Japan Earthquake: Political Aspects

[tsutsuji]

The IAEA is afraid that the Japanese government might set more severe decontamination standards than the IAEA is ready to accept:

The Japanese authorities (...) are encouraged to avoid over-conservatism which could not effectively contribute to the reduction of exposure doses.
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/G129rev1_e.pdf advice 1 p. 4

for the next cropping season there is room for removing some of the conservatism
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/G129rev1_e.pdf advice 8 p. 5

Instead of "As low as reasonably achievable", the IAEA's philosophy seems to be "as high as reasonably achievable" :

It is important to avoid classifying as “radioactive waste” such waste materials that do not cause exposures that would warrant special radiation protection measures.
(...)
Residues that satisfy the clearance level can be used in various ways, such as the construction of structures, reclamations, banks and roads.
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/G129rev1_e.pdf advice 5 p. 5

This would allow the removed material to be used in selected applications, e.g. together with clean material in the construction of structures, banks, reclamations or roads that will not pose undue risks to members of the public.
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/G129rev1_e.pdf p.12

Pursuing a management strategy for all of these contaminated materials as radioactive waste due to over-conservatism would lead to enormous challenges in the timely establishment of a completely new infrastructure with regard to human resources, transportation and large facilities for processing and storage.
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/G129rev1_e.pdf p.19

 

[zapperzero]

No criticism planned or intended. I have no argument with you personally and neither of us will make that decision.

This is all hypothetical, of course. But I expressed myself in that manner to emphasize the fact that I agree with you - such a venture may very well yield nothing but a net loss of time, money and human health.

 

[etudiant]

The IAEA is afraid that the Japanese government might set more severe decontamination standards than the IAEA is ready to accept:



Instead of "As low as reasonably achievable", the IAEA's philosophy seems to be "as high as reasonably achievable" :

I had thought that the Japanese government response was painfully uncoordinated and minimalist. So the IAEA comments to me seemed to be a recommendation to focus on the big picture and maximize the relief rather than to waste effort on something impractical such as removing several inches of soil across very large areas.
Tsutsuji- sans comment really makes me sit up and reflect. Very interesting perspective.

 

[joewein]

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/rc20111020a3.html" that appeared in the paper last Sunday.

Okutama is no Chernobyl

By JOE WEIN
Tokyo
I commend Giovanni Fazio in his letter of Oct. 16 for drawing attention to the fact that Okutama, with some of the highest radiation levels in Tokyo, is also a major source of drinking water for its 13 million people. However, he overstates his case when claiming "Tokyo tap water comes from an area with cesium contamination at levels equivalent to the Chernobyl evacuation zones."

A helicopter survey found most of the mountains around Lake Okutama to be contaminated with between 10,000 and 30,000 Bq/m² of cesium 137. The "permanent control zone" around Chernobyl is defined as 555,000 Bq/m² and more while the evacuated "closed zone" is polluted with 1,480,000 Bq/m² and more.

We would not even be discussing such numbers if Tepco had invested in a scrubber to filter the emergency venting system of its reactors. Thirty years ago Sweden installed the so-called FILTRA system at its boiling water reactors. None of the Japanese nuclear power stations have such external scrubbers, which would have been dirt cheap compared to now trying to decontaminate hundreds of square kilometers of polluted land. Their installation should be mandatory for any reactors allowed to resume power production.

 

[rmattila]

Thirty years ago Sweden installed the so-called FILTRA system at its boiling water reactors.

To be accurate, FILTRA is the name of the large gravel bed installation installed only at the Barsebäck site - all other Swedish (and Finnish) BWR:s got a smaller wet scrubber system, called plainly "filtered pressure reduction system of reactor containment", or shortly "system 362".

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.47news.jp/CN/201110/CN2011102001000778.html A petition requesting the decommissionning of all of the 10 nuclear reactors in Fukushima prefecture was passed at Fukushima prefectoral assembly.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://mytown.asahi.com/ibaraki/news.php?k_id=08000001110250001 Ibaraki prefecture's nuclear safety commission has held its first open door meeting in its 32 year long history. On 24 October, the commission members heard the explanations of Tokai Daini NPP's plant manager about the NPP's safety measures. A wall able to withstand 15 m tsunamis will be built in three years' time.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20111025/t10013494961000.html The Atomic Energy Commission of Japan had a meeting on 25 October about the cost of severe accidents. An estimate of the cost of severe accidents under the hypothesis that such accidents occur from once in 500 years to once in 100,000 years is ¥ 0.0046 to 1.2 ¥ per kilowatt. The commission concludes that the cost of nuclear energy should increase from ¥ 5 to ¥ 6 (or ¥ 6 to ¥ 7) per kilowatt, and this is still the cheapest way of producing electricity. However one member pointed out that the cost of decontamination over wide areas (such as forests) and the cost of the disposal of the generated waste is not integrated in the estimate. According to him, the cost of severe accidents is 16 ¥ per kilowatt. His remark was added as reference in the report.

 

[Martin Peters]

Thank you, Tsutsuji, for the extensive information you have provided.

The cost of energy that you mentioned is given in the original article in terms of yen per kilowatt-hour (not per kilowatt).

 

[tsutsuji]

The cost of energy that you mentioned is given in the original article in terms of yen per kilowatt-hour (not per kilowatt).

Thanks for correcting the mistake.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/local/news/20111029-OYT1T00194.htm & http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/ann/news/web/html/211101003.html Three candidates (current mayor Kunio Hiramatsu, former governor Toru Hashimoto, and communist party's Koichi Watashi) of Osaka city's mayoral election (27 November 2011) advocate "exit from nuclear dependency". Osaka city owns 9% of Kansai Electric.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.nikkei.com/news/headline...19481E2E0E2E0988DE2E0E3E3E0E2E3E38297EAE2E2E2 Minister of economy and industry Yukio Edano reprimended NISA chief Hiroyuki Fukano for being late because the NISA, which had learned about the risk of transient criticality at Fukushima Daiichi unit 2 late in the night of November 1, contacted the prime minister's office after 7 AM on November 2. According to cabinet chief secretary Osamu Fujimura, because temperature and pressure levels are stable, the NISA juged that "it is not a situation where a danger is immediately occurring" and waited until the next morning to tell the Prime Minister. Osamu Fujimura learned about the events at around 9 AM after he came to the Kantei. Nuclear accident recovery is the government's top priority and information about possible nuclear fission must be passed to the government without delay, he said, criticizing the NISA.

 

[URob]

Instead of "cold shutdown". How about "gassed up and ready to go".

 

[ThinkToday]

I don't think taking the time to thoughtfully assess the cost (men/dose/money) v. benefit (information) of taking a look inside is a bad thing. I don't think a determination of what would be gained NOW and what would be changed NOW based on that look inside is a bad thing, especially if other assessment tools can be used. Beyond the obvious, my concern is the Japanese version of the NRC doesn't drag cleanup out the way it was at TMI, and end up with a systems (gasket/seal/pump/door/electronic monitoring, etc.) failures and rusted everything) because they weren't designed to be unattended for years on end. i.e. proceed carefully, but proceed.

As a former HP, I tend towards caution in opening things up and poking around. It would appear the “Lessons Learned” studies were left unread. I remember working at different sites in the US after TMI retrofitting systems identified from lessons learned. I’m curious if other countries took our lessons learned to heart. It seems like post accident cleanup strategies would be factored into plant design after TMI, and for that matter, after SL1. I think we’ve all gotten over the “it can’t happen here” thing. Anyone know what changed in Japan after TMI, if anything? I haven’t set foot in a plant for many years, but I’d think (hope) it’s better.

 

[clancy688]

Outsourced from the https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3613496&postcount=11658":

If I choose to be anti-nuke I want it based on sound science, NOT political considerations or activist driven pseudo science.

150.000 permanent displaced people are a perfect scientific reason, at least for me. I don't oppose nuke power because it's "killing more people than coal or whatever" - I oppose it because it has the capability to displace millions of people and wreck entire economies. If something goes wrong.

Let's take the current Fukushima example. The Tokyo metropolitan area is the economic hub and engine of Japan. It's the largest metropolitan economy of the world. One third of Japans GDP comes from Tokyo alone.
Let's imagine the whole Tokyo area would've been hit with 20-100 mSv/a+ radiation. First, we'd have over 30 million displaced people. And second, Japan would lose one third of its economy. The world would lose one third of Japans economy.
I don't even want to imagine the global recession which would've followed. A nightmare.

No burning coal plant has the ability to wreck entire economies. No gas plant. No wind turbine. If a dam fails, hydroelectric power may have the ability to wreak havoc over thousands of square miles. But there you can immediately start rebuilding everything once the water has drained. With a nuclear accident, you cannot. You have to wait for dozens of years until the nuclides are gone.

 

[Astronuc]

Instead of "cold shutdown". How about "gassed up and ready to go".

The Fukushima units 1-4 are history. Once they severely damaged the core, including control blades, possibly with some fuel melting, and then added seawater, those units are damaged beyond repair. Those units will have to be demolished.

 

[SteveElbows]

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/rc20111020a3.html" that appeared in the paper last Sunday.

Venting should be scrubbed as much as possible. However at Fukushima it seems likely that quite a lot of the contamination did not come from venting. For example various release estimate data suggests that reactor 2 was responsible for a lot of the contamination, and that reactor never got to vent through the stack. It is not possible to be completely sure about this because reactor 3 and the reactor building 4 explosion, along with any continued output from reactor 1, could be responsible for an unknown percentage of the emissions which fell on land on the March 15th peak. But at this point we certainly cannot rule out the prospect that far more than 50% of the contamination of Japanese land didn't come out through the proper venting path. Another factor is that the wind is though to have taken the initial reactor 3 venting emissions out to sea rather than contaminating the land.

 

[URob]

Originally Posted by URob
Instead of "cold shutdown". How about "gassed up and ready to go".
The Fukushima units 1-4 are history. Once they severely damaged the core, including control blades, possibly with some fuel melting, and then added seawater, those units are damaged beyond repair. Those units will have to be demolished.

Sorry, I thought one of the reactors was in cold shutdown prior to the accident.

 

[Astronuc]

Originally Posted by URob
Instead of "cold shutdown". How about "gassed up and ready to go".
The Fukushima units 1-4 are history. Once they severely damaged the core, including control blades, possibly with some fuel melting, and then added seawater, those units are damaged beyond repair. Those units will have to be demolished.

Sorry, I thought one of the reactors was in cold shutdown prior to the accident.

Unit 4 reactor was empty, while Units 1, 2 and 3 scrammed when the sensors detected the earthquake. The secondary containment of Unit 4 was damaged by fire and some kind of explosion when hydrogen, apparently from Unit 3, ignited.

TEPCO's focus has been on trying to stabilize or bring to cold shutdown conditions, Units 1, 2 and 3. Besides the reactor cores, the balance of plant areas of Units 1-4 were also heavily damaged or destroyed.

 

[joewein]

Venting should be scrubbed as much as possible. However at Fukushima it seems likely that quite a lot of the contamination did not come from venting.

Steve,

I think even in that scenario the unscrubbed vent path still plays a significant role, because the absence of more effective scrubbers may have acted as an incentive to postpone venting as much as possible in order not having to release unscrubbed gas into the environment around the plant.

Once the zirconium reaction set in, they had to vent to reduce pressure from hydrogen, but at the same time the fuel was already damaged by then, so it would have meant release of radioactivity. If they thought there was still a chance of restarting one of the cooling systems, gambling on the containment surviving until then may have looked like the lesser of two evils.

Had there been effective scrubbing available on the hardened vent path, earlier venting may have looked like the lesser evil. Tepco might have avoided the burst suppression chamber in unit 2 or gases leaking out around the reactor lid flanges in unit 3 and massive hydrogen explosion (if this is what led to those massive releases of radioactivity from these two units, far worse than from unit 1 which was vented).

 

[zapperzero]

Once the zirconium reaction set in, they had to vent to reduce pressure from hydrogen, but at the same time the fuel was already damaged by then, so it would have meant release of radioactivity. If they thought there was still a chance of restarting one of the cooling systems, gambling on the containment surviving until then may have looked like the lesser of two evils.

This stuff should have been spelled out clearly in the severe accident management guidelines. There should have been no delays induced by decision-making and certainly no gambling. No electricity, water level so and so, pressure so and so, IC inactive? Vent. Now. No ifs, no buts, no waiting for the buses to leave or for the prime-minister to give the order.

 

[URob]

Tepco http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201111240030
“Radioactive materials (such as cesium) that scattered and fell from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant belong to individual landowners there, not TEPCO.” ~ Tokyo Electric Power Company...

 

[NUCENG]

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201111240030
“Radioactive materials (such as cesium) that scattered and fell from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant belong to individual landowners there, not TEPCO.” ~ Tokyo Electric Power Company...

Wow. That makes no sense, but is typical when lawyers are involved. By that logic a chemical polluter is not responsible for cleanup either.

PS corrected link in the quoted section above.

 

[Astronuc]

Tepco http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201111240030
“Radioactive materials (such as cesium) that scattered and fell from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant belong to individual landowners there, not TEPCO.” ~ Tokyo Electric Power Company...

That's disgraceful, as well as absurd.

 

[clancy688]

By that logic, the people of Texas owned all parts of the space shuttle Columbia which fell on their property. Therefore there should've been no obligation to return those parts to NASA.

 

[Caniche]

That's disgraceful, as well as absurd.

that's the logic of the market, absurd I know, but since we have no input let's just test it to destruction,good for a laff ψ

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111215/1005_shinsei.html Fukushima prefecture has decided not to apply for a 3 billion yen subsidy it is entitled to as a prefecture hosting nuclear power plants. This is consistent with the prefectoral assembly motion requesting the decommissioning of all NPPs in Fukushima prefecture. A number of local governments such as Minamisoma have also decided not to apply for NPP-related subsidies. Kagoshima prefecture and Satsumasendai city are also not applying for the subsidy concerning the extension of Sendai NPP.

 

[zapperzero]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111215/1005_shinsei.html Fukushima prefecture has decided not to apply for a 3 billion yen subsidy it is entitled to as a prefecture hosting nuclear power plants.

Sudden outbreak of common sense?

 

[NUCENG]

Sudden outbreak of common sense?

I'm not sure it makes a lot of sense for them to turn down that money. There will be recovery work ongoing at the Fukushima Daichi plants for up to 40 years from the latest estimates. They probably won't be paying taxeds since they won't be producing any profit. In the meantime the prefecture has a huge displaced population, security and other ongoing expenses. Does accepting that money obligate them to allow F1-5, F1-6, and Fukushima Daini to resume operation?

 

[zapperzero]

I am skimming through docs that NUCENG has graciously provided in another thread.
I came across this wonderful example of doublethink and I thought I'd share:

"The potential for containment failure from core melt accidents
has been under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) for some time. The possibility of early failure with the
potential for a large release of radioactivity (aerosol concentration
is higher early in the accident) is the principle reason
for this attention. Containment loads that might lead to such
failure can result from severe accidents not normally considered
in the design basis of nuclear power plants.

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/6476557-e9NERk/6476557.pdf
bolding is mine. NRC is aware of the possibility, but does not think plants should be designed taking the possibility into account, yet proceeds with analyzing the possibility because of its likeliness.

 

[zapperzero]

Does accepting that money obligate them to allow F1-5, F1-6, and Fukushima Daini to resume operation?

Presumably you cannot benefit from something AND want it gone

 

[NUCENG]

Presumably you cannot benefit from something AND want it gone

As opposed to typical decisions by politicians in every other country on earth, that makes Japan the sole exception! (Sorry, no emoticon for BIGGER GRIN.)

 

[zapperzero]

As opposed to typical decisions by politicians in every other country on earth, that makes Japan the sole exception! (Sorry, no emoticon for BIGGER GRIN.)

We have to conclude that politicians transition from elastic to plastic deformation mode when their approval rate drops below the "pitchforks and torches" threshold

 

[NUCENG]

I am skimming through docs that NUCENG has graciously provided in another thread.
I came across this wonderful example of doublethink and I thought I'd share:


http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/6476557-e9NERk/6476557.pdf
bolding is mine. NRC is aware of the possibility, but does not think plants should be designed taking the possibility into account, yet proceeds with analyzing the possibility because of its likeliness.

Just a wee bit overstated and out of context. The fallacy is to imply that a scenario must be part of design basis if it is possible. It is possible that an asteroid will hit a nuclear plant. Any idea on how we should design for that? It is possible that the end of the world will occur on December 21, 2012. Does anyone plan to not shop for Christmas? Should nuclear plants in Nebraska and Iowa design for tsunamis? The report you are quoting addresses possibilities, but not the probability of the event. Japan's accident does not automatically mean every plant is vulnerable to the same scenario. For example, if plants implement actions to address extended station blackouts and harden against external events (i.e., flooding), are further upgrades to hardened vent systems really going to improve safety?

Another example of a question to consider: In Japan there were problems with steam driven heat removal systems (HPCI, RCIC, and Isolation Condensers). There were no low pressure safety systems available due to loss of AC power. The plants delayed depressurization and venting hoping to use the steam driven systems as long as possible. If the corrective actions taken in haste are to require earlier depressurization and venting in hopes of using fire pumps as alternative injection sources, does that actually increase risk? Consider that at Fukushima these alternate injection systems were disrupted at least twice by the hydrogen explosions. If you add filters to the hardened wetwell vent systems what impact does the backpressure have on its venting capacity? The optimum solution is not obvious.

 

[zapperzero]

Just a wee bit overstated and out of context. The fallacy is to imply that a scenario must be part of design basis if it is possible. The report you are quoting addresses possibilities, but not the probability of the event.

If it's probable enough to spend money on experiments and analysis, maybe it is probable enough to take into account in the design process?

Japan's accident does not automatically mean every plant is vulnerable to the same scenario. For example, if plants implement actions to address extended station blackouts and harden against external events (i.e., flooding), are further upgrades to hardened vent systems really going to improve safety?

I happen to believe that hardened vents are a poor idea so I don't know how to reply to the specific question. I am aware that planning to fight the last war can be somewhat stupid, but now that I think of it, these are machines; commonalities of design imply common failure modes.

Another example of a question to consider: In Japan there were problems with steam driven heat removal systems (HPCI, RCIC, and Isolation Condensers). There were no low pressure safety systems available due to loss of AC power. The plants delayed depressurization and venting hoping to use the steam driven systems as long as possible.

They delayed because of the aforementioned hardened vent system, whose existence gave them the choice between a massive, intentional contaminants release NOW and a possibly even larger, but unintentional release LATER. That is a bad choice to present someone with in a complex crisis situation. In the event, the venting system turned out to not be operational in at least one reactor, sadly.

If the corrective actions taken in haste are to require earlier depressurization and venting in hopes of using fire pumps as alternative injection sources, does that actually increase risk? Consider that at Fukushima these alternate injection systems were disrupted at least twice by the hydrogen explosions. If you add filters to the hardened wetwell vent systems what impact does the backpressure have on its venting capacity? The optimum solution is not obvious.

I think that requiring earlier depressurization increases the risk of seeing another big release, while somewhat decreasing the risk of another melt-through. I do not believe that anyone has analyzed the respective risks to the population before making this decision. It seems moot anyway, as the target should be "no release".

As to backpressure, I think there is such a measure as the effective cross-section of a filter. One just has to make it big enough. The swedes seem to be on the right track, to me, with their artificial swamp thing.

Another solution if you want a small, cheap filter would be to have a buffer somewhere, a bladder or a hole in the ground or a long pipe or something and vent into that first, then rely on the filter for subsequent, smaller releases and for slowly processing the initial one.

 

[NUCENG]

If it's probable enough to spend money on experiments and analysis, maybe it is probable enough to take into account in the design process?


I happen to believe that hardened vents are a poor idea so I don't know how to reply to the specific question. I am aware that planning to fight the last war can be somewhat stupid, but now that I think of it, these are machines; commonalities of design imply common failure modes.


They delayed because of the aforementioned hardened vent system, whose existence gave them the choice between a massive, intentional contaminants release NOW and a possibly even larger, but unintentional release LATER. That is a bad choice to present someone with in a complex crisis situation. In the event, the venting system turned out to not be operational in at least one reactor, sadly.



I think that requiring earlier depressurization increases the risk of seeing another big release, while somewhat decreasing the risk of another melt-through. I do not believe that anyone has analyzed the respective risks to the population before making this decision. It seems moot anyway, as the target should be "no release".

As to backpressure, I think there is such a measure as the effective cross-section of a filter. One just has to make it big enough. The swedes seem to be on the right track, to me, with their artificial swamp thing.

Another solution if you want a small, cheap filter would be to have a buffer somewhere, a bladder or a hole in the ground or a long pipe or something and vent into that first, then rely on the filter for subsequent, smaller releases and for slowly processing the initial one.

Mathematicians have calculated PI to a number of decimal places that is absurd in computing any useful result. Experiments determine possibilities, and again, practical applications also need to consider probabilities, or we'd all still be living in caves.

Operators at Fukushima were not wringing their hands over the decision to vent. There were three causes of the delay. First, their procedures didn't allow venting until containment pressure was twice its design rating, while the standard in GE design for the hardened vent was to vent before exceeding design pressure. Second, they had delays to get corporate and government permission to vent. Finally, they waited until initial evacuations were complete. In the meantime they had lost the ability to depressurize the reactor to allow alternative makeup systems to be used to cool the core, and the containment was leaking fission products and hydrogen.

I agree that the target should be no release, and that means preventing core damage from external events or extended SBOs. But we must also have some level of design for severe (beyond design basis) accidents. You may be spot on about early depressurization. You may also be right about filtration options for the vent path. But you also may be totally underestimating the interaction of the potential solutions. I was trying to help you see that by the discussion of interplay with early depressurization and venting. NRC and industry (and "watchdog" groups) have begun a series of meetings to discuss these complex issues. When trascripts or webcasts are available I will post links to the discussions. I hope you will see I am urging detailed evaluations for the options to make certain the results actually improve safety.

 

[clancy688]

The report you are quoting addresses possibilities, but not the probability of the event. Japan's accident does not automatically mean every plant is vulnerable to the same scenario.

That kind of thought chain is exactly what maneuvered us in this kind of mess in the first place.

"It can happen, but it's very unlikely that it will happen, so we won't take counter measures since hardening the plant against low possibility events will be extremely expensive and, as we already concluded, not necessary anyways. Why should we take measures against something we are sure won't happen during our lifetime?"

That kind of thinking may be applicable for normal plants, industry and even dams. But not for nuclear power which has the unique chance of actually making giant areas of land (with lots of other industry) off limits for years.
If a normal plant pops you lose the plant. And perhaps everything which's near to the plant. If a nuclear plant pops, there's the possibility that you lose the whole freaking state.

So if you find a problem in such a plant, you are obligated to take counter measures, whatever the chances of this event happening or not happening are.