. Obviously, philosophers had some concept of what constituted "truth", "knowledge", etc, prior to the 17th century. What if all of the post-Cartesian, Dualistic, Mirror-of-nature approach to evidence and justification was misguided?

After all, there are very few self-respecting philosophers who would promote the total, original, mind-body duality of Descartes. There are also very few who would purposely succomb to the idea of "mind-stuff" inherent in Locke.

Now, without the aforementioned biases, philosophy might not need so complicated a vocabulary to describe things that the lay-person never has to encounter, never has to consider -- indeed, wouldn't understand. Of course, one could simply say that that one is uneducated, and so it is only logical that s/he can't conceive of higher philosophical concepts. And yet, according to the very philosophers who gave you your framework (the framework of representationalism that is at the heart of most of the comments made on this forum, along with most of the philosophies of mind ever published), there should be nothing more obvious and intuitive then those things which relate directly to one's own cognitive processes.

 

[Philocrat]

THE LOGICAL AND QUANTITATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DECLARATORY AND EXISTENTIAL CLAIMS

PROPOSITIONS

All propositions are conclusions. Because of this, every one of it has a deductive origin. Even if the creator and holder of such a proposition did not intend it to be so, someone else who hears it will ensure that it so be. This is also equlivalent to adequately and materially implying that a proposition is an abberviation of a fully deduced argumment.


BELIEFS

All beliefs have the same quantitative and logical structures as propositions. Because of this, all propositions and beliefs unavoidably share the same epistemological fate.


COVERSATIONS

A conversation, as philosophically defined, is a collection of sentences. Without submitting to any controversy, I am willing to claim that all sentences (including questions, commands, exclamations, metaphore, etc) are propositions since they are usually intended (either directly or indirectly) to convey some truth values.

Every conversation creates two or multiple referencial positions either in the abstract logical space or in the real external world for the installation of all participants. This is wholly compatible with saying that a conversation can take place between:

1) A and A

2) A and B

3) A and B and C

4) (A, B) and (C, D)

And so on. However, by analysis, (1) is equivalent to someone just thinking by himself because thinking is also conversational in structure. It is equivalent to saying : "I am conversing with myself". (2) is equivalent to two people having a conversation with each other, and so is (3) equivalent to three people having a conversation. And lastly, (4) is equivalent ot one group of two people having a conversation with another group of two people. You can increase the complexities of these arrangements and regroupings as much as you like, the conversational principles governing them fundamentally remain the same.

The standard claim in conversational theory is that:

Every statement or proposition from every participant must contribute to the intermediate truth-values and the overall truth value of the whole conversation. That the boundary of truth is the whole conversation itself.

That a good conversation is marked by how relevant a given proposition or statement is to the subject matter under discourse.

PROBLEM: If you naively claim that you are a solipsist, then this is what you are quantitatively and logically implying:

1) All proppositions are always made from A to A (you are the speaker and hearer of your own noise)

2) All beliefs are always composed, held and propagated from A to A

3) All conversations are always conducted between A and A

Spooky, isn't it?

 

[RingoKid]

sorry but it all keeps coming back to this, which i figured out years ago.

accept nothing as fact
question everything
determine your own truth
define your own reality

the key is the definition of nothing

nothing is perfect
in the space where nothing exists
will one find perfection
the perfect nothing

...seek

>>so nothing CAN be known if you look for it. The space is a compactified dimension and in it all is known but not a thing exists there because thoughts are not physical ?

 

[Iacchus32]

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really. There is no intrasubjective means of ascertaining what is true (in any absolute sense). Nor can we trust our senses, which are inevitably theory-laden. Nor can we trust our reason, by which nothing can be known for certain. As Mentat says, solipsism may be the case as far as the evidence of our senses and of our reason goes. This doesn't mean we cannot know things, but it does place tight restrictions on what we can know and how, and what we should count as convincing evidence.

It all begins with and ends with, the mind, however. Which leads me to ask, is the mind merely the mechanism by which we experience reality? If so, why should we be so quick to dismiss those things that the mind sees? ... period. Especially when it involves those things which are not a part of our everyday reality which only the mind can see, that are non-physical in other words. How do we in fact know that the mind hasn't faithfully witnessed something which actually does exist, suggesting in part that there's a whole world of reality -- an abstract dimension of thought if you will -- unto the mind itself? Indeed, is it possible that our imaginations are a living environment unto themeselves? Which of course would help to elucidate this living entity/being we call consciousness.

Sorry Mentat, I don't mean to discount anything you're trying to say here, because it is very important that we understand the medium we have to work with when it comes to drawing our conclusions. In which case how much leeway do we really have with the observations we make with our minds, when in fact this is all we have to work with? But then again since this is all inherent with nature's design, maybe it isn't necessary for us to look outside of it (the experiential mind) for the answer? Thus far nature has been more than willing to share its secrets with us don't you think?

 

[honestrosewater]

A proposition.
Reasoning that supports that proposition.
If the proposition takes the form of utterance or text, and other members of the same "group" (peers) hear/read it, it is public.
Simply losing in argument.
Anyone player in a particular language-game who will play by the rules.

So what you're decribing is logicians using logic; A player is a logician, and a language-game is a logic, right? I ask because Logic is already established.

No. But isn't it common-sensical that the meaning assigned to "meaning" which withstands argument the best will be the most socially accepted (i.e. the currently true) one?

But that's exactly my question- How do you know others are assigning the same meaning to a word?
Say arguer X and arguer Y are arguing with each other. X and Y are using the same language L. X and Y are arguing about X's claim: "The interpretation of L used by X is identical to the interpretation of L used by Y." How could this argument end?
I haven't really thought this through, but surely you all can help me along (I doubt these are new questions). Might X and Y need to decide the truth or falsity of a few more claims: (1a) L is consistent, (1b) L is complete, (2a) In all respects, X and Y are the same arguer, or (2b) In all relevant respects, X and Y are the same arguer.
I don't know what are relevant respects in all cases. In some cases, X and Y both being humans with normal vision and having seen the sun could be relevant respects, while X and Y living in different countries could be an irrelevant respect.

Not any more than all chess-players can be "forced" to follow all the rules of chess.

Can all chess-players be forced to follow at least one set of rules? If it isn't obvious, I'm thinking of physical rules.

What does "arguing with oneself" entail?

I would have said it entails that all claims are made by the same arguer. But I might have to change that, depending on the answers to my other questions.

Sure it can. The "truth" would then be that you hadn't yet discovered the truth about whatever it is you are discussing.

But don't all arguers have to agree that "we haven't yet discovered the truth about what we are discussing" is true?

 

[Mentat]

So what you're decribing is logicians using logic; A player is a logician, and a language-game is a logic, right?

No, a "player" is any participant in a "language-game" (Sprach-spiel). There's no easy way to get through this, but I'll do my best to paraphrase the concept:

Think of what a "game" is. Try to define it rigidly. You will soon discover that you can't, because whatever definition you come up with will either leave out some type of game (board game, card game, olympic game, kids playing games), or will be so broad that it will include things that are clearly not "games". What makes a game a game is it's (in Wittgenstein's terms) "family resemblances". There may not be anyone common factor to all games, but there are many factors that are common to a lot of games; games that, in turn have other things in common with yet other games which they don't have incommon with the aforementioned...

A language-game is the same concept. There are innumerable language-games (asking for something and having it brought to you, saying something and having it repeated, asking questions, identifying objects, etc). What you will notice if you examine the plethura of language-games is that they don't all have anyone thing in common, but they have "family resemblances", just like "games" (hence the term, "language-game", since categorization of a type of language use, is much like a categorization of a type of "game").

Games, however, typically have rules. These rules can be strict, and necessarily adhered to, or they can be completely ad hoc (as with so many games that little children make up as they go along), or they can be anything in between. So with language-games; they have rules, but "rules" in different senses and to different degrees of necessity/importance/rigidness.

So, what I was saying before was that, in philosophical discussion, the "moves" we can make (considering "philosophical discussion" to be yet another "language-game" with its own "rules") are different than the "moves" we can make in other language-games. What is important is to realize that "truth" is a mostly philosophical notion, and (depending on which brand of philosophy you are practising (social, as with the pre-Platonics; epistemological, as with the post-Kantians; etc)) can mean simply "that which I can get away with saying (i.e. a "move" I'm allowed to make) in this particular language-game".

I ask because Logic is already established.

Logic is a set of rules for a set of "games". Logic is supposed to describe, and limit, all possible games. I won't make any claims about whether that's the case or not, but I will say that it lacks relevance, since all language-games will be bound by some rules, and those rules will be "logical" in some way or another.

But that's exactly my question- How do you know others are assigning the same meaning to a word?
Say arguer X and arguer Y are arguing with each other. X and Y are using the same language L. X and Y are arguing about X's claim: "The interpretation of L used by X is identical to the interpretation of L used by Y." How could this argument end?
I haven't really thought this through, but surely you all can help me along (I doubt these are new questions). Might X and Y need to decide the truth or falsity of a few more claims: (1a) L is consistent, (1b) L is complete...

Those are assumed upon the taking up of a certain language-game. In much the same way, we assume that the rules of some new board game (for example) are going to be consistent, even if we haven't ever played the game before.

(2a) In all respects, X and Y are the same arguer, or (2b) In all relevant respects, X and Y are the same arguer.

Why would X and Y be the same arguer?

I don't know what are relevant respects in all cases. In some cases, X and Y both being humans with normal vision and having seen the sun could be relevant respects, while X and Y living in different countries could be an irrelevant respect.

Oh, so you're talking about when they agree with one another, right? When they agree, do they become the same arguer? Is that what you are asking?

If so, then I'd say that it isn't an argument and doesn't enter into the problem of discovering "truth". After all, if two people agree on something, then the "game" is over.

Can all chess-players be forced to follow at least one set of rules? If it isn't obvious, I'm thinking of physical rules.

The point is the rules that they must follow in order to play "chess". If they start moving the king as though it were a rook, they aren't playing "chess" anymore, they're playing something else (similar to chess, perhaps, but a different game).

I would have said it entails that all claims are made by the same arguer. But I might have to change that, depending on the answers to my other questions.

Think of it in terms of "games" an my answer (the one I would give) will seem obvious.

But don't all arguers have to agree that "we haven't yet discovered the truth about what we are discussing" is true?

Why should they? As long as they all agree that they haven't yet agreed...I don't think I really understand what you're asking. Clarify please.

 

[Philocrat]

No, a "player" is any participant in a "language-game" (Sprach-spiel). There's no easy way to get through this, but I'll do my best to paraphrase the concept:

Think of what a "game" is. Try to define it rigidly. You will soon discover that you can't, because whatever definition you come up with will either leave out some type of game (board game, card game, olympic game, kids playing games), or will be so broad that it will include things that are clearly not "games". What makes a game a game is it's (in Wittgenstein's terms) "family resemblances". There may not be anyone common factor to all games, but there are many factors that are common to a lot of games; games that, in turn have other things in common with yet other games which they don't have incommon with the aforementioned...

A language-game is the same concept. There are innumerable language-games (asking for something and having it brought to you, saying something and having it repeated, asking questions, identifying objects, etc). What you will notice if you examine the plethura of language-games is that they don't all have anyone thing in common, but they have "family resemblances", just like "games" (hence the term, "language-game", since categorization of a type of language use, is much like a categorization of a type of "game").

Games, however, typically have rules. These rules can be strict, and necessarily adhered to, or they can be completely ad hoc (as with so many games that little children make up as they go along), or they can be anything in between. So with language-games; they have rules, but "rules" in different senses and to different degrees of necessity/importance/rigidness.

So, what I was saying before was that, in philosophical discussion, the "moves" we can make (considering "philosophical discussion" to be yet another "language-game" with its own "rules") are different than the "moves" we can make in other language-games. What is important is to realize that "truth" is a mostly philosophical notion, and (depending on which brand of philosophy you are practising (social, as with the pre-Platonics; epistemological, as with the post-Kantians; etc)) can mean simply "that which I can get away with saying (i.e. a "move" I'm allowed to make) in this particular language-game".

Mentat, you are painting a picture of the world whose societies all function like 'Games'. The fundamental issue here is not necessarily about whether 'one or more games are ever like' but mainly about 'what is common to all games?' or 'what is the common outcome or outcomes of all games, regardless of how widely or narrowly they all structurally and functionaly vary?'

As soon as you ask these questions, the next most important or significant questions that would confront you are these:

1) Why do all games have these common features or outcomes ?

2) How much do these common features or outcomes affect the way all games are currently played?

3) What can be collectively done by all the players to structurally and functionally improve the nature of all games?

4)And, ultemately, what is the fundamental benefit for all the players committing themselves to such a project of games improvement?

These are the hard-headed questions that now demand carefully thought out answers. So, what are these common features? They are these:

1) PLAYERS

All games need Players, otherwise it is not a game

2) RULES

All games must have rules, or methods.

3) PLAY

All games need to be played. If you design a game with players and rules without ever playing it, then it would be either a furniture that you just sit down and admire forever or it is not a game at all.

4) RESULT

All games always result in three possible outcomes (a) WIN, (2) LOSE or (3) DRAW

These are the key common features. The variations in the Player types, rules, or the physical designs of all games seem to be trivially insiginificant, if not irrelevant.

PROBLEM: Every win produces Happiness for both the Winners and their loyal supporters. Every Loss produces Unhappiness for the Loosers and their supporters. Every draw brings happiness to all the players and their supporters on both sides of the game. Question: Supposing all the players structurally and functionaly progress to a point in their overall existence such that they bocome so smart that all games always end in a draw, would these players still be happy with this new state of affair? Would games still be games?

 

[Mentat]

Mentat, you are painting a picture of the world whose societies all function like 'Games'. The fundamental issue here is not necessarily about whether 'one or more games are ever like' but mainly about 'what is common to all games?' or 'what is the common outcome or outcomes of all games, regardless of how widely or narrowly they all structurally and functionaly vary?'

No, no, Wittgenstein expected people to try this, and nipped it in the bud. To fuss about what is "common to all games" will lead you to a definition that is either too rigid, or too permissive. It simply cannot be done. And, even if it could, why would you want to?

No, when you think of the difference between chess, soccer, gymnastics, and kids outside throwing a ball at one another and making up rules as they go and scoffing at the very concept of their being made more rigid (the rules, that is)...just think about it for a while.

 

[Doctordick]

What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates?

Clearly the answer is "None!" IMHO this is a very important question; and one not discussed anywhere in this thread!

If we all but share one mind and that mind knows everything then what more is there to know?

Oh, so now somebody knows everything do they? What round hole did you pull that out of?

And, that maybe we shouldn't be so quick to discount those things which seem to arise solely from the mind, since it is after all the only means we have by which to know anything.

I don't think anyone here wants to discuss it!

The Senses are the suppliers of evidence!

Doesn't that presume a mind knowing what senses are?

Yes, the evidence has to be extrapolated or, at the very least "witnessed" ... which, is accomplished by means of an "experiential mind."

Aren't you being led astray here? We had this concept "a mind" (some inexplicable source of ideas). Now I can work with that and the problems it poses, but now you add "senses"! Why and where did that arise? From your mind or not? Apparently it's just another inexplicable source; but a source of what?

What do you think of the sort of mind that has never been exposed to any information from the external world...that is from outset completely disconnected from the senses? Call it a 'HUMOID' if you like.

Why don't we just call it a "fetus" at the moment of conception? Or do you think that single cell is already connected to "its senses"?

About as close as I could get to that would be somebody who was in a coma.

Now here you have gotten so far astray as to be no longer on subject. A person in a coma has all kinds of operating connections to their senses. They breath, their heart beats, they digest food. A mind, cut off from their senses? Get out of here; you haven't even thought about this "mind" processes its ideas yet! You added "senses" and are now dividing the mind into two different states "conscious" and "unconscious"! You started with one "primitive" and are now up to three without making any progress at all. (Not even an argument as to why these three conceptual "primitives" are necessary.)

What if, instead of accurate representation in the mind, what mattered for "evidence" or "proof" would simply be social convention? IOW, what if what counted as "justification" was simply what arguments would allow you to make the claim in public without being successfully countered?

Now, haven't you just side stepped the whole question here? How does that mind deal with "social convention" without senses or consciousness? Off the subject?

I guess I should also ask what counts as "an arguer".

Talk about off the subject! Like puppies barking at one another. It appears to me that everybody on this forum just spouts forth without ever putting an iota of thought into what they are saying. I think it's called Attention Deficit Syndrome.

Yeah, Honestrosewater says it all really.

I'm glad someone has got this all figured out. How come I don't see lacchus32 jumping in and agreeing?

And yet, according to the very philosophers who gave you your framework (the framework of representationalism that is at the heart of most of the comments made on this forum, along with most of the philosophies of mind ever published), there should be nothing more obvious and intuitive then those things which relate directly to one's own cognitive processes.

So you think "intuition" is the best source of "knowledge". How did you come to that conclusion?

If you naively claim that you are a solipsist, then this is what you are quantitatively and logically implying:

1) All proppositions are always made from A to A (you are the speaker and hearer of your own noise)

2) All beliefs are always composed, held and propagated from A to A

3) All conversations are always conducted between A and A

Spooky, isn't it?

If that were true, one would have to be pretty stupid to claim to be a solipsist then wouldn't one? Are you sure you are not oversimplifying the issues here? Would Hume agree with you?

sorry but it all keeps coming back to this, which i figured out years ago.

Well, now we have two people who have it all figured out. :zzz:

In which case how much leeway do we really have with the observations we make with our minds, when in fact this is all we have to work with?

Sounds to me like you are trying to get back on subject. Do you really think it'll work?

But that's exactly my question- How do you know others are assigning the same meaning to a word?

Now that's an interesting question; exactly how does one come to know the meaning of a word? Back to that fetus (or Humoid if you prefer); exactly how did it come to know the meaning of that first word it came to know? And what, pray tell, was it?

Why should they? As long as they all agree that they haven't yet agreed...I don't think I really understand what you're asking. Clarify please.

Boy, you sure said a lot for someone who didn't understand what he was being asked! :

Supposing all the players structurally and functionaly progress to a point in their overall existence such that they bocome so smart that all games always end in a draw, would these players still be happy with this new state of affair? Would games still be games?

Let's see now, "What is Evidence?" has been brought to "Would games still be games?" It reminds me of that "phone" game we used to play when I was a kid. One person writes something down (reasonably complex) and then whispers it to another. The message is then passed from one child to another (works pretty good with about twenty kids). Then the last one writes down the message. Finally the first and last messages are compared. They seldom have anything to do with one another.

...just think about it for a while.

I suspect that request is beyond the capabilities of most people on this forum; but, perhaps I am in error. I wrote what I wrote because I found the original question interesting (apparently no one else agreed) and a thread which avoided the whole issue.

Is there anyone here who is interested in continuing with a discussion of exactly what the consequences of the constraint pointed out by lacchus32 might be?

What evidence do we have, but what the "experiential mind" dictates?

As I said earlier, the answer is clearly "None!" I think I have some very important things to say concerning the consequences of that fact, but it would require a little thought and I wouldn't want to over tax your attention span.

Have fun -- Dick :shy:

 

[Iacchus32]

Clearly the answer is "None!" IMHO this is a very important question; and one not discussed anywhere in this thread!

I agree, this is a very important question, because what it really gets down to is how can we know anything if we don't know ourselves? Or, for that matter, is there really "a self" there for us to know?

I don't think anyone here wants to discuss it!

Well, I was beginning to wonder about that myself but, I think the problem lies in the fact that most of us are applying this to things we (allegedly) examine outside of the mind, to further our own particular brand of research, while I'm more concerned with the mind's ability to look at itself, and understand what "a mind" is from the standpoint of being a mind that is ... if, you catch my drift?

Oh, and thanks for showing an interest.

Now here you have gotten so far astray as to be no longer on subject. A person in a coma has all kinds of operating connections to their senses. They breath, their heart beats, they digest food. A mind, cut off from their senses? Get out of here; you haven't even thought about this "mind" processes its ideas yet! You added "senses" and are now dividing the mind into two different states "conscious" and "unconscious"! You started with one "primitive" and are now up to three without making any progress at all. (Not even an argument as to why these three conceptual "primitives" are necessary.)

I think what I was trying to get at here, at least initially, is where is the "experiential part" of that person that we've come to know as that person? Why is it that they no longer appear to be at home?

I suspect that request is beyond the capabilities of most people on this forum; but, perhaps I am in error. I wrote what I wrote because I found the original question interesting (apparently no one else agreed) and a thread which avoided the whole issue.

Is there anyone here who is interested in continuing with a discussion of exactly what the consequences of the constraint pointed out by lacchus32 might be?

In other words should the mind be given license to reflect on the mind itself, since that's what it seems to be so good at ... the ability to reflect on things? Is the medium of the mind itself a legitimate process in other words?

As I said earlier, the answer is clearly "None!" I think I have some very important things to say concerning the consequences of that fact, but it would require a little thought and I wouldn't want to over tax your attention span.

Have fun -- Dick :shy:

Then by all means let's hear it! While hey admit that I have somewhat of a limited attention span, but heck, it's the only one I've got!

 

[Philocrat]

Doesn't that presume a mind knowing what senses are?

Some people say that there is such thing as a mind/soul/consciousness that extends beyond the material body. They then become locked up in a stalemate of explaining it. Whatever the mind is, I open-mindedly look at it as a contributor to the understanding of the natural world. Being a contributor, it must behave like every other organs in the material body: CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF SEEING AND UNDERSTANDING what the whole human self ecounters in every moment of its being. It is immaterial whether it is fundamentally different from the material body or not, in the end, by the sum totality of its worth, it must do something concrete to deserve any place in the whole human body. I couldn't careless what the mind is or where it comes from or what happens to it afterwards, so long as it does something useful while there is a human being in existence.

So, what does it do to deserve a place in the self? It must receive input, compute and display. For example, whatever the sense organs supply to it, it must:

1) Make at least an estimate of what it is. Interprete the shapes, sizes, lines, circles, count, etc.

2) It must label every aspect of it and numerically and norminally map them onto what outwardly constitutes a whole

3) It must name it (that is, the outcome of (3)).

4) And file it away in the memory for subsequent recall and use.

This process is repeated until enough information is built up over time to start conceptualising and making concrete predictions that are wholly relevant and useful to the overall preservation of the beholder of such a mind or consciousness. So, as you can see, I always interprete the whole notion of the mind or consciousness purposively. The ROLE-PLAY PRINCIPLE is the centre piece of my own interpretation of the mind.

On the issue of knowing what the mind or conscousness is and where it is located in the body, as I have consistently argued on this PF, if it is truly posing a 'hard-problem' as it is being alledged, there is no way to know that until we fully study and understand how the meterial body itself is configured and functioned, from the physiological to the neuro-computational level. At the moment no one can honestly turn up and claim to fully know this. Me, I am flexible...I'll wait!

NOTE: By this interpretation, I am not in anyway neglecting the possibility of such deviations as hallucinations, visual illusions, misconceptions, and other spooky types of deviations. I totally acknowledge all these, except that I always look at them as marginal functional errors in the whole process of sensing, interpreting and understanding the world. Just as the sense organs mispercieve so can the mind make quantificational and logical errors in the process of interpretation and understanding.

 

[Iacchus32]

NOTE: By this interpretation, I am not in anyway neglecting the possibility of such deviations as hallucinations, visual illusions, misconceptions, and other spooky types of deviations. I totally acknowledge all these, except that I always look at them as marginal functional errors in the whole process of sensing, interpreting and understanding the world. Just as the sense organs mispercieve so can the mind make quantificational and logical errors in the process of interpretation and understanding.

Which is to say you like to believe you have a firm grip on reality then, correct?

 

[Philocrat]

Which is to say you like to believe you have a firm grip on reality then, correct?

Not necessarily...I am only acknowledging my own perceptual limitations without necessarily inviting anyone else to do the same. That's why I will like to wait until further notice.

 

[honestrosewater]

Why should they? As long as they all agree that they haven't yet agreed...I don't think I really understand what you're asking. Clarify please.

I could be clearer if I knew the rules of the game. Presumably, the rules would state that the game ends when a player makes a claim that is not successfully countered by any other player. So how can a game end with all claims having been successfully countered? If that's one of the rules, the rules are inconsistent. If the players can end the game illegally- IOW their decision does not follow from the rules but is made outside of or independently of the rules- fine, no problem. But they can still end the game legally: If a player can claim something along the lines of "This is the last claim made in this argument" and no other player counters that claim, then the game ends legally, with one player making a claim that is not successfully countered by any other player.

My question about meaning... Say two people meet on a dog lovers discussion forum. After completely describing their dogs to each other, they realize their descriptions are identical: Big floppy ears, brown, furry coat, long, purple tongue, 42 teeth, and so on. So they decide to send pictures of their dogs to each other. Surprisingly, the pictures are not identical; one is a picture of a dog, the other is a picture of a lizard. Do the pictures provide evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them? Could their words ever have provided evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

 

[Doctordick]

"How can we know anything?"

I agree, this is a very important question, because what it really gets down to is how can we know anything if we don't know ourselves? Or, for that matter, is there really "a self" there for us to know?

Now see, I think you are already getting ahead of the problem! Lots of text with little careful thought. Actually, right here in this quote alone you have posed three different questions. Why don't we just start with the first question and worry about the others later? In my opinion, what it really gets down to is how can we "know" anything period? If you can't answer that question everything else is moot.

Some people say that there is such thing as a mind/soul/consciousness that extends beyond the material body.

Yeh, and I know somebody who says we are born knowing everything and have forgotten! There are a lot of dumb ideas out there; if we are going to list them all, I guarantee you'll exceed my attention span! The impression I get is that you are trying to force an interpretation of the word "mind" which will beg the original question: "How can we know anything?"

Which is to say you like to believe you have a firm grip on reality then, correct?

Before one can have a firm grip on reality, one must first at least understand what reality is! Do you think anybody knows what reality is? If so, how did they come to know it? Can no one see the conundrum here?

I am only acknowledging my own perceptual limitations ...

Are you really? How did you come to know what your perceptual limitations are?

In my opinion, we have a very serious problem here. No one above even thought to comment on the "humoid" start point (the fetus). Somehow a single cell having no brain, no eyes, no nerves, no eyes, ears, nose, tongue or fingers comes to know what these things are! As adults they have a mental picture of what they call reality; what they are and what the world around them is and a rough idea of the rules they obey. And no one finds that in the least bit strange? Somehow this entity begins with no knowledge of reality at all and, in a matter of a few short years, has fundamentally solved the problem. This hasn't happened just once; it happens hundreds of millions of times every year. Yet, not only has no one explained how this is accomplished, no one is even interested in examining the problem.

Well I was and am! And the first thing to be done is exactly state what the problem is. Somehow every one of us has managed to create a workable explanation of a body of totally undefined information (reality) which has been transformed by a totally undefined process (our senses). As a fetus, you were certainly not cognizant of any definitions. It follows (as the night the day ) that the problem is a solvable problem! So why don't we just sit down and solve it: come up with a procedure for solving such a problem? Create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process! If you cannot do that, how can you ever hope to understand the human mind?

If you have the attention span to follow it, I can show you a solution. Not necessarily "the solution" but "a solution". Understanding that solution opens one's eyes to some of the the fundamental characteristics and limitations of those solutions our minds have created.

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

 

[Philocrat]

How did you come to know what your perceptual limitations are?

I can't claim to know that, but as I have argued elsewhere on this forum, it seems as if the human mind is naturally predisposed to make some estimates about what is wrong with things and how things ought to be. They appear to me as estimates of some sort. We tend to all want more than there is or more than things currently are. On this, I always keep an open my until we make some scientific progress in the science of man, if any.

In my opinion, we have a very serious problem here. No one above even thought to comment on the "humoid" start point (the fetus). Somehow a single cell having no brain, no eyes, no nerves, no eyes, ears, nose, tongue or fingers comes to know what these things are! As adults they have a mental picture of what they call reality; what they are and what the world around them is and a rough idea of the rules they obey. And no one finds that in the least bit strange? Somehow this entity begins with no knowledge of reality at all and, in a matter of a few short years, has fundamentally solved the problem. This hasn't happened just once; it happens hundreds of millions of times every year. Yet, not only has no one explained how this is accomplished, no one is even interested in examining the problem.

And one of the fascinating things about foetus is that it can't even exist without being materially fed from conception. It's mind strangely enough tends to expand as more matter is fed to it. When it comes out of the mother's womb (the contributory cause of it), it still continues to be fed by more matter and throughout its youth to adulthood, it conitunes to rely on more matter for its mind to even make an inch attempt of learning about the natural world and expanding accordingly. Stop feeding it with matter at any point in time, it not only stops acquiring more information, like magic, it everporates. So much of an indendennce! Really, independence of mind?

Well I was and am! And the first thing to be done is exactly state what the problem is. Somehow every one of us has managed to create a workable explanation of a body of totally undefined information (reality) which has been transformed by a totally undefined process (our senses). As a fetus, you were certainly not cognizant of any definitions. It follows (as the night the day ) that the problem is a solvable problem! So why don't we just sit down and solve it: come up with a procedure for solving such a problem? Create an explanation of a body of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined process! If you cannot do that, how can you ever hope to understand the human mind?

Grind the world to a hault. Stop everyone from having sex or reproducing in anyway possible, and see what happens. If the soul or mind or consciousness is so independent and unigue, let us all stop having sex and let us see if it can single-handedly reproduce itself without any intervention of matter! The fact that is apparent to me is this:

The LIFE-AND-DEATH CYCLE is a natural mechanism for 'NUMERICAL' preservation of the whole human race ('SAVED-BY-NUMBER' Mechanism). It seems as if the whole of the human race is naturally preserved by numerical recycling of its imperfect parts. The whole process looks entirely like a material process. BIG question for everyman's conscience:

WHY PRESERVE THE WHOLE HUMAN RACE BY NUMERICALLY DESTROYING AND REPLACING THE ACTUAL HUMAN BEINGS THEMSELVES VIA THIS LIFE-AND-DEATH CYCLE OR MECHANISM?

So, when someone asks you: 'is the human race (whole) being preserved?' How do you answer that? That the real human beings (parts) are being numerically destroyed and replaced or recycled in order to do so? What about the real human beings themselves that are being savagedly recycled in the process? Special invisible hands taking care of the business? Oh, yeh? I could be wrong, but the whole process looks wholly materially and mechanically induced. And worst still, even if this cirular process were arguably preserving in the first place, there is currently no guarantee that the human race may not be left with the same fate as the dinosaurs, for there is nothing that I have personally seen that logically rules this out.

And what happens if you could do this:

WHOLLY AND COMPLETELY PRESERVE BOTH THE WHOLE AND ITS PARTS (HUMAN RACE AND THE ACTUAL HUMAN BEINGS) IN THE STRICTEST SENSE OF THE WORD?

If you have the attention span to follow it, I can show you a solution. Not necessarily "the solution" but "a solution". Understanding that solution opens one's eyes to some of the the fundamental characteristics and limitations of those solutions our minds have created.

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

Keep your solution to yourself for now. I have seen enought that invites me to wait until further notice.

 

[RingoKid]

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

no, not really, just your own...

 

[honestrosewater]

If you have the attention span to follow it, I can show you a solution. Not necessarily "the solution" but "a solution". Understanding that solution opens one's eyes to some of the the fundamental characteristics and limitations of those solutions our minds have created.

Do I have anyone's interest? -- Dick

If you would stop insulting people, I would like to discuss your solution.

 

[Iacchus32]

Now see, I think you are already getting ahead of the problem! Lots of text with little careful thought. Actually, right here in this quote alone you have posed three different questions. Why don't we just start with the first question and worry about the others later? In my opinion, what it really gets down to is how can we "know" anything period? If you can't answer that question everything else is moot.

The one thing I do know is it takes "a mind" to know the truth. That in fact we "experience" the truth through our relationship with it. What else can we know of a certainty beyond that? That everything is contingent upon that original something (not nothing) which makes all things certain?

 

[RingoKid]

nothing is certain...

...couldn't resist

 

[Iacchus32]

nothing is certain...

...couldn't resist

Yes, but how could you be so sure? Who (or what) told you this?

 

[RingoKid]

Nobody told me this. It is something that in my experience I have found to be true...

In other words I know and trust myself enough to believe what i have found to be true

knowledge of self is great, isn't it ?

 

[honestrosewater]

The one thing I do know is it takes "a mind" to know the truth. That in fact we "experience" the truth through our relationship with it. What else can we know of a certainty beyond that? That everything is contingent upon that original something (not nothing) which makes all things certain?

This may be a small point, but do you ask, "What entails my experience?" or, "What does my experience entail?"

 

[Mentat]

I could be clearer if I knew the rules of the game. Presumably, the rules would state that the game ends when a player makes a claim that is not successfully countered by any other player. So how can a game end with all claims having been successfully countered?

A game ends when no more legal moves can be made (as with all games), for whatever reason. Do you play chess? If so, think of the difference between winning by stalemate, and winning by checkmate.

My question about meaning... Say two people meet on a dog lovers discussion forum. After completely describing their dogs to each other, they realize their descriptions are identical: Big floppy ears, brown, furry coat, long, purple tongue, 42 teeth, and so on. So they decide to send pictures of their dogs to each other. Surprisingly, the pictures are not identical; one is a picture of a dog, the other is a picture of a lizard. Do the pictures provide evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

Sure, but I don't see the relevance. If the definitions of the words were not established from the beginning (though both assumed that the other was using the same set of definitions as they were) then confusion should be expected.

Could their words ever have provided evidence that the words they were using meant different things to each of them?

They simply hadn't cleared up all the rules of their language-game yet. Think of trying to play chess with someone who thought that rooks, in addition to their actual legal moves, could also move in space in the forward diagonal directions. They just aren't playing by the same rules as you are, so you are technically not even playing the same game (though there are versions of Shogi (Japanese chess) in which the aforementioned rook moves are indeed legal).