Why consciousness is not reducible to nonconscious things

[pftest]

What do you think of the following argument about consciousness* (from now on called "C"):

________________________________________________

P1: The only things reductionism reduces, are our own misconceptions.
P2: Misconceptions require C.
C: To say that C is reducible, is to say that C is a misconception that requires C.
________________________________________________

As you see, the conclusion doesn't get rid of C. The statement "C is reducible" can be compared with the statement "C is dreamable". Even if C is dreamable, there is still a C that is dreaming it. That is why C is not reducible to non-C things.


* Btw my definition of C is "having experiences". Examples of experiences are for example pain, what it feels like to see a car, etc. This is my theoretically neutral definition of C. It doesn't state C is material or non-material, it just refers to our experiences, and we all understand what we mean when talking about them.

 

[vectorcube]

Your argument is pretty bad.

Here is my take on it. consciousness is a physical fact, but is not reducible to physical facts. The thing that is non-reducible is the subjective mood necessary to be conscious.

 

[pftest]

You say the argument is bad, can you point out where the flaw is (premise 1, 2 or the conclusion)?

 

[Mattara]

You say the argument is bad, can you point out where the flaw is (premise 1, 2 or the conclusion)?

Your argument is based on a false understanding of (hierarchical) reductionism. It is no misconception to say that water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even when further reductionism reveals that these atoms consists of protons, neutrons and electrons.

Here is an argument against your position.

1. Consciousness can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. Consciousness can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
5. Consciousness is a material phenomena (from 3&4).

 

[pftest]

Your argument is based on a false understanding of (hierarchical) reductionism. It is no misconception to say that water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even when further reductionism reveals that these atoms consists of protons, neutrons and electrons.

The proton/neutron situation shows that the "2 hydrogen atoms and 1 oxygen atom" view is a flawed/incomplete view of the situation. Its the same as when you think a parked car is a solid, static, motionless object. Further investigation reveals the car to consist of a huge amount of moving atoms with lots of space between them. The initial idea of the car as being a solid motionless object, was a misconception and it has been reduced to a more accurate view of the physical situation.

Here is an argument against your position.

1. Consciousness can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. Consciousness can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
5. Consciousness is a material phenomena (from 3&4).

Your argument is an argument for monism, of which materialism is just one type. It is not an argument for materialism in particular. There are other types of monism as well (neutral monism, panpsychism, idealism, etc.).

Btw its important to note that I am not saying consciousness is immaterial, since my definition is theoretically neutral. The argument merely says that C is not reducible to nonconscious things. If matter is considered void of consciousness, then C is not reducible to that.

 

[DaveC426913]

4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)

Can you clarify? At face-value, this statement is false.

 

[apeiron]

Between the extremes of emergent monism and disconnected dualism, there is a futher ontic position - the dichotomy.

So in this view, anything real can always be reduced in two complementary directions. And these directions are bounding limits rather than fundamental states.

With the mind~brain issue for example, we can see that we can reduce it to the ancient dichotomy of substance~form. Or local constructive materials and globally constraining organisation.

So consciousness is not reducible to material causes, but it could be treated as a generalised form. An arrangement of material that has the organisation we would consider the essence of mindfulness. The challenge then is to develop mathematically rigorous descriptions of "mindfulness". Which is what people try to do with neural nets, or complex adaptive system theory, etc.

Again, emergence and dualism are poor choices, even if very common ones. If you get into mind science you can discover other positions to take.

 

[vectorcube]

You say the argument is bad, can you point out where the flaw is (premise 1, 2 or the conclusion)?

I don ` t even think you know what is a proposition. A proposition can be either true or false, decided upon by a state of affair. This is not commonly understood. You would not know this if you are not a philosopher.

 

[pftest]

I don ` t even think you know what is a proposition. A proposition can be either true or false, decided upon by a state of affair. This is not commonly understood. You would not know this if you are not a philosopher.

The argument has 2 propositions and a conclusion. Which of them has a flaw in it?

 

[vectorcube]

The argument has 2 propositions and a conclusion. Which of them has a flaw in it?

I read Premise 2, and i can` t help but want to inflict pain on myself.

 

[Mattara]

The proton/neutron situation shows that the "2 hydrogen atoms and 1 oxygen atom" view is a flawed/incomplete view of the situation. Its the same as when you think a parked car is a solid, static, motionless object. Further investigation reveals the car to consist of a huge amount of moving atoms with lots of space between them. The initial idea of the car as being a solid motionless object, was a misconception and it has been reduced to a more accurate view of the physical situation.

No, both are accurate and neither is flawed. The reduced view is more precise in that particular area, though.

Your argument is an argument for monism, of which materialism is just one type. It is not an argument for materialism in particular. There are other types of monism as well (neutral monism, panpsychism, idealism, etc.).

Idealism is certainly not materialism.

 

[Mattara]

Can you clarify? At face-value, this statement is false.

Do you not accept the conservation of momentum? If you kick matter, it kicks back. You can't kick matter if your foot is not material itself, because that would be a violation of the conservation of momentum.

 

[DaveC426913]

Do you not accept the conservation of momentum? If you kick matter, it kicks back. You can't kick matter if your foot is not material itself, because that would be a violation of the conservation of momentum.

Your statement is:

Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)

Light can interact with matter yet it is not matter.

 

[vectorcube]

Your argument is based on a false understanding of (hierarchical) reductionism. It is no misconception to say that water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even when further reductionism reveals that these atoms consists of protons, neutrons and electrons.

Here is an argument against your position.

1. Consciousness can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. Consciousness can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)
5. Consciousness is a material phenomena (from 3&4).

From 3 & 4, it follows that "consciousness is matter", and not material phenomena.
What this implies is that 1 is false. Intuitively, i think it is hard to make the case that matter is consciousness.

 

[vectorcube]

Your statement is:

Light can interact with matter yet it is not matter.

Pretty simple. Just change matter to physical facts.

 

[DaveC426913]

Pretty simple. Just change matter to physical facts.

4. Anything that can interact with physical facts is by definition physical facts (from definition)


That makes no sense at all.

 

[vectorcube]

4. Anything that can interact with physical facts is by definition physical facts (from definition)


That makes no sense at all.

It is like asking why not "2+2=5". I can` t help you.

Seriously, tho, materialism makes no distinction between particles with mass, and particles without mass. In either case, they both need to governed by some law to make it work.


As to why you think "physical facts" does not make sense is beyond me. "Physics facts" is supposed to make a empirical proposition true( or false). They are suppose to be completely mind-independent. Don` t argue. This is how philosophers set the relationships, and that is how i learn it.


In fact, i can think of a better way of express materialism:
Every process in the universe can be explained by physical laws, and constitutes.

 

[DaveC426913]

It is like asking why not "2+2=5". I can` t help you.

I wasn't asking for your help, I was asking Mattara to clarify his statement, which is false. Your modification makes no sense.

Seriously, tho, materialism makes no distinction between particles with mass, and particles without mass. In either case, they both need to governed by some law to make it work.


As to why you think "physical facts" does not make sense is beyond me. "Physics facts" is supposed to make a empirical proposition true( or false). They are suppose to be completely mind-independent. Don` t argue. This is how philosophers set the relationships, and that is how i learn it.


In fact, i can think of a better way of express materialism:
Every process in the universe can be explained by physical laws, and constitutes.

There's no way you're going to be able to express the original argument if the words and definitions are ambiguous, resulting in refutable premises.

I'm simply asking for the original argument to be written with acceptable premises.

 

[pftest]

No, both are accurate and neither is flawed. The reduced view is more precise in that particular area, though.

Lets put it this way, the reduced view gives a full description of the physical nature of the object (for as far as we know), whereas the nonreduced view gives an incomplete description. The view that a car is a motionless solid object, is incomplete. If someone gave you such a description of a car, you would never know that it actually consists of zillions of physical ingredients moving rapidly, as well as lots of empty space. Your understanding(concept) of the car would be incomplete.

Idealism is certainly not materialism.

Neutral monism, panpsychism and idealism are types of monism, but they are certainly not materialism. Quite the contrary. Since your argument about interaction is only an argument for monism, it is not an argument for materialism in particular. This argument of mine would also be invalid, for the same reason yours is:

1. C can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. C can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that interacts with C, is conscious.
5. Matter is a conscious phenomenon.

 

[vectorcube]

I wasn't asking for your help, I was asking Mattara to clarify his statement, which is false. Your modification makes no sense.

Well, then you must not get it. It is crazy. It is like saying 2+2=42...
I just had to comment when your wrote "proton is massless", because matter could only interact with matter. It is sad, and funny at the same time.

There's no way you're going to be able to express the original argument if the words and definitions are ambiguous, resulting in refutable premises.

I'm simply asking for the original argument to be written with acceptable premises.

ok, if you say so.

 

[DaveC426913]

I just had to comment when your wrote "proton is massless", because matter could only interact with matter. It is sad, and funny at the same time.

I didn't write that. That would be false. Read it again. What I wrote is correct.

You seem to be having difficulty with your emotions. Science and philosophy should not make you feel sad.

 

[vectorcube]

I didn't write that. That would be false. Read it again. What I wrote is correct.

You seem to be having difficulty with your emotions. Science and philosophy should not make you feel sad.

No, no.. I love science and philosophy. That is not the problem. It`s just that reading about how photon is massless sounds crazy in a philosophy discussion about materialism. Don` t you think?

 

[DaveC426913]

No, no.. I love science and philosophy. That is not the problem. It`s just that reading about how photon is massless sounds crazy in a philosophy discussion about materialism. Don` t you think?

I never mentioned photons. Nor did I mention mass. (I also didn't mention protons, so I'm not sure why, in post 20, you put those words in my mouth, then proceeded to mock me for it.)

It seems to me there's some dancing around the issue here. You're taking my words, mangling them, reattributing them to me, then calling them sad or crazy or whatever other derisive-yet-completely-unsubstantive adjective comes to your mind.

The original premise was:

"Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)"

This premise is false.

That's it. That's my whole case. Mattara made this statement in post 4. It was flawed; it contains a false premise. I asked for clarification.

BTW, it is not necessary for you to pick up this ball. It is really directed to Mattara. If you have some constructive input in his place that'd great.

 

[Mattara]

Lets put it this way, the reduced view gives a full description of the physical nature of the object (for as far as we know), whereas the nonreduced view gives an incomplete description. The view that a car is a motionless solid object, is incomplete. If someone gave you such a description of a car, you would never know that it actually consists of zillions of physical ingredients moving rapidly, as well as lots of empty space. Your understanding(concept) of the car would be incomplete.

Neutral monism, panpsychism and idealism are types of monism, but they are certainly not materialism. Quite the contrary. Since your argument about interaction is only an argument for monism, it is not an argument for materialism in particular. This argument of mine would also be invalid, for the same reason yours is:

1. C can interact with the brain (premise)
2. The brain is material (premise)
3. C can interact with matter (from 1&2)
4. Anything that interacts with C, is conscious.
5. Matter is a conscious phenomenon.

That does not follow. Just because all consciousness can be explained in terms of mater does not mean that all mater can be explained in terms of consciousness.

(M (C))

 

[Mattara]

From 3 & 4, it follows that "consciousness is matter", and not material phenomena.
What this implies is that 1 is false. Intuitively, i think it is hard to make the case that matter is consciousness.

Just because all consciousness is matter does not imply that all mater is conscious. Just like that fact that some life is made of matter does not imply that all matter is alive. There is no contradiction.

 

[DaveC426913]

Mattara, can you follow up with my https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=2401429&postcount=13"? It'd be great to get closure and not dilute the rest of this thread with the barely on-topic bickering between Vectorcube and myself.

 

[Mattara]

Your statement is:

Light can interact with matter yet it is not matter.

Yes, it is. I obviously do not mean Newtonian matter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass–energy_equivalence

Do you reject the conservation of momentum? If my immaterial foot kicks a ball and the ball keeps rolling, the change in (linear) momentum in the ball is m_ballv_ball and the change in linear momentum of my foot is m_footv_foot.

From the conservation of momentum we get that

m_ballv_ball + m_footv_foot = 0

However, since my foot is immaterial, the second product is 0 and you have a situation where the left hand side is nonzero and the right hand side is 0, which is contradictory. Thus, interaction between something immaterial and matter is a violation of the conservation of momentum. Perhaps a more clear argument is the following.

1. The conservation of momentum is valid (premise)
2. If something immaterial can interact with something material, the conservation of momentum is invalid (since something immaterial would have no mass, Newtonian or relativistic, it would have no momentum and you would get momentum out of nothing).
3. It is not the case that something immaterial can interact with something material (from 1&2)
4. The mind interacts with the brain (premise)
5. It cannot be the case that the mind is immaterial (from 3&4)

 

[pftest]

Yes, it is. I obviously do not mean Newtonian matter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass–energy_equivalence

Do you reject the conservation of momentum? If my immaterial foot kicks a ball and the ball keeps rolling, the change in (linear) momentum in the ball is m_ballv_ball and the change in linear momentum of my foot is m_footv_foot.

The mass energy equivalence is an interesting bit. Note how in the following paragraph it is explained that energy is a purely conceptual phenomenon:

During a 1961 lecture[7] for undergraduate students at the California Institute of Technology, Richard Feynman, a celebrated physics teacher and Nobel Laureate, said this about the concept of energy:

There is a fact, or if you wish, a law, governing natural phenomena that are known to date. There is no known exception to this law; it is exact, so far we know. The law is called conservation of energy; it states that there is a certain quantity, which we call energy, that does not change in manifold changes which nature undergoes. That is a most abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that there is a numerical quantity, which does not change when something happens. It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange fact that we can calculate some number, and when we finish watching nature go through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same.
—The Feynman Lectures on Physics[7]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy#History

So the mass-energy equivalence actually shows that mental (conceptual) phenomena are equivalent to mass in motion. So too is the opposite true: all mass in motion is equivalent to a concept (energy). Because the statement E=MC2 is true on a universal scale, it is no longer materialism (materialism doesn't regard mind as a universal phenomenon). Of course this formula was never meant as a metaphysical statement about the mind-body relationship, but it shows how abstract concepts are right in the heart of physics.

Your statement was:

2. If something immaterial can interact with something material, the conservation of momentum is invalid (since something immaterial would have no mass, Newtonian or relativistic, it would have no momentum and you would get momentum out of nothing).

If by "immaterial" you mean "consciousness", then statement 2 is false. The mass-energy equivalence does show that concepts can influence mass. If by immaterial you do not mean "consciousness", then the argument simply is not relevant to consciousness.

 

[apeiron]

1. The conservation of momentum is valid (premise)
2. If something immaterial can interact with something material, the conservation of momentum is invalid (since something immaterial would have no mass, Newtonian or relativistic, it would have no momentum and you would get momentum out of nothing).
3. It is not the case that something immaterial can interact with something material (from 1&2)
4. The mind interacts with the brain (premise)
5. It cannot be the case that the mind is immaterial (from 3&4)

Again, where the argument breaks down is the claim that matter is material - that its entire essence is that of substance. Matter also has an equally fundamental "immaterial" aspect, which is its form, its organisation, its relationships.

Information theoretic approaches to modelling have their problems, but at least they put form and substance on an equally atomistic footing and so they can be used in laws, both first and second laws of thermodynamics.

When we are talking about the mind~brain, we are also accepting that the wholeness of the system has both its formal aspects and its substantial aspects. It is dualism to speak of consciousness and matter - making a mystery of what is really not that mysterious, just complex and poorly modeled.

 

[Mattara]

Again, where the argument breaks down is the claim that matter is material - that its entire essence is that of substance. Matter also has an equally fundamental "immaterial" aspect, which is its form, its organisation, its relationships.

Information theoretic approaches to modelling have their problems, but at least they put form and substance on an equally atomistic footing and so they can be used in laws, both first and second laws of thermodynamics.

When we are talking about the mind~brain, we are also accepting that the wholeness of the system has both its formal aspects and its substantial aspects. It is dualism to speak of consciousness and matter - making a mystery of what is really not that mysterious, just complex and poorly modeled.

Matter is by definition material, so I see no problem with that claim.

 

[Mattara]

So the mass-energy equivalence actually shows that mental (conceptual) phenomena are equivalent to mass in motion. So too is the opposite true: all mass in motion is equivalent to a concept (energy). Because the statement E=MC2 is true on a universal scale, it is no longer materialism (materialism doesn't regard mind as a universal phenomenon). Of course this formula was never meant as a metaphysical statement about the mind-body relationship, but it shows how abstract concepts are right in the heart of physics.

The mass-energy equivalence universality is no threat to materialism; in fact, it is one of the great successes of materialism. Again, just because all minds are material does not imply that all matter forms minds.

If by "immaterial" you mean "consciousness", then statement 2 is false. The mass-energy equivalence does show that concepts can influence mass. If by immaterial you do not mean "consciousness", then the argument simply is not relevant to consciousness.

It is certainly relevant because it shows that anything that interacts with matter have to be by definition matter on pain of contradicting the conservation of momentum.

 

[apeiron]

Matter is by definition material, so I see no problem with that claim.

You are missing the point. I am challenging your definition of the material, not of matter.

There are many other problems with what you presume of course.

Even if we choose to frame the discussion in terms of conservation principles, it is clear that the material world has two aspects - the first and second law, closed and open systems.

The "material world", as you would put it, may be closed in terms of mass/energy/information. But consciousness - as a complex dissipative process - is open, gradient degrading.

If we just measure the quantitative aspects of brain activity, we can see that a conscious mind consumes more energy than a hard working muscle. So it is not an inertial process - conserving momentum - but an accelerative process - entropy generating.

You cannot then claim consciousness "just is" a "material closed system". Even in material terms, it "just is" an open system. Or more accurately, a dissipative structure - a form, an organisation, indeed.

So again you end up being forced to admit that irreduciably, materiality has two aspects. So the conclusion is correct. Mind and brain are "made of the same stuff" in some general sense. But that does not mean the formal aspects of a material realm can be reduced to its substantial aspects. Both are equally fundamental to existence.

This is not a panpsychic approach (all matter has a mind). But it is pansemiotic. Reality irreduciably involves meaning-making as well as information - or global form as well as local substance.

 

[vectorcube]

I never mentioned photons. Nor did I mention mass. (I also didn't mention protons, so I'm not sure why, in post 20, you put those words in my mouth, then proceeded to mock me for it.)

It seems to me there's some dancing around the issue here. You're taking my words, mangling them, reattributing them to me, then calling them sad or crazy or whatever other derisive-yet-completely-unsubstantive adjective comes to your mind.

The original premise was:

"Anything that can interact with matter is by definition matter (from definition)"

This premise is false.

That's it. That's my whole case. Mattara made this statement in post 4. It was flawed; it contains a false premise. I asked for clarification.

BTW, it is not necessary for you to pick up this ball. It is really directed to Mattara. If you have some constructive input in his place that'd great.

Discussion forum, remember? I am not mocking you. I made no mistake in understanding what you wrote, so you really sure stop playing this game of " you don` t understand me because i am too complicated for you". It is becoming very childlish( look, is another unsubstantive adjective ).

 

[DaveC426913]

Yes, it is. I obviously do not mean Newtonian matter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass–energy_equivalence

Do you reject the conservation of momentum? If my immaterial foot kicks a ball and the ball keeps rolling, the change in (linear) momentum in the ball is m_ballv_ball and the change in linear momentum of my foot is m_footv_foot.

Again, you go off on a tangent instead of addressing my point.

If you don't mean "matter", don't use the word. Philosophy may be less rigorous than the sciences but you don't have license to make up definitions for existing words.

 

[DaveC426913]

I made no mistake in understanding what you wrote,

Then why did you come back with "protons"? I was talking about light. If you did not misunderstand then you are being deliberately obtuse.

so you really sure stop playing this game of " you don` t understand me because i am too complicated for you".

And AGAIN, you ascribe claims to me. You must stop doing that.

If you had a case here, you would be able to refer to factual content in this thread, rather than making things up.

It is becoming very childlish( look, is another unsubstantive adjective ).

I've had it. I have absolutely no beef with you, so I have no idea why you keep trying to address this and turn it into some sort of fight. You can't speak for Mattara. Stop trying.