Japan Earthquake: Political Aspects

[zapperzero]

So I'm wondering: they lied, but to whom?

To each other, to the public, to the shareholders (you would do well to remember that TEPCO still is a publicly traded company, one that has lost 80% in (shares) value since the beginning of the crisis) and to the international media.

The only truly serious bit is "lying to each other". That has hampered decision-making.

 

[Astronuc]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_34.html

Parents demand lower radiation limit for children

It really is inappropriate to have any radiation exposure limit on children much above background + normal X-rays.

Children 18 and younger should not be exposed to elevated anthropogenic radiation levels beyond those of medical diagnostics. Because of illness or injury, some children may require exposure to radiation (X-rays, CAT-scan, radiotherapy, . . . ) above that of the norm.

When I studied health physics and radiation protection, we learned that children under 18 should not be exposed to elevated levels of radiation.

 

[tsutsuji]

TEPCO is apparently being careful in stating it may have been damaged in the earthquake,

I think you know the technicalities of nuclear power plants much better than I, so if you think that the published data are consistent with the "shut down manually" analysis, I am not going to refute this.

But, from a "more political" perspective, I think that the careful way for Tepco, if some uncertainty is remaining, consists in emphasizing the "Worker error may have led to meltdown" thesis (as the Japan Times title at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110517x1.html is saying) rather than the "Our NPPs's design can't resist earthquakes" thesis.

It is the same problem as for aircraft manufacturers whenever an airliner disaster occurs. It is better and "more careful" for them to assume that the pilot made a mistake than to assume that their design is wrong. In the first case they don't have anything to do. In the other case they have to recall all their airliners and apply retrofits to all of them. The second hypothesis is more costly.

Oops, that is right! Great point. They had cooling and AC power and expected to be able to control cooldown.

Also, generally speaking, earthquakes are something "normal" in Japan :

According to the JMA earthquake catalogues, over 100 thousand events have been recorded in every year, which roughly means that we have about 300 earthquakes per day in Japan.
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/eew/abs/20100910Abstract_YAMAMOTO.pdf

 

[sp2]

Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie; however not divulging facts to them is not lying and if not asked directly they will not reveal voluntary. Japanese (as a matter of fact all Asians) in their mentality will aways try and give a better scenario and more pleasing story than actually is. If this mindset is correct for nuclear managers that I doubt very much.

(It is known that co-pilots at Korean Air would say to the captain: "It is fine weather out there today, is it not captain?" actually meaning "Captain, it is dangerous to fly through that massive thunder storm ahead!")

Having said that and noting the resources spent in arranging a close looped cooling system by flooding reactor 1, I can only conclude that the radiation reports of the 11th evening were ignored, not considered or even not known to the planners of unit 1 cooling. Only once their flooding preparation started, only then they noticed things are not as expected which resulted in going through all the available data and brain storming sessions and new insight was found.

Anyone with extensive experience of Japanese people and culture know that this idea

<<Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie>> is utter nonsense.

They lie all the time --just like every other people on Earth. They just work harder at spinning it, and rationalizing it, so they can pretend to themselves and each other that they're *not* lying.
The simple truth of 'saving face' is that it's all *about* lying.

AFAICT, the greatest effect of this tradition is that it tends to make bad problems worse, and more difficult to fix.

Fukushima, TEPCO, the regulators, and the Japanese government have given us so many prime examples of this effect in the last few months that it might be absurdly funny --if it weren't so utterly tragic.

 

[rowmag]

Also, generally speaking, earthquakes are something "normal" in Japan :

According to the JMA earthquake catalogues, over 100 thousand events have been recorded in every year, which roughly means that we have about 300 earthquakes per day in Japan.
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/eew/abs...t_YAMAMOTO.pdf

Sure, though this was not a normal one. I can easily imagine the operators being in a state of confusion as to which procedures to follow, which instruments to trust, not knowing what's broken, etc. Especially being on the coast with tsunami warnings coming in.

 

[ThomS]

Earthquakes are everyday here - definitely. Generally speaking, people "feel" safer here if there is a small shaker regularly. Specifically, once or twice every 1-2 weeks and strong enough to gently sway one's chair (say Shindo 2 or little 3). In general, when we haven't had an earthquake like above in a while, people begin to worry and wonder if a big one is near.

 

[NUCENG]

I think you know the technicalities of nuclear power plants much better than I, so if you think that the published data are consistent with the "shut down manually" analysis, I am not going to refute this.

But, from a "more political" perspective, I think that the careful way for Tepco, if some uncertainty is remaining, consists in emphasizing the "Worker error may have led to meltdown" thesis (as the Japan Times title at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110517x1.html is saying) rather than the "Our NPPs's design can't resist earthquakes" thesis.

It is the same problem as for aircraft manufacturers whenever an airliner disaster occurs. It is better and "more careful" for them to assume that the pilot made a mistake than to assume that their design is wrong. In the first case they don't have anything to do. In the other case they have to recall all their airliners and apply retrofits to all of them. The second hypothesis is more costly.


Also, generally speaking, earthquakes are something "normal" in Japan :

TEPCO should never get away with blaming this on the reactor operator.

First, Isolation of the Isolation Condenser only applies to Unit 1. Units 2,3, and 4 are also significantly damagesd, and there may have been some damage to units 5 and 6 as well. Second, I have found clear evidence that Japan had not considered geological evidence and even historical earthquakes and tsunamies. That poor operator was following his guidance in accordance with his or her training, procedures, and the information available. Because there was a single point failure (tsunami) the operator was set up to fail.

Only in 2008 did Japan finally reevaluate seismic risk at the plants and then, for reasons totally inconceivable, they ignored tsunami risk which was available and actually discussed by one of their science consultants. That is a management failure, and engineering failure, and a regulatory failure. Add in the Fukuoka condenser tube failure, Kashiwazaki Kariwa, earthquake damage, Tokaimura criticality event, resistance to Probabilistic Risk Analysis, TEPCO coverups of test data, and possible collusion between industry and regulatory agencies, and it makes me wonder if they have just been lucky until the last couple of years. I have just started reading about the history of problems at the Monju breeder reactor.

As to your airline reference, Air France is apparently ready to toss their pilots under the bus (if they can recover the bodies) because they were unable to find the right answer while they were experiencing multiple alarms and control failures they had not been trained on. This forum can help ensure that doesn't happen in the Fukushima Daiichi case.

 

[NUCENG]

Sure, though this was not a normal one. I can easily imagine the operators being in a state of confusion as to which procedures to follow, which instruments to trust, not knowing what's broken, etc. Especially being on the coast with tsunami warnings coming in.

And imagine being on watch while tsunami waters are destroying your car, threatening to collapse the building you are in, and wondering if you still have a home or whether your family got to high ground in time. Not to mention that one of your colleagues is stuck in a crane and probably injured severely, but you can't get to him. Then you count noses and find out two other workers are missing,

 

[rowmag]

Earthquakes are everyday here - definitely. Generally speaking, people "feel" safer here if there is a small shaker regularly. Specifically, once or twice every 1-2 weeks and strong enough to gently sway one's chair (say Shindo 2 or little 3). In general, when we haven't had an earthquake like above in a while, people begin to worry and wonder if a big one is near.

There is a qualitative difference between a Shindo 2 or 3, and a Shindo 6 or 7. The latter is more akin to being in a car wreck: adrenaline, daze, you try to be logical and think you are, but in retrospect realize you were just lucky with the decisions you end up making (or not, as the case may be). Plus the factors NUCENG mentioned, in this case.

Which, on reflection, means humans should ideally not have to be counted on to handle an emergency shut-down. How well could the plant have shut itself down automatically once the SCRAM signal was sent by the seismic interlock, if the operators had been incapacitated, and assuming no power loss, or earthquake or tsunami damage to the plant itself?

 

[NUCENG]

There is a qualitative difference between a Shindo 2 or 3, and a Shindo 6 or 7. The latter is more akin to being in a car wreck: adrenaline, daze, you try to be logical and think you are, but in retrospect realize you were just lucky with the decisions you end up making (or not, as the case may be). Plus the factors NUCENG mentioned, in this case.

Which, on reflection, means humans should ideally not have to be counted on to handle an emergency shut-down. How well could the plant have shut itself down automatically once the SCRAM signal was sent by the seismic interlock, if the operators had been incapacitated, and assuming no power loss, or earthquake or tsunami damage to the plant itself?

I used to joke that the first step in emergency operating procedures should be to shoot all the operators. TMI2 and Chernobyl were made worse by operator actions that defeated automatic protection systems. Unfortunately the automatic protection systems are never intended to deal with severe accidents because they are beyond the design basis by definition. Containment venting, adding boron, using fire systems to inject water, bringing in alternative generators and repairing offsite power were all manual actions beyond the capability of the automatic systems.

 

[rowmag]

Unfortunately the automatic protection systems are never intended to deal with severe accidents because they are beyond the design basis by definition. Containment venting, adding boron, using fire systems to inject water, bringing in alternative generators and repairing offsite power were all manual actions beyond the capability of the automatic systems.

Ok, then suppose it had just been a Shindo 4 -- enough to trip the interlock, say, but not enough to do any damage? (But let's suppose it somehow creates a nitrogen leak in the control room or something that knocks out the operators.) Could the system bring itself safely down unassisted?

 

[Drakkith]

Ok, then suppose it had just been a Shindo 4 -- enough to trip the interlock, say, but not enough to do any damage? (But let's suppose it somehow creates a nitrogen leak in the control room or something that knocks out the operators.) Could the system bring itself safely down unassisted?

I thought that the automatic systems were the ones that immediately shut down the reactors when the quake was detected?

 

[NUCENG]

I thought that the automatic systems were the ones that immediately shut down the reactors when the quake was detected?

Generally there are automated systems to control reactivity (scram), isolate leakage (PCIS), initiate reactor water level control (ECCS), RPV pressure control (SRVs and ADS), and supply power (batteries and diesel generators and pneumatic systems). These systems take the plant to a hot shutdown status. Safely taking the plant from there to cold shutdown requires operator action.

 

[Drakkith]

Generally there are automated systems to control reactivity (scram), isolate leakage (PCIS), initiate reactor water level control (ECCS), RPV pressure control (SRVs and ADS), and supply power (batteries and diesel generators and pneumatic systems). These systems take the plant to a hot shutdown status. Safely taking the plant from there to cold shutdown requires operator action.

Ah ok.

 

[rowmag]

Thanks, NUCENG. So it should hold for a few hours at least until the operators are needed?

 

[andybwell]

Anyone with extensive experience of Japanese people and culture know that this idea

<<Japanese are a nation of honor, they do not lie>> is utter nonsense.

They lie all the time --just like every other people on Earth. They just work harder at spinning it, and rationalizing it, so they can pretend to themselves and each other that they're *not* lying.
The simple truth of 'saving face' is that it's all *about* lying.

AFAICT, the greatest effect of this tradition is that it tends to make bad problems worse, and more difficult to fix.

Fukushima, TEPCO, the regulators, and the Japanese government have given us so many prime examples of this effect in the last few months that it might be absurdly funny --if it weren't so utterly tragic.

Why is it that Fukushima and fallout risk/data is not on any national news on TV?

"We have a Supreme court that has given the "corporation" status equal and greater than the ordinary citizen. GE and Comcast are partners in NBC...and certainly all media companies need chips and other technology from Hitachi and Toshiba, the corporate connections are everywhere."
http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/node/3118

 

[andybwell]

Why is it that Fukushima and fallout risk/data is not on any national news on TV?

"We have a Supreme court that has given the "corporation" status equal and greater than the ordinary citizen. GE and Comcast are partners in NBC...and certainly all media companies need chips and other technology from Hitachi and Toshiba, the corporate connections are everywhere."
http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/node/3118

"Stochastic effects are those that occur by chance. Stochastic effects caused by
ionizing radiation consist primarily of genetic effects and cancer. As the dose to an
individual increases, the probability that cancer or a genetic effect will occur also
increases. However, at no time, even for high doses, is it certain that cancer or
genetic damage will result. Similarly, for stochastic effects, there is no threshold
dose below which it is relatively certain that an adverse effect cannot occur."

Truly terrifying.

http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-manuals/em385-1-80/c-3.pdf

 

[tsutsuji]

A long and detailed Asahi article on the impact of top-level US-Japan diplomacy on Fukushima decision making : http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201105200150.html

 

[jlduh]

new picture of unit 3 with iaea team: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110527_3.jpg
On the left we can see 2nd fuel machine, and big crane in center

One is Philippe Jamet, Head, Division of Nuclear Installation Safety at IAEA.
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/multimedia/videos/safety/npp/jamet/index.html

By the way everything he is saying in this video is a premonition, several month before, of what occurred at Fukushima...

The analysis is perfect. Not sure the actions were (or will be) as effective.

 

[andybwell]

SWITZERLAND!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13556283

 

[turi]

SWITZERLAND!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13556283

Uh, that's just the government. Parliament will discuss this too and then it's quite certain that there will be referendums and initiatives to be decided by the citizens. Quite possible that the voters will approve a plan to phase out nuclear energy, but it's certainly too early to say.

 

[zapperzero]

Here's a new political angle for you to chew on: the summer winds are blowing towards China.

 

[AntonL]

new picture of unit 3 with iaea team: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110527_3.jpg

Can someone please explain to me the added value of this huge IAEA teem in Japan. They said their study will be based on data provided by TEPCO, they are not collecting anything of their own. To my mind the IAEA delegation is nothing more than a international show at great cost to the international community and host. Looking at the IAEA site and at their http://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/sets/72157626815913418/" I have the impression it is a Mike Weightman promotion, we see MW in many poses and picture always titled "MW this and that" but all other team members do not have names. Oops, sorry I am being unfair to Greg Webb who operated the camera and is mentioned in small print.

Analysing IAEA latest report (my comments added):

The IAEA's Fact-Finding Mission in Japan visited the tsunami-damaged Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on 27 May 2011, the final site visit of the team's programme to identify lessons from the Japanese nuclear accident that could help improve global nuclear safety.
what the team did and the justification thereof. Did they learn anything new?

The team's international experts from 12 nations held discussions with top plant operating officials and toured the six-reactor facility.
keeping the top plant operating officials from doing their job, of the 40+ tepco staff possibly only 2 or 3 addressed the meeting

"Visiting Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was a once-in-a-lifetime experience - once in 10 lifetimes, I suspect. Our team left with great admiration for the extraordinary workers who have been undertaking such immensely difficult tasks," said team leader Mike Weightman, the United Kingdom's chief inspector of nuclear installations.
what else should he say after that visit and witnessing the power of nature which man will never tame

Next for the team are continuing discussions with Japanese officials from a variety of agencies as part of an exchange of technical data that will assist the mission in drafting its report, which will be presented to the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety at IAEA headquarters in Vienna on 20 to 24 June
and wasting more time of Japanese officials and in the end they will repack the data and findings that they received from the Japanese and present it proudly as their own findings. Will there be anything new? No, in my opinon just a rehash what has already been said by various observers and analysts

Without hands-on work no new insight will be obtained!

or am I just being to hard?

 

[Godzilla1985]

Since unit 4 fuel pool fears receded to some extent, reactor 3 is the only likely candidate where images from outside the building could tell us much. And the area of real interest is going to be hard to see unless they actively decide to get a camera closer to that area when lighting conditions are at their best.

Uh, if they can get a camera in the debris-filled spent fuel pool of #3, surely they've already captured the area where the reactor resides on high definition film from just about every angle imaginable and know for a fact whether it's covered or not. TEPCO knows. Everyone else is in the dark. That's another example of a "cover-up", whether for better or worse, no matter how TEPCO would like to redefine it. Maybe they're still a "private" entity in the eyes of the law, but perhaps they should reconsider now that this is a "public" problem of epic proportions.

I mean, c'mon, that Putzmeister dangled a camera right above the spent fuel pool - which is right next to the reactor. They have photos of that whole area. Why haven't they showed them, especially if they're inconclusive?

Go easy on Jim, he's a nice old man who's been around the industry and knows his instruments.

Moderators, feel free to move post to other thread as it's probably more appropriate in the "political" one.

Just one more question: are we 100% sure here that the core resides underneath the crane? That seemed to be the consensus view earlier on (I've read all ~8,000 posts), but is there still any doubt?

 

[Danuta]

Can someone please explain to me the added value of this huge IAEA teem in Japan. They said their study will be based on data provided by TEPCO, they are not collecting anything of their own. To my mind the IAEA delegation is nothing more than a international show at great cost to the international community and host.

Seeing as the IAEA has become nothing more than a bunch of door-to-door nuclear sales people they are probably there to see what nuclear-related "stuff and services" TEPCO will require for the ongoing and future cleanup so as they can hook them up with the right suppier/s.

Sales reps aren't going to collect technical disaster data and re-analyse it. Not their job.

Or, am *I* the one being too hard?

 

[andybwell]

This is a conversation between the WSJ and a senior Japanese Politician that finally tells the truth as he sees it! The underlining is mine.

 

[andybwell]

Here is the relevant conversation by the "retired" politician! The underlining is mine.

By YUKA HAYASHI And TOKO SEKIGUCHI

The following is a partial transcript from The Wall Street Journal Interview with Japan senior political figure Ichiro Ozawa, who is calling on Prime Minister Naoto Kan to step down. Ozawa is a long-time rival within the ruling Democratic Party of Japan and is facing charges of improprieties over his fund-raising organization.

Q: By and large, how would you assess the government's response to the earthquake and nuclear crisis?

A: It's been two months, actually 70 days, but the situation at the nuclear reactors is still out of control.

The Kan administration's handling of the situation has been extremely slow. Their understanding of the gravity of the radioactive contamination has been altogether too rosy, or rather they haven't understood it at all.

The administration hasn't taken the initiative in making decisions and executing policies. Decision-making equals taking responsibility. So if nobody is taking responsibility, nothing is being decided.

Q: Why didn't the Kan administration inform the public of the severity of the problems at the nuclear plants? Did they know?

A: Of course the administration knew.

Q: What could the government have done to prevent the flare-up in the nuclear crisis?

A: First of all, it makes no sense to point fingers at Tepco (plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co.), given the current situation. There are a lot of arguments going on, blaming TEPCO, blaming this person and that person. They are all meaningless. There is no point in blaming Tepco. I strongly believe the government must take the leadership and take the initiative in determining what to do. In reality, Tepco is no longer capable of doing anything. (By not facing reality) we are moving toward a tragedy, day by day.

Q: Prime Minister Kan set up a task force and has stationed government officials inside Tepco's offices so they can keep tabs on the company. Is that enough?

A: When Tepco knew what was happening at the nuclear plants, the government must have known it as well. As I said, they can't go on blaming others. The government must take responsibility and take the lead in coming up with solutions.

Q: If you had been in charge, would you have disclosed all the information about the meltdown in the initial stage?

A: Yes. I would have. There is no use in holding back information. We have to decide what to do, based on the premise of the information we have. This problem may be contained in Fukushima for now, but the contamination may spread outside of Fukushima. Anxiety and frustration are growing. People cannot live in the contaminated areas. These areas are becoming uninhabitable. Japan has lost its territory by that much. If we do nothing, even Tokyo could become off limits. There is a huge amount of uranium fuels in the plants, much more than in Chernobyl. This is a terrible situation. The government doesn't tell the truth and people live in a happy-go-lucky...

Q: Mr. Kan seems to have turned to many people for advice. What seems to be the problem?

A: It's not enough. Precisely, it's meaningless to put together a team made up exclusively of people who depend on nuclear power to make a living. All of them are members of the nuclear mafia. Did you see all those scholars saying "the crisis is not so terrible," "won't harm the health at all" on TV? What they say is meaningless because they depend on nuclear power for their livelihood. But people, and the Japanese media, don't understand it. The Japanese media is helpless.
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Re: Thread to discuss CURRENT events at Fukushima Quote [+] #

Ichiro Ozawa [link to en.wikipedia.org]
May be not retired but too old to care.
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He's not too old. he simply wants to form the next government.
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He's not too old. he simply wants to form the next government.
Quoting: Anonymous Coward 1356602

I think the immensity of his statement is that he is telling the truth as he sees it in public!
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He's not too old. he simply wants to form the next government.
Quoting: Anonymous Coward 1356602

I think the immensity of his statement is that he is telling the truth as he sees it in public!
Quoting: Anonymous Coward 1404555It takes it out of forums that state "don't believe a dam thing you read here" into msm.

 

[gmax137]

Well I finally had time to view the show, and it was pretty interesting. One thing that continues unabated is the repeated juxtaposition of (admittedly dramatic) weapons test films with discussion of nuclear power. Just because Weinberg and Seaborg et al worked on the Manhattan project doesn't mean that a power plant is a bomb factory. This 'journalistic' fantasy has been a staple of the anti-nuclear-power movement ever since the US and USSR began negotiating down the weapons stockpiles. Many well-meaning people have fallen for this story. See, for example:

... there was as second reason why these leading countries wanted to build a profitable civil nuclear industry: the race they were involved in was also a military one, and as i mentionned already in some previous posts, they needed PLUTONIUM in larger quantities for the bombs and missiles... And one way to get it was through civil reactors, where PU is a byproduct of the nuclear fission in used cores. This is a know fact that civil nuclear birth happened as a close brother of military nuclear.

Nobody has ever used a BWR to produce weapons grade plutonium. Why? Because a BWR is operated for 12 to 18 months between refuelings, and this ensures that the spent fuel contains large amounts of Pu-240 in addition to the Pu-239. If you wanted to make a bomb out of the fuel, you'd need to separate out the 240, a profligate source of neutrons that would ruin any attempt to make a weapon with the material. And, if you have the technology to separate the Pu-240 from the Pu-239, then you can just as well make a uranium bomb and skip the BWR step.

Reactors run to create Pu-239 for bombs are run for short times between refueling, or have the ability to add and remove fuel while operating. To refuel a BWR, you need to remove the vessel closure head, and then remove all of the steam separator/dryer components before you can even see the fuel. There is no connection between a BWR and the weapons.

I disagree.
The point being made is about the overall cultural interrelation of civil use of nuclear power and military use.
It is historically true that military use came first, and that the era of first diffusion of civil nuclear plants was also a period of cold war and military weapons proliferation.

The technical fact that a BWR reactor may not be the best reactor to breed military grade plutonium does not undermine, I think, the cultural point being made.

Even recently when IRAN was supposedly building plants for claimed civil use, the international comunity was suspicious to say the least.

By the way if a nation is determined to produce military grade plutonium and can only get his hands on a BWR could it be possible to make a shorter run with a core of fuel just to obtain better chances of extracting military grade plutonium from it ?

Thanks for the reply, sorry I've been away for a week or so. I'm not sure what I said that you disagree with. Can you amplify / clarify your first paragraph? What do you mean by a 'cultural interrelation'? How is it manifested?

...and that the era of first diffusion of civil nuclear plants was also a period of cold war and military weapons proliferation.

I find this particularly baffling. Is there something about, say, a 1956 Chevy, or a Boeing 707, or Liz Taylor, that embodies the cold war -- just because they share the same time period?

As to the Iran nuclear program, nobody is really concerned if Iran wants to run a nuclear power plant to make electricity. The concern is with the Iranian position - that they want to enrich their own uranium.

And as far as making plutonium with a BWR on a short cycle - I suppose it could be done, but then the plant wouldn't be making much if any electricity; then why build all of the attendant infrastructure (turbines, condensers, generators, electrical switchyards, etc etc). Especially when it is obvious that the unit isn't supplying power to the local grid?

 

[Luca Bevil]

Ok you are right I was cryptic.
What I meant is that in the first phases of nuclear power safety was not a first and foremost concern.

WWII first, then the cold war I think (I was not born then, just trying to extrapolate for my memories as a child in late 60s early 70s) made the public decision makers and society as a whole much more used to extreme risks, in this context the likelyhood of safety accidents in civil plants could have been underestimated even more than in recent days.

where do I get this impression... well for example the fact that the Chicago Pile 1 was built in such a populated area is a sign of both an incomplete perception of the scale of the danger and a society used to extreme risks and death

 

[gmax137]

Luca, the chicago pile made 200 watts (http://www.atomicheritage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=297). That's the heat output of a medium-large light bulb. And if you don't think Fermi & Zinn et al were concerned with safety, you need to read more on the subject.

Interestingly, the CP-1 led to Argonne national lab (still in Illinois) which (I believe) ran the National Reactor Testing Station out in Idaho (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idaho_Reactor_Testing_Station). The list of experiments done there (in the quest for reactor safety) is astounding.

 

[sono]

A reminder to all of us that it's never wrong to have better damage control equipment and plans, because when the proverbial **** hits the fan, every bit of pre-planning counts. Sadly, irrational decisionmaking and wishful thinking resulted in emergency-suitable robots being phased out 5 years ago:

Five years before the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami triggered the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, Japan's six robots that could venture into a radiation-filled reactor building were consigned to the scrap heap.

The reasons ranged from the uneasiness they caused nuclear plant employees, to the belief that a nuclear power accident could never occur in technologically advanced Japan.

http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201105260175.html

 

[sono]

in this context the likelyhood of safety accidents in civil plants could have been underestimated even more than in recent days.

You have no idea what kind of cowboy mentality was prevalent in the early years... For a little shocker/introduction, watch this

 

[Luca Bevil]

Luca, the chicago pile made 200 watts (http://www.atomicheritage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=297). That's the heat output of a medium-large light bulb. And if you don't think Fermi & Zinn et al were concerned with safety, you need to read more on the subject.

Interestingly, the CP-1 led to Argonne national lab (still in Illinois) which (I believe) ran the National Reactor Testing Station out in Idaho (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idaho_Reactor_Testing_Station). The list of experiments done there (in the quest for reactor safety) is astounding.

Well it seems that we keep on disagreeing but in a very civilised way and interesting discussion.
Thank you for the stimulus and feedback.

I'd like to read your view on what is written in the book "Nuclear Safety" by Gianni Petrangeli.
It can be read at http://www.scribd.com/doc/40037799/Nuclear-Safety-Gianni-Petrangeli

page 2 gives a schematic of safety measures at CP1 and a speculative explanation of the acronym SCRAM

According to the author "In the light of subsequent approaches used in
reactor safety, probably, in this first period, not all the necessary precautions were taken; however, it is necessary to consider the specific time and circumstances present (a world war in progress or just finished, status of radiation protection knowledge not yet sufficiently advanced, etc.).

On this specific point I kind of share Petrangeli evaluation.
On other book topics my view is much more harsh than Petrangeli view.
In short I deem "complacent", and short minded, economically blinded the attitude toward nuclear safety that has been prevailing in many cases and has unfortunately been factually demonstated at Fukushima.

My hope is that such an attitude will be drastically reconsidered.
I'll be looking forward to read your opinion.
My best regards
Luca

 

[jlduh]

As a direct consequence of the Fukushima disaster, Angela Merkel just announced today that Germany is going to definitively shutdown its 17 nuclear reactors in the next 11 years: 14 before 2021, and the 3 most recent ones in 2022.

Recent polls show that 60 per cent of Germans wanted to shutdown all 17 nuclear plants in the country, with 70 per cent fearful that a Japanese-style disaster could happen in Germany.

http://www.therecord.com/news/world/article/539928--germany-announces-plan-to-shut-down-all-nuclear-power-plants-by-2022

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/30/germany-to-shut-nuclear-reactors

This decision is today a big subject here in France as you can imagine (France being a strong promoter of nuclear industries!).

Just heard also that the nuclear electricity is subject to price increases in the next years (supposedly because of investments in nuclear safety... which was already safe, were they keeping saying. ?). That may be also a strategy from EDF Suez here in France to justify huge price increases (they already started!) in the next years, they have now (since several years) shareholders to please!

But they have to be very careful with this strategy to justify price increases...

Because the gap between prices of renewable energies and nuclear electricity will decrease, which will bring the critical question: why pay the same prices if the risks are higher? This has always been the big justification here in France for nuclear power: it costs less! But based on the lastest high price increases (and the planned ones!) this starts to bother more and more people. It seems that some projections of costs for latest generations of nuclear plants (like EPR from AREVA) leads to a doubling of production costs in comparison with the ones from the first generations...

In this case, why take the risk of having nuclear plants in a country if the cost advantage evaporates?

(remember you have to take into accout the cost for intalling ad maintaining a huge grid which is also related to big centralized production policy).

 

[jlduh]

Something to add to the previous post...

The cost of "cleaning" (if even possible) could be between 50 times and 165 times the investment cost of one single reactor (I took 2 billions dollars for unit cost)!


http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/31_24.html

Fukushima cleanup could cost up to $250 billion

A private think tank says the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant could cost Japan up to 250 billion dollars over the next 10 years.The estimate is part of the Nuclear Safety Commission's ongoing survey of opinions on the disaster from nuclear and other experts.[...] the costs of the accident could range from nearly 71 to 250 billion dollars. The figure includes 54 billion to buy up all land within 20 kilometers of the plant, 8 billion for compensation payments to local residents, and 9 to 188 billion to scrap the plant's reactors.

Iwata said a drastic review of the government's nuclear energy policy is necessary to fund the cleanup.He said the government could channel about 71 billion dollars to the necessary fund over the next decade by freezing research and development projects linked to the nuclear fuel cycle.Another 150 billion could come from Tokyo Electric Power Company's reserve fund, and the government's nuclear energy-related budgets.