Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

[kote]

At various academic conferences in the last years on quantum gravity, (reportedly)one can find philosophers at physicists' gatherings and physicists at philosopher's events. What, in your opinion, can explain this trend except that we are nearing a new revolution in physics that will turn our understanding of nature and reality upside down?

I blame physics for getting so confused with itself that it's reverting back to questions philosophers never left . Empiricism and ontology have always been part of philosophy. The Copenhagen Interpretation is basically QM as viewed through logical positivism. Einstein's arguments with Bohr were based on his ontological "criterion of reality" and his epistemological criterion for completeness. You can read 17th century empiricism or even rationalism and swear you're reading about QM.

Bohr wrote Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, and his essays "on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge" were split into a few different books. Heisenberg wrote Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. Bohm published in philosophy journals.

The link between physics and philosophy is nothing new, and physicists involved in paradigm shifts are actually (and consciously) doing a lot of philosophy. It wasn't long ago that physicists and mathematicians were just called "philosophers." It's a tough line to draw.

 

[Naty1]

What do you think of general relativity's General covariance? How do you interpret it wrt to our experience?

You might find this thread of interest:https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=2310836#post2310836 (I posted this because I can't help but wonder if transforms more general than Lorentz might suggest broader formulations for gravity.)

Peter Bergmann, a former student of Einsteins, says in THE RIDDLE OF GRAVITATION (pg72).

Reliance on the principle of general covariance drastically restricts the range of potential mathematical-geometric relations that might be considered as representing the laws of gravitation.

Together with the idea that any formulation for gravity approach the laws of Newton under reasonable conditions, these

..are sufficient to remove all ambiguities and lead to a single possible law of gravitation.

So seems like covariance/invariance got us off to a good start. The question is can we do better with it? I just checked the index for Roger Penrose THE ROAD TO REALITY his thousand page summary of mathematical physics: oddly, nothing shown for covariance nor invariance. What a surprise!

Are space and time fundamental in your opinion? (this is a pretty central point in discussing what is real)

Very much so, a personal opinion...but if everything pops out of some sort of bang (big or finite) seems like in some way space and time are as physically real and fundamental as energy and particles, maybe fields...Maybe energy spawns space and time, but the opposite seems plausible as well...

Posts here asking others to think about the physical vs mathematical aspects of spacetime brings out some vitriol...also some insights by those who remain calm...many here,but not all, think that the existing rules and regulations are "law"..for example, if something is not in the standard model, well its very suspect...forgetting that gravity is omitted..likely the most ubiquitious force in the universe. That apparently makes it difficult to "think beyond the box"..maybe that's why so many breakthroughs come from theorists young enough not to know what "can't be possible". (Beckenstein and Hrtle come to mind)
So good luck...You might also check causual dynamic triangulation...some recent discussions here reflected current efforts at building models from which spacetime can "spontaneously" emerge...and offer interesting insights.

Is Spacetime a physical entity might be of interest:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=2300751#post2300751


Can there be a theory of the universe's boundary conditions? (another pretty central point wrt what is real)

Sure, Hawking and Hartle (among many others I'm sure) have worked on it...don't recall where he/they came out nor if they changed minds over the years...Here's one snippet: THE UNIVERSE IN A NUTSHELL (2001)

..the universe need have no beginning or (may) end in imaginary time. Imaginary time behaves just like another direction in space. ..If histories of the universe went off to infinity like a saddle or plane one would have the problem of specifying what the boundary conditions were at infinity...but one can avoid having to specify boundary conditions...if all histories of the universe in imagniary time are closed surfaces, like the surface of the earth.

I'd say that it's likely that the future theory of quantum gravity will re-define how we view 'something' and 'nothing' in a radical way(there are already good idications about that).

To reconcile GR and QM will likely take a majopr paradigm shift...

What, in your opinion, can explain this trend except that we are nearing a new revolution in physics that will turn our understanding of nature and reality upside down?

I don't personally think its that..in fact, not much major has happened for maybe twenty/forty years...Lots of improvements, I think, can't think of anything major...seems like experimentlists may have made more breakthroughts than theorists...black holes, dark matter,dark energy,Hubble expansion, and very recently, findings "planets like ours"...etc...maybe that is about to swing towards theorists??

 

[Fredrik]

The Copenhagen Interpretation is basically QM as viewed through logical positivism.

I've heard this claim before. (Maybe it was you that time too, I don't remember who I was talking to). Can you justify it? How do you define logical positivism and what does the CI have to do with it?

Edit: OK, I'm reading the Wikipedia page on logical positivism, and also the first few pages of Popper's "The logic of scientific discoveries", using the "search inside" feature at amazon.com. It seems to me that the logical positivists, or at least some guy named Reichenbach (who according to Wikipedia is one of the originators of logical positivism), thought that it must be possible to logically conclude the truth of universal statements ("all swans are white") from the truth of singular statements ("this swan is white"). They didn't know how, but they were sure that it was possible. Reichenbach claimed that this was "unreservedly accepted by the whole of science". (There are other crazy Reichenbach quotes in Popper's book).

Popper rejects this nonsense, and starts talking about falsifiability and so on. Wikipedia says that "he argued that the positivists' criterion of verifiability was too strong a criterion for science, and should be replaced by a criterion of falsifiability". This is exactly how I interpret the first few pages too. If this is an accurate representation of logical positivism, then this school of thought is clearly based on some heavy wishful thinking. Scientists would of course want to find the truth and then prove that it's the truth, but logically, this isn't possible.

The Copenhagen interpretation strikes me as being very far from all of this nonsense. It contains precisely what you need to turn the mathematical model into a (falsifiable) theory. Nothing more, nothing less. So what does it have to do with logical positivism?

 

[Fredrik]

I didn't say what we know and experience was unreal,

I didn't say that you did. I said that you stated something unknowable as if it was a fact.

...the world we experience does not exist apart from our perception of it(perception is real). It exists only in our, err, perception of it.

You can't possibly know that for a fact. It might be true, but there's nothing you can do to prove that it is, even to yourself. So it's an unknowable. By making this claim, you're implying that you have knowledge that no human can possibly have. That's why it sounds crazy.

 

[kote]

I've heard this claim before. (Maybe it was you that time too, I don't remember who I was talking to). Can you justify it? How do you define logical positivism and what does the CI have to do with it?

Probably was me! I can't prove historically that one school of thought influenced the other, but the ontological, epistemological, and semantic views are virtually identical. They were also fleshed out at about the same time. I can only recycle quotes at the moment, but here's what I've got on hand:

A subsequent measurement to a certain degree deprives the information given by a previous experiment of its significance for predicting the future course of phenomena. Obviously, these facts not only set a limit to the extent of the information obtainable by measurements, but they also set a limit to the meaning which we may attribute to such information. We meet here in a new light the old truth that in our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold and aspects of our experience.​

Niels Bohr. Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934) 18.​

Notice here that Bohr admits that he doesn't and can't know anything about "the real essence of the phenomena." He also puts "meaning" in italics in the original. This is important because subsequently he stops referring to any underlying "real essence" and simply calls obtainable information "real" at the basic level. He explains the change in how he talks about or expresses reality on page 94:

It lies in the nature of physical observation, nevertheless, that all experience must ultimately be expressed in terms of classical concepts, neglecting the quantum of action.​

And on page 123:

For describing our mental activity, we require, on one hand, an objectively given content to be placed in opposition to a perceiving subject, while, on the other hand, as is already implied in such an assertion, no sharp separation between object and subject can be maintained, since the perceiving subject also belongs to our mental content. From these circumstances follows not only the relative meaning of every concept, or rather every word, the meaning depending upon our arbitrary choice of view point, but also that we must, in general, be prepared to accept the fact that a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view which defy a unique description.​

There is no separable objective reality, and words must be defined from the point of view of subjective experience, necessarily. Additionally, subjective experience is classical, so it can never truly represent the meaningless concept of the underlying "manifold," which is not classical.

Compare this to:

A 1929 pamphlet written by Neurath, Hahn, and Rudolf Carnap summarized the doctrines of the Vienna Circle at that time. These included: the opposition to all metaphysics, especially ontology and synthetic a priori propositions; the rejection of metaphysics not as wrong but as having no meaning; a criterion of meaning based on Ludwig Wittgenstein's early work; the idea that all knowledge should be codifiable in a single standard language of science; and above all the project of "rational reconstruction", in which ordinary-language concepts were gradually to be replaced by more precise equivalents in that standard language.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism​

There is nothing besides subjectivity, and we should redefine words that are commonly thought of as referring to objective reality with meanings based only on subjectivity, which is the only thing that is within the limits of our knowledge.

Edit: With regard to verifiability, there are a few steps to the process for Bohr, which are quoted above.

Step 1: "Reality," as in "the real essence of the phenomena," is not verifiable.
Step 2: "Reality," as we usually think of it, and as used in step 1, is therefore meaningless.
Step 3: Let's redefine what's real in terms of verifiable subjectivity so that we can still call things "real."
Step 4: Voila; I can say that real objects exist in space-time. I can also say that every other concept we naively call real, such as color or sound, are just as real as particles or anything else. "Reality:" fixed, and verifiable (just don't try to visualize any underlying objective phenomena - to do so is meaningless anyways).

Edit2: Popper was a realist and objected to CI .

 

[Fra]

At various academic conferences in the last years on quantum gravity, (reportedly)one can find philosophers at physicists' gatherings and physicists at philosopher's events. What, in your opinion, can explain this trend except that we are nearing a new revolution in physics that will turn our understanding of nature and reality upside down?

I see several connections between fundamental physics, and the nature of information and knowledge and thus the fundamentals of science and law as such - and the latter certainly has philosophical dimensions.

With this I refer mainly to the "inside views", "inference views" and the physical basis of law and symmetry and the physical nature of time. Smolin for example has objected to the notion of eternal timeless laws, and his argumetens are philosophical that suggest that law must have a physical context, and that in general even laws are evolving.

QM is a measurement theory, but contains a lot of fixed baggage needed to define the information structures. Now in a true intrinsic measurement theory, this structure itself is dynamical too, and thus observer dependent. In the inside view there is no baggage, like gigantic timelss state spaces etc. This can dependending on your interpretation lead to evolving laws and emergent symmetries, that produces the interactions along with the process - ie you don't put in a hamiltonian in manually, the interactions are produces as part of the process.

This is also my preferred view on QM, which suggests that in the new understanding (not yet existing), QM structure will be understood as a limit case of kind of preferred inside view where the observer is very massive relative to the system. And a lot of what is now postulated of QM structure and some of that parameters and symmetries of the standard model might be understood as an evolution problem.

To make sense out of this, a lot of philosophical issues arise, that concern the philosophy of science and the nature of physical law.

Except for my own thinking, Smolins evolving law, Olaf Dreyers internal relativity, and Ariel Caticha program to infere the laws of physics from generic rules of inference are sniffing onto this.

IMHO at least, these radical views, has implications also for the context where QM formalism as expected to emerge. In these views the context of QM should emerge, rather than be put in by hand, or postulated.

For example, a bit simplified most of the standard model more or less "follow" from a series of symmetry assuptions. Thus, to explain, understand and solve the fine tuning problems, it seems a key is to understand the process whereby symmetries emerge in processes - rather than looking for the perfect big master symmetry - becuase the question would still remain - why this symmetry. I find this to be extremely interesting and promising but also difficult and yet undeveloped, and questions like that would get attention in this reasoning.

/Fredrik

 

[WaveJumper]

I didn't say that you did. I said that you stated something unknowable as if it was a fact.


You can't possibly know that for a fact. It might be true, but there's nothing you can do to prove that it is, even to yourself. So it's an unknowable. By making this claim, you're implying that you have knowledge that no human can possibly have. .

ok, let's take a different approach - take the mind/observer/ out of the equation(suppose it was possible). What do you 'see'? Where is everything in this relative to the FOR world of electromagnetic physicallly-looking phenomena? Where is the electron in this relative space of ever-shifting haze of probabilities of non-local manifestations of wave-like entities? Is there movement in continuous space and true observer-independent time, or are we the observers(whatever that means for electromagntic creatures like us) an essential part of this fluid-like, amorphic reality? What could give confidence that the electromagnetic fields masquerading as physical objects in relative space and time are real outside of our twisted perception of them?
Do you 'see' an absolute, material universe that is background-dependent? If you do, i think envy you.

That's why it sounds crazy.

You are right, it does. What is your favourite interpretation of quantum theory that you think makes sense and does not sound crazy?

 

[Fredrik]

ok, let's take a different approach - take the mind/observer/ out of the equation(suppose it was possible). What do you 'see'? Where is everything in this relative to the FOR world of electromagnetic physicallly-looking phenomena? Where is the electron in this relative space of ever-shifting haze of probabilities of non-local manifestations of wave-like entities? Is there movement in continuous space and true observer-independent time, or are we the observers(whatever that means for electromagntic creatures like us) an essential part of this fluid-like, amorphic reality? What could give confidence that the electromagnetic fields masquerading as physical objects in relative space and time are real outside of our twisted perception of them?
Do you 'see' an absolute, material universe that is background-dependent? If you do, i think envy you.

Those questions don't make much sense. I can't even make sense of the language in the "where is everything" question. Where is the electron in what space? You need a theory to define the concept of time, and you didn't specify one. What does it mean to be an essential part of reality? What I said in #100 answers your question about electromagnetic fields (if "are real" means the same thing as "exist"). I have no idea what it would mean to see an absolute material background-dependent universe. The word background-dependent is especially confusing in this context.

You are right, it does. What is your favourite interpretation of quantum theory that you think makes sense and does not sound crazy?

See post #11. If the word "algorithm" bothers you (apparently it bothered someone), just replace "an algorithm" with "a set of rules". See also #27.

 

[RUTA]

There are two levels of interpretation. (You've heard me go over this before!)
Distinguish ontological interpretation (what is being debated here) with praxic interpretation what you are talking about being necessary. QM in CI has its praxic interpetation:

Born's probability law and the Eigen-value principle
(plus what operators and hilbert spaces we associate with given physical observables and systems)

That I think is all that is necessary to do an experiment in the lab and see if it matches what the theory predicts.

You are pulling a fast one trying to confuse this type of interpretation with the metaphysical speculations of the various ontological interpretatons.

Did you read my post on particle physics earlier in this thread? Do you think a Hilbert space structure "is all that is necessary" to generate particle physics data? Read that post and ask yourself, What if we didn't believe particles were responsible for the clicks? That's an ontological (not praxic) question and it has lots to do with the way information from experimental devices is turned into "data" in particle physics. Don't confuse "data" with "instrument readings." Instrument readings are worthless without metaphysical assumptions.

 

[kote]

Did you read my post on particle physics earlier in this thread? Do you think a Hilbert space structure "is all that is necessary" to generate particle physics data? Read that post and ask yourself, What if we didn't believe particles were responsible for the clicks? That's an ontological (not praxic) question and it has lots to do with the way information from experimental devices is turned into "data" in particle physics. Don't confuse "data" with "instrument readings." Instrument readings are worthless without metaphysical assumptions.

Agreed. All theories must have at least implicit ontology for them to have any applicability. All theories have variables representing some property of reality. You may not think the theory is complete or accurate, or you may not believe the ontology of the theory, but in the context of the theory itself that ontology still exists and is necessary.

 

[jambaugh]

Did you read my post on particle physics earlier in this thread? Do you think a Hilbert space structure "is all that is necessary" to generate particle physics data? Read that post and ask yourself, What if we didn't believe particles were responsible for the clicks? That's an ontological (not praxic) question and it has lots to do with the way information from experimental devices is turned into "data" in particle physics. Don't confuse "data" with "instrument readings." Instrument readings are worthless without metaphysical assumptions.

In your earlier post you a building a straw man. The device in question is not studying the paths of the particles [edit: or the particles themselves] but the behavior at the center of the collision. Dissassociating the clicks is just disassembling your measuring device. The whole of the tracks once reconstructed using the prior verified theory is the single "click" associated with a particle of a certain mass and momentum (range). Or more specifically a specific configuration of particle paths is the single "click" for a particular resonance at the collision center.

This is the point in CI of treating your measuring devices classically. In so far as the collision experiment goes the particles detected are the the measuring device and you'll note the theorests interpreting the data do not treat such particles as localized at their detectors in the equations they write down. Rather the system cut is between the detector array and the collision center. The input beams and output spray of particles are both part of the measuring device when outside and part of the system when they are near the collision center.

If one is looking for say a top quark interaction you don't seriously mean they expect the top quark to create a path in their detector array? So you should view the detector array no differently in terms of this discussion than say the electrons in a photo-multiplier tubes designed to detect photons.

Similarly when one is measuring the spin of an electron with an SG magnet or rather its magnetic moment one is using the electron's position and momentum as a classical measuring device. This is inherent in the |up> or |down> kets one writes and in the ignoring of the HUP with regard to localizing the electron's lateral position while assuming zero lateral momentum.

The metaphysics of these paths of which you speak is necessary only as a practical convenience in so far as one is treating the measuring device itself as a classical system.
Our language is very object oriented and so being careful to describe all the tracks phenomenologically would be painfully tedious.

"We observed conserved electronic charge-spin-mass causally propagate in this direction"
vs
"We observed an electron with this momentum"

It is important to distinquish a "quantum particle" from "a particle" in the classical sense. The definition of a "quantum particle" is a quantum system with non-trivial irreducible Poincare group representation. It is not an object it is a system of activity, a process.

Hence we may in the "quantum particle" context speak of ghost and virtual particles which are component processes in a resolution of many quanta interactions but are not even associated directly with "clicks of a detector". But when one is invoking say ghosts or virtual particles one gets into deep stuff trying to apply metaphysics.

Let me ask you, what is the metaphysical status of a phonon? Can you make any meaningful metaphysical assumptions about phonons?

[EDIT: In fact I think you have pinned down a key point. When you find it necessary to make metaphysical assumptions you must have crossed the system cut from quantum system to measuring device/mechanism! This is exactly the "why" of the CI postulate that we must treat our measuring devices classically.]

 

[Dmitry67]

I wonder what Quantum Computing guys are thinking about the CI. They deal with systems of few atoms that DO measure. They deal with systems of few atoms configured differently - and these configurations DO NOT 'measure', passing the superposition or storing the superposition for some time.

 

[nikman]

I wonder what Quantum Computing guys are thinking about the CI. They deal with systems of few atoms that DO measure. They deal with systems of few atoms configured differently - and these configurations DO NOT 'measure', passing the superposition or storing the superposition for some time.

Amazingly, one of the pioneers in the quantum computing field is the IQOQI in Vienna, and of course we're dealing again with Zeilinger, Brukner et alii. Zeilinger is on record as preferring the CI for its "austerity".

Entanglement is the key, and entanglement's right up the CI's alley. It all harks back to the Bell Inequality experiments of Alain Aspect. In the quantum computing literature you see "Bell entanglement" mentioned frequently.

And in the end you DO measure. And the qubit superposition collapses into a "0" or "1" classical bit. Otherwise what's the point?

FWIW the IQOQI are also the people who conducted the highly successful entanglement and teleportation experiments in the Carnary Islands (144 km between La Palma and Tenerife two summers ago).

Go measure.

 

[nikman]

In the event anyone cares, and in re: upthread stuff ... it's sometimes claimed that Wittgenstein never discussed QM. But he did on at least one occasion:225 A proposition, an hypothesis, is coupled with reality -- with varying degrees of freedom. In the limit case there's no longer any connection, reality can do anything it likes without coming into conflict with the proposition: in which case the proposition (hypothesis) is senseless!

All that matters is that the signs, in no matter how complicated a way, still in the end refer to immediate experience and not to an intermediary (a thing in itself).

All that's required for our propositions (about reality) to have a sense, is that our experience in some sense or other either tends to agree with them or tends not to agree with them. That is, immediate experience need confirm only something about them, some facet of them. And in fact this image is taken straight from reality, since we say 'There's a chair here', when we only see one side of it.

According to my principle, two assumptions must be identical in sense if every possible experience that confirms the one confirms the other too. Thus, if no empirical way of deciding between them is conceivable.

A proposition construed in such a way that it can be uncheckably true or false is completely detached from reality and no longer functions as a proposition.

The views of modern physicists (Eddington) tally with mine completely, when they say that the signs in their equations no longer have 'meanings', and that physics cannot attain to such meanings but must stay put at the signs. But they don't see that these signs have meaning in as much as -- and only in as much as -- immediately observable phenomena (such as points of light) do or do not correspond to them.

A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else: it is the reality. A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else which alone makes the proposition true or false: it itself is what verifies the proposition. (Philosophical Remarks, pp 282-3)

 

[kote]

A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else: it is the reality. A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else which along makes the proposition true or false: it itself is what verifies the proposition. (Philosophical Remarks, pp 282-3)

Bohr anyone? Also, since we've mentioned positivism, most of that movement was explicitly based on Wittgenstein's thoughts on language, meaning, and verification.

 

[nikman]

Bohr anyone? Also, since we've mentioned positivism, most of that movement was explicitly based on Wittgenstein's thoughts on language, meaning, and verification.

It was based on the Tractatus. The language game stuff came later. Philosophical Remarks was an in-between work.

Bohr was unaware of Wittgenstein all of his life, AFAIK. He had explicit problems with Husserl and the phenomenologists but that's different. Anyway there's an interesting interview that David Peat conducted with Heisenberg where they got into LW. Heisenberg did not like Tractatus (too dryasdust or whatever) but really got behind Philosophical Investigations.

Or maybe he was just trying to be hip.

 

[kote]

It was based on the Tractatus. The language game stuff came later. Philosophical Remarks was an in-between work.

Bohr was unaware of Wittgenstein all of his life, AFAIK. He had explicit problems with Husserl and the phenomenologists but that's different. Anyway there's an interesting interview that David Peat conducted with Heisenberg where they got into LW. Heisenberg did not like Tractatus (too dryasdust or whatever) but really got behind Philosophical Investigations.

Or maybe he was just trying to be hip.

I don't have any knowledge of Bohr being directly influenced by Wittgenstein, but he surely had positivist ties and held similar views to theirs (though he arguably got there different ways). I don't agree with all of Jan Faye's conclusions here, but this paper talks about a lot of the historical links: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003737/" . If Bohr was holding positivist conferences at his mansion and acknowledged positivist views, he probably knew about Wittgenstein. That's just speculation though.

 

[nikman]

I don't have any knowledge of Bohr being directly influenced by Wittgenstein, but he surely had positivist ties and held similar views to theirs (though he arguably got there different ways). I don't agree with all of Jan Faye's conclusions here, but this paper talks about a lot of the historical links: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003737/" . If Bohr was holding positivist conferences at his mansion and acknowledged positivist views, he probably knew about Wittgenstein. That's just speculation though.

Neurath might have mentioned Wittgenstein if Bohr had read the Trac, but as you say it's speculation. By 1936 LW was well beyond positivism. According to legend he'd earlier treated the Vienna Circle with a degree of boorishness remarkable even for him. (Turning his back to the assembled savants for at least one entire meeting and staring out the window without speaking. With friends like that.)

Edit: Turning his back, not turing it. Different thread, different forum.

 

[WaveJumper]

Those questions don't make much sense. I can't even make sense of the language in the "where is everything" question.

I think you do. I was asking if you think the characteristics of the world are to a certain extent dependent on us.

Where is the electron in what space?

There must be a correlation between theoretical models and reality.

You need a theory to define the concept of time, and you didn't specify one.

None of our theories gives a good foundation about what time is. I was interested in your personal opinion wrt time in your chosen quantum interpretation.[Edit: you choose to refrain from making guesses, that's ok, it sounds sensible]

What does it mean to be an essential part of reality?

It means that by choosing the measuring equipment we can influence the outomes in experiments(that probably applies to reality too).

What I said in #100 answers your question about electromagnetic fields (if "are real" means the same thing as "exist").

If a theory produces a prediction that matches an experiement that does not point in any way to what exists independently of us. So it doesn't answer my question.

I have no idea what it would mean to see an absolute material background-dependent universe. The word background-dependent is especially confusing in this context.

Any theory of quantum gravity has to be background independent, if we are to preserve GR. If you believe in a fixed, absolute universe, you are believing in a model of a universe where the defining equations of a unified theory would be background-dependent. I am not saying you do, but you didn't give clues as to what a reality independent of us should look like in your opinion.

See post #11. If the word "algorithm" bothers you (apparently it bothered someone), just replace "an algorithm" with "a set of rules". See also #27.

Is that an instrumentalist approach or is it closer to the - "we don't have enough information to draw a conclusion" type of argument? When you said this in post 11:

They are all trying to tell us what QM really describes, but a theory doesn't have to describe anything

What do you mean by "a theory doesn't have to describe anything"? Do you mean anything deeper than what appears to perception? If yes, i think our positions aren't too far apart.

IMO, since we can never differntiate between information about reality and the Reality, it is the "thing" that exists independently of us. A chair, a car, a lover, etc. is all information about these entities, manifested by abstract quantum fields in relative space-time. Everything we perceive is a construct based on information. The images that we form on the basis of this are our constructs. In this sense the information is the basic building block of the world we perceive. Space and time are concepts aimed at giving meaning to our world of appearances. So they are entirely reasonable constructs, as long as they are used for their relational purposes. I guess that puts me closer to the CI, but i don't want to open another can of worms.

Does anyone think a universe can exist that's devoid of information and information transfer? If we were able to strip the universe of all the information, what would remain of it?

 

[RUTA]

In your earlier post you a building a straw man. The device in question is not studying the paths of the particles [edit: or the particles themselves] but the behavior at the center of the collision. Dissassociating the clicks is just disassembling your measuring device. The whole of the tracks once reconstructed using the prior verified theory is the single "click" associated with a particle of a certain mass and momentum (range). Or more specifically a specific configuration of particle paths is the single "click" for a particular resonance at the collision center.


Similarly when one is measuring the spin of an electron with an SG magnet or rather its magnetic moment one is using the electron's position and momentum as a classical measuring device. This is inherent in the |up> or |down> kets one writes and in the ignoring of the HUP with regard to localizing the electron's lateral position while assuming zero lateral momentum.

It is important to distinquish a "quantum particle" from "a particle" in the classical sense. The definition of a "quantum particle" is a quantum system with non-trivial irreducible Poincare group representation. It is not an object it is a system of activity, a process.

[EDIT: In fact I think you have pinned down a key point. When you find it necessary to make metaphysical assumptions you must have crossed the system cut from quantum system to measuring device/mechanism! This is exactly the "why" of the CI postulate that we must treat our measuring devices classically.]

This has NOTHING to do with my post. Nothing. You didn't understand one word.

 

[jambaugh]

This has NOTHING to do with my post. Nothing. You didn't understand one word.

You are talking about post #74 in this thread I presume? What were you implying with the question?

What would happen to this enterprise if we rather believed there were no click-causing particles?

As I understood it you were arguing the relevance of metaphysical questions about quantum systems is necessity...

in order to collect "objective data"

I was asserting that the system in question was classical and part of the measuring device at the point where you were invoking these metaphysical questions.

Possibly that was not your point. I still would, for the sake of others who may mistakenly think it was, argue that such metaphysical question about components of the observational devices themselves are within the context of a classical model we use in describing those devices while using them to probe the actual quantum processes. In CI one insists on treating the devices classically because that is a (praxic) fundamental requirement for their use in obtaining the information not an assertion about the devices' (ontic) fundamental nature.

The "metaphysical" questions within a model are not metaphysical issues outside the use of that model except and only when one is making a broader metaphysical postulate that the model is a representation of a physical fundamental reality. They are just artifacts of that model's classical treatment no different from "metaphysical" question about say the existence of a solution to some abstract differential equation even if that equation is being used in some hard scientific application.

BTW I never did answer your question:

Do you think a Hilbert space structure "is all that is necessary" to generate particle physics data?

No it takes a laboratory experment to generate particle physics data. Interpreting that data and setting up the experiment for that matter (what you mean by going from "instrument readings" to "data") requires we invoke the mathematical structure of the theory along with the operational (praxic) interpretation, i.e. which operations and objects in the mathematics correspond to what operations and objects in the laboratory. Note however that the mathematical objects in QM (with CI) do not correspond to the system or system state but to the (classically treated) devices. Hence the necessity of their classical treatment.

Frankly I don't see Hilbert spaces as the primary mathematical objects we should use but rather the operator algebra and its dual of co-operators. But that's a whole other thread. (Though I think some of the biases in interpretation come from focusing too closely on the Hilbert space formulation.)

Again you may say I totally missed your point. If so and you feel generous with your time why don't you break it down in simple terms my sluggish brain can absorb. PM it to me if you like so we won't have to bother everyone with my remediation.

 

[RUTA]

Neo-Copenhagenists like Brukner and Zeilinger are busy trying to marry the above to avant-garde informatics and create a new synthesis based on the principle that in the deepest possible sense you can't separate a thing from what you know about that thing. I for one say more power to them.

In your previous Zeilinger quote he said the premeasurement object has absolutely no properties. Couple that with the claim in this quote and you have to wonder whether the premeasurement object has any ontic status at all.

 

[RUTA]

Again you may say I totally missed your point. If so and you feel generous with your time why don't you break it down in simple terms my sluggish brain can absorb. PM it to me if you like so we won't have to bother everyone with my remediation.

Sorry, jambaugh, I'm not effectively communicating my point so I'm frustrated. We're talking past one another. Let me try again.

My post was in response to an attitude that I see here, at conferences, seminars, etc. -- that physics doesn't need interpretation b/c we're guided by empiricism. My argument is that we interpret theory to create experiments and interpret instrument readings to create data. I used the example of particle physics b/c I'm familiar with it and it strikes me as particularly poignant. Returning to that example, ask yourself whether we would spend billions of dollars building accelerators and detectors if we didn't believe that matter is made of fundamental building blocks (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, etc). That we call detector clicks "hits" and search for "tracks" belies a particular interpretation of quantum field theory (QFT) based on this belief. Suppose that we rather believed there were no "quantum particles" creating those detector clicks -- they are the response of the detector to the accelerator, things which DO exist, nothing more. In this interpretation, greater accelerator energies merely produce more complex patterns in the detector. Would we bother to spend billions of dollars looking for such patterns in these highly contrived situations? Probably not. We would probably spend this money and manpower on problems related to truly fundamental physics, i.e., the "true" decomposition of objects based on some alternate interpretation of QFT.

I'm not trying to establish and debate alternate interpretations of QFT. I'm trying to present an argument against the belief that physics doesn't need "interpretation." That's all.

 

[nikman]

In your previous Zeilinger quote he said the premeasurement object has absolutely no properties. Couple that with the claim in this quote and you have to wonder whether the premeasurement object has any ontic status at all.

If you mean the interview I quoted from, the interviewer asked him this:

"... Ultimately that implies something monstrous: namely that the particle had absolutely no characteristics before it was measured. The great Danish physicist Niels Bohr once said: no one has ever seen a chair. There is no objective reality. Only that which is measured exists. We construct reality, and only in the moment of measurement or observation."

And Zeilinger replied:

"n my view there is something that exists independently of us – in physics we call that the singular event. For example the activity of a particle detector. Or the activity of a certain cell in my eye, which registers a certain number of light particles and then provokes a chemical reaction that is then registered in the brain. The images that we form on the basis of this are our constructs. Bohr's chair or on a much more abstract level, the quantum mechanics equation of states, are our concepts of an object. Of course they are very purpose-oriented, because they've been corroborated with repeated use."

Which doesn't address the issue explicitly raised by the interviewer, that of "what's there" (if anything) prior to observation/measurement. Z may or may not have evaded it deliberately, it's hard to say. (Anyway, is a potentiality ontic?) As one of the co-authors of one of the two Leggett experiment papers (the other paper being by Nicolas Gisin's Geneva group, which ran a separate experiment also violating Leggett's inequality) he's complicit in suggesting that:

"[O]ne could consider the breakdown of other assumptions that are implicit in our reasoning leading to the [testable Leggett] inequality. These include Aristotelian logic, counterfactual definiteness, absence of actions into the past or a world that is not completely deterministic ... We believe that our results lend strong support to the view that any future extension of quantum theory that is in agreement with experiments must abandon certain features of realistic descriptions."

Zeilinger has also talked about "the two freedoms" -- the freedom of the experimenter to set part of the terms for realization by asking the question he or she decides to ask, and the freedom of nature to return serve by giving the answer it damn well pleases. This has a constructivist feel about it, although I don't know that he's ever openly identified with that tendency and he's not a featured player among the Constructivist Foundations crowd.

 

[nikman]

"... absence of actions into the past or a world that is not completely deterministic."

To be understood (I'm almost 100% sure) as "absence of a world that is not completely deterministic," i.e., "presence of a world that's completely deterministic." As an assumption of realism. Sometimes I wish I could edit this stuff for these people.

 

[molinaro]

I vote transactional. It seems the simplest and if it's good enough for Feynman it's good enough for me.

 

[RUTA]

Zeilinger has also talked about "the two freedoms" -- the freedom of the experimenter to set part of the terms for realization by asking the question he or she decides to ask, and the freedom of nature to return serve by giving the answer it damn well pleases. This has a constructivist feel about it, although I don't know that he's ever openly identified with that tendency and he's not a featured player among the Constructivist Foundations crowd.

Thanks for supplying all that text, nikman! It's interesting that Z talks about these two freedoms in light of the delayed choice experiments he has conducted. I saw him present this one: Anton Zeilinger, “Why the quantum? ‘It’ from ‘bit’? A participatory universe? Three far-reaching challenges from John Archibald Wheeler and their relation to experiment,” in Science and Ultimate Reality: Quantum Theory, Cosmology and Complexity, John D. Barrow, Paul C.W. Davies and Charles L. Harper, Jr. (eds.), (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, 2004), pp 201-220. Therein, one photon (call it 1) of an entangled pair goes through a double slit to detector C while its partner (call it 2) goes through a lens to a detector A at the focal length (f) or to a detector B at 2f. If photon 2 is detected at f, photon 1 contributes to an interference pattern. If photon 2 is detected at 2f, photon 1 contributes to a particle pattern. The outcomes are strikingly in agreement, what makes it weird is that photon 1 is detected before photon 2. So, is the experimenter really free "to set part of the terms," i.e., free to choose detector A or B for photon 2, given that photon 1 has already contributed to its related pattern at C? Is Nature really free to give "the answer it damn well pleases" at C, given the freedom of the experimenter to choose A or B?

 

[jambaugh]

We're talking past one another. Let me try again.

I believe I understand. I still see a bias in how you explained it as far as the form that interpertation should take. Yes we must believe we are studing nature and not the behavior of detectors. But I say beliving there is a "real" (ontological) structure of some type and believing there is no "real" (ontological) structure are just two opposite ontological interpertations. There is a third path.

This may have undeservedly flown at you but its, a point I've tried to make to others. One may believe on is studing nature (outside of ourselves or our devices) without imposing specific implicit formats to that nature inherent in a conceptualizable "state of reality". It is hard to step out of this mindset since it is the proper and practical way to study nature on the scale in which we normally live (and have evolved the brain to understand it). One must appreciate the weight of years over which we evolved both mind and language where objective reality works fine for throwing rocks or shooting arrows and firing bullets at prey (and enemies). Suddently in the past century we hit the limit of classical thinking with the study of phenomena at the quantum level.

It is unprecedented and much of the "of course" and "obvious" ways of understanding needs revision. We still have the strong (and normally appropriate) habit of casting phenomena in terms of a continuous sequence of states. Some still try to do this with QM.

(I'm preachin' to the crowd now, sorry.) I think it is very similar to someone trying to pin down exact formal definitions for words we use in common speech. The words have meaning but it is not some fixed objective and definable meaning (except of course when we work in fromal contexts such as law or mathematics.) Words are an interaction between people by which we invoke in others a desired mode of thinking. It is process. It isn't just mundane pragmatism which is why I invoke the term "praxic". It includes the poetry and music and inspirational sermons. And carrying the analogy further it to has inexact outcomes.

So too I see nature as an amalgam of processes, studiable, understandable, but not wholy reducible to objective state any more than is the human experience. We can speak of people as individuals while understanding fully that who a given individual is cannot be separated from the society in which he lives or reducible to a clockwork of reflexive responses to his environment. Likewsie an electron is an individable unit process but not definable apart from from its environment or reducible to a point in a state manifold following a trajectory.

This is not to say we need to ascribe any mystic nonsense to it either (which I see as a way of giving up instead of trying a better paradigm of understanding). It is merely an acknowledgment of the flaw in one specific paradigm.

As I mentioned words meanings can't be pinned down except in a specifically formal context. However that is what we have in science. The fundamental root is the definition of science as an epistemological discipline. Thus when we ask the meaning of the word "electron" it must in the context of science derive from the process by which we know something about the electron, those acts of observation which distinguish it from a plumb pudding or a slap on the face. And when we ask the meaning of the wave function so too we must look at the scientific root. It is not something we observe but one level abstracted. Its meaning is thus this abstraction, our knowledge of the system, and not the system with which we do interact in our observatories and laboratories.

You know the old saw about "Have you stopped beating your wife?" I see much of the debate about interpretations and specifically criticism of CI as ritious indignation that I haven't stopped beating my wife without any attempt to understand that I haven't because I'm not even married. CI is not a metaphysical interpetation it is the rejection of metaphysical interpetation. When asked how I can possibly be so stupid as to believe there is no reality, I am taken aback by the assertion that I have made any such claim about reality. To do so would be just as much a heracy in the CI as to assert the reality of the wave-function.

One can be an agnostic theist or an agnostic atheist. The agnostic part asserts the question of the existence of the deity is not knowable and to believe (either way) is a leap of faith. Thereby the agnostic rejects in particular the deity question as a scientific one.

CI (and positivism in general) is agnosticism about reality. One can still choose a leap of faith or simply walk away leaving the question unanswered. But it is an acknowledgment (or assertion if you will) that the choice to leap is a choice for whatever reason to leave the domain of science. Now I think that question is arguable and its answer is knowable which is what I've been up to on these threads.

And finally (stretching the religion analogy for all its worth) the agnostic is understandibly offended by the implication that he cannot function morally because he has not taken the leap of faith toward deism. Because the deist derives his moral code from his belief blinds him to the possibility that it could come from another source. This is true only within the context of his belief which as an article of faith he cannot question. So too I take exception with those who assert a metaphysical interpretation is necessary for science to function.

Hence RUTA my overly strong reaction to your post. Though you may not have been making such a pronouncment or not for the same reason, it resembled a bit to me a that sort of bias.

Well pardon this old windbag for his soapbox sermons. You all will get a break as I'm off to Vegas tomorrow early to behave unscientfically for a bit.

 

[Dmitry67]

I vote transactional. It seems the simplest and if it's good enough for Feynman it's good enough for me.

TI does not address the issue of "incomplete" transactions. Many photons escape to infinity, they will never find their absorbers, because the Universe is expanding and it becomes more and more transparent.

 

[Fredrik]

My post was in response to an attitude that I see here, at conferences, seminars, etc. -- that physics doesn't need interpretation b/c we're guided by empiricism. My argument is that we interpret theory to create experiments and interpret instrument readings to create data.

I would say (and have said, earlier in this thread and in other threads) that a mathematical model needs an interpretation, but a theory by (my) definition already includes one. For example, Minkowski space is a mathematical model of space and time, but the theory of special relativity is defined by a set of axioms that tells us how to interpret the mathematics as predictions about the results of experiments.

When I say that QM doesn't need an interpretation, I mean the theory of quantum mechanics, not the mathematical model (Hilbert space or something mathematically equivalent), and more specifically, I mean that a theory such as the Copenhagen "interpretation" doesn't need further interpretation. I mean, we obviously need to interpret the mathematics as predictions about the results of experiments, but we don't have to interpret it ontologically as a statement about what "is" and what "really happens".

The first kind of interpretation is sufficient, and the second kind isn't really science. I like to point out that it isn't philosophy either. The philosophy part of this is the thought process you have to go through to realize it isn't science.

There are two major problems with the attempts to find an ontological interpretation of QM. The first is that QM may not have an ontological interpretation that has anything to do with reality, and the second is that even if it does, there's nothing we can do to verify that the correct ontological interpretation is in fact correct.

I used the example of particle physics b/c I'm familiar with it and it strikes me as particularly poignant. Returning to that example, ask yourself whether we would spend billions of dollars building accelerators and detectors if we didn't believe that matter is made of fundamental building blocks (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, etc). That we call detector clicks "hits" and search for "tracks" belies a particular interpretation of quantum field theory (QFT) based on this belief. Suppose that we rather believed there were no "quantum particles" creating those detector clicks -- they are the response of the detector to the accelerator, things which DO exist, nothing more. In this interpretation, greater accelerator energies merely produce more complex patterns in the detector. Would we bother to spend billions of dollars looking for such patterns in these highly contrived situations? Probably not. We would probably spend this money and manpower on problems related to truly fundamental physics, i.e., the "true" decomposition of objects based on some alternate interpretation of QFT.

You're describing an extreme viewpoint that I don't think many people have. (Does anyone have it?) I think it would be idiotic to refuse to use words like "particle" just because the standard model isn't verifiable. What i think we should do is to continue to say that particles exist, and try to teach as many people as possible what that statement really means. (See #100).

 

[Fredrik]

CI (and positivism in general) is agnosticism about reality.

You too associate the CI with positivism? I really don't see how the CI can be thought of as an example of positivism. As far as I can tell, positivism, or at least logical positivism (I'm not sure if there's a significant difference), requires theories to be verifiable, but the CI is a fantastic example of a theory that's falsifiable but not verifiable.

I realize that the CI may in part have been inspired by positivistic thinking, since it doesn't include an ontological intepretation, but I see no reason to say that it is positivism.

 

[Demystifier]

I remember there is also partial decoherence.
For me this is a proof that MWI is true.

I would say that there is a soft MWI and a hard MWI. Soft MWI merely claims that the wave function satisfies the Schrodinger equation and that it never collapses. Hard MWI claims that this is enough, i.e., that no further assumptions are needed in order to interpret the wave function correctly.

For me, partial decoherence is a strong evidence for soft MWI, but not for hard MWI.
As you admit, the biggest problem of hard MWI is to explain the Born rule.
With soft MWI it is much easier, because you are allowed to assume or postulate something in addition. An example of soft MWI is the Bohmian interpretation which assumes that waves serve as pilots for pointlike particles, which allows to explain the Born rule from other postulates.

 

[nikman]

Thanks for supplying all that text, nikman! It's interesting that Z talks about these two freedoms in light of the delayed choice experiments he has conducted. I saw him present this one: Anton Zeilinger, “Why the quantum? ‘It’ from ‘bit’? A participatory universe?... Therein, one photon (call it 1) of an entangled pair goes through a double slit to detector C while its partner (call it 2) goes through a lens to a detector A at the focal length (f) or to a detector B at 2f. If photon 2 is detected at f, photon 1 contributes to an interference pattern. If photon 2 is detected at 2f, photon 1 contributes to a particle pattern. The outcomes are strikingly in agreement, what makes it weird is that photon 1 is detected before photon 2. So, is the experimenter really free "to set part of the terms," i.e., free to choose detector A or B for photon 2, given that photon 1 has already contributed to its related pattern at C? Is Nature really free to give "the answer it damn well pleases" at C, given the freedom of the experimenter to choose A or B?

This has resonances of the "before-before" experiments of the Gisin group, which is a demonstration of quantum atemporality and which Antoine Suarez dwells upon at length and considers also to be proof of free will. And I must ponder upon it, unless ...

Z and Brukner discuss a somewhat comparable experimental situation, involving the Heisenberg microscope, in a 2005 paper, "Quantum Physics as a Science of Information" ...

http://www.dancing-peasants.com/sciphil/QPSI(2005).pdf ... big file, slow download ...

and they say this about that:

"These experiments also shed interesting light on the role of the observer with respect to reality. We note that it is the experimentalist who chooses the apparatus. The experimentalist, in our case Birgit, decides whether to put the detector into the focal plane or, say, the image plane. That way, she determines which property of the system, wave or particle, can be reality. We might thus conclude that the experimentalist choosing the apparatus determines which physical quantity, i.e., quality, can be reality. In that sense, the experimentalist's choice is constitutive of the universe. However, the specific outcome here, which of the two slits the particle passes through in our case or where on the observation plane it arrives in the other, cannot be influenced by her. That way, Nature avoids complete controllability by the observer." (page 5, aka 51)

 

[Dmitry67]

Regarding CI, it would make sense if it would not try to "sit on 2 chairs"

CI: wavefunction is NOT real (there are some other flavours of CI where it is real, but "classic" CI it is not real)

So only MACROSCOPIC events are real in CI. Particles, both real or virtual, are just a mathematical technique of calculationg the correlation between the macroscopic events: reading of the devices, clicks and beeps.

In that extreme form it is self-consistent.

But when it tried to talk about the particles as something real, it becomes illogical, saying that "these 4 atoms are the measurement device, and these atoms are not"

 

[RUTA]

I believe I understand. I still see a bias in how you explained it as far as the form that interpertation should take. Yes we must believe we are studing nature and not the behavior of detectors. But I say beliving there is a "real" (ontological) structure of some type and believing there is no "real" (ontological) structure are just two opposite ontological interpertations. There is a third path.

I believe I now understand you. In fact, you correctly discerned a bias and it is precisely the bias to which you take exception, so your responses did reflect an understanding of my posts and it was I who did not understand you! Sorry. Anyway, let the argument begin!

I am claiming that metaphysical interpretation is necessary to do experimental particle physics (given the thread, we should keep the argument to quantum physics). We devise particle physics experiments and gather data from them under a specific metaphysical interpretation, i.e., that particles exist or, if you like, more loosely, that detector clicks always trace out classical trajectories. This is a metaphysical assumption. There are other metaphysical interpretations of quantum field theory (QFT) which would lead to different experiments altogether, e.g., that what we observe in a particle physics experiment is evidence of the relationship between the detector and the accelerator. In this second metaphysical interpretation, contrary to your assertion supra, we ARE studying the detector (in concert with the accelerator). In fact, to study the behavior of detectors (and accelerators) IS a study of nature. Apparently, you believe that if we assumed the second metaphysical interpretation of QFT (no particles), we would still be building huge accelerators and looking for the masses of ... well, you tell me.

(I'm preachin' to the crowd now, sorry.) I think it is very similar to someone trying to pin down exact formal definitions for words we use in common speech. The words have meaning but it is not some fixed objective and definable meaning (except of course when we work in fromal contexts such as law or mathematics.) Words are an interaction between people by which we invoke in others a desired mode of thinking. It is process. It isn't just mundane pragmatism which is why I invoke the term "praxic". It includes the poetry and music and inspirational sermons. And carrying the analogy further it to has inexact outcomes.

This sounds like Finkelstein, D. R. Emptiness and relativity. In B. Alan Wallace, ed., Meeting at the Roots, Berkeley CA: Univ, of California Press (2001). You can read it on his website: http://www.physics.gatech.edu/people/faculty/dfinkelstein.html#publications
You might want to read this paper (if you haven't already), I think you'd be interested in it.

As I mentioned words meanings can't be pinned down except in a specifically formal context. However that is what we have in science. The fundamental root is the definition of science as an epistemological discipline. Thus when we ask the meaning of the word "electron" it must in the context of science derive from the process by which we know something about the electron, those acts of observation which distinguish it from a plumb pudding or a slap on the face. And when we ask the meaning of the wave function so too we must look at the scientific root. It is not something we observe but one level abstracted. Its meaning is thus this abstraction, our knowledge of the system, and not the system with which we do interact in our observatories and laboratories.

The reliance on metaphysical interpretation in particle physics is illustrated nicely by answering the question, what is an "electron?" First, one does preprocessing -- you create individual clicks, i.e., spacetime locations, from voltage/current surges in your detector. Second, you do pattern recognition -- you use the clicks you created from voltage/current surges to create tracks, based on the assumption that there are indeed tracts to be found, which means you throw away clicks that don't fit on your best-fit collection of tracks. Third, you do geometrical fitting -- you do curve fitting on the tracts, based on the assumption that there are dynamical entities tracing out these paths, to obtain the dynamical characteristics of the "click-causing particles." This last step is pure classical physics, by the way. After all this massaging of instrument readings, you may find an "electron," i.e., a trajectory characterized dynamically via a particular mass, spin, charge, etc.

To refute my claim, you must argue that we would invest billions of dollars and huge IQ-human-hrs to build these devices and create this data from the instrument readings, announcing the discovery of various particles, even if we rather believed the detector events were the result of the second metaphysical interpretation above, i.e., there are no "click-causing particles." I eagerly await that argument!

You know the old saw about "Have you stopped beating your wife?" I see much of the debate about interpretations and specifically criticism of CI as ritious indignation that I haven't stopped beating my wife without any attempt to understand that I haven't because I'm not even married. CI is not a metaphysical interpetation it is the rejection of metaphysical interpetation. When asked how I can possibly be so stupid as to believe there is no reality, I am taken aback by the assertion that I have made any such claim about reality. To do so would be just as much a heracy in the CI as to assert the reality of the wave-function.

In my view, CI is not the rejection of metaphysical interpretation but the acceptance of ambiguity in the metaphysical interpretation of QM. In other words, there are different ways to think metaphysically about QM which allow physicists to create experiments and turn instrument readings into data. So, why commit to anyone of them? But, that's not part of this argument.

And finally (stretching the religion analogy for all its worth) the agnostic is understandibly offended by the implication that he cannot function morally because he has not taken the leap of faith toward deism. Because the deist derives his moral code from his belief blinds him to the possibility that it could come from another source. This is true only within the context of his belief which as an article of faith he cannot question. So too I take exception with those who assert a metaphysical interpretation is necessary for science to function.

Hence RUTA my overly strong reaction to your post. Though you may not have been making such a pronouncment or not for the same reason, it resembled a bit to me a that sort of bias.

Your reaction was warranted, we do disagree on this very point (as regards particle physics, anyway).

Well pardon this old windbag for his soapbox sermons. You all will get a break as I'm off to Vegas tomorrow early to behave unscientfically for a bit.

On the contrary, I'm very grateful that you are taking the time to argue this point with someone of "lesser ability." Good luck in Vegas