Is Killing a Pig Any Different Than Killing a Person?

[viet_jon]

of course it's wrong...

but is it any different than killing a pig?

 

[WiFO215]

That would depend on your perception I suppose. An extension to your question might be if killing plants is right? For they too have lives. I'm going to like this debate.

If you're one of those "Hey! It's a dog-eat-dog world so if a human is killed too bad!" sort then I guess it isn't wrong. But if you aren't I'd like to see you justify how killing of plants and animals becomes right.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

of course it's wrong...

but is it any different than killing a pig?

Actually, many people think that there are circumstances in which killing someone is not wrong. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_war" , for example.

My response to your 2^nd question is, is the pig an enemy combatant? Even if he isn't we may still be able to detain him at Guantanamo.

⚛​

 

[vanesch]

of course it's wrong...

but is it any different than killing a pig?

As long as it is done cleanly, it is an ecological act in both cases

 

[Jimmy Snyder]

of course it's wrong...

but is it any different than killing a pig?

Yes.

Moreover, killing a person, though always distasteful, is not always wrong.

 

[Esperanza]

Perceptions, cultural and religious values are always in the middle of these controversial subjects, but what are you killing and your motive and perception is need also to be taking into consideration. If you are vegetarian or not your motive is to survive as you need nutrients to survive and you are either or both participating in the destruction of living things, is your live or theirs. I don't think that killing is right but I believe that there are justifications, for example you kill a pig or a lettuce because you need to eat. Different countries have different opinions about this and that related to cultural and spiritual values and believes for example, some people believe in death penalty, some people have kill someone in their own defence, or by accident or in an act of uncontrollable emotional violence, for example a father who find someone rapping his child . Although different justice systems have their own say, if killing is right or wrong relate to why and how and how this affect your personal believes. For example to me killing is wrong because of my spiritual believes, however I need to eat, in the other hand I drive and I pray every day not to be involve in an accident as I don't think I can live with the guilt of killing someone, but if I drink and drive, or I am sober and someone just want to commit suicide and jump in front of my car, this make a lot of different

 

[Moridin]

1. By killing another person, you are affirming a universal right to self-ownership.
2. By killing another person, you are denying a universal right to self-ownership.
3. Contradiction (from 1 and 2)
4. Killing another person is wrong.

This works for most cases except self-defense or versions of self-defense, since the person attacking you has acted on an invalid justification.

1. By killing another person, one is affirming the existence of a universal right to self-ownership exists. One cannot assume that it only applies to oneself, since that would them simply be a personal opinion, rather than an objective fact, since everything objective needs to be universal, by definition.
2. By killing another person, one is denying that person a universal right to self-ownership.

My argument is independent on whether or not an actual universal right to self-ownership actually exists, since it is an internal contradiction, rather than an external.

This is an argument for moral realism, so if correct, it disproves all forms of moral anti-realism.

 

[viet_jon]

Perceptions, cultural and religious values are always in the middle of these controversial subjects, but what are you killing and your motive and perception is need also to be taking into consideration. If you are vegetarian or not your motive is to survive as you need nutrients to survive and you are either or both participating in the destruction of living things, is your live or theirs. I don't think that killing is right but I believe that there are justifications, for example you kill a pig or a lettuce because you need to eat. Different countries have different opinions about this and that related to cultural and spiritual values and believes for example, some people believe in death penalty, some people have kill someone in their own defence, or by accident or in an act of uncontrollable emotional violence, for example a father who find someone rapping his child . Although different justice systems have their own say, if killing is right or wrong relate to why and how and how this affect your personal believes. For example to me killing is wrong because of my spiritual believes, however I need to eat, in the other hand I drive and I pray every day not to be involve in an accident as I don't think I can live with the guilt of killing someone, but if I drink and drive, or I am sober and someone just want to commit suicide and jump in front of my car, this make a lot of different

how about cannibalism?

 

[octelcogopod]

1. By killing another person, you are affirming a universal right to self-ownership.
2. By killing another person, you are denying a universal right to self-ownership.
3. Contradiction (from 1 and 2)
4. Killing another person is wrong.

This works for most cases except self-defense or versions of self-defense, since the person attacking you has acted on an invalid justification.

1. By killing another person, one is affirming the existence of a universal right to self-ownership exists. One cannot assume that it only applies to oneself, since that would them simply be a personal opinion, rather than an objective fact, since everything objective needs to be universal, by definition.
2. By killing another person, one is denying that person a universal right to self-ownership.

My argument is independent on whether or not an actual universal right to self-ownership actually exists, since it is an internal contradiction, rather than an external.

This is an argument for moral realism, so if correct, it disproves all forms of moral anti-realism.

But if it isn't an external right but an internal, then the person who kills can decide if the other person deserves his right.. Some people also think that they do not have the right to live if someone more powerful than them decide that they don't..
The right wil always be a matter of perspctive right?

 

[turbo]

how about cannibalism?

Cannibals = true humanitarians.

 

[MaWM]

If we accept our own survival as a "good" thing, then things which maximize our survival are good. Humans are, by nature, a social species; cooperation increases our mutual chances for survival. In order to cooperate most effectively, a stable society should exist. Thus, there are certain requirements we must put on ourselves in order to maintain a stable society. Clearly, frequent and arbitrary killing is not consistent with a stable society. A society can, however, tolerate killing in limited situations. Where by "limited" I mean limited to small numbers and to individuals that are somehow (perhaps arbitrarily) distinguished from the general public (criminals, enemies, whatever. This is also a tool of sectarian violence). The need for this distinction is to stop the "ethical drift" which eventually leads to a contradiction like Moridin described (and nicely, at that).

 

[Moridin]

But if it isn't an external right but an internal, then the person who kills can decide if the other person deserves his right.. Some people also think that they do not have the right to live if someone more powerful than them decide that they don't..
The right wil always be a matter of perspctive right?

Not necessarily. To proclaim that one has a right to do X, one must show that it is a universal right (based on empirical facts / doesn't disappear if you stop believing in it), because otherwise, it would simply be ones subjective opinion, which would not constitute a valid justification for X in the first place, since it would be nothing more than to say that you like the color blue. If one does not have a valid justification for X, it cannot be said that action X is justified ("morally correct").

My argument is generally independent of the actual existence of such a right. What matters ought to be the contradiction in the justification.

If you decide that I do not have a right to live, well, than that's just your subjective opinion, which cannot be said to be a valid justification. If it can be objectively determined that you ought to do X, a person who says that he or she does not agree is largely irrelevant, just like claiming that one does not agree that the Earth is round.

This sort of reasoning can be applied to other situations as well. Take stealing, for example. This is going to be the most basic form, with no twists (one should probably contextualize for more difficult situations).

By stealing, one is asserting the existence of a universal right to property (I have the right to have Z in my possession).
By stealing, one is denying the existence of a universal right to property (You do not have the right to have Z in your possession).

Naturally, the argument would be more powerful if it could be conclusively demonstrated that such a universal right to property is factual, but I haven't thought about that hard enough. Naturally, any religious explanation would most likely be invalid by definition.

 

[Huckleberry]

By not stealing, one is asserting the existence of a universal right to property (You have the right to have Z in your possession).
By not stealing, one is denying the existence of a universal right to property (I do not have the right to have Z in my possession).
These statements conflict so not stealing cannot be morally right. Or maybe it just means every individual does not have the right to own all property. Or maybe since this series of statements contradicts the alternate series of statements that conclude stealing is wrong, then it must be that morals are not universal. I should have thought of that when Gramma caught me with my hand in the cookie jar.

By eating, I am affirming my hunger.
By eating, I am denying my hunger.
The statements contradict themselves.
Eating is wrong.
But wait...
By not eating, I am denying my hunger
By not eating, I am affirming my hunger
These statements contradict themselves too.
Not eating is wrong.

Maybe only eating because I'm hungry is wrong. Drinking because I'm thirsty is wrong. Sleeping because I'm tired is wrong. The general pattern here leads me to believe that a life of self-denial and suffering must be correct. Any kind of self-satisfactory behaviour must be universally wrong. So if I tell Gramma that I'm not hungry she should let me have one of those cookies. This might explain the obesity epidemic in the US. We are being morally responsible with our eating habits.

Or perhaps being imperfect beings we cannot be morally absolute. We are morally relative by our imperfect nature, regardless of the existence, or lack thereof, of moral absolutes. Or perhaps two opposing concepts can be simultaneously true or false, or equally irrelevent.

 

[Moridin]

(1) Is "not stealing" an action? I don't think so. If you do, can you describe the act of "not stealing"?
(2) By eating, you are removing your hunger, not affirming its existence. Eating is also not an action in the moral sphere and claiming that hunger is a right or a value is a non sequitur.
(3) Is "not eating" an action? I don't think so. If you do, can you describe the act of "not eating"?

Or perhaps being imperfect beings we cannot be morally absolute. We are morally relative by our imperfect nature, regardless of the existence, or lack thereof, of moral absolutes. Or perhaps two opposing concepts can be simultaneously true or false, or equally irrelevent.

Objective (or universal) morality is not the same as moral absolutism, since the later denies contextualizing, whereas the prior does not, since it is based on objective facts, rather than subjective rules. I chose the easiest examples to illustrate the general argument.

You are accepting the existence of objective morality just by taking part in this discussion. In a rational discussion, one is assuming quite a lot before it begins, such as the existence and independence of truth, the validity of language and the senses and so on. One of these is that there is objective reason for ones opponent to change position (otherwise one has to admit that one is taking part in an irrational discussion where one can only bring subjective, and ultimately invalid arguments), that is, that it is universally preferable that your opponent changes his mind. But that is objective morality. Every time you begin a discussion, you are presupposing objective morality.

Here is another example of objective morality (or at least transforming is to ought).

1. It is cold outside.
2. Being out in the cold without protection risks getting sick.
3. Provided I have access to all relevant information and are reasoning correctly, I do not want to risk getting sick.
4. I ought to put on protection.

1+ 2 + 3 = 4

 

[Huckleberry]

(1) Is "not stealing" an action? I don't think so. If you do, can you describe the act of "not stealing"?
(2) By eating, you are removing your hunger, not affirming its existence. Eating is also not an action in the moral sphere and claiming that hunger is a right or a value is a non sequitur.
(3) Is "not eating" an action? I don't think so. If you do, can you describe the act of "not eating"?

Before a conscious action is performed a conscious decision must be made. If making a decision may be considered an action then not killing may be an action because rational decisions derive from our consciousness. By making the decision to kill one assumes that there is the option to decide not to kill. So if your theorem applies strictly to actions then it is okay to decide to perform the action of killing someone, but not okay to perform the action itself. I find that to be a contradictory statement. (or at least incongruent)

Looking at the eating example I see that you are right that my choice of defining terms was incorrect. To make the statement true using the words affirm and deny I would have to change the text of the sentences so that they would not be equal. However, I see no reason why the theorem should only apply to rights, and not to anything universal among humans such as eating, drinking and sleeping. If we apply the theorem as universal to all life then it would be wrong to kill any living thing. We would soon starve to death. (Haha, maybe eating is wrong after all).

Objective (or universal) morality is not the same as moral absolutism, since the later denies contextualizing, whereas the prior does not, since it is based on objective facts, rather than subjective rules. I chose the easiest examples to illustrate the general argument.

I never considered the difference between them to be of much signifigance, but I see you are right. Thank you for pointing that out. You are also right that there isn't much point in an argument if there is nothing that can be argued rationally, though there are other ways to make a rational argument besides making and defending a case against an opponent.

To rephrase I would say that we are not perfectly rational, all-knowing beings, and that we can't be perfectly objective in our judgement of morals. We are all morally subjective to some extent.

 

[Moridin]

Before a conscious action is performed a conscious decision must be made. If making a decision may be considered an action then not killing may be an action because rational decisions derive from our consciousness. By making the decision to kill one assumes that there is the option to decide not to kill. So if your theorem applies strictly to actions then it is okay to decide to perform the action of killing someone, but not okay to perform the action itself. I find that to be a contradictory statement. (or at least incongruent)

Your argument rests on the claim that there one can decisions not to do something, rather than simply not deciding to do something, which seems highly suspicious. An action is defined as what an agent can do, not the negative of it. I would argue that the term action is only valid in the positive sense.

If we apply the theorem as universal to all life then it would be wrong to kill any living thing. We would soon starve to death.

No, since rights exists in relation to abilities. I take it that you would not approve of 8-year-olds going to visit strip clubs, drinking bears, signing up for the army or driving cars?

To rephrase I would say that we are not perfectly rational, all-knowing beings, and that we can't be perfectly objective in our judgement of morals. We are all morally subjective to some extent.

The fact that we are not perfectly rational and so on, does not change the fact that such objective morality exists in principle?

In any case, that is of little importance. What matters is if the justification given can be shown to be valid or not. If a moral conclusion follows from the premises, then fine. If not, then it seem like the justification is invalid.

Did you agree with my example? I'll reformulate it.

1. It is cold outside. (empirical fact)
2. Being out in the cold without protection risks getting sick. (empirical fact)
3. It is objectively beneficent to value not risking to get sick. (empirical fact)
4. I ought to put on protection. (a moral imperative)

If you agree that 1-3 (objectively) leads to 4, we seem to have established 4 as an objective moral fact?

 

[Huckleberry]

Well, I disagree that only actions in the positive sense are valid, as what we choose not to do can have just as much of an effect on the world around us as what we choose to do. If I am hiking on a trail and see someone that has spent a few days trapped under a rock, I would see choosing not to aid them if it were in my power to do so as a malicious, immoral act.

I agree that rights exist in relation to abilities. Pets should not be given the right to vote because there is no evidence that they have the ability to make that decision. But I think we probably agree that pets display the ability of being alive. Why should they be spereate from the right to have life if they exhibit the ability for it? Do rights only apply to humans, or to all beings that have the ability to act on that right? And if they only apply to humans can they be universally objective? If it is universally wrong to kill then it is universally wrong to eat anything that isn't already dead.

I'm not concerned about the fact that objective morality exists in principle. I want to know if the principle of objective morality exists as fact. I'm not sure it does.

In your example I am not sure about #2 or #3. I don't understand how being out in the cold without protection would cause illness, except hypothermia or frostbite or such things, though it is somewhat non-sequitur to the argument. I don't believe it is objectively beneficent to always avoid risking sickness. Sometimes the decision is subjective and sometimes it is objective, but that doesn't necessarily correlate to being beneficent. For example, as a child I would hope to get sick to miss a few days of school. That is not a particularly objective view. Then there are cases of early explorers crossing vast uncharted oceans, risking sickness and death for discovery. I see that as an objectively beneficent viewpoint. Another person may disagree. So I'm still no closer to any rational certainty that there is objective morality.

 

[Huckleberry]

of course it's wrong...

but is it any different than killing a pig?

http://www.killology.com/art_beh_problem.htm

In conflict situations the dominance of midbrain processing can be observed in the existence of a powerful resistance to killing one's own kind, a resistance that exists in every healthy member of every species. Konrad Lorenz, in his definitive book, On Aggression, notes that it is rare for animals of the same species to fight to the death. In their territorial and mating battles animals with horns will butt their heads together in a relatively harmless fashion, but against any other species they will go to the side and attempt to gut and gore. Similarly, piranha will fight one another with raps of their tails but they will turn their teeth on anything and everything else, and rattlesnakes will wrestle each other but they have no hesitation to turn their fangs on anything else. Lorenz suggests that this "non-specicidal" tendency is imprinted into the genetic code in order to safeguard the survival of the species.

Yes, killing another person is much different than killing a pig. We are socially conditioned to believe that murder is wrong. That has an effect on how we feel when we perform the act. It is also very possible that there may be biological reasons we avoid killing humans, such as mirror neurons. Psychologically it is easier to empathize with another person than an animal.

I have a relative who volunteered for forced recon for 2 tours during the Vietnam War. He described his experiences with killing and death along these lines. At first it was a frightening experience that made him sick. Eventually he came to enjoy the sensation, like adrenalin, and the pleasure of living and being the more powerful animal. Eventually he came to think nothing of it.

After many years back in the states he still has nightmares. There are gaps in his memory of that time and I believe that he sometimes intentionally tells falsehoods and exagerrations of his war stories. He isolates himself from society in a rural community. He studies religion and philosophy regularly, and his viewpoints still change wildly from Stalin to Ghandi and others whom he admires. The personality characteristics that best define him would be antagonistic, obstinate, dominating, gossiping, loyal, kind, compassionate.

When the movie Platoon came out in theaters we went to see it. He was crying when we came out. As soon as we got onto the highway someone cut him off in traffic. He started a high speed chase down the road after them threatening to kill them. I was about 12 and my mother and aunt were also with us.

I doubt this sort of psychosis is common among butchers of pigs. And the closer and more personal the killing is, the harder it is to deal with psychologically.

 

[Pythagorean]

Emotionally, I think killing a human is "more wrong" than killing a pig. That is to say, I don't like it because I'm a human, not a pig. In fact, I eat pigs, and they have to die to be eaten... so it works out nicely given my place in the food chain.

Logically, there's nothing wrong with the killing itself, but there's less conditions where it's more productive to society than there are conditions that make it destructive to society.

 

[Moridin]

But I think we probably agree that pets display the ability of being alive. Why should they be spereate from the right to have life if they exhibit the ability for it? Do rights only apply to humans, or to all beings that have the ability to act on that right? And if they only apply to humans can they be universally objective?

To claim that rights only apply to humans because of their species would be speciesism, which I consider invalid. I am sorry if it seemed as I referred to speciesism. The reason is because human cognitive function are vastly superior. I'll quote from Carrier, 2005, since he does it much better than me.

"Moreland [evangelical philosopher] in turn responds to the idea that humans are special on naturalism by calling this 'speciesism', the belief that humans are more valuable than animals based solely on a 'racist, unjustified bias towards one's own biological classification'. But this is a bogus charge. The special value humans is not based on our commonality of species.

[...]

Our value is based on objective distinct properties possessed by humans that are the most valuable thing to use, or to any fully-sentient being - far more valuable than anything possessed by other animals. Each human mind is an entire universe unto itself, a marvelous architecture of personality, of thoughts, dreams, memories, values, of knowledge and ideas and creative drives and skills. No other animal comes close to possessing this. The loss of a human mind is a truly profound loss to the entire universe, and the development of a human mind is the greatest, most marvelous thing the universe may ever realize. But more importantly, each human shares our awareness of being, our understanding, our capacity for perceiving happiness, and agreeing to help each other achieve it. And it is by virtue of our ability to truly comprehend happiness in this way that our happiness is so valuable. It cannot be said that we disvalues the comprehension of happiness in other animals out of bias, for they do not possesses such a thing. They can experience a kind of happiness, and thus they have value, but they cannot comprehend it, truly perceive and savor that happiness, nor can they join society and act among us accordingly. Yet if being happy is good, knowing happiness, and how to produce it, is necessarily better. That has little to do with what species you are

If it is universally wrong to kill then it is universally wrong to eat anything that isn't already dead.

Well, now we seem to have forgotten contextualizing and fallen into the trap of moral absolutism by favoring rules over context (which would be subjective). Due to the above quoted passage, killing a human is different from killing a spider and killing, say, in self-defense would be different from killing an innocent bystander.

I'm not concerned about the fact that objective morality exists in principle. I want to know if the principle of objective morality exists as fact. I'm not sure it does.

I would argue that moral decisions are ultimately based on what facts exists.

In your example I am not sure about #2 or #3. I don't understand how being out in the cold without protection would cause illness, except hypothermia or frostbite or such things, though it is somewhat non-sequitur to the argument.

If so, I would argue that is a flaw in my example, rather than in the principle. Take some high-risk thing instead, say, using a powerful welding device.

1. Using a powerful welding device can cause severe injuries if used without adequate protection. (empirically testable)
2. It is objectively beneficent for a person to value not becoming severely injured for ones (empirically testable)
4. I ought to put on protection. (moral imperative)

Naturally, if the context changes, so does the conclusion. But this is due to empirical fact changes, not subjective opinion.

I don't believe it is objectively beneficent to always avoid risking sickness.

Indeed, that would depend on what context we are in, but the fundamental argument is that moral imperatives depend on what the situation is like (what empirical facts exists).

For example, as a child I would hope to get sick to miss a few days of school. That is not a particularly objective view. Then there are cases of early explorers crossing vast uncharted oceans, risking sickness and death for discovery. I see that as an objectively beneficent viewpoint. Another person may disagree.

Some people accept evolution. Others do not. However, that does not suggest that the empirical facts evolution is based on are relative.

. Lorenz suggests that this "non-specicidal" tendency is imprinted into the genetic code in order to safeguard the survival of the species.

As for Konrad Lorenz, he advocated group selectionism in On Agression, which is a questionable approach that has largely been abandoned today. There is no real urge to safeguard the survival of the species. It can be more easily explained if one adopts gene selection (eg, Dawkins, The Selfish Gene).

 

[JoeDawg]

(1) Is "not stealing" an action? I don't think so. If you do, can you describe the act of "not stealing"?

Buying.

Which is one way, of several, you can take someone else's property and make it your property. Stealing is another.

(2) By eating, you are removing your hunger, not affirming its existence. Eating is also not an action in the moral sphere and claiming that hunger is a right or a value is a non sequitur.

Fasting is considered by many to be something the purifies, both physically and morally.

(3) Is "not eating" an action? I don't think so. If you do, can you describe the act of "not eating"?

Starving, Fasting, and pretty much any other actions that doesn't involve eating... is 'not eating'.

You are playing with words, nothing more.

Objectivity is something scientists strive for, using scientific method... its not something we have. Its not something we even know for certain exists. Absolutes are just as empty.

 

[JoeDawg]

the loss of a human mind is a truly profound loss to the entire universe, and the development of a human mind is the greatest, most marvelous thing the universe may ever realize.

What a load of egocentric crap. The universe doesn't care if human beings exist.

We are born on a small planet, around an average star, in the ass end of one, of a billion galaxies. And we have only been around for a fraction of an instant on the scale of the universe. The idea that human beings are something special is egotism, and stems from the fact that we value ourselves... which is purely instinctive and something common to all forms of life that end up procreating. Those that don't value themselves don't survive long. Self preservation is only important, to those who have it. It doesn't imply value, it describes values certain creatures have.

Life has the value we give it. And that's entirely subjective.

Killing is wrong when we agree it is.

 

[JoeDawg]

1. It is cold outside. (empirical fact)

No, an empirical fact would be what the temperature is by some measure: Celsius, Kelvin...

"Cold" is completely relative, based on what you are comparing. Its cold on earth...compared to the sun.

 

[Huckleberry]

I would argue that moral decisions are ultimately based on what facts exists.

I think this may be the main point of difference in our philosophies. I would argue that moral decisions are based on subjective or relative values.

What is acceptable to the opinion of society becomes morality. I'm not even sure how morals can be assigned to objective fact without losing their objectivity, since they weigh the subjective properties of good and evil. I agree with Moore that it is a naturalistic fallacy to do so.

Objective or absolute morality may exist, but due to the limitations of our knowledge, or imperfect nature, I don't see how any society or individual can currently claim to understand such things completely. We ought to strive to do so to become better than we are, but the contextual circumstances of human nature determine what the current situation is.

Some people accept evolution. Others do not. However, that does not suggest that the empirical facts evolution is based on are relative.

It also does not suggest that evolution is beneficent. My point was that facts are not inherently beneficent. The measure of beneficence relies on a subjective interpretation of morality.

 

[Moridin]

Buying.

Which is one way, of several, you can take someone else's property and make it your property. Stealing is another.

You seem to be misunderstanding the concept of a right. A right is a justification for something, or more concretely, something you are justified in using violence to defend. In trade, you are not violating anyone's rights.

Objectivity is something scientists strive for, using scientific method... its not something we have. Its not something we even know for certain exists. Absolutes are just as empty.

Moral realism =/= moral absolutism

What a load of egocentric crap. The universe doesn't care if human beings exist.

He got a little emotional perhaps. The other parts of the quote are the relevant ones. You agree that it is an objective fact that humans have a vastly superior cognitive function that other species?

Killing is wrong when we agree it is.

By disagreeing with me, you are affirming my position. Either your position on moral relativism is subjective and based on your opinion, which is like saying that you like blue, which is fine, but irrelevant. Or it is based on objective criteria, in which case you presuppose when entering a rational discussion that it ought to be the case that your opponent changes his mind when presented with evidence in an objective way.

By questioning moral realism, you are affirming it.

I would argue that moral decisions are based on subjective or relative values.

The fact that you are disagreeing with me shows that you affirm moral realism. By questioning moral realism, you are claiming that it ought to be moral relativism that is true in some objective way (if not, that is just your unsupported opinion with no objective support), which undermines your position.

What is acceptable to the opinion of society becomes morality. I'm not even sure how morals can be assigned to objective fact without losing their objectivity, since they weigh the subjective properties of good and evil. I agree with Moore that it is a naturalistic fallacy to do so.

The Naturalist Fallacy is not applicable, since it is only relevant when "philosophers attempts to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition of the term "good" in terms of one or more natural properties". I am not performing that fallacy, since I argue that moral facts are empirical facts and I have never once appeal to something being more natural than others. I am not even committing the is-ought fallacy, since I have given numerous examples on how to transform and is to an ought.

In fact, you are the one committing the naturalist fallacy by arguing that moral relativism is more natural.

Objective or absolute morality may exist, but due to the limitations of our knowledge, or imperfect nature, I don't see how any society or individual can currently claim to understand such things completely.

Please separate moral realism with moral absolutism. They cannot be both true at the same time, since moral absolutism is in fact subjective (the replacement of context with rules).

It also does not suggest that evolution is beneficent. My point was that facts are not inherently beneficent. The measure of beneficence relies on a subjective interpretation of morality.

Would it be objectively beneficent for me if you decided to use a chainsaw to saw of my legs? Of course not. And not because it is my subjective opinion, but because it would massively decrees my living standard in an objective way (unable to walk, unable to work etc.)

"Cold" is completely relative, based on what you are comparing. Its cold on earth...compared to the sun.

No, temperature are the relative measure. Cold is the sum of the kinetic energies of particles in a system, whereas temperature is an arbitrary measure proportional to the average velocity of the particles in a system.

 

[Huckleberry]

You seem to be misunderstanding the concept of a right. A right is a justification for something, or more concretely, something you are justified in using violence to defend. In trade, you are not violating anyone's rights.

This is almost unbelievable. First you make a claim that a right to property exists by using a theorem that appeals to objectivity. Then when that same theorem is used to claim that no right to property exists you claim that would be violating someone's rights. The right must first be proven to exist before it can be violated, which was the point of the exercise in the first place.

The fact that you are disagreeing with me shows that you affirm moral realism. By questioning moral realism, you are claiming that it ought to be moral relativism that is true in some objective way (if not, that is just your unsupported opinion with no objective support), which undermines your position.

No, I am not saying that it ought to be moral relativism that is true in an objective way. I thought I made clear in my statement that moral relativism is the way of the world, due to limiting contextual factors. I did not conflate moral relativism with truth. You are the one claiming that actions are moral based on facts, thus you must show these facts.

The Naturalist Fallacy is not applicable, since it is only relevant when "philosophers attempts to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition of the term "good" in terms of one or more natural properties". I am not performing that fallacy, since I argue that moral facts are empirical facts and I have never once appeal to something being more natural than others. I am not even committing the is-ought fallacy, since I have given numerous examples on how to transform and is to an ought.

You stated that higher cognitive function makes human being's right to life more valuable than other animals. That is a property that you assigned, and is a naturalistic fallacy. Some people are more beneficent than others, and that quality has nothing at all to do with their cognitive ability. To justify the taking of life because one life-form is more cognitive than another is bias. One could just as easily justify the position that 'might makes right', and superior physical strength grants the right to kill creatures weaker than themselves.

1. Using a powerful welding device can cause severe injuries if used without adequate protection. (empirically testable)
2. It is objectively beneficent for a person to value not becoming severely injured for ones (empirically testable)
4. I ought to put on protection. (moral imperative)

Here you say some action is objectively beneficent. You are making a fact-based claim to an indefinable quality. You are appealing to a definition of the term 'good' to justify your position. That is a naturalistic fallacy.

In fact, you are the one committing the naturalist fallacy by arguing that moral relativism is more natural.

No, I would only be making that mistake if I claimed that moral relativism is more beneficent, which I did not. (edit-In fact, I specifically stated that we ought to strive to understand moral objectivism and moral absolutism to become better than we are. How could you confuse my statement as support for moral relativism?)

Please separate moral realism with moral absolutism. They cannot be both true at the same time, since moral absolutism is in fact subjective (the replacement of context with rules).

Objective or absolute morality may exist, but due to the limitations of our knowledge, or imperfect nature, I don't see how any society or individual can currently claim to understand such things completely.

I did not make any claim that they both be true at the same time. I used the conjunction 'or' in all cases.

Would it be objectively beneficent for me if you decided to use a chainsaw to saw of my legs? Of course not. And not because it is my subjective opinion, but because it would massively decrees my living standard in an objective way (unable to walk, unable to work etc.)

There are contexts where removing another person's limb may be beneficent. There are also contexts where decreasing the standard of living of others may be beneficent. I still fail to see how beneficence can be considered purely objective, since it requires subjective value judgements. I also fail to see how any action can be moral or immoral separated from the intent that motivated it.

I'm starting to dislike the nature of this argument, where meanings are misinterpreted (perhaps intentionally) to suit one's own argument. I can't argue against an infallible position where even if I disagree I am agreeing with it. That's absurd, and not objective at all. I think I'll excuse myself before this degenerates even further.

 

[JoeDawg]

You seem to be misunderstanding the concept of a right.

You seem to be making it up as you go... which is very ironic... in a slapstick kind of way.

In trade, you are not violating anyone's rights.

According to you, humans have a cognitive ability that gives them a right to life? What if they can't afford to buy food and therefore starve. Trade violates their rights.

You agree that it is an objective fact that humans have a vastly superior cognitive function that other species?

Its only superior when we use it to do something those without it can't. Otherwise its just a different cognitive function. And there are quite a few animals with cognitive functions that are superior to ours... in certain ways, when doing certain things.

By disagreeing with me, you are affirming my position.

I bet you can pull a rabbit out of your ass as well.

You can't derive an ought from an is.

I am not performing that fallacy, since I argue that moral facts are empirical facts and I have never once appeal to something being more natural than others. I am not even committing the is-ought fallacy, since I have given numerous examples on how to transform and is to an ought.

Then you are a great and powerful wizard, or possibly, a hopelessly deluded randian fanatic.

In fact, you are the one committing the naturalist fallacy by arguing that moral relativism is more natural.

Really, can you quote the part where I said that?
Sounds like you arguing with yourself here more than anyone else.
Might improve things if you actually read for comprehension and not just so you can paste in your memorized answers.

Would it be objectively beneficent for me if you decided to use a chainsaw to saw of my legs?

Might be fun, if I was more inclined to violence. Plenty of people like that around though if that's what you are into. We tend to put them in jail.

I'm not a pacifist though. Happy to beat you senseless if you get in my face. Not going to argue the right or wrong of it. Life happens. I'll let the lawyers decide what was legal. They don't worry about rights or wrongs so much.

Of course not. And not because it is my subjective opinion, but because it would massively decrees my living standard in an objective way (unable to walk, unable to work etc.)

Why would your lack of ability to work be objectively bad. You assume I give a rats ass about your life. We could just let you die, or kill you... that would be most beneficent. Cruel to let you live really, when you can't produce anything. Poor chap.

No, temperature are the relative measure. Cold is the sum of the kinetic energies of particles in a system, whereas temperature is an arbitrary measure proportional to the average velocity of the particles in a system.

Average does not equal arbitrary. Please check your dictionary.
And your example of observing, gee its cold outside, doesn't jive with your attempt to backpedal about particles in a system.

Quite amusing though, been a while since I read such self-contradicting nonsense.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

By questioning moral realism, you are affirming it.

Okay, I'm totally just sticking my head in here without having read most of this thread. But the above argument sounds to me just like this arcane Stoicist point we would advance in grade school: “I'm rubber and you're glue, whatever you say bounces off of me and sticks to you.”

⚛​

 

[viet_jon]

What a load of egocentric crap. The universe doesn't care if human beings exist.

We are born on a small planet, around an average star, in the ass end of one, of a billion galaxies. And we have only been around for a fraction of an instant on the scale of the universe. The idea that human beings are something special is egotism, and stems from the fact that we value ourselves... which is purely instinctive and something common to all forms of life that end up procreating. Those that don't value themselves don't survive long. Self preservation is only important, to those who have it. It doesn't imply value, it describes values certain creatures have.

Life has the value we give it. And that's entirely subjective.

Killing is wrong when we agree it is.

I agree. Good post.

 

[Moridin]

This is almost unbelievable. First you make a claim that a right to property exists by using a theorem that appeals to objectivity. Then when that same theorem is used to claim that no right to property exists you claim that would be violating someone's rights. The right must first be proven to exist before it can be violated, which was the point of the exercise in the first place.

No, I have never claimed that rights actually exists. See my opening post in this topic.

No, I am not saying that it ought to be moral relativism that is true in an objective way. I thought I made clear in my statement that moral relativism is the way of the world, due to limiting contextual factors. I did not conflate moral relativism with truth. You are the one claiming that actions are moral based on facts, thus you must show these facts.

If your position is not that moral relativism ought to be true (that is, use objective arguments to argue for it), then your position is by definition, contradictory and invalid. If your do not think that your position ought to be considered true, then you would not be taking part in this discussion, but since you are, it necessarily follows that you think your position ought to be considered true.

You are simply contradicting yourself.

You stated that higher cognitive function makes human being's right to life more valuable than other animals. That is a property that you assigned, and is a naturalistic fallacy.

No, naturalistic fallacy is when one is appealing to a definition of the term "good" in terms of one or more natural properties. That is, X is morally good, because it is natural. I have not argued this, so I do not see why your objection is valid. I also stated that humans are more valuable since their cognitive functions are vastly superior. You even agreed that value is in proportion to ability. You are embarrassing yourself.

Stop contradicting yourself.

Some people are more beneficent than others, and that quality has nothing at all to do with their cognitive ability.

Have you changed your position now? Earlier you said that value was in proportion to ability.

To justify the taking of life because one life-form is more cognitive than another is bias.

No, it is based on objective facts. It would only be bias if I'd argue that one life-form is more valuable than others because of biological classification or because no difference existed.

One could just as easily justify the position that 'might makes right', and superior physical strength grants the right to kill creatures weaker than themselves.

I have already proven the moral invalidity of murder, so your statement is incorrect.

Here you say some action is objectively beneficent. You are making a fact-based claim to an indefinable quality. You are appealing to a definition of the term 'good' to justify your position. That is a naturalistic fallacy.

Objective morality does not commit the fallacy because it does not directly transpose natural facts into moral judgments, but rather uses them as evidence. In fact it is the relativist who commits the naturalistic fallacy, by assuming that our unprocessed opinions and instincts about moral standards are automatically valid.

No, I would only be making that mistake if I claimed that moral relativism is more beneficent, which I did not. (edit-In fact, I specifically stated that we ought to strive to understand moral objectivism and moral absolutism to become better than we are. How could you confuse my statement as support for moral relativism?)

You are contradicting yourself yet again. By using the term ought in an objective way, you have disproven your own position.

There are contexts where removing another person's limb may be beneficent. There are also contexts where decreasing the standard of living of others may be beneficent.

Now you are trying to argue for moral realism. Make up your mind. Context is what is important here.

I still fail to see how beneficence can be considered purely objective, since it requires subjective value judgements. I also fail to see how any action can be moral or immoral separated from the intent that motivated it.

Everyone would value it if they had access to all relevant information and did not perform logical fallacies. This is an empirical statement, so its truth depends on evidence. Justifications are moral or immoral, based on context.

I can't argue against an infallible position where even if I disagree I am agreeing with it. That's absurd, and not objective at all. I think I'll excuse myself before this degenerates even further.

When entering a rational discussion, one commits oneself to certain presuppositions, like the existence and independence of truth, the meaningfulness of language and so on. To try to argue against it would be to undermine ones own position. If you where to argue that truth does not exist, the fact that you are arguing with me over the truth of the proposition "truth does not exists" shows that you are affirming that which you are denying, ie. performing the stolen concept fallacy. By arguing that truth does not exist, you are shooting yourself in the foot.

This happens in the same manner when you try to argue that it objectively ought to be the case that moral relativism is true.

I will take this as your concession.

 

[Moridin]

According to you, humans have a cognitive ability that gives them a right to life? What if they can't afford to buy food and therefore starve. Trade violates their rights.

Trade is volitional.

Its only superior when we use it to do something those without it can't. Otherwise its just a different cognitive function. And there are quite a few animals with cognitive functions that are superior to ours... in certain ways, when doing certain things.

Overall cognitive function.

You can't derive an ought from an is.

I have demonstrated countless of times that it is possible.

In fact, by disagreeing with me, you are affirming my position. You are performing the stolen concept fallacy.

When entering a rational discussion, one commits oneself to certain presuppositions, like the existence and independence of truth, the meaningfulness of language and so on. To try to argue against it would be to undermine ones own position. If you where to argue that truth does not exist, the fact that you are arguing with me over the truth of the proposition "truth does not exists" shows that you are affirming that which you are denying, ie. performing the stolen concept fallacy. By arguing that truth does not exist, you are shooting yourself in the foot.

This happens in the same manner when you try to argue that it objectively ought to be the case that moral relativism is true.

Then you are a great and powerful wizard, or possibly, a hopelessly deluded randian fanatic.

What an intelligent non-argument.

Really, can you quote the part where I said that?
Sounds like you arguing with yourself here more than anyone else.
Might improve things if you actually read for comprehension and not just so you can paste in your memorized answers.

As a relativist, you commit the naturalistic fallacy, by assuming that our unprocessed opinions and instincts about moral standards are automatically valid.

I'm not a pacifist though. Happy to beat you senseless if you get in my face. Not going to argue the right or wrong of it. Life happens. I'll let the lawyers decide what was legal. They don't worry about rights or wrongs so much.

I will take this as your concession.

Quite amusing though, been a while since I read such self-contradicting nonsense.

How so? I have proven that you both have performed the stolen concept fallacy and the naturalist fallacy.

 

[Moridin]

Okay, I'm totally just sticking my head in here without having read most of this thread. But the above argument sounds to me just like this arcane Stoicist point we would advance in grade school: “I'm rubber and you're glue, whatever you say bounces off of me and sticks to you.”

⚛​

When you question a proposition X, you either have objective arguments, or subjective arguments. If you have subjective arguments, they hold no objective value and are thus as irrelevant to a rational discussion as saying that blue is your favorite color.

If you claim to have objective arguments that moral relativism is true, that means that you think that it objectively ought to be the case that moral relativism is true and that it objectively ought to the be the case that everyone changes their mind and accept the proposition of moral relativism.

Furthermore, it is the relativist who commits the naturalistic fallacy, by assuming that our unprocessed opinions and instincts about moral standards are automatically valid.

That is why moral relativism is a fundamentally self-contradicting proposition, since it is actually a fallacy.

 

[JoeDawg]

This happens in the same manner when you try to argue that it objectively ought to be the case that moral relativism is true.

Strawman.

No one is arguing that except you.

 

[JoeDawg]

Trade is volitional.

The strong set the rules.

You are a randian troll.

 

[Moridin]

Strawman.

No one is arguing that except you.

No, I am a moral realist. By questioning moral realism, you are admitting that it is true. If you are not questioning moral realism, then why are you posting?

When you question a proposition X, you either have objective arguments, or subjective arguments. If you have subjective arguments, they hold no objective value and are thus as irrelevant for a rational discussion as arguing that you like the color blue. It is nice that you like the color blue, but that's just your opinion.

If you claim to have objective arguments that moral relativism is true, that means that you think that it objectively ought to be the case that moral relativism is true and that it objectively ought to the be the case that everyone changes their mind and accept the proposition of moral relativism (otherwise you would not have objective arguments and take part in a rational discussion). So moral relativism performs the stolen concept fallacy. It is the same as claiming that it is true that no truth exist, or verbally argue that all language is meaningless.

Furthermore, it is the relativist who commits the naturalistic fallacy, by assuming that our unprocessed opinions and instincts about moral standards are automatically valid.

That is why moral relativism is a fundamentally a self-refuting proposition.

Thanks.