Why consciousness is not reducible to nonconscious things

[magpies]

Can you give me an example of what reducing C would look like?

 

[pftest]

Can you give me an example of what reducing C would look like?

The not possible version is something like "consciousness is just a complex configuration of physical ingredients".

 

[magpies]

Oh ok I guess I agree with you basicaly but I would take it a step beyond what you have. So I still don't think you can even reduce it at all.

I mean you could try to reduce it to something but that would just be a lie. If your ok with lies I guess that's kool.

 

[pftest]

Oh ok I guess I agree with you basicaly but I would take it a step beyond what you have. So I still don't think you can even reduce it at all.

Why not?

 

[magpies]

Forgive me if this is committing a taboo but because consciousness is consciousness and any "reduction" of it is a lie for better or worse.

 

[pftest]

Ok. Well, i read stenger, and the last chapter of his book, and i can` t help but feel he was an idiot for making up metaphysical claims in the bases of speculative physical theory.

Yes and even if his physical theory is correct, it doesn't support the metaphysical claim very well. The idea that the universe can come from a very simple mathematical principle, also allows the metaphysical possibility that a simple mind capable of simple mathematics can bring the universe into existence. The simpler the math gets the simpler any mind needs to be to think it.

 

[qraal]

Forgive me if this is committing a taboo but because consciousness is consciousness and any "reduction" of it is a lie for better or worse.

A rock is also composed of molecules, themselves composed atoms, which in turn are composed of electrons and nucleons, the latter being composed of quarks and gluons... yet a rock is still a rock. Likewise "consciousness" could be composed of lower level entities and still be distinct from them. It's not obvious that consciousness is irreducible and thus this present discussion.

Don't assert the conclusion - that consciousness is irreducible - without something to back up the claim. Else you're just stating your belief and not a fact obvious to us all. Because, at least to me, it's not obviously so.

 

[pftest]

Forgive me if this is committing a taboo but because consciousness is consciousness and any "reduction" of it is a lie for better or worse.

One can have misconceptions (delusions) about oneself. Those can be "reduced" and gotten rid of.

 

[pftest]

A rock is also composed of molecules, themselves composed atoms, which in turn are composed of electrons and nucleons, the latter being composed of quarks and gluons... yet a rock is still a rock.

What do you mean "its still a rock"? If its composed of atoms, quarks, etc. then isn't a rock just a configuration of atoms, quarks, etc.?

 

[vectorcube]

Yes and even if his physical theory is correct, it doesn't support the metaphysical claim very well. The idea that the universe can come from a very simple mathematical principle, also allows the metaphysical possibility that a simple mind capable of simple mathematics can bring the universe into existence. The simpler the math gets the simpler any mind needs to be to think it.

Well, he is a ****ing idiot. Even if there is some some equation that bring about the universe. It merely shifted the question to why those equations, and not others. It does not answer anything about ultimate origin.

 

[magpies]

Ok well if conciousness is reducible what would be an example of it being reduced?

The example of a rock is interesting. It may have quarks and atoms inside it but none the less the rock is the rock. The quarks and atoms are a subset part of the rock without the rock the quarks and atoms would be just that and not a rock.

 

[pftest]

Example: you are hypnotised into thinking you are a chicken. Or you dream you are one. You now have a misconception about yourself, and that can be gotten rid of (reduced). This is not the reduction as in "consisting of smaller components", but the reduction as in "having a misconception, improving your understanding and thereby getting rid of it".

There is no telling how deluded a state of mind we are in. We could be cows inside a milkfarm connected to a virtual reality computer to think we have a human life

As long as there is the ability to be deluded at all, one can in principle have any kind of delusion. But if there is no ability to be deluded (for example, non-conscious atoms do not have the ability to have delusions), then there will never be any delusion.

 

[qraal]

What do you mean "its still a rock"? If its composed of atoms, quarks, etc. then isn't a rock just a configuration of atoms, quarks, etc.?

A rock is a certain configuration of atoms, quarks etc. Just as any element is a certain, distinct configuration of electrons, protons and (optionally) neutrons. But lead isn't gold, nor are oxygen and fluorine interchangeable for purposes of breathing.

 

[magpies]

Is there a more true form to the rock? Is electrons protons neutrons better then say quarks or molecules or any other configuration of parts? I would go out on a limb and say the rock is the truest form of the rock would you agree? Of course this is just silly I am being silly arnt I :)

 

[qraal]

Is there a more true form to the rock? Is electrons protons neutrons better then say quarks or molecules or any other configuration of parts? I would go out on a limb and say the rock is the truest form of the rock would you agree? Of course this is just silly I am being silly arnt I :)

Rocks are, by definition, aggregates of crystals and other compounds, often many different kinds of crystals, thus defining what the 'true form' might be is probably pointless. But say we dissolve a rock in a solution. Where did the rock go? All its parts are still there and if we evaporate the solute we might get a 'rock' again, but not the 'same' rock. Similarly death might dissolve whatever it is that makes 'consciousness' and eventual consumption of the body's components might bring about another 'consciousness', but asking where it went in between the two might be as meaningless as where the rock went.

Might be. I'm posing this as one metaphysical possibility that no one has yet eliminated from consideration.

 

[pftest]

Is there a more true form to the rock? Is electrons protons neutrons better then say quarks or molecules or any other configuration of parts? I would go out on a limb and say the rock is the truest form of the rock would you agree? Of course this is just silly I am being silly arnt I :)

The rock can be described fully in terms of its components and their configuration. So those components give the full description, whereas the statement "its a rock" gives an incomplete description. The componental description also makes the "its a rock"-description redundant, whereas the "its a rock"-description does not make the componental description redundant (by reading the statement "its a rock" you would never know it consists of atoms and such).

So the more accurate form is the componental one.

 

[qraal]

The rock can be described fully in terms of its components and their configuration. So those components give the full description, whereas the statement "its a rock" gives an incomplete description. The componental description also makes the "its a rock"-description redundant, whereas the "its a rock"-description does not make the componental description redundant (by reading the statement "its a rock" you would never know it consists of atoms and such).

So the more accurate form is the componental one.

For a specific rock, yes, but rocks in general? Maybe not. Higher level descriptors are often more succinct than ultra-detailed decompositions, but of course one can do more with more details. Geology, for example, would be impossible if we left out too much detail, and would be too cumbersome if we left in too much detail. One can always be more accurate, but become less meaningful in the process. Coarse-grain descriptions make science communicable.

 

[pftest]

True, from a social perspective the higher level descriptions are useful and needed. Physically, ignoring all social requirements, the lower level descriptions are most accurate. "rocks in general" do not physically exist, since any rock is always a specific physical object. The "in general" part is an abstraction that takes place in human minds.

 

[qraal]

True, from a social perspective the higher level descriptions are useful and needed. Physically, ignoring all social requirements, the lower level descriptions are most accurate. "rocks in general" do not physically exist, since any rock is always a specific physical object. The "in general" part is an abstraction that takes place in human minds.

Thus the snake swallows its tail...

 

[apeiron]

For a specific rock, yes, but rocks in general? Maybe not. Higher level descriptors are often more succinct than ultra-detailed decompositions, but of course one can do more with more details. Geology, for example, would be impossible if we left out too much detail, and would be too cumbersome if we left in too much detail. One can always be more accurate, but become less meaningful in the process. Coarse-grain descriptions make science communicable.

This is the correct line of thinking. Substance opposed to form. But we just need to generalise "rock" further to really get there in this argument. And this can be done using the template of a spatiotemporal (or scalar) hierarchy.

So substance and form are at opposing limits of a hierarchy. One is the most local or smallest scale, the other the global or largest. Causality at the bottom scale is constructive, at the top scale it becomes constraints based.

Now with rocks, we can agree that a rock is a compound (constructed) of a mix of atoms. At this level of discussion, compounds and how they achieve their form, we need to find what is actually the organisational principles appropriate to this level.

A rock isn't. But a geological strata is. We can then see that this global scale view gives us sight of "rockness" formed over geological timescales, as the result of temperatures, pressures, large-scale mixing processes. It explains why a rock is mixed as it is, with perhaps quartz crystals and other inclusions. And also why the rock is cool, not hot lava temperature.

So it is always easy to win the "its just a configuration of substance" argument if the wrong scale of analysis is applied. We can take some real world object that interests us, like a rock, and reduce its substances towards their most local. But then we leave the formal aspects of the rock at the scale we found it, rather than "reducing it" - though it should seem more like expanding it, as we are increasing scale to head towards the global view.

Once you also expand the configurational or organisational principles of the object, you can then see how the global aspects are also fundamental. Rocks would not exist without rock-forming processes and contexts.

Of course, it can be tricky identifying where to stop in the stepping back to global scale. But atoms and geology seem fairly accurately complementary in this particular example.

Now the trick with consciousness and theories of mind is to do the same thing. To reduce the thing in itself, people who have what we label "consciousness" and "unconsciousness" as aspects of their being, towards both the local and global levels of explanation.

When discussing minds, the question becomes what are the atoms, what the geology, of this area of science?

 

[apeiron]

True, from a social perspective the higher level descriptions are useful and needed. Physically, ignoring all social requirements, the lower level descriptions are most accurate. "rocks in general" do not physically exist, since any rock is always a specific physical object. The "in general" part is an abstraction that takes place in human minds.

Incorrect as all knowledge is modelling. And all modelling is reduction - the shedding of particulars to extract generals.

So we generalise the notion of local substance to produce models of things like atoms and quarks. And we also generalise the notion of form to - eventually - produce fundamental laws such as the first and second law of thermodynamics, the laws of motion, etc.

What do you think an atom is? A little hard ball. A wave function (as physically demonstrated in twin slit experiments)? A compound of more fundamental particles (which have even less concrete existence)?

A rock is always an intermediate scale object - not yet reduced towards its complementary aspects of substance and form. But you are completely missing the point if you believe science does not generalise such real life entities towards local initial condition descriptions and globally constraining laws.

 

[qraal]

(snipped)

Now the trick with consciousness and theories of mind is to do the same thing. To reduce the thing in itself, people who have what we label "consciousness" and "unconsciousness" as aspects of their being, towards both the local and global levels of explanation.

When discussing minds, the question becomes what are the atoms, what the geology, of this area of science?

Nicely put apeiron. What are the "rocks" of consciousness? And what are the "strata"? Metaphysical monists who want it to all be 'mass/energy' or all 'mind/ideas' seem bent on ignoring such subtleties though.

 

[apeiron]

With consciousness, the rock might be some particular instance of attentive awareness. That is the intermediate level of explanandum. So over about half a second, the brain forms an organised state of meaningful comprehension in response to some event in the world, like a rock falling on the foot.

This state of attentive understanding then has both its material and formal aspects - is local or substantial causes, and its global or form type causes.

So substances are involved. All kinds of neural, synaptic, membrane pore and molecular level changes were part of the rock-scale attentional shift.

But also global forms. So we can talk about memory, anticipation, focus, suppression as strata-level organisational processes or forms. The kind of general things also needed to account for "a moment of awareness".

Both the atoms - neurons and synapses - are "non-conscious" scale of explanation or modelling. And so are the global forms like anticipation, memory, or whatever else we find useful to employ in the modelling. Anticipation, as a properly generalised idea, no longer equates to what we mean by consciousness, though captures of course some essential aspect of being conscious.

A satisfactory theory of mind would then be about having both the right atoms and the right configurations. We need substances and forms which are actually - in some strict sense we can specify - complementary as levels of explanation.

So with a "theory of rocks", we would have to be able to show that there is a deep duality between the local and global views. Is the atomic level of description actually related in a formal sense to the geological strata level? In fact, it seems only a crude and clumsy duality is represented here. But good enough to see that this is what we already do with more mundane entities.

In the same way, getting it right for explaining minds will need not just a local view and a global view, but a strict framework under which we can measure how well these two view are mutual or complementary.

So is a neural component view formally dual to a psychological process view? Is one the right atoms that makes the other the right forms?

Having accepted the basic idea - that reductionism needs to be dualistic to give a full account of reality and its contents - we have to be able to make the transition from a handwaving kind of connection between existing levels of scientific discourse (the neural component models, the psychological process models) to one that is completely formal. Mathematical. Logically universal in that it applies to the description of rocks, minds and every other kind of actual thing.

 

[qraal]

With consciousness, the rock might be some particular instance of attentive awareness. That is the intermediate level of explanandum. So over about half a second, the brain forms an organised state of meaningful comprehension in response to some event in the world, like a rock falling on the foot.

This state of attentive understanding then has both its material and formal aspects - is local or substantial causes, and its global or form type causes.

So substances are involved. All kinds of neural, synaptic, membrane pore and molecular level changes were part of the rock-scale attentional shift.

But also global forms. So we can talk about memory, anticipation, focus, suppression as strata-level organisational processes or forms. The kind of general things also needed to account for "a moment of awareness".

Both the atoms - neurons and synapses - are "non-conscious" scale of explanation or modelling. And so are the global forms like anticipation, memory, or whatever else we find useful to employ in the modelling. Anticipation, as a properly generalised idea, no longer equates to what we mean by consciousness, though captures of course some essential aspect of being conscious.

A satisfactory theory of mind would then be about having both the right atoms and the right configurations. We need substances and forms which are actually - in some strict sense we can specify - complementary as levels of explanation.

So with a "theory of rocks", we would have to be able to show that there is a deep duality between the local and global views. Is the atomic level of description actually related in a formal sense to the geological strata level? In fact, it seems only a crude and clumsy duality is represented here. But good enough to see that this is what we already do with more mundane entities.

In the same way, getting it right for explaining minds will need not just a local view and a global view, but a strict framework under which we can measure how well these two view are mutual or complementary.

So is a neural component view formally dual to a psychological process view? Is one the right atoms that makes the other the right forms?

Having accepted the basic idea - that reductionism needs to be dualistic to give a full account of reality and its contents - we have to be able to make the transition from a handwaving kind of connection between existing levels of scientific discourse (the neural component models, the psychological process models) to one that is completely formal. Mathematical. Logically universal in that it applies to the description of rocks, minds and every other kind of actual thing.

Hmmm... Would be quite an impressive mathematical "theory of forms+substances". Any suggestions on where to begin with such a thing?

Of course one curious aspect of all this that needs to be address by an "explanation of mind" is the very act of explanation or understanding, since it is an activity of mind. How do we avoid a potential pathology because of the "self-feedback"? Can any explanation which doesn't explain 'itself' really count as a complete theory of mind? Greg Egan's novel "Distress" posits an open-ended reality in which the "Theory of Everything" is kind of indeterminate until understood by a Mind or - as the protagonist discovers - ALL minds after the Theory becomes definite. Every conscious being after that point in time has an immediate intuitive grasp of the Theory as a 'precondition' of their being, thus closing the causal loop.

Does a theory of Mind need to explain 'explanation' then?

 

[apeiron]

Hmmm... Would be quite an impressive mathematical "theory of forms+substances". Any suggestions on where to begin with such a thing?

It is of course my project. And the approach I take arises out of hierarchy theory (Stanley Salthe's scalar hierarchy in particular). So there is some rudimentary math models already around. I also see Grossberg's anticipatory neural nets and dissipative structure theory as other angles on the same dilemma.

This is a "live" direction for biology and neuroscience.

Happy to respond to PMs for more detail.

Of course one curious aspect of all this that needs to be address by an "explanation of mind" is the very act of explanation or understanding, since it is an activity of mind. How do we avoid a potential pathology because of the "self-feedback"? Can any explanation which doesn't explain 'itself' really count as a complete theory of mind? Greg Egan's novel "Distress" posits an open-ended reality in which the "Theory of Everything" is kind of indeterminate until understood by a Mind or - as the protagonist discovers - ALL minds after the Theory becomes definite. Every conscious being after that point in time has an immediate intuitive grasp of the Theory as a 'precondition' of their being, thus closing the causal loop.

Does a theory of Mind need to explain 'explanation' then?

Yes it is essential that us observers be included in the final theory of everything!

So us knowing the world is somehow also the world knowing itself into coherent existence. Same "physical" (and mental) principles at work.

This is the thread of thought running through Peirce's semiotics, Maturana's autopoiesis, etc.

It is central to my own approach too.

So a mindless physics is one way to model reality. But ultimately it fails because minds got left out. So start again with fundamentals that include mind as well matter, form as well as substance, constraints as well as construction, etc.

 

[qraal]

It is of course my project. And the approach I take arises out of hierarchy theory (Stanley Salthe's scalar hierarchy in particular). So there is some rudimentary math models already around. I also see Grossberg's anticipatory neural nets and dissipative structure theory as other angles on the same dilemma.

This is a "live" direction for biology and neuroscience.

Yes it is essential that us observers be included in the final theory of everything!

So us knowing the world is somehow also the world knowing itself into coherent existence. Same "physical" (and mental) principles at work.

This is the thread of thought running through Peirce's semiotics, Maturana's autopoiesis, etc.

It is central to my own approach too.

So a mindless physics is one way to model reality. But ultimately it fails because minds got left out. So start again with fundamentals that include mind as well matter, form as well as substance, constraints as well as construction, etc.

Makes sense.

BTW did you pick "apeiron" as a user name because your view is monistic with an apeiron modified to give the contents of the world? What, in your opinion, is the 'boundless', the Absolute?

 

[apeiron]

Makes sense.

BTW did you pick "apeiron" as a user name because your view is monistic with an apeiron modified to give the contents of the world? What, in your opinion, is the 'boundless', the Absolute?

It is Anaximander's apeiron of course. I was very surprised to study these issues for about 20 years and to eventually find the very first philosopher of record got it spot on at the beginning.

Of course, it is quite difficult to be certain about what Anaximander really thought, however scholars like Kahn have done some careful work.

I myself equate the apeiron to Peirce's later (equally fragmentary and sketchy) notion of vagueness. And in turn to infinite symmetry.

So apeiron = vagueness = symmetry.

And it is a (vague) kind of monism. But which then separates dichotomously into polar opposites. So becomes dual in some crisply developed sense. And then the two become the three as the complementary things mix. You end up with the triadic state that is a hierarchy, where two levels of being have the thirdness which is their interaction.

So vagueness => dichotomies => hiearchies as things develop.

With Anaximander, the apeiron => the hot and the cold => the mixing of the hot and the cold. Though he had to add other secondary dichotomisations, such as the damp and the dry, the heavy and the light, to create enough complexity to account for our universe.

The modern view of the apeiron as the unbounded and the unlimited would seem to have more in common with quantum foams, hilbert spaces and non-commutative geometry. Places where there is action in all directions and so no directions clearly exist.

Do you have your own view about this?

 

[octelcogopod]

When I read this thread I can't help but think that there is a lot of information we are missing, and that it's completely off the mark.
First off, why are we talking about whether the mind can interact with the brain, or if energy is equivalent to matter, when we have no idea what neither of these actually are?
The definition of the mind, the subjective, and how it arises in the objective physical is still a big mystery, so you are just throwing darts in darkness imo.

This mystery can not be solved with Mattara's logic, nor can it be solved currently with ANY philosophy.
Do we really know enough about matter and energy to even start this discussion? I think not.
I suspect the solution to what consciousness is lies deep within physics, where not only the brain itself matters, but the environment it senses as well.
Of course, that's not actually a discussion, because it is not based on physical evidence, but it is my opinion.

 

[magpies]

Well I don't know about you but I do know what energy and matter are. Its not hard to tell what energy is once someone explains the basics of what it is... same with matter or mass.

 

[BigFairy]

wow, well that is something then :)

 

[qraal]

It is Anaximander's apeiron of course. I was very surprised to study these issues for about 20 years and to eventually find the very first philosopher of record got it spot on at the beginning.

Of course, it is quite difficult to be certain about what Anaximander really thought, however scholars like Kahn have done some careful work.

I myself equate the apeiron to Peirce's later (equally fragmentary and sketchy) notion of vagueness. And in turn to infinite symmetry.

So apeiron = vagueness = symmetry.

And it is a (vague) kind of monism. But which then separates dichotomously into polar opposites. So becomes dual in some crisply developed sense. And then the two become the three as the complementary things mix. You end up with the triadic state that is a hierarchy, where two levels of being have the thirdness which is their interaction.

The modern view of the apeiron as the unbounded and the unlimited would seem to have more in common with quantum foams, hilbert spaces and non-commutative geometry. Places where there is action in all directions and so no directions clearly exist.

Do you have your own view about this?

The idea of the undifferentiated primordial stuff becomes definite via differentiation appears in so many ancient accounts of reality, so it's hardly new to Anaximander. He tried to give the first non-mythological account based on the properties of the primordial stuff itself. I can see the appeal, but I am unsure it's even conceivable to test.

My own view. Take Shankaran advaita, mix with Whiteheadian pan-experientialism and filter it through Neo-Platonism. Roughly that. When I'm not focussing on the physical world and being a physicalist for the sake of the argument. Each perspective provides valid observations on the short-comings of the others.

 

[apeiron]

The idea of the undifferentiated primordial stuff becomes definite via differentiation appears in so many ancient accounts of reality, so it's hardly new to Anaximander. He tried to give the first non-mythological account based on the properties of the primordial stuff itself. I can see the appeal, but I am unsure it's even conceivable to test.
.

Agreed that Anaximander had Hesiod's Theogeny as a template for order out of chaos. And that Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-arising was very similar, and eastern ideas generally similar.

It is quite possible that the same ideas were obvious independently, or that ideas flowed from west to east or vice versa.

 

[apeiron]

Checking out Shankaran advaita reminds me of a key difference I would have to Anaximander and also Buddhist doctrines like pratîtya-samutpâda.

The usual idea is that the monadic indefinite gives rise to definite things, which can then dissolve back into that deep oneness. Things rise and then subside or decay again. The eternal cycle.

But my view is that once the one divides, it cannot go back. This is a second law approach. Once a symmetry is broken, it is divided in ways that it cannot repair. History could be reversed in a theoretical sense, but there would not actually be the "free energy" to do so.

My notes also remind me of the Kyoto School. A blending of east and west.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

Then Rivero, a string theorist on these forums, has speculated on the original possible east-west link.

http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0309104

 

[qraal]

Hi apeiron

I too am sceptical of claims of universal dissolution and self-renewal - like Steinhardt and Turok's various "Clashing Branes" attempts at "Phoenix universes" that endlessly expand and then blaze into life again. They seem to make time meaningless, which doesn't seem to accord with reality.

Shankara's advaita has meant different things to different interpreters. I take the oneness/non-duality to only be achieved at the very "highest" level of reality, with the merger of subject-object - a cosmic level unity -, but all lower levels experience differentiation. Multiplicity and flux aren't things to escape from in a "return to Godhead" kind of way. Moksha is more an attitude than an objective transformation of the subject, though it can be that too. I am too world-affirmative to take the path of renunciation that many of Shankara's admirers embraced.

Checking out Shankaran advaita reminds me of a key difference I would have to Anaximander and also Buddhist doctrines like pratîtya-samutpâda.

The usual idea is that the monadic indefinite gives rise to definite things, which can then dissolve back into that deep oneness. Things rise and then subside or decay again. The eternal cycle.

But my view is that once the one divides, it cannot go back. This is a second law approach. Once a symmetry is broken, it is divided in ways that it cannot repair. History could be reversed in a theoretical sense, but there would not actually be the "free energy" to do so.

My notes also remind me of the Kyoto School. A blending of east and west.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

Then Rivero, a string theorist on these forums, has speculated on the original possible east-west link.

http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0309104

Japanese theology I've only just recently opened a book on, but what little I have seen intrigues me. No doubt the philosophy will be similarly delightful in surprises of insight.

 

[apeiron]

Shankara's advaita has meant different things to different interpreters. I take the oneness/non-duality to only be achieved at the very "highest" level of reality, with the merger of subject-object - a cosmic level unity -, but all lower levels experience differentiation. Multiplicity and flux aren't things to escape from in a "return to Godhead" kind of way. Moksha is more an attitude than an objective transformation of the subject, though it can be that too. I am too world-affirmative to take the path of renunciation that many of Shankara's admirers embraced.

So many ways of dancing around this subject. I have to agree that this also expresses the same general thoughts probably.

The way I would phrase it is that what is possible is both stasis and flux, being and becoming, the passive and the active way. Always the dichotomies that together make for a complete mapping of what is possible.

So we want a world view that is both constantly changing yet also somehow eternally the same.

And one way of doing this is through the notion of equlibrium. The state where all is changing but change no longer looks like change.

So I would treat the apeiron, the vague monadic beginning, as an equilibrium (but a symmetry state that proved unstable - the old pencil balanced on its point analogy)

And then the final state of reality, its crisply broken development, would also be a return to equilibrium. But now a stable and final outcome because it has broken. The pencil has fallen.

So outcomes are also equilibriums. Monadic in that sense. But dualistic and triadic in their internal organisation. So overall there has been a change, an actual development.

If we were applying this to religious ideas (which I'm not, but Hegel and others might) then a return to a vaguer state of oneness might seem wrong. It is instead the developed state of oneness which is the natural way to go.

Of course, in cosmological terms, this final outcome for our universe is in fact likely to be its heat death. A cold dark void that is just empty space populated by a last fizzle of event-horizon radiation - photons with a wavelength of the visible universe as Lineweaver suggests.

Not exactly godhead in most people's view. But I actually like this vision.

What was the meaning of existence? To create precisely nothing. To dissipate all flux and multiplicity into as little as logically possible. Of course, there will still be a void. Three dimensions of space and one of time. Plus any wee string dimensions or other features which prove irreducible, like protons. So absolute nothing will not be achieve.

But as we know, the interesting question is why a something rather than a nothing. And the answer in this view is that, well, the universe was doing its best to get there!