An Empirical Inductive Method.Applied to a Panpsychism Model of Consciousness

[hypnagogue]

Les, I appreciate the thoughtfulness and thoroughness with which you've conducted this discussion. I would like to throw my hat into the ring with some questions and comments of my own. I am sympathetic with many of your ideas, so if it seems I am being critical here it is only with respect to those aspects that I take most immediate issue with.

The issue that immediately springs out at me in the very first post is your characterization of consciousness as an essentially spherical structure. More generally, you use the concepts of space and structure in your non-physical, metaphysical picture (for instance, the location of the universe within the illumination continuum). Do you mean such structural/spatial pictures to be taken literally or metaphorically? It seems to me that structural and spatial relations ultimately belong in the arena of physical phenomena. For instance, philosophical ruminations on the difficulties of integrating consciousness with the physical picture of reality include the (instrospectively empirical) observations that consciousness (as a whole) seems to have no spatial extension or location or shape-- indeed, no real spatial character at all. I wonder if it might be more fruitful to include space and time themselves (in addition to mass, charge, and the like) as constructs ultimately originating in, or intimately tied into, non-physical phenomena rather than situating the non-physical basis in spatiotemporal terms.

I also notice that you characterize retention, or memory, as a property of the illumination continuum. Here I have a similar concern as above. While there is nothing essentially logically incorrect with assigning illumination the function of memory, it seems to me that memory as such is a purely functional phenomenon and accordingly is more at home in the physical realm. Surely the experience of memory must be non-physical for the same reason any conscious, subjective experience must be non-physical, but the functional underpinnings of the process are readily amenable to the structure of the physical world.

Perhaps an analogy would be fruitful here. Assume for the sake of argument that we have a computer C that is not conscious, but which is programmed with a neural algorithm designed to mimic the function of the neurons in a human brain responsible for memory retention. (The existence of such specialized memory neurons is readily demonstrated by brain lesion cases.) C, then, not only can remember past inputs, but remembers them in much the same fashion as a human remembers his inputs-- repeated exposure improves C's memory, but C's memory will gradually fade in the absence of future exposures, etc. Thus the process of retention and even the specific patterns it takes on are entirely capable of being carried out by purely extrinsic/relational/physical means. What differentiates C's memory from a human's memory is that C will not subjectively experience its recalled memory, ex hypothesi-- but this is a question of subjective experience, not of retention per se. Ultimately it is the same scenario as, say, visual perception-- the story of photon detection can be told in terms of physics and neurons, while the story of visual experience needs something extra. Likewise, the story of memory retention can be told in terms of physics and neurons, while it is the story of experiencing memory that needs something extra. I believe your illumination continuum is poised to provide that 'something extra,' but I don't think it should bleed out into physical territory when there is no conceptual need for it. If it does, we seem to have redundant powers of retention in our metaphysical picture. What is responsible for memory-- the patterns of neural activation, or the illumination it somehow connects to, or some combination of both? If it is some combination of both, how come we can duplicate it without recourse to the underlying illumination, e.g. in the case of the non-conscious computer?

Quick question here: you refer to energy as decompression of illumination. Do you have any picture accounting for how the compression takes place? I may have overlooked something, but if I have I'd appreciate a more explicit treatment of your ideas on this.

Lastly, I'd like to make a comment on the inner/outer dichotomy, which has been discussed at various points in this thread. In common discourse, it's customary to refer to sensual perceptions quite literally as the 'outer world,' distinct from the mind/consciousness. But on closer inspection, we find that the world that we directly perceive itself is part of our inner world. This room I am in right now appears to be outside of me, but in reality it is quite a part of me, merely projected to appear as if it is outside of me. That is, although it appears that I am situated inside this room that I subjectively experience, this room that I subjectively experience is actually situated inside my mind/consciousness. I do not doubt that I am actually situated inside an objectively existing room in a quite literal sense, but I do not come into direct, conscious contact with this objective room. I only come into direct contact with the room that I subjectively experience, which is an experience situated within my mind (metaphorically speaking) no less than my experiences of emotions are situated within my mind. My contact with the objective room is in actuality indirect, with my directly experienced conscious model of it acting as an interface or proxy for my interactions with it.

(minor edit for clarity; substance remains the same)

 

[Les Sleeth]

The issue that immediately springs out at me in the very first post is your characterization of consciousness as an essentially spherical structure. More generally, you use the concepts of space and structure in your non-physical, metaphysical picture (for instance, the location of the universe within the illumination continuum). Do you mean such structural/spatial pictures to be taken literally or metaphorically? It seems to me that structural and spatial relations ultimately belong in the arena of physical phenomena. For instance, philosophical ruminations on the difficulties of integrating consciousness with the physical picture of reality include the (introspectively empirical) observations that consciousness (as a whole) seems to have no spatial extension or location or shape-- indeed, no real spatial character at all. I wonder if it might be more fruitful to include space and time themselves (in addition to mass, charge, and the like) as constructs ultimately originating in, or intimately tied into, non-physical phenomena rather than situating the non-physical basis in spatiotemporal terms.

I don’t know if you read the three-page monistic contemplation on illumination I posted for Radar earlier. If one hasn’t thought much about monism, it isn’t immediately obvious how it would explain things like space or physics. Since in your post you ask about both, let me explain them (I’ve mixed up the order of your comments some to help me do that).

In the monistic model, there is no such thing as space, and physics has no separate reality of its own. There is only the absolute base stuff of existence: illumination. It exists everywhere, and has for all time. There is no discontinuance of it whether in infinite extension, or infinite reduction. As I labeled it in the post to Radar, the base state of illumination is in a condition of absolute homogeneity. Illumination is all there is, which means all the different things we see in the universe are shapes and manifest potentials of illumination, including space and physics.

But what does that have to do with the popular concept that “consciousness (as a whole) seems to have no spatial extension or location or shape”? Relying on my model, the reason we don’t see the extension or shape of consciousness is because the “base state” of consciousness isn’t being studied. At this point, the only thing being looked at are functions. Even the aspects of qualia and subjective experience are scrutinized only in action; where those aspects originate is not known.

I’ve suggested if one learns to experience the “foundation” of consciousness, it is there one observes shape and extension. Otherwise, it is similar to the “space” of physics, which appears to be a void to the physical senses, but which (according to my model), is really inhabited by uninterrupted illumination.

I also notice that you characterize retention, or memory, as a property of the illumination continuum. Here I have a similar concern as above. While there is nothing essentially logically incorrect with assigning illumination the function of memory, it seems to me that memory as such is a purely functional phenomenon and accordingly is more at home in the physical realm. Surely the experience of memory must be non-physical for the same reason any conscious, subjective experience must be non-physical, but the functional underpinnings of the process are readily amenable to the structure of the physical world.

I am not sure we are in agreement about what “physical” is. Structure alone does not necessarily mean physical. Physical first and foremost seems defined by particle-ness; and then, there are properties, such as fields or gravity, which appear in the presence of matter, and so are physical manifestations.

I don’t see why some portion of the illumination continuum couldn’t achieve particle-less non-physical structure. In fact, if you study my diagrams, you’ll see I propose the basis of physics is illumination fashioned into a metaphysical structure.

I don’t think it makes sense for consciousness not to have structure. If it didn’t, then consciousness would necessarily have to be chaotic and/or lack any ability whatsoever to be complex. Yet we know that isn’t the case. If we are derived from some larger pool of consciousness, then I think that has to have structure as well, and our individual consciousness likely possesses a similar sort of structuring.

Perhaps an analogy would be fruitful here. Assume for the sake of argument that we have a computer C that is not conscious, but which is programmed with a neural algorithm designed to mimic the function of the neurons in a human brain responsible for memory retention. (The existence of such specialized memory neurons is readily demonstrated by brain lesion cases.) C, then, not only can remember past inputs, but remembers them in much the same fashion as a human remembers his inputs-- repeated exposure improves C's memory, but C's memory will gradually fade in the absence of future exposures, etc. Thus the process of retention and even the specific patterns it takes on are entirely capable of being carried out by purely extrinsic/relational/physical means. What differentiates C's memory from a human's memory is that C will not subjectively experience its recalled memory, ex hypothesi-- but this is a question of subjective experience, not of retention per se. Ultimately it is the same scenario as, say, visual perception-- the story of photon detection can be told in terms of physics and neurons, while the story of visual experience needs something extra. Likewise, the story of memory retention can be told in terms of physics and neurons, while it is the story of experiencing memory that needs something extra. I believe your illumination continuum is poised to provide that 'something extra,' but I don't think it should bleed out into physical territory when there is no conceptual need for it. If it does, we seem to have redundant powers of retention in our metaphysical picture. What is responsible for memory-- the patterns of neural activation, or the illumination it somehow connects to, or some combination of both? If it is some combination of both, how come we can duplicate it without recourse to the underlying illumination, e.g. in the case of the non-conscious computer?

If you can see that “physical” is merely a shape of illumination, as is consciousness, then for the two to coexist in biology, it means there has to be some harmonization of form at their interface. A simplistic analogy is like the mist that sits on top of a lake. What is the demarcation point between the water and the mist? One can imagine (at the right temperature) there is an area where water is evaporating and mist is condensing -- back and forth.

Rather than temperature being the determining factor, imagine it is concentration, and that every physical manifestation is the result of a specific degree of “concentration” of illumination (sufficient to cause “particlization”). Also, keep in mind that illumination is modeled as “vibrant,” which means when concentrated, that vibrancy is accentuated to become oscillation. If something can be made to oscillate fast enough, it might differentiate into phases. For example, say a volume of illumination were compressed, which also makes that volume oscillate. The more it is compressed, the more it oscillates. Because compression is convergent, it means the oscillation will be a convergent-divergent cycle. Keep compressing and one might expect at some critical point, the rapidly oscillating volume would polarize into two phases: a divergent phase, and a convergent phase. The model I presented suggests that is exactly what a “particle” is – some volume of concentrated, polar differentiated illumination.

Now, panpsychic consciousness might be something similar, except one big “particle” and, according to my model, with a core of pure illumination preserved at the center. A central nervous system created to house a “point” of that conscious illumination structure would need to match the “shape” of the structure. That is why, in this model, the brain is differentiated into left and right, and why neuron organization assist with memory and other functionality; i.e., because the CSN is physically “matching” the metaphysical shape of consciousness.

As far as a computer becoming conscious, I don’t see how if we rely on my model. A computer linked to sensing devices might simulate sensitivity and retention, but what are we going to use for pure, undifferentiated illumination that is the core of consciousness?

Quick question here: you refer to energy as decompression of illumination. Do you have any picture accounting for how the compression takes place? I may have overlooked something, but if I have I'd appreciate a more explicit treatment of your ideas on this.

Yes, I did explain that. If you look at Diagrams 9, 10, and 11 along with the accompanying text, you will see that I explain compression is made possible by the concentrative phase of the panpsychic structure.

 

[honestrosewater]

Les,
Okay, I read the first page and skimmed through the rest. If you've already addressed my questions, don't feel obliged to repeat yourself, you can just refer me to the appropriate posts.
This may seem like a big step backwards, but I want to make sure we're on the same page. It should be pretty painless at least.

Why is your method necessary? Are you assuming that objective evidence is different from subjective evidence? The first possible difference between them that comes to mind is accessibility.

Assume there are two different people, Alice and Bob. Presumably, they are different because they each have exclusive access to a world of evidence: the world of their own subjective evidence. Call Alice's World of Subjective Evidence AWSE, and Bob's same BWSE. Presumably, there exists a third world of evidence to which they both have access. Call this world, the World of Objective Evidence, WOE. Presumably, Alice and Bob have access to each other (or some form of each other) through WOE. Unless I have explained something incorrectly, (I'm trying to not be "formal" but maybe my attempt is superficial?) WOE is simply where AWSE and BWSE overlap. It isn't that AWSE and BWSE are disjoint and contained within WOE. The whole relationship can be represented as a simple Venn diagram with two overlapping circles, as pictured on the left here http://mathworld.wolfram.com/VennDiagram.html with A=AWSE, B=BWSE, $A \cap B$=WOE. Right? Is this how you imagine things? There doesn't even have to be a "context" for the circles.

Now, what is to stop AWSE and BWSE from merging completely together, until both are one circle, WOE? I am just talking about worlds of evidence, not physical locations or anything else.
If people can share some evidence, why can they not share all evidence? If Bob and Alice share evidence for tree, leaf, branch, oak, vein, green, yellow, English, etc., why can Bob not use the evidence already in WOE to introduce evidence for maple from BWSE into WOE and thus into AWSE? By the same process, is it not possible for Bob to introduce all evidence in BWSE into AWSE through WOE?
That is, if any evidence in WOE is similar enough to be considered shared (though I wouldn't consider it to actually be identical) then all evidence accessible to either BWSE or AWSE can be made similar enough to be considered shared.

Perhaps I misunderstood your use of empirical, but it seems this is what your method attempts to do. How is your method different from the current methods by which "objective" evidence is shared? If it is assumed that objective evidence can be shared by virtue of some similarities in the nature or circumstances of people and through some reliable method, why would that same assumption exclude subjective evidence from being shared by the same reliable method? Is it just that no method of sharing subjective experience has yet been precise enough? It seems to me that scientific and artistic (objective and subjective, generically) methods of communication ultimately function the same way, but can encompass varying degrees of ambiguity/precision. They just happen to have tended toward opposite ends, for the most part.

I swear I meant to say something about physical and metaphysical, but the concepts seem rather meaningless at the moment.

 

[honestrosewater]

I'm not trying to hijack this thread. If someone deems that to be happening, please split my posts off into another thread. The reason I'm bringing this stuff up is because I think it forms the foundation of Les' method, and that foundation isn't clear to me. Perhaps you all have already clarified this in other threads that I missed. So split or edit it if appropriate.

Okay, physical and metaphysical. Would you equate physical evidence with objective evidence (the WOE) and metaphysical evidence with subjective evidence (the WSE)? (Perhaps you don't even like my above ideas, but for now I'll assume you do.) In other words, physical reality- whatever its "nature"- is evidenced in the WOE. Metaphysical reality- whatever its nature- is evidenced in the WSE. The WOE is a subset of the WSE. Thus physical evidence is a subset of metaphysical evidence. This seems to be in accord with the usual definitions of the terms.
Note that this doesn't introduce any new sets- it's just equating terms. The nature of physical or metaphysical reality still must be inferred from the evidence. I think I'm making no assumptions about the possibility of equating the evidence with the nature. That is, I'm not assuming it's either possible or impossible- I'm staying undecided for now. If I did make an assumption about this, please point it out.

Presumably, the mechanism which makes the evidence in the WOE accessible is (at least) the sensory neuron (as opposed to interneurons). The process of physical evidencing initiates (and perhaps ends) with the firing of a sensory neuron. Perhaps you would extend this mechanism to include interneurons as well. Perhaps to certain neural circuits not involving the brain (reflexes). Perhaps even to the whole nervous system. This brings up my next question: What is the mechanism that makes the evidence in the WSE accessible? I assume consciousness is the answer, but I'm wondering if you would make any further distinctions. For instance, between consciousness and the nervous system. By asking these questions, I'm trying to flesh out your hierarchy via my set model, using proper subsets and supersets. My model still contains only two sets, WSE and WOE, and these sets may even be equal, but I'm wondering if you think some metaphysical evidence cannot be physically evidenced, making the WOE a proper subset of the WSE.

Now, for the mechanism of sharing evidence between WSEs, I would turn to semiotics. Briefly, semiotics is the study of signs (as in conceptual devices, not supernatural encounters or anything). Here's a nice online text http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/semiotic.html and part of its description of what semiotics encompasses:

Semiotics is not widely institutionalized as an academic discipline. It is a field of study involving many different theoretical stances and methodological tools. One of the broadest definitions is that of Umberto Eco, who states that 'semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign' (Eco 1976, 7). Semiotics involves the study not only of what we refer to as 'signs' in everyday speech, but of anything which 'stands for' something else. In a semiotic sense, signs take the form of words, images, sounds, gestures and objects. Whilst for the linguist Saussure, 'semiology' was 'a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life', for the philosopher Charles Peirce 'semiotic' was the 'formal doctrine of signs' which was closely related to Logic (Peirce 1931-58, 2.227). For him, 'a sign... is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity' (Peirce 1931-58, 2.228). He declared that 'every thought is a sign' (Peirce 1931-58, 1.538; cf. 5.250ff, 5.283ff). Contemporary semioticians study signs not in isolation but as part of semiotic 'sign systems' (such as a medium or genre). They study how meanings are made: as such, being concerned not only with communication but also with the construction and maintenance of reality. Semiotics and that branch of linguistics known as semantics have a common concern with the meaning of signs, but John Sturrock argues that whereas semantics focuses on what words mean, semiotics is concerned with how signs mean (Sturrock 1986, 22). For C W Morris (deriving this threefold classification from Peirce), semiotics embraced semantics, along with the other traditional branches of linguistics:
semantics: the relationship of signs to what they stand for;
syntactics (or syntax): the formal or structural relations between signs;
pragmatics: the relation of signs to interpreters (Morris 1938, 6-7).

It's been a while since I "studied" semiotics, but you can get the basic idea by reading the first and second chapters. The basic "unit" of semiotics is the sign. You can define the sign as bridging the gap between evidence and nature or between evidence and evidence or both. IIRC much of semiotics studies the use of signs in social contexts. I'm just suggesting some of its concepts can be used in this model. For instance, incorporating the rhetorical tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony) into your judgment of "good" evidence may be helpful IMO (If I remember them correctly.)
Thoughts?

 

[honestrosewater]

Okay, sorry, this will be my last post until someone responds. I just want to add a little about why I think semiotics would be helpful.
Briefly, a sign has two parts,
1) the signifier- the form the sign takes.
2) the signified- the concept represented.
There are three general types of signs (though according to the above text, Peirce created a typology with 59,049 types of signs, so you can get quite specific!). In the following examples, the signified will be the visual aspects of a person's subjective experience of a tree*, the signifier will be given. The types are:
1) Symbolic- the signifier does not resemble the signified; the relationship is arbitrary, conventional. Example: the written English word "tree".
2) Iconic- the signifier resembles the signified. Example: a painting of a tree.
3) Indexical- the signifier is directly related to the signified. Example: a photograph of a tree.

To more clearly see how this relates to the topic of this thread, specifically the sharing of subjective experiences, use a ghost instead of a tree in the examples. Better still, think of Les' experience of union and the diagrams and explanatory text Les provided.
Les may want to permit only certain types of signs in empirical induction. Or rather, Les may want to consider only certain types of signs as "evidence" in empirical induction. We would presumably have to use some iconic signs to communicate (written language).
I suspect there are important limits on what types of signs can be used to communicate subjective experience and rules for how those signs need to be related to each other (relating two different signs with one common part) to form an acceptable "chain of evidence". So I brought up semiotics because using the work of others can save a lot of time and effort. This brief explanation is just that- these concepts have been further refined.

BTW You may even disagree with my example. How is a photograph of X directly related to a person's conscious experience of X? How can a person's painting of X only resemble their conscious experience of X? I'm not even sure I agree with my example, but I was trying to make this brief.

*Edit: in "the visual aspects of a person's subjective experience of a tree" a tree was meant as a "physical" tree, composed of living plant cells.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les,
Okay, I read the first page and skimmed through the rest. If you've already addressed my questions, don't feel obliged to repeat yourself, you can just refer me to the appropriate posts. . . Why is your method necessary? Are you assuming that objective evidence is different from subjective evidence? The first possible difference between them that comes to mind is accessibility. . . . I swear I meant to say something about physical and metaphysical, but the concepts seem rather meaningless at the moment.

Hi Honest,

I wanted to think about your post before answering. I afraid I can’t see the relevance of semiotics to the theme of this thread, nor how Venn diagrams fit in the model I presented. You certainly have an active mind though!

If you are still interested I’ll give you my two cents worth on a couple of your other ideas and comments. First let me orient you to the theme of this thread. The overall concept is about theoretical modeling. You are familiar I am sure with lots of theories -- works in progress where people are trying to figure out how some aspect of reality functions. Some models have more pieces in place than others; the Big Bang has several key pieces (the expanding universe, background microwave radiation, the findings of the COBE satellite, etc.), while string theory has only mathematical validity (no observed “pieces” of the model).

In metaphysics, sometimes theoretical modeling can get pretty far from evidence, unless it’s scientific modeling, which brings us to one of your questions. Metaphysics is not about subjectivity. Here’s an edited post I made from another thread explaining metaphysics:

“To the person casually using the word, quite often they use metaphysical to mean something ethereal or spiritual. But that isn't really what it means, even if to claim existence is say, all spirit, is a metaphysical statement.

We had a pretty heated debate here when someone asked if everything can be explained/accounted for with physics. Those who said yes were making a metaphysical statement because they were saying the basis of existence is purely physical. When we talk about general conditions of existence behind apparent reality, that are causing what we can see and measure and experience -- that is metaphysics. It doesn't have to be something spiritual, or non-physical; it doesn't even have to be true about all existence. It could refer just to conditions behind one particular aspect of reality.

Something one hears all the time around here is that any explanation that isn't scientific is worthless, or ‘nonsense’ as I've seen many times. That view is itself metaphysical, what some call ‘scientism,’ in the sense that it assumes reality is such that only science can reveal it. A similar example is my friend who is a historian, and who evaluates everything as history. I have yet another friend, educated as an economist, who likes to tell me ‘everything is economics.’"

So if a model attempts to explain what is behind and causing appearances, then that is a metaphysical model. Now, when it comes to modeling something like a creator, or cosmic consciousness, or anything non-physical (and therefore unavailable to the senses), that modeling has a reputation for being pure speculation. If, for example, some kind of huge or omnipresent consciousness has been involved in the formation of the universe, how do we model it?

A model always starts with premises, and so what I suggested for any model, whether it is a physical model or a creator model, is that its premises should be supported by evidence. If they aren’t, then what basis is there for evaluating the model? I also suggested a metaphysical model should be consistent with how things we can see work, hopefully help explain those things better than they are without the model, and that the model isn’t contradicted by even one thing we know to be true. In this way a metaphysical model can be made more realistic. I then offered to demonstrate this technique on something that seems it must be purely speculative, which is the idea of panpsychism, or the idea that some greater consciousness has assisted in the origination and development of the universe.

That brings us to the issue of subjectivity. I am not going to get into your questions about the details of the nervous system, but what I suggested in this thread is that possibly a general consciousness pool exists, and maybe our universe is within that. The idea of the central nervous system, then, is that it was evolved as a result of the general consciousness’s “emergent striving” to emerge here on Earth, through physicalness, as individual (i.e., versus “general”) consciousnesses.

What is consciousness? I portray it as being aware that one is aware. We are aware of light, for example, because the eyes relay that information. But a human doesn’t just “detect” light, a more central part of consciousness knows that it detected light. I modeled that “knower” as the core of consciousness, and went on to claim that it is the gradual development of the core knower as one ages that is the basis of subjectivity.

Okay, so as you point out, there are billions of little subjective human beings walking about. We can see there is a world outside of us, we can see we have a body which is equipped to feed us information about that “outside” world, and then there is us, consciousness, inside the brain somewhere receiving that information. As you imply, all the humans living in this universe share that universe, and can receive information about it; but also, that information once it’s been received by us, becomes private. No one can get into your consciousness and receive your information, or be where you exactly are consciously. In that sense, because each conscious point is unique, and receives information only it can receive from the spot it occupies, that helps to create the individuals we are, or as I called it, to individuate us.

That information coming to us from the “outside” is objective because others have access to it. That information which is inside is subjective. Because the “outside” world is physical, we normally think of objective information as physical information. Because we perceive the outside world with our senses, that is how we study physicalness, and that is why empiricism relies on sense data to study and interpret the physical world. I can look at a tree, and you can look at tree, and that is one way I can know if what you say corresponds to some actual aspect of reality.

As you can see from the definitions of metaphysics and subjectivity, it isn’t accurate to say metaphysical is subjective because a metaphysical perspective of physicalism, for example, has a great amount of objective data available.

However, because of the apparently non-physical nature expected for a “general” consciousness pool, for this thread a certain subjective experience was relied on for evidence. As evidence I cited reports of people who’ve practice “union.” Their experience is subjective, not “objective” as science demands, but I claimed that such inner experience might provide information that the senses cannot detect, and so when added to a sense data, might allow us to create a better model.

So, that’s what this thread is about. I used a specific subjective experience to try to strengthen a normally weakly-supported metaphysical theory, and then created a model using that evidence along with what relevant objective information we have.

 

[honestrosewater]

Okay, I'm not disagreeing with you yet- I just need to make sure we are talking about the same things. I realize this is rather tedious, and I appreciate your patience and help. BTW I'm making up most of this as I type, so I can't just refer you to an already developed model to save time. Trust me, if I could, I would.

When we talk about general conditions of existence behind apparent reality, that are causing what we can see and measure and experience -- that is metaphysics. It doesn't have to be something spiritual, or non-physical; it doesn't even have to be true about all existence. It could refer just to conditions behind one particular aspect of reality.

Your "behind apparent reality" is my "nature", and your "apparent reality" is my "evidence".

In other words, physical reality- whatever its "nature"- is evidenced in the WOE. Metaphysical reality- whatever its nature- is evidenced in the WSE.

So you are saying that I shouldn't speak of metaphysical and physical realities but of metaphysical and physical models. The models are only using our evidence in such a way as to give us insights into the nature of our evidence- the nature of the reality "behind" our evidence. In other words, the models are used to assign additional meaning to our evidence. One such meaning is physicalness- existence in a physical reality.

To clarify that, let me run through some of my assumptions/definitions. The phrase "conscious experience" can be used individually, collectively, and generally. That is, we can speak of individual, unique experiences, as in "seeing a live tree". After seeing more live trees, we can speak of collective experience, as in "seeing live trees". And after seeing things other than live trees, we can speak of general experience, as in "seeing". Conscious experience is what I mean by evidence.
All evidence is subjective. At least some evidence is objective in addition to being subjective. Evidence becomes objective when two people establish a correspondence between their subjective experience. We can establish this correspondence in several ways: by being in each other's presence and pointing to something, calling what we are pointing to a tree, associating the verbal word tree with the written word tree, etc. This is where signs and sign systems (chains of evidence) come in- signs are the mechanisms of establishing correspondence; being in each other's presence and pointing to something, calling what we are pointing to a tree, and associating the verbal word tree with the written word tree are all instances of creating and using signs. And tieing those signs together creates a sign system.

Perhaps this seems like I'm going too far back, but what are models if not sign systems, chains of evidence? A physical or metaphysical model can be explicitly and precisely described by explicitly and precisely describing the chain of evidence- each sign that is used in the model and the connections between them. Doing this for each model would be a monumental task, but I suspect much of the process can be generalized. This is similar to what is done in formal logic, except that semiotics goes further. For instance, logic takes certain terms as undefined. The term "number" may be left undefined in some formal logic system. But the term "number" is part of a sign- the signifier. Semiotics acknowledges what logic does not or cannot- that the term "number" means something to the person using it- more than it means in the formal logic system; A formal sign system can describe that meaning- the signified- and trace that meaning back to a piece of individual, collective, or general evidence and make apparent whether that evidence is objective or not.
This tracking of meaning could be important in describing a person's reasoning as a formal system. What does the term "number" mean to the mathematician using it? Maybe this is why Penrose fails in trying to model human reasoning as a sound formal system- er, sorry, I have several things going on in my head right now- I don't mean to let them all intrude here. I'll stop this train and respond to the rest of your post. I just have to say that I have a strong suspicion that the distinction between individual, collective, and general evidence is the crucial distinction to make, and signifying individual evidence is the crucial step.

If, for example, some kind of huge or omnipresent consciousness has been involved in the formation of the universe, how do we model it?

What I am suggesting is that if someone has experienced this omnipresent consciousness, that person can use a formal sign system to model it, making the model more than purely speculative. Formal and informal sign systems are used when someone describes the taste of something to someone who has never tasted it. And when someone describes a perfect circle to someone else. And when two people agree about the color of a shirt or the mass of a photon. It's all the same process of linking together signs. Part of the process has already been formalized by logic. Part of the process has already been accepted by physical science. But logic stops short of incorporating all the signified parts of the signs. And physical science stops short of incorporating evidence not available to the senses. So you just need to create a model that uses logical and scientific methods and incorporates what they do not. I think a formal sign system is just the thing to do it. You can then test the system for soundness, completeness, etc. Well, I suspect you would be able to, at least. I haven't actually worked all of this out- I'm developing this idea as I'm writing.

What is consciousness? I portray it as being aware that one is aware. We are aware of light, for example, because the eyes relay that information. But a human doesn’t just “detect” light, a more central part of consciousness knows that it detected light. I modeled that “knower” as the core of consciousness, and went on to claim that it is the gradual development of the core knower as one ages that is the basis of subjectivity.

This knowing that you know is what I'm dealing with in another thread. Actually, for now, I'm just trying to figure out how you can know that you know a statement is true in different kinds of formal systems, but I intend to extend it to knowing about your observations/"conscious experience"/evidence. You may be interested in reading http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/penrose.html article by Chalmers, especially "2. Penrose's Second Argument".

As you imply, all the humans living in this universe share that universe, and can receive information about it;

I'm not sure what you mean. I assumed information (evidence) could be shared between two WSEs and called the set of that shared evidence the WOE. Adding a third WSE would give you at least a second WOE which may or may not share evidence with the first WOE. Between Alice, Bob, and Cathy, you would get WOEs AB, AC, BC, and ABC, some of which may be empty and so on, I'm sure you get the picture. (BTW I mean "sharing" as "having in common", just a state of affairs, not an action.) For the WOE to be nonempty, some weaker form of your statement would have to be true. If a WOE was equivalent to a WSE, some weaker form would be true. But I wasn't equating evidence with nature or being. The WSE is only part of being human- sharing evidence isn't the same as sharing what I think you would call your "point of consciousness". So instead of "living in this universe" I would say "being evidenced in the WOE" perhaps or "being partially evidenced in the WOE". People would have to infer the nature from the evidence and this may involve induction. Though presumably you can deductively infer your own nature from your own evidence. I'm not sure what that entails, it gets tricky. I would have to consider it further, but I want to finish this post some time today.
Anyway, yes, I do personally suspect that your statement is true.

I can look at a tree, and you can look at tree, and that is one way I can know if what you say corresponds to some actual aspect of reality.

Exactly. And the same process is involved in exchanging abstract ideas. We agree that we cannot draw a perfect circle nor a line of infinite length, right? These things have a "nonphysical" nature. Yet formal languages can describe these things in such a way that different people can know they are talking about precisely the same things (given some assumptions, of course) without ever having pointed to the same perfect circle or infinite line in each other's presence. You and I can talk informally about trees and come to know that we are talking about the same thing (to a certain degree of precision) without ever having pointed to the same tree in each other's presence. Physicists can talk about photons and know they are talking about precisely the same thing without ever having pointed to the same photon in each other's presence. So why can't you develop a formal sign system that describes union in such a way that different people can know they are talking about precisely the same thing (given some assumptions, of course) without ever having pointed to the same union in each other's presence. If evidence of perfect circles, infinite lines, trees, and photons is acceptable, why would evidence of union not also be acceptable?
I'm saying that our ability to share evidence of these things depends not on the nature of the things but on our system of communication. All of our systems of communication- whether they internally ackowledge it or not- use signs- they are sign systems. I think what you are doing is the same as what could be accomplished by a formal sign system.

However, because of the apparently non-physical nature expected for a “general” consciousness pool, for this thread a certain subjective experience was relied on for evidence. As evidence I cited reports of people who’ve practice “union.” Their experience is subjective, not “objective” as science demands, but I claimed that such inner experience might provide information that the senses cannot detect, and so when added to a sense data, might allow us to create a better model.

Exactly what a formal sign system could do- be a theory incorporating all evidence- subjective and objective- bringing it all together under the same theory. Kind of like a TOE for evidence. The theory would still be inductive if it spoke to the nature of things, I'm not suggesting otherwise- well, not yet. There is possibly an interesting "out" if a person's reasoning could be modeled by a formal sign system. A formal sign system could potentially be you in an indirect, incomplete way- it would actually just represent all of your knowledge and such so it wouldn't actually be you- but "be you" sounds more impressive. I haven't much more than an inkling of how this would work. But the system would include your knowledge about yourself- and if you knew that you were conscious, you could possibly know that other people are conscious by virtue of your shared evidence which the system would fully and precisely describe. If you could demonstrate your own consciousness to yourself, the consciousness of others could follow. I mean "know" in the strongest way- and as true justified belief. And I mean "true" in the strongest way. Anyway, that was a bunch of BIG "ifs" and "possiblies". I just get so excited I can't contain myself sometimes.

There's some link I still feel I haven't made quite clear enough yet, but I'll stop here and continue to look for it.

 

[honestrosewater]

BTW I recognize the difference between pointing to a tree and pointing to a creator of the universe. The creator of the universe is not accessible through the senses. Fine. And so the distinction between physical and metaphysical is drawn. Great. But I am talking about shared evidence*- evidence which can be gained through conscious experience and physically evidenced through the senses (i.e. communicated). Being physically evidenced is not the same as physically existing. I gave examples of things which metaphysically exist and can be physically evidenced- and physically evidenced precisely and consistently- abstract ideas. Sorry for going on and on, but I need to clarify the things about which I am not confused.

*I see now that I was wrong in equating conscious experience with evidence. Evidence is actually the affirmative statement of a conscious experience (i.e. the knowledge of such an experience). You can make such a statement to yourself or to others, as in "I saw a tree" or "I want some pizza" or "Pizza gives me heatburn". A sign system establishing correspondence between evidence would include such statements and others like "Pizza is a kind of food made by rolling out some dough...", "Dough is a mixture of flour, water, eggs, ...", "Flour is white, dry,..." and so on, all tied together in some way. But a formal sign system would, well, formalize the whole process of construcitng and relating those statements and their signs. It would also, if you constructed it to, rule out contradictions and such.
I thought that metaphysical things were unprovable, but I'm beginning to doubt that (well, unprovable in some system, I should say). There is already a system that at least comes close- human reasoning. A system modelling human reasoning can possibly be proved to be everything one can reasonably ( ) demand such a system to be. Such a system would describe what it is like. And again, signifying individual experience is the crucial step since without it, whiteness and dryness would have to be left undefined. And again, I am straying from the topic- but because I see them as so closely related.

Edit: Briefly, I think your goal of stengthening metaphysical theories can be accomplished by formalizing your communication system. And I think such a formalization would involve formally modelling your own system of reasoning (reasoning about your knowledge). And I think a formal sign system would do the job.
Wait, I think I know your response: Prove it. Argh.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Briefly, I think your goal of stengthening metaphysical theories can be accomplished by formalizing your communication system. And I think such a formalization would involve formally modelling your own system of reasoning (reasoning about your knowledge). And I think a formal sign system would do the job.

Wait, I think I know your response: Prove it. Argh.

I didn't mean to imply that semiotics have no relevance to theoretical modeling, I just meant that it just wasn't what this thread is about.

Beyond that (in regard to semiology) I'd say that each of us have to rely on our strengths and interests, and formal sign systems isn't one of mine. If you read how I write and think, you can see I am continuously trying to relate things to my and others' experiences. I like to make things concrete rather than abstract, and I want to stay as close to experience as possible because I believe that is where all knowledge lies.

Lately Hypnagogue and I have been disagreeing, and I'd attribute it to exactly the sort of the difference between someone who is comfortable, and even prefers, abstract thought, and someone (me) who likes it concrete and experience-based. I think you can communicate with more people that way, while abstractness leaves most people behind in the dust.

I can see you are quite the abstracter! Science, math, programming . . .all of those areas needs people good at that, so you are certainly at the right website. I am a bit out of place here, but they tolerate me anyway so far. Anyway, most of what you said in your last posts I can't disagree with, you make valid points. The only thing I can say for certain is that developing a formal sign system is the opposite way I want to go since I prefer to make abstract ideas more concrete.

 

[honestrosewater]

I am a bit out of place here, but they tolerate me anyway so far.

I appreciate your presence here. And I'm clearly not alone in that.

The only thing I can say for certain is that developing a formal sign system is the opposite way I want to go since I prefer to make abstract ideas more concrete.

It seems this is the link I didn't make clear. A formal sign system would include both "abstract" (implication, equivalence, uniqueness) and "concrete" (dryness, whiteness, smoothness) meaning. I am not suggesting ignoring or preferring either of them. To clarify what I mean by a formal sign system I could lay one out for you, but I won't press the issue anymore if you don't want to.

The basis of consciousness appears to be vibrant illumination
In union, one can see consciousness is illumination (seen inside one’s consciousness, so obviously not with the eyes). I used the word “illumination” instead of “light” because people (especially at PF) might think of photons. But the illumination of consciousness is not “particlized,” it is smooth, homogeneous. In terms of its vibrancy, I don’t mean vibrating, but rather super-finely energetic. It isn’t so much seen as it is heard (as before, not with the ears, but rather one listens with consciousness itself).

How does the appearance of "physical" objects compare to the appearance of "nonphysical" objects? For instance, how do nonphysical brightness and smoothness compare to physical brightness and smoothness? Obviously you can make the distinction of not being directly experienced through the senses, but how do you know you are not just remembering some (originally) sensory experience? Do the brightness and smoothness experienced through union differ from the same experienced through memory? Dreams present similar questions, but maybe we should stick to wakeful experience.
BTW I'm not disagreeing, I'm inquiring.

 

[sage]

i don't know much about philosophy but i am not convinced that
a)presence of an universal consciousness is needed to explain the universe(and everything in it including ourselves).and that
b)consciousness cannot be generated by known biological processes alone.
why can't a universal consciousness be detected by existing scientific instruments? because it is not a physical entity? then how can it act on a physical entity, what are the laws of interaction? are there any quantitative models? right now the idea seems rather vague to me.

 

[Les Sleeth]

How does the appearance of "physical" objects compare to the appearance of "nonphysical" objects? For instance, how do nonphysical brightness and smoothness compare to physical brightness and smoothness? Obviously you can make the distinction of not being directly experienced through the senses, but how do you know you are not just remembering some (originally) sensory experience? Do the brightness and smoothness experienced through union differ from the same experienced through memory? Dreams present similar questions, but maybe we should stick to wakeful experience.

They are totally different, not even close; as different as between your memory of light and looking at a light bulb, except even more so because of an important aspect I’ve not talked about.

One of the biggest leaps I made in my meditating career was when I realized that that inner light is felt more than it is “seen.” That insight led me from having meditation primarily be an exercise in concentration, to being one of practicing feeling my own being. The instant I became clear about that, meditation got 1000% easier. Learning to recognize the feel of one’s consciousness naturally concentrates one, naturally stills the mind, naturally pulls one inward . . . so that one is relieved of having to make any effort other than feeling.

So there is no mistake by what I mean by “feeling,” I do not mean emotion or any of the senses. This feeling is a kind of sensitivity and receptiveness done with the innermost part of consciousness; later one learns one is actually feeling one’s own consciousness with consciousness itself. Getting good at that is what leads one straight to union. So this inner light is more than brightness, and much more substantial than a memory.

 

[Les Sleeth]

. . . why can't a universal consciousness be detected by existing scientific instruments? because it is not a physical entity? then how can it act on a physical entity, what are the laws of interaction? are there any quantitative models? right now the idea seems rather vague to me.

If you are interested in a logical explanation for that question, you can do a search of this thread using the term "monism." Somewhere I posted a relatively short (long for a post tho) contemplation of the idea that a single substance could be the basis of consciousness and matter. What we call matter would be seen as this basic "stuff" in a more concentrated condition than consciousness, so there is no real duality.

 

[honestrosewater]

So this inner light is more than brightness, and much more substantial than a memory.

Do you know if any studies have been conducted to find correlations between the subjective experience of union and observable brain states?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Do you know if any studies have been conducted to find correlations between the subjective experience of union and observable brain states?

I've not heard of any studies. I would see part of the problem as finding someone who really is accomplished at union. I've mentioned I live in an area where there are lots of spiritual head trips going on, and some people I talk to claim they know all about it. But when I question them I can tell they don't. Another problem would be how the meditator would indicate to researchers when he/she starts to experience union. With me at least, maintaining an awareness of some task I had to perform would interfere with the single pointed way consciousness needs to be to approach union. I suppose they could just monitor without the meditator participating in any other way except working toward union.


I have often wondered myself what might show up if the brain were monitored. My theory is that it would show something like the alpha state, and so not really reflect what is going on inside. But of course I don't know. It would be fun to submit to tests to find out.

 

[honestrosewater]

My theory is that it would show something like the alpha state, and so not really reflect what is going on inside. But of course I don't know. It would be fun to submit to tests to find out.

I don't have any more questions- for now. Thanks again.

 

[roamer]

honestrosewater, I thought you might find this http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/101/46/16369" .
I'm not certain if these mediation techniques are similar to Les's practice of union. What you will see is that there are basically two stages to the mediations one consists of a visualization and the other is the experience of "nothingness". Both of these states corespond to two very distinct brain states and i would suspect the latter may be similar to union. The experience of nothingness is the highest aim of these mediatators, this state is apparently hard to describe but is often thought of as experiencing the very base state of conciousness. In any case there definitely is a very observable effect in the brain for these meditators. Personally I don't know how much it means to me that we can observe different brain states in meditators especially if you see conciousness as not being physical.