Why did Churchill refuse to discuss peace with Hitler in 1940?

[SW VandeCarr]

After the fall of France in June, 1940, the German Government, by way of Hitler's public statements and diplomatic back channels, offered to discuss the end of hostilities between Germany and the British Empire (incl Canada, Australia and New Zealand) based on the "map of Europe".

At that point in time Austria, Czechoslovakia, and parts of Poland had been annexed by Germany. German troops occupied the rest of western Poland, half of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. Italy was allied to Germany and a pact, amounting to an alliance, existed between Germany and the USSR. Spain, Finland, Vichy France and most of the eastern Europe states had pro-German governments. Sweden and Switzerland were "neutral". The only place in mainland Europe somewhat friendly to the UK was Greece.

The US was officially neutral and in any case, totally unprepared for a land war. Also, it was known from some of Hitler's many verbal outpourings and his book Mein Kampf that Hitler had vague hopes for an eventual Anglo-German alliance against the USSR.

Given all this and an American public that seemed all too willing to let Britain go down, why did Churchill refuse to even discuss the matter and rather risk the possible invasion of Britain and the new "dark age" that he himself described in a speech before Parliament?

EDIT: My question here regards the rationality of Churchill's position. He could have bought time by entering into discussions. In the end, the UK survived and eventually, with its allies, won. But he risked a disaster that could have easily occurred with the destruction of the Royal Air Force. As it happened, the country suffered terribly, and it was only Hitler's decision to invade Russia, and the Japanese decision to attack the US that took much of the pressure off Britain. http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/defeat/britain-alone.htm

 

[Andre]

why did Churchill refuse to even discuss the matter and rather risk the possible invasion of Britain and the new "dark age" that he himself described in a speech before Parliament?

Maybe there was not a lot of rationality apart from some elements, throughout the ages, the grand strategy of Britain had generally been, to support the weaker party in Europe to oppose the emerge of large powerful empires that might threathen the Albion. Also Churchill may have been very aware of Hitlers strong aversion against the treaty (dictate) of Versailles 1919 that elicited revenge on the German side eventually.

If you follow his finest hour speech, you could not deny Churchill having some keen vision about the future. No doubt that he visioned a German attack in future even if there was to be an agreement. I think that Hitler already had shown some contempt about treaties like that. He had enough reason to see that the period 1918-1939 was merely a truce in a continuous single world war

Also maybe the factor of buying time with talks is unsure. The Luftwaffe had lost many transport aircraft during the May 1940 campaign in the low countries and needed time to restore that capacity to support an invasion. However it's a bit rationalisation afterwards, Churchill just being convinced that he had to stand up against the Nazis and avoid sending mixed signals that could confuse friends too.

and it was only Hitler's decision to invade Russia, and the Japanese decision to attack the US that took much of the pressure off Britain.

Possibly true on a strategic level, on the tactical level, during the battle of Brittain, it was certainly Hitlers decision, following a RAF air attack on Berlin (in reaction to bombs on London), to shift the bombing from RAF assets, to the cities at night. This gave the heavily attrited RAF a break and opened to possibility to restore the air defence forces. Eventually the losses of the luftwaffe grew so big that continuation of the attack was against the odds. Apart from that Hitler could not afford to postpone operation Barbarossa (attack on Russia) to avoid still fighting in the extreme cold Russian winter.

 

[Borek]

Some of the countries that have already fallen had their goverments and soldiers on exile in UK. They were allies with signed treaties with UK. To start talks with Hitler would mean betraying them and they were numerous enough to became a problem. Not to mention fact that betraying them would be simply dishonest (which, as history shows, sometimes is an important argument, sometimes is not).

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Maybe there was not a lot of rationality apart from some elements, throughout the ages, the grand strategy of Britain had generally been, to support the weaker party in Europe to oppose the emerge of large powerful empires that might threathen the Albion.

Yes. but Britain always worked with continental allies to help manage the European balance of power. From the late 1600's to the early 1800's England/Britain worked with Germanic allies (Austria, Prussia) against its perennial foe, France. After that, the main constant in British continental policy was that no continental power should control the low countries (Benelux). By June, 1940, the Germans held the Benelux and Britain had no continental allies.

If you follow his finest hour speech, you could not deny Churchill having some keen vision about the future. No doubt that he visioned a German attack in future even if there was to be an agreement.

I'm not saying that Churchill's position was irrational; motivated only by an absolute loathing of Adolf Hitler. I'm only saying it was not the most rational. It was not "realpolitik". It's true that an immediate invasion was unlikely. The Germans weren't prepared for amphibious warfare. But the destruction of RAF was likely. It was vastly outnumbered, and it nearly was destroyed. If the Germans gained uncontested control of British airspace, they wouldn't have needed to invade. It would have been over.

Any agreement with the Nazi government would have been cynical. Certainly the German-USSR pact was. Moreover, the British could have simply agreed to a truce and delayed any commitment. Hitler wanted to attack the USSR, not Britain. In Nazi racial theory, the British (or at least the English) were fellow Teutons (at least for the time being).

Also maybe the factor of buying time with talks is unsure. The Luftwaffe had lost many transport aircraft during the May 1940 campaign in the low countries and needed time to restore that capacity to support an invasion. However it's a bit rationalisation afterwards, Churchill just being convinced that he had to stand up against the Nazis and avoid sending mixed signals that could confuse friends too.

What "friends" are you talking about? The major commonwealth members were not in any immediate danger, no matter what Britain did. The US administration was friendly to Britain and tried to help, by way of Lend Lease and other schemes that belied its official neutrality. But the US was neither prepared for, not did the public support, entry into the war in 1940. Not everyone in the US was an anglophile. There were large numbers of people with Irish, Italian and German ancestry. Many of them (but by no means all) openly supported their ancestral homelands right up to December 7, 1941.

it was certainly Hitlers decision, following a RAF air attack on Berlin (in reaction to bombs on London), to shift the bombing from RAF assets, to the cities at night. This gave the heavily attrited RAF a break and opened to possibility to restore the air defence forces. Eventually the losses of the luftwaffe grew so big that continuation of the attack was against the odds. Apart from that Hitler could not afford to postpone operation Barbarossa (attack on Russia) to avoid still fighting in the extreme cold Russian winter.

Yes. Britain caught a break by the fact that getting its cities and civilian population pounded was a diversion by the Luftwaffe from destroying the RAF. There might have been an easier and less painful way is all I'm saying.

Your argument that Hitler did not want to delay Barbarossa would play into my argument if it were true. It would have strengthened the British negotiating position. However it's not exactly true. Hitler's wanted to someday conquer the USSR up to Urals, but he did not commit to it until January, 1941 when he ordered his High Command to lay plans for an attack to begin in May, 1941. It was later delayed to June 1941 because of Yugoslavia's defection (for which it paid a high price.)

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Some of the countries that have already fallen had their goverments and soldiers on exile in UK. They were allies with signed treaties with UK. To start talks with Hitler would mean betraying them and they were numerous enough to became a problem. Not to mention fact that betraying them would be simply dishonest (which, as history shows, sometimes is an important argument, sometimes is not).

What's the most rational policy? To risk the very existence of your nation, or to play a cynical game? In my view, Britain was lucky, both at Dunkirk and in the Battle of Britain. That's not to take anything away from the heroic feats of the RAF and the British public. But if von Runstedt's column did not halt for two days due to overabundance of caution, the BEF might well have been captured or destroyed in toto on the beaches of Dunkirk.

I can't put my finger on a source right now, but the British Government had worse case plans to move all functions and all possible military/naval assets to Canada, and continue the war from there.

 

[russ_watters]

Considering how difficult Normandy was, how strong the British navy was and how easily we could have at least jumped-in to help repel an invasion, I think it would be a tough sell to convince someone today that a successful invasion of the UK would have been possible. Even at that time, I bet they felt pretty secure and that probably weighed in the decision making process.

 

[mgb_phys]

Considering how difficult Normandy was, how strong the British navy was

Even though southern England was much less defended in 1940 than Normandy was in 1944 and with many fewer troops. The German army doesn't seem to have had any idea about how difficult a beach landing was compared to a blitzkreig. Churchill had planned the Gallipoli attack and saw what even lightly armed resistance could do to an invasion force.

There has been a lot of debate about why an obviously insane invasion plan was mounted. Apart from requiring the destruction of the RAF it relied on the navy to do nothing against a force of unarmed river barges.

The current favorite theory is that all three German services thought it was impossible but couldn't lose face by being the one to say so - and were happy to let if fail as the result of one of the others. Certainly all the surviving commanders claimed this in 1945.

and how easily we could have at least jumped-in to help repel an invasion,

Probably harder than you think, the only way to get that much troops and equipment is by sea, and the few troop transport ships available and the limited escorts in 1940 would be an easy U-boat target.
There is then the question of how many 100,000 men lost at sea before even reaching the battle field the US public would stand. This may have even been part of the plan - to force a pre-emptive and aborted US involvement.

 

[Integral]

I cannot see where Churchill had any choices. Surrender was not an option, perhaps a century earlier when surrendering to a German invasion would have just meant a different cousin on the English throne it could have been different. But Hitler was NOT a member of any of the Royal families of Europe so neither the ruling class nor the common people would have tolerated a surrender as it would have been the end of England.

Even Hitler knew that he needed air superiority to have any chance for a successful invasion, he started where he had to start, Churchill was not given any options, he was fighting for the very existence of the UK and defended as he HAD to defend.

I am not sure that the loss of the English army at Dunkirk would have been that significant other then to moral. Hitler still needed air superiority, so needed to win the Battle of Britain, he did not, and the men and equipment saved at Dunkirk were not part of that victory. I would bet that they were a small fraction of the D day force. Dunkirk was more of a moral victory and in the long run really did not contribute that much the overall victory.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I cannot see where Churchill had any choices. Surrender was not an option,

No. Churchill had a choice. Hitler made a public offer to end hostilities: Britain recognizes the "map of Europe" and Germany makes no other demands on Britain, the Commonwealth or its possessions. No bombing, no threat of invasion. He bought off the USSR with such a treaty in 1939. That treaty essentially gave Stalin a free hand (as far as Germany was concerned) to take over eastern Poland, the Baltic states and Finland (all formerly part of the Czarist Russian Empire). Finland had other ideas and turned back the Soviet invaders in the 1939-40 Winter War.

All Churchill had to do was agree to a truce. Churchill, I'm sure, suspected Hitler would attack the USSR and wanted to cover his rear by neutralizing Britain with a pact. Another PM might have taken up the offer, just to gain a respite. Britain lacked the capacity to influence events in Europe anyway. Better to take advantage of a truce, to build forces with the expectation that Hitler would eventually turn on Britain, but not right way.

 

[russ_watters]

Probably harder than you think, the only way to get that much troops and equipment is by sea, and the few troop transport ships available and the limited escorts in 1940 would be an easy U-boat target.
There is then the question of how many 100,000 men lost at sea before even reaching the battle field the US public would stand. This may have even been part of the plan - to force a pre-emptive and aborted US involvement.

I was actually thinking about only a naval support role, not a ground force.

 

[mheslep]

... But he risked a disaster that could have easily occurred with the destruction of the Royal Air Force. As it happened, the country suffered terribly, and it was only Hitler's decision to invade Russia, [...] that took much of the pressure off Britain.


http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/defeat/britain-alone.htm

I don't think this last assumption fits the time line. The Battle of Britain began June 10, 1940 with the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pack still in place. The Nazi pre-invasion air attack of Britain was more/less abandoned long before the Nazis attacked the Soviets.

 

[mheslep]

Considering how difficult Normandy was, how strong the British navy was and how easily we could have at least jumped-in to help repel an invasion, I think it would be a tough sell to convince someone today that a successful invasion of the UK would have been possible. Even at that time, I bet they felt pretty secure and that probably weighed in the decision making process.

That's a very reasonable set of assumptions unless the Germans had won the early air battle. British navy would have to flee or sink, Britain becomes blockaded so that a starving Britain is nowhere near as strong as a German held Normandy, US couldn't come to the rescue - especially in 1940. Also, the German's probably would have gone with large scale airborne invasions - maybe Isle of Wight to start - as the did in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete#Evacuation_to_Egypt.2C_28.E2.80.9331_May". Cut it off, build or capture air strips, etc.

 

[mheslep]

No. Churchill had a choice. Hitler made a public offer to end hostilities: Britain recognizes the "map of Europe" and Germany makes no other demands on Britain, the Commonwealth or its possessions. [...]

All Churchill had to do was agree to a truce. Churchill, I'm sure, suspected Hitler would attack the USSR and wanted to cover his rear by neutralizing Britain with a pact. Another PM might have taken up the offer, just to gain a respite. [...]

You're making assumptions of real, useful gains for Churchill by making a pact. Churchill would have only been certain of holding a piece of paper in his hand, not that he would have in reality any respite. What evidence is there that he would have gained any time? Then the chance of that additional time must be balanced against the nearly certain disadvantages - Hitler gains more control of Europe, as you point out Hitler would have a free hand to attack the Soviets, resistance is demoralized in Europe, and Britain dilutes its own resolution to fight rather than appease.

 

[shoehorn]

But the US was neither prepared for, not did the public support, entry into the war in 1940. Not everyone in the US was an anglophile. There were large numbers of people with Irish, Italian and German ancestry. Many of them (but by no means all) openly supported their ancestral homelands right up to December 7, 1941.

Eh? Ireland was officially neutral during the war although in practice she had a stance of providing all sorts of assistance to the allies short of opening up her ports to the allied fleets; conversely, her stance towards the axis powers was much less hospitable. In addition, tens of thousands of Irish enlisted in British forces during this period. Indeed, Joe Kennedy excepted, there was considerable political support among Irish-Americans in the US for the UK's fight against the axis long before the Americans entered the war.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I don't think this last assumption fits the time line. The Battle of Britain began June 10, 1940 with the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pack still in place. The Nazi pre-invasion air attack of Britain was more/less abandoned long before the Nazis attacked the Soviets.

No. The Battle of Britain began on August 15, 1940. See my link in post 1. It ended on Sept 7, 1940 when the Germans switched to civilian targets, allowing the British to begin replacing the losses of the RAF. Attacks continued on and off into 1941 but diminished as the Germans moved assets to the east. As I already stated, Hitler ordered his High Command to begin planning for Barbarossa in Jan, 1941.

As far as an invasion of Britain goes, it couldn't have happened unless the RAF was destroyed; and if the RAF was destroyed, an invasion might not have been necessary. Hitler wanted to invade Russia, not Britain. In his mind, an Anglo-German alliance against the USSR was the goal; but Churchill was being irrational. If he made another peace offer after destroying the RAF, and Churchill refused, his government might have fallen, and new, more reasonable PM might have done a deal; or so Hitler thought.

As far as the German-Soviet Pact goes, it was always cynical. But the pretense lasted right up to June 22,1941 when Germany attacked.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Eh? Ireland was officially neutral during the war although in practice she had a stance of providing all sorts of assistance to the allies short of opening up her ports to the allied fleets; conversely, her stance towards the axis powers was much less hospitable. In addition, tens of thousands of Irish enlisted in British forces during this period. Indeed, Joe Kennedy excepted, there was considerable political support among Irish-Americans in the US for the UK's fight against the axis long before the Americans entered the war.

Joe Kennedy and many others in the US, although it was probably much less then a majority of Irish Americans. This was 1940. After Pearl Harbor, all (at least overt) pro-German feeling vanished virtually overnight.

EDIT: Regardless of how Irish Americans may have felt about the Axis powers, I don't think "anglophile" would have described the typical Irish Catholic American in 1940. Also, I know Ireland was neutral during both world wars. I admit that sentence could have been misunderstood. I meant that the Irish Catholic American population weren't necessarily pro-British.

EDIT: Sorry. Ireland was not an independent nation during WWI. The Irish Free State was established in 1922 although I'm not sure how free it was.

 

[mheslep]

No. The Battle of Britain began on August 15, 1940.

Arg, I meant July 10, 1940. Your author refers to a particular attack, perhaps that marked the shift to attacks on RAF airfields. See, e.g., Gilbert's
http://books.google.com/books?id=0z...rld War&pg=PA109#v=onepage&q=10 July&f=false":

On July 10 a formation of 120 German German bombers and fighters attacked a British convoy in the English Channel. At the same time, a further seventy German Aircraft bombed the dockyard installations in South Wales.

Or Hough and Richards here:
http://books.google.com/books?id=AePbrerDWiIC&lpg=PP1&dq=Battle%20of%20Britain&pg=PA121#v=onepage&q&f=false"

The official dates for the start and completion of the Battle of Britain, 10 July and 31 October, [...]

Thus the German invasion of Russia had no impact in the success or failure of the Battle of Britain.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

You're making assumptions of real, useful gains for Churchill by making a pact.

Not really. Just avoiding an existential threat until such time as when Britain was better prepared. The Luftwaffe was five times the size of the RAF in June, 1940. France was defeated, the USSR had a pact with Germany and was doing bad things (Finland, the Baltic states, eastern Poland), and the rest of Europe was either pro-German or neutral.

You don't know what you can or cannot get unless you talk, and while you talk, you continue preparing for war. The fact was that Churchill simply loathed Hitler from a time before Hitler took power. He had the temerity to oppose his own party and its leader Neville Chamberlain when Chamberlain had secured "Peace in our time" in the 1938 Munch agreements.

Obviously, you talk with the Nazis with your eyes open and your "power dry" and give nothing up. But you can't give up what you don't have, and Britain had no influence or power in continental Europe in June, 1940.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Thus the German invasion of Russia had no impact in the success or failure of the Battle of Britain.

I never said it did. I said it took the pressure off Britain in terms of air raids which continued into early 1941.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

William Stephenson was making great strides to gaining American support for Britain. With diplomatic ties forged by Stephenson Roosevelt all but openly made support of England the official American position on the war regardless of the US's ability to immediately enter the campaign. With the assistance of Roosevelt and the FBI Stephenson was able to choke american financial support for Germany when the Nazis were starting to grope for resources. It would seem that Churchill took a gamble on eventual american intervention and I would not really put that past him.

Eh? Ireland was officially neutral during the war although in practice she had a stance of providing all sorts of assistance to the allies short of opening up her ports to the allied fleets; conversely, her stance towards the axis powers was much less hospitable. In addition, tens of thousands of Irish enlisted in British forces during this period. Indeed, Joe Kennedy excepted, there was considerable political support among Irish-Americans in the US for the UK's fight against the axis long before the Americans entered the war.

Members of the old brigade were supporting, and attempting to make ties with, the Nazis. Ireland's marginal support of the Allies was really only won by circumstance, the government realizing that England would have made no qualms in taking them by force if they felt it necessary.

 

[croghan27]

Eh? Ireland was officially neutral during the war although in practice she had a stance of providing all sorts of assistance to the allies short of opening up her ports to the allied fleets; conversely, her stance towards the axis powers was much less hospitable.

An Irish friend of mine tells two stories that may or may not be true about Ireland during the War. The first is that the people of Dublin used to leave their lights on during German bomber raids - on the theory that the Luftwaffe would "fly to Dublin and turn right" to Liverpool.

The other is of the only bomb dropped on Ireland during the War. Would you not know it, it hit the Synagogue in Dublin - 1943. The Irish gov't promptly complained to Ribbontrop - who paid for its' reconstruction. All this at the same time the terrible things that were happening to the Jews on the contenent.

 

[shoehorn]

An Irish friend of mine tells two stories that may or may not be true about Ireland during the War. The first is that the people of Dublin used to leave their lights on during German bomber raids - on the theory that the Luftwaffe would "fly to Dublin and turn right" to Liverpool.

The other is of the only bomb dropped on Ireland during the War. Would you not know it, it hit the Synagogue in Dublin - 1943. The Irish gov't promptly complained to Ribbontrop - who paid for its' reconstruction. All this at the same time the terrible things that were happening to the Jews on the contenent.

A cursory review of Ireland's history during the war appears to show that your friend knows very little about the history of his country during that period.

 

[croghan27]

A cursory review of Ireland's history during the war appears to show that your friend knows very little about the history of his country during that period.

He did not claim that Ireland, or indeed the Irish people, did not support Britain in the conflict - these were just (perhaps) urban myths that are in circulation.

Certainly there was a great deal of antipathy toward Britain before, at that time and even later - that Ireland remained neutral is evidence of less than support.The Easter Uprising was not that long before - and was still in Irish consciousness. I guess they show some dichotomy in the country's thinking: they are irked at England for centuries of imposed rule, but have been so acclimatized to the occupiers thinking they tend to support Britain in dire times.

No - he was not an historian - he was a resident of Dublin as were his parents during the conflict. I have tried (not too hard, I must admit) to research both stories to no avail - but that says more about me than the veracity of the related stories

 

[Jobrag]

I think that we are all very lucky that Churchill resisted pressure to come to terms with Hitler. If Britain had come to terms the German invasion of Russia might well have been successful, with Britain out of the war Germany would have been able to buy arms and equipment from the USA (an astounding proportion of the German army transport was still horse drawn), would have had access to oil from the middle east, and raw materials from around the world.
Once Russia was subjugated, and all of Europe under German occupation or Fascist control (Italy and Spain) does anyone think that Hitler would have been happy to have a free democracy just offshore. I don't see that Germany would have invaded but the formation of a Pro-German political party well funded from Berlin, leading to democratic success and eventual dictatorship is not too fanciful a thought.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I think that we are all very lucky that Churchill resisted pressure to come to terms with Hitler. If Britain had come to terms the German invasion of Russia might well have been successful, with Britain out of the war Germany would have been able to buy arms and equipment from the USA (an astounding proportion of the German army transport was still horse drawn), would have had access to oil from the middle east, and raw materials from around the world.
Once Russia was subjugated, and all of Europe under German occupation or Fascist control (Italy and Spain) does anyone think that Hitler would have been happy to have a free democracy just offshore. I don't see that Germany would have invaded but the formation of a Pro-German political party well funded from Berlin, leading to democratic success and eventual dictatorship is not too fanciful a thought.

You make some good points. My point was that Churchill took a huge risk by not accepting Hitler's offer to at least talk. I don't think he contemplated that the entire RAF could have been destroyed. The fact that it wasn't was luck IMO. The RAF performed heroically, but had not Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to stop attacking the RAF and its facilities and focus on civilian bombing of London and other cities (with fighters protecting bombers) the RAF almost certainly would have been destroyed.

If from June, 1940, Britain was able to enjoy a respite while Hitler turned his attention eastward, it could have continued to build forces, imported food stuffs against a possible future German blockade, etc. In other words, it could have been much stronger by the end of 1940 than it actually was (and thousands of lives would have been spared).

As far as Barbarossa is concerned, it was bound to fail with tragic consequences for Germany. The USSR, with its vast spaces, huge population and General Winter, would have absorbed any German attack and eventually taken the offensive. They did in fact do exactly that without any significant help from Britain. The US entered the war just days after the Soviets turned back an attack on Moscow and nearly achieved a major break through that could have sent the Germans running back to Poland. The Germans never threatened Moscow again.

Even if the Germans took Moscow, it's 1600 km (1000 miles) from Moscow to the Urals, and beyond the Urals, the Russians were building vast new war making capabilities. The Soviet war plan assumed the Germans would take Moscow and Leningrad (now St Petersburg). In fact they never did.

 

[croghan27]

Even if the Germans took Moscow, it's 1600 km (1000 miles) from Moscow to the Urals, and beyond the Urals, the Russians were building vast new war making capabilities. The Soviet war plan assumed the Germans would take Moscow and Leningrad (now St Petersburg). In fact they never did.

That is something everyone I have read has claimed as an 'everyone knows' fact, SW VC - can you give me a link to some details on this? I would like to look more closely at this.

I certainly agree with your list of factors that halted the advance from the east - but you leave out the excellent commanders of the Soviet military. Much is made of the skill of Wehrmacht leaders, and even of the Western Allied commanders - you must do extensive research to find the names of those Soviet Generals that defeated the invasion on land.

Here is a link to a website called Intelligence².
http://www.intelligencesquared.com/"

There is a very informative debate (you may have to poke about to find it) on Churchill's abilities as a military leader.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

That is something everyone I have read has claimed as an 'everyone knows' fact, SW VC - can you give me a link to some details on this? I would like to look more closely at this.

.
http://www.intelligencesquared.com/"

For what exactly in the quote would you like more details; the geographic facts, the industrialization of western Siberia, or the contingency plans if Moscow fell?

Thanks for the link.

 

[mheslep]

You make some good points. My point was that Churchill took a huge risk by not accepting Hitler's offer to at least talk. I don't think he contemplated that the entire RAF could have been destroyed. The fact that it wasn't was luck IMO. The RAF performed heroically, but had not Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to stop attacking the RAF and its facilities and focus on civilian bombing of London and other cities (with fighters protecting bombers) the RAF almost certainly would have been destroyed. [...]

The Luftwaffe took tremendous losses - some 1300 aircraft in the BoB alone comes to mind without checking. It's by no means clear the Luftwaffe would have ever wiped out the RAF.

The proposition of talking to Hitler in June 1940 should be weighed pro and con. I don't accept that there was no downside. The the chance of that additional time must be balanced against the nearly certain disadvantages - Hitler gains more control of Europe, as you point out Hitler would have a free hand to attack the Soviets (a con, not a pro), resistance is demoralized in Europe, and Britain dilutes its own population's resolution to fight rather than appease.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

It's by no means clear the Luftwaffe would have ever wiped out the RAF.

Nor will it ever be clear. Britain in fact won the BoB for several reasons: 1) It had radar 2) It's planes could stay in the air longer because they were close to their airfields. 3) Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to change to strategic bombing at a critical point in the battle. The numbers stated in my first post link tell the story. By Sept 7, 1940 the RAF was down to a critical level of fighters while the Germans still had substantial reserves despite their heavy losses.

The point is that Churchill was at a major disadvantage in air power and he knew it. The importance of air power was probably not fully appreciated. WWII proved how important air power was as the war progressed. Later, the British would disable the Bismark with flimsy biplanes after the Bismark sunk the Hood, Britain's largest battleship. Once the Bismark was incapacitated it was an easy mark for British warships.

The numbers available to Churchill appear in the overview of the link below. Churchill needed a miracle. Fortunately he got one.

http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1756.html

 

[croghan27]

For what exactly in the quote would you like more details; the geographic facts, the industrialization of western Siberia, or the contingency plans if Moscow fell?

I would think the 'industrialization of western Siberia' would be intimately tied to the fall of Moscow. If this was a 'contingency plan', rather than part of Stalin's "X year plans" I would appreciate the link.

A bit of drift here... I see that Stalin is not without his supporters ... http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/reuters/100501/n_top_news/cnews_us_europe_mayday_protests"

In Russia, a May Day rally gathered thousands of Communist supporters who marched through the streets of Moscow holding red banners and portraits of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I would think the 'industrialization of western Siberia' would be intimately tied to the fall of Moscow. If this was a 'contingency plan', rather than part of Stalin's "X year plans" I would appreciate the link.

No. The industrialization of Siberia goes back at least to the 1928 Five Year Plan. The contingency plan for Moscow was apparently to destroy much of it before the Germans could take possession. The government was officially transferred to Kujbysev on Oct 16, 1941 but Stalin stayed behind to direct the city's defense (or destruction if necessary). Much of Soviet war production had already been relocated to western Siberian cities like Celjabinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Sverdlovsk. Tank production was heavily concentrated at Kirov, which is west of the Urals, but well east of Moscow You can look up Soviet arms production figures in the Wikipedia for the war years. They're pretty impressive.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...-to-destroy-Moscow-if-the-Nazis-moved-in.html.

 

[D H]

My question here regards the rationality of Churchill's position. He could have bought time by entering into discussions.

You make some good points. My point was that Churchill took a huge risk by not accepting Hitler's offer to at least talk.

In both of the above, you are ignoring politics and are ignoring the even huger risks that such discussions would have entailed.

Churchill was appointed Prime Minister precisely because he had been a long-time vocal opponent of Hitler. By May 10, 1940, it had become quite apparent that treaties with Germany were written in vanishing ink. Neville Chamberlain's appeasement had obviously failed. Insanity is "doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Negotiating a surrender (and that is essentially what you are talking about) with Germany would not have been rational. It would have been insane.

Suppose Churchill had gone against everything for which he stood and did entreat with Hitler. The primary beneficiary would have been Germany, not England. Germany had not yet broken its pact with the Soviet Union. Entreating with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild from its attack on Europe. Germany would have been able to marshall the resources of a continent while England would have had the resources of a little island plus those from some severable connections in their (distant) fellow Commonwealth nations. Breaking that treaty with Germany would have been rather difficult in Great Britain without an attack from Germany. Germany had proven that they had no such restrictions. A treaty with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild until they decided that time was ripe to break the treaty and attack Great Britain.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

In both of the above, you are ignoring politics and are ignoring the even huger risks that such discussions would have entailed.

Churchill was appointed Prime Minister precisely because he had been a long-time vocal opponent of Hitler. By May 10, 1940, it had become quite apparent that treaties with Germany were written in vanishing ink.

True. But Britain and Germany had already been at war since Sept 3, 1939 for precisely that reason and Britain was losing.

Suppose Churchill had gone against everything for which he stood and did entreat with Hitler. The primary beneficiary would have been Germany, not England. Germany had not yet broken its pact with the Soviet Union. Entreating with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild from its attack on Europe. Germany would have been able to marshall the resources of a continent while England would have had the resources of a little island plus those from some severable connections in their (distant) fellow Commonwealth nations

There was nothing Britain could do in Europe anyway. Churchill took power on the day the invasion of the Low Countries began. The British Expeditionary Force had to retreat to the coast at Dunkirk where they managed to escape only because Gen von Rundstedt inexplicably halted his column for two days. After the fall of France Britain faced a very dire situation.

.

A treaty with Germany would have given Germany time to rebuild until they
decided that time was ripe to break the treaty and attack Great Britain.

I never mentioned a treaty. I've been talking about a truce only. North and South Korea operate under a truce. They are still technically at war and have been since 1950. My whole point is that a truce at this point in time would have been to Britain's advantage given that continuing hostilities would have only increased Britain's losses (as it in fact did). If you read all the prior posts you saw that in June, 1940 Britain had about 640 serviceable fighters. Germany had over 2200 fighters and bombers. Churchill, IMO risked the possible destruction of his nation at a time when it was the only viable opponent of Germany still standing. Hitler was about to make a big mistake by invading the Soviet Union. My whole argument is that this was bound to fail regardless of what Britain did. A glance at a map shows the insanity of this endeavor.

If you want to argue that Germany could have conquered (not merely defeated) the Soviet Union, then I would have to agree with you given that premise. But I don't accept that this was possible. Mere defeat is when a nation agrees to end hostilities on unfavorable terms. Conquest is tantamount to the destruction of a nation. I've argued that a truce need not have been unfavorable to Britain given the circumstances.

 

[Astronuc]

As far as an invasion of Britain goes, it couldn't have happened unless the RAF was destroyed; and if the RAF was destroyed, an invasion might not have been necessary. Hitler wanted to invade Russia, not Britain. In his mind, an Anglo-German alliance against the USSR was the goal; but Churchill was being irrational. If he made another peace offer after destroying the RAF, and Churchill refused, his government might have fallen, and new, more reasonable PM might have done a deal; or so Hitler thought.

This would seem to indicate that Hitler was being irrational, but nothing about Churchill. Churchill took a calculated risk.

Clearly, Chamberlain's approach of appeasement failed miserably.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeasement

There was a 'state of war' between Britain and Germany as of 3 September 1939.

Declaration of war: Chamberlain's radio broadcast, 3 September 1939, 11am
I am speaking to you from the cabinet room at 10 Downing Street. This morning the British ambassador in Berlin handed the German government a final note stating that unless we heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/06/second-world-war-declaration-chamberlain

See also - http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/sep/06/second-world-war

If Churchill (England) were to be 'talking' with Hitler, ostensibly they would have lost support from the US and other sources. Over what period of time would Churchill and Hitler 'talk' - weeks, months? Hilter's actions on the continent proved him untrustworthy.

One could argue that England would have time to arm, but then Germany would have time to maneuver as well.

Besides, Churchill had a rather dim view of Hitler.
http://www.archive.org/details/WinstonChurchill-onHitler

Furthermore, Roosevelt and Churchill had been corresponding since September 1939.

On September 11, 1939, just a few scant days after Hitler inaugurated the Second World War by unleashing the German Army in Poland, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt penned a brief but important message to Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Roosevelt did not know it at the time, but his initiative would mark the beginning of one of the most extraordinary relationships in political history, a relationship marked by an intimate correspondence unparalleled among national leaders, a relationship which, in due course, would lead to the establishment of a military alliance unique among sovereign states.

FDR wrote to Churchill because he was looking for information about the War, and because he wished to establish contact with a British leader who appeared to be a likely candidate for Prime Minister, in the event that the current Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, should resign or be forced from office. FDR's intuition would prove correct. On May 10 1940, the very day on which the German Army finally launched its long anticipated attack on France and Low Countries following the six-month period known as the "phony war," Winston Churchill became Prime Minister of Great Britain.

From the start, the correspondence between the two men was marked by an easy and affable writing style that foreshadowed the friendship that was to come. In his very first letter, FDR noted their common experience in Naval matters, (FDR had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under U.S. President Woodrow Wilson during World War I), as well as their common interest in history. . . .

I can't imagine Churchill telling Roosevelt that Churchill would be in favor of talking with Hitler.

I can imagine that if Churchill had made such a comment to Roosevelt, Roosevelt's response would have been something on the order of "What?! Are you nuts!?".

This might be of interest for those wishing to understand Churchill.
Churchill and Roosevelt, the Complete Correspondence:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0691056498/?tag=pfamazon01-20

Or drop into the FDR library.

Finally, Churchill was aware of developments on the continent via the intelligence services.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

This would seem to indicate that Hitler was being irrational, but nothing about Churchill. Churchill took a calculated risk.

I would argue that it was reflective of Churchill's combative personality and his blinding personal hatred of Hitler more than any calculation. The calculation would be have been to start talks between plenipotentiaries somewhere like Lisbon and get the "Jerries" off your back for a while. This was the man who failed to assess the risks of the Gallapoli fiasco in WWI. That ruined Churchill's career for quite some time.

I can't imagine Churchill telling Roosevelt that Churchill would be in favor of talking with Hitler.

I can. From Churchill's point of view, it might have been a good ploy to get the US into the war.