- #141
RUTA
Science Advisor
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Fredrik said:When I say that QM doesn't need an interpretation, I mean the theory of quantum mechanics, not the mathematical model (Hilbert space or something mathematically equivalent), and more specifically, I mean that a theory such as the Copenhagen "interpretation" doesn't need further interpretation. I mean, we obviously need to interpret the mathematics as predictions about the results of experiments, but we don't have to interpret it ontologically as a statement about what "is" and what "really happens".
I agree.
Fredrik said:There are two major problems with the attempts to find an ontological interpretation of QM. The first is that QM may not have an ontological interpretation that has anything to do with reality, and the second is that even if it does, there's nothing we can do to verify that the correct ontological interpretation is in fact correct.
I don't know to what extent we ever verify ontological interpretations, given under determination. As a physicist who is often chastised by philosophers for being a verificationist and empiricist, I think the value of creating new interpretations lies in their ability to suggest new theory and/or experiments.
Fredrik said:You're describing an extreme viewpoint that I don't think many people have. (Does anyone have it?) I think it would be idiotic to refuse to use words like "particle" just because the standard model isn't verifiable. What i think we should do is to continue to say that particles exist, and try to teach as many people as possible what that statement really means. (See #100).
Here are two interpretations of QM whereby there are no "click-causing particles:"
Genuine Fortuitousness, A. Bohr & O. Ulfbeck, Rev. Mod. Phys. 67, 1-35 (1995); A. Bohr, B. Mottelson & O. Ulfbeck, Found. Phys. 34, #3, 405-417 (2004).
Relational Blockworld, Silberstein, M., Stuckey, W.M., Cifone, M., Studies in History & Philosophy of Modern Physics 39(4), 736-751 (2008); Stuckey, W.M., Silberstein, M., Cifone, M., Foundations of Physics 38(4), 348-383 (2008).
I don't know that GF leads to new experiments/theory. RBW does, but until those consequences are accepted for publication, there's nothing to discuss. [We're just now finishing a paper along those lines.]
But, again, I did not post with the intent of arguing for this particular ontological interpretation of QFT. I was simply trying to point out that we would expect to create very different experiments and look for very different data if we subscribed to a very different ontological interpretation of QFT. This strikes me as trivially true, but I'm almost as philosophically naive as the physicists I'm addressing with this claim