Biden & Graham Debate Iraq: 1/7/07 on Meet the Press

[turbo]

I don't imply that the conflict of Sunni and Shii was inevitable nor has it been historically wide spread, but I do think that there are individuals who have exploited the perceived differences once the control of Saddam Hussein and his regime was removed.

True. Under Hussein, Iraq was quite secular and tribal differences were perhaps more important than religious differences. Religious fundamentalism would have posed a threat to his power. With him out of the picture, and with an ineffectual puppet government in place, the influence of the clerics and tribal leaders become important, and the intricate mix of loyalties creates a volatile, dangerous situation that could destablilize the entire region. Dick Cheney knew this years ago when he explained Bush I's decision to leave Hussein in power. Somehow he managed to forget all this when he became VP, though.

 

[BobG]

No, it seems Rezh Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein tolerated each other. There was no love between Khomeini and Hussein.

Well, the Sunni-Shii conflict (animosity) seems to be a more recent development along the lines of the more recent troubles between Catholic and Protestant in N. Ireland.

Which has nothing to do with a Sunni-Shia dispute.

Actually, it does. The tensions stay under the surface as long as everyone knows their place. Shiites in Sunni countries sit pretty low in the pecking order.

Khomeini coming to power caused problems for all the Sunni states - he stirred up Shiites in the entire region and the Shia in Sunni countries started wanting a fairer distribution of wealth and rights. Actually, Khomeini called for the overthrow of governments that were becoming too secular and westernized, including the overthrow of Hussein, but most countries diffused the issue by improving conditions for Shiites at least a little (a lot more Shiites listened to Khomeini than Sunnis). Hussein obviously had his own way of dealing with troublesome Shiites.

If Hussein had actually won his war with Iran, he would have been immensely popular with other Sunni leaders - a nice side benefit to expanding his oil fields.

Hussein's primary motivation had nothing to do with Sunni-Shiite relations, but those relations did have a lot to do with setting up favorable conditions for an invasion.

 

[Yonoz]

Everyone is correct, in a way.
During the 1980's the Muslim Middle East was falling out of love with with Nasser's secular Pan-Arab nationalism, which was (and still is, to an extent) the moral basis for most of the Arab regimes. Iran's theocratical revolution presented an alternative to Nasser's secular nationalism. As such, fundamentalist Iran was deemed a risk to the stability of these regimes and the Middle East in general. That is why in the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq was backed by virtually the entire ME and the West.
Of course no theory is complete without an exception, portrayed by Syria. The reason this apparent poster boy for pan-Arab nationalism is allied with its traditional enemies, is its unnatural Allawite leadership.

 

[ophase]

I think you all have confused about Iraq. You think that there's something wrong about the ethnics in Iraq. You think that Hussein was strongly conscious about his decisions and you think so much that make you confused at last. There's not so much thing to think about.

According to me, the point that you missed is "Education". These people are all ignorant ! They shoot each other for such unsensible reasons bcs of their ignorance.

So instead of ruining their civilization, we should help them to build up their buildings and cities again. I'm so sorry bcs I used to remember Baghdad with its famous roads, carpets, Alaaddin and palaces from ancient times.

I compare Iraq with Japan just after the WWII. Japanese people wasn't ignorant at all to build it up everything again.
So all world has to use their sources to help Iraq people to build up their civilization.

 

[Pelt]

Actually, it does. The tensions stay under the surface as long as everyone knows their place. Shiites in Sunni countries sit pretty low in the pecking order.

Um, Syria?

Khomeini coming to power caused problems for all the Sunni states - he stirred up Shiites in the entire region and the Shia in Sunni countries started wanting a fairer distribution of wealth and rights.

That actually never happened. Quite the contrary. Ayatollah Khomeini never gained a Shia constituency outside of Iran (you can thank the legacy of the Safavids for this). His revolution has been an unmitigated failure in that respect. One of the main reasons why is because Arabs ain't Persians and Arab Shiis see no reason to bow and scrape before Qom when they have Najaf. On top of that, the Syrian Allawites have very little to gain by acknowledging the religious leadership of the 12er Shia. If you need a crude analogy, Shiites are like Protestants to Catholics, only the Catholics lacked any sort of episcopal structure to their faith to start with and the Shia aren't even close to ecumenical amongst themselves.

Actually, Khomeini called for the overthrow of governments that were becoming too secular and westernized, including the overthrow of Hussein, but most countries diffused the issue by improving conditions for Shiites at least a little (a lot more Shiites listened to Khomeini than Sunnis).

Most countries? Most of the theocratic Gulf States, if any, have made any moves towards improving the treatment of their Shia subjects. 5er Shiis make up the plurality of Yemeni Muslims, and they're treated brutally by the government. Pakistan and Afghanistan have enjoyed comparatively peaceful relationships between their large Shia minorities and the Sunni majority. I don't see any evidence whatsoever that the 1979 revolution accompanied societal shifts in countries with large Shia populations.

Hussein obviously had his own way of dealing with troublesome Shiites.

And Sunnis (Kurdish and Arab). Simply following Sunni tradition didn't place you in a higher caste in Baathist Iraqi society. You were from Tikrit or Mosul, a loyal Ba'athist, and probably a butcher. Your faith was simply incidental to your place of birth.

If Hussein had actually won his war with Iran, he would have been immensely popular with other Sunni leaders - a nice side benefit to expanding his oil fields.

I'm sure Hussein believed that as strongly as be believed he could split the Persian Sunnis off from the main body (another overestimation of Sunni-Shia animosity?). Neither dream came to pass, and either way the Gulf States benefited from loans to Baghdad. It remains an open question as to whether or not the GCC would've tolerated, let alone celebrated, a Baathist strategic success in that war.

Hussein's primary motivation had nothing to do with Sunni-Shiite relations, but those relations did have a lot to do with setting up favorable conditions for an invasion.

Had a lot to do with Sunni-Shia relations? The man lost Khuzestan for precisely because he gambled that an invasion would rally Sunni Arabs in Iran to his cause. In the end, nationality or fear or whatever won out and the Iranians pushed the Iraqis out two years later.

 

[Yonoz]

Hiya Pelt, I'm glad to see someone so well versed in the history of the region. I agree there's more to this than merely religious feuds, but surely you acknowledge that, at least so far as the Iranian leadership is concerned, politics and religion are inseperable - just as politics and ethnicity are inseperable in today's Middle East.

Had a lot to do with Sunni-Shia relations? The man lost Khuzestan for precisely because he gambled that an invasion would rally Sunni Arabs in Iran to his cause. In the end, nationality or fear or whatever won out and the Iranians pushed the Iraqis out two years later.

I'd say in the end http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_executions_of_Iranian_prisoners" ...

 

[Pelt]

Hiya Pelt, I'm glad to see someone so well versed in the history of the region.

It's a great region to study for folks interested in a variety of things. It's the Crimea of the 21st century (at least until Crimea gets interesting again).

I agree there's more to this than merely religious feuds, but surely you acknowledge that, at least so far as the Iranian leadership is concerned, politics and religion are inseperable

Most definitely. Post-1979 Iranian grand strategy is as inherently religious as it is unrealized. Unfortunately, it hasn't changed.

- just as politics and ethnicity are inseperable in today's Middle East.

I tend to look down on this generalization, though. Ethnic identity plays on a second tier to national, tribal and even religious identity in the region. Consider Iran--it's only compelling unifying characteristic demographically is a slight majority of Persians, a 70 percent Iranic speaking population, and 90 percent adherence to some Shia tradition (adherence to the state's 12er faith is uncertain). That still leaves a Sunni Arab population just under two thirds the size of Iraq's total Sunni community (Arab and Kurd). Nevertheless, Azeris (some 16 million) formed a core base of support for Khomeini in 1979, and urbanized Azeris and Persians mingle freely. In Iran, religion is a more important source of identity than your ancestral tongue.

Ethnic identity pops up in only two internationally significant areas of the Middle East--Kurdistan (a threeway between Turks, Arabs and Kurds) and Sudan.

I'd say in the end http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_executions_of_Iranian_prisoners" ...

Ah, but consider that in 1980 MEK--who drew their fighters from Persian and Azeri communities--calculated that it would be a great idea to join forces with Hussein while the actual Sunni Arabs living closest to the cavalry didn't so much as lift a finger. If fear won out, it would be one of the rare times where a community on the out and closest to safe embrace of a future ally had more caution than an isolated, yet persistent band of malcontents in the dominant culture. 1988 might've cowered some (though MEK keeps plugging on), but Iraq had already quit Iranian territory in 1982.

 

[Yonoz]

It is an exciting, though sometimes terrible, unravelling of a chapter of history. Would you mind describing the parallels with Crimea? Perhaps another thread would be a better stage for that.

I tend to look down on this generalization, though. Ethnic identity plays on a second tier to national, tribal and even religious identity in the region. Consider Iran--it's only compelling unifying characteristic demographically is a slight majority of Persians, a 70 percent Iranic speaking population, and 90 percent adherence to some Shia tradition (adherence to the state's 12er faith is uncertain). That still leaves a Sunni Arab population just under two thirds the size of Iraq's total Sunni community (Arab and Kurd). Nevertheless, Azeris (some 16 million) formed a core base of support for Khomeini in 1979, and urbanized Azeris and Persians mingle freely. In Iran, religion is a more important source of identity than your ancestral tongue.

Ethnic identity pops up in only two internationally significant areas of the Middle East--Kurdistan (a threeway between Turks, Arabs and Kurds) and Sudan.

Agreed - it was a generalization for simplicity's sake. "Ethnicity" is too narrow a definition, but I cannot think of a single, unified definition that accurately describes these "identity" groups.

Ah, but consider that in 1980 MEK--who drew their fighters from Persian and Azeri communities--calculated that it would be a great idea to join forces with Hussein while the actual Sunni Arabs living closest to the cavalry didn't so much as lift a finger. If fear won out, it would be one of the rare times where a community on the out and closest to safe embrace of a future ally had more caution than an isolated, yet persistent band of malcontents in the dominant culture. 1988 might've cowered some (though MEK keeps plugging on), but Iraq had already quit Iranian territory in 1982.

Indeed, however in retrospect one can argue those Sunni Arabs understood the Iranian's regime's resolve in dealing with fifth columns, and realized joining Hussein's "cavalry" is a risk not worth taking, particularly for Sunnis. In that perspective - fear most definitely won out.

EDIT: On a side note, I don't know what those MEK fighters were thinking. They certainly did not "calculate" - anyone who does the maths realizes there will always be that "morning after". I suppose they were an idealist lot. Socialists...

 

[Pelt]

It is an exciting, though sometimes terrible, unravelling of a chapter of history. Would you mind describing the parallels with Crimea? Perhaps another thread would be a better stage for that.

Another thread probably would be appropriate, but suffices to say that Crimea had all the major players we see today--a large Muslim continental power seeking hegemony over some strategic chokepoint (straits instead of oil), the West, Russia, and a mix of interesting peoples (around the Black Sea rather than the Persian Gulf). Only this time around the roles are reversed and the Muslim empire--this time Persia--is the bad guy from the West's point of view and the it's the Russians turn to play the enablers.

Agreed - it was a generalization for simplicity's sake. "Ethnicity" is too narrow a definition, but I cannot think of a single, unified definition that accurately describes these "identity" groups.

That's a good instinct to go with. It's even better to follow it through and eschew identities stronger than national ones. It's weird how it works out, but even Iraqis who can't stand living with other people of a different creed or ethnicity want to remain Iraqis. Chalk it up to delusions of grandeur about ruling the whole rather than simply a part. The Hakims and al Dawa would love Shi'a dominance, but will reject Iranian rule by jurisprudence--if for no better reason than they think Najaf should be the center of the Shi'a world, not some bastard Persian ghetto like Qom. They're also smart enough to calculate that they can't manage Kurds and Sunnis well enough to rule absolutely, and even smart enough to figure they can't survive as a nation separate from the whole. So, they'll aim for the Kurdish solution or, barring that, a permanent place in whatever majority governments arise. The thing to remember is while Qom wants to rule here on Earth, Najaf is not only content but hellbent on guiding religiously provided politics gives them preferential space to do so. The Iraqi ayatollahs are no revolutionaries, not one bit.

Indeed, however in retrospect one can argue those Sunni Arabs understood the Iranian's regime's resolve in dealing with fifth columns, and realized joining Hussein's "cavalry" is a risk not worth taking, particularly for Sunnis. In that perspective - fear most definitely won out.

Think about the timing. The war started barely two years after Khomeini took over the reins and not even year after the turmoil surrounding Bargazan's resignation. Iran is at its weakest, and nobody really knows how the new regime will shape up. The Cultural Revolution didn't pick up steam until April 1980, and Hussein launched his attack September of that year. The Iranian armed forces were still in disarray. It took Tehran two years to execute a successful counteroffensive, about as much time as it took the Soviets to turn it around in World War II. And we all know that before Stalingrad it was hardly a foregone conclusion how the Eastern Front would shape up. Simply put, nobody had enough time or information to accurately determine how the new regime would shape up, let alone how forcefully it could--let alone would--act after hostilities began.

EDIT: On a side note, I don't know what those MEK fighters were thinking. They certainly did not "calculate" - anyone who does the maths realizes there will always be that "morning after". I suppose they were an idealist lot. Socialists...

Once again, you calculate based on your best understanding of the information you have. MEK has the added disadvantages of calculating against a thinking adversary and with not much more access to intelligence and capacity to analyze it than your typical Persian.

 

[Yonoz]

That's a good instinct to go with. It's even better to follow it through and eschew identities stronger than national ones. It's weird how it works out, but even Iraqis who can't stand living with other people of a different creed or ethnicity want to remain Iraqis. Chalk it up to delusions of grandeur about ruling the whole rather than simply a part. The Hakims and al Dawa would love Shi'a dominance, but will reject Iranian rule by jurisprudence--if for no better reason than they think Najaf should be the center of the Shi'a world, not some bastard Persian ghetto like Qom. They're also smart enough to calculate that they can't manage Kurds and Sunnis well enough to rule absolutely, and even smart enough to figure they can't survive as a nation separate from the whole. So, they'll aim for the Kurdish solution or, barring that, a permanent place in whatever majority governments arise. The thing to remember is while Qom wants to rule here on Earth, Najaf is not only content but hellbent on guiding religiously provided politics gives them preferential space to do so. The Iraqi ayatollahs are no revolutionaries, not one bit.

As long as we're dealing with historical parallels, one can argue the political system evolving in Iraq (and its relationship with its immediate neighbours) is reminiscent of 18-19th centuries' European system of pacts and treatise (keeping with Huntington, the "ethnic group" being the reincarnation of the state). If it is so, then it might just give that region some temporary, relative peace; but it is doomed to scleratise - and seeing how, geopolitically, so many parts of the Middle East are like the Balkans magnified, one can only hope the leaderships here are not only willing, but also agile enough to keep their peoples' nationalism (or its younger sibling - "ethnicism"?) in check.

Think about the timing. The war started barely two years after Khomeini took over the reins and not even year after the turmoil surrounding Bargazan's resignation. Iran is at its weakest, and nobody really knows how the new regime will shape up. The Cultural Revolution didn't pick up steam until April 1980, and Hussein launched his attack September of that year. The Iranian armed forces were still in disarray. It took Tehran two years to execute a successful counteroffensive, about as much time as it took the Soviets to turn it around in World War II. And we all know that before Stalingrad it was hardly a foregone conclusion how the Eastern Front would shape up. Simply put, nobody had enough time or information to accurately determine how the new regime would shape up, let alone how forcefully it could--let alone would--act after hostilities began.

One, or both, of us is underestimating those Iranian Sunni Arabs. I still believe it was not nationalism, but foresight, that kept them from acting, obviously their geopolitical status would be a major factor in their reasoning. Quite simply, they had more to lose by turning against the new leadership than they would gain had Saddam won. It's nearly impossible to figure out their thinking at the time, but I'll try and look it up tomorrow.

Once again, you calculate based on your best understanding of the information you have. MEK has the added disadvantages of calculating against a thinking adversary and with not much more access to intelligence and capacity to analyze it than your typical Persian.

Of course. I wouldn't be so sure otherwise!
This reminds me - the title of this thread is "what to do about Iraq". Iraq's future is not as uncertain as it was a few months ago, but it's yet to be played out. So, what's your forecast for Iraq?

 

[Astronuc]

Perhaps a separate thread on "What to do about Iran", or "What to do about the ME" would be appropriate. It's a topic or set of topics that are complex.

It would appear that tribal affiliation is a key factor in many of the ME states. The national borders are obviously arbitrary, but those borders have more or less been in place for a number of generations already.

In the near term, it would appear that Iraq will be an occupied state. In the longer term, it depends on what leader comes to power - as seems to be the case historically. And certainly there will be external pressures from outside interests.

BTW, Pelt, what is the basis of your comments? Please provide evidence to support one's statements.

With respect to the Crimea, what is the "large Muslim continental power seeking hegemony over some strategic chokepoint"? Is this a reference to the Ottoman Empire or the Tatars?

 

[Pelt]

It would appear that tribal affiliation is a key factor in many of the ME states. The national borders are obviously arbitrary, but those borders have more or less been in place for a number of generations already.

Just to be clear, tribal ties weigh in only amongst rural and semi-rural Arab populations (they'll still figure heavily in municipalities tallying up to 50,000 pop). Borders have stuck largely because increasing population density promoted the replacement of tribal identity with some form of provincialism bordering on nationalism (the most obvious incubator for study are Palestinian communities). Remember, this is the land of the city-state, and with few exceptions Egyptian, Libyan, Levantine and Mesopotomian metropolises have shaped lasting trends in Middle Eastern culture and society.

Tribesmen are at their weakest in the day-to-day operations of modern Arab states; for one, there's not enough of them two prop up a government (Hussein's was running nearly on empty largely because he wanted to pull in most of his people from Tikrit) Two, your buddies from the block might be loyal but they're not terribly good at their jobs. Most of them are no-shows in the first place, collecting a check for an official position while not performing much in the way of actual duties. Three, you usually want your homeboys to fill up the military ranks--that's why you see so many of these governments with military officers doubling in civil positions. Negotiating with somewhat friendly tribes solves some of your manpower problems but with the same if not greater cost in inefficiency. For the state to function even minimally, you have to draft a crapload of bureaucrats from the educated, urban classes and even take on a few as ministers.

Tribal identity plays its strongest role when small, isolated pockets like Tikrit or Qardaha feed tribesmen into the military who later impose juntas on the state. In this way, it's somewhat similar to street gangs metastasizing into organized crime rackets. Nasser, Sadat, Hussein and Hafez al-Assad seem like sophisticated types but at the end of the day they're still a bunch of wiseguys from the old neighborhood gaming the system to make a quick buck.

It's an interesting dynamic that's peculiar to the Arabized Muslim world. Tribalism continues to hold sway in the governing classes while at the same time tribal identity is slipping away from the populace at large. Then you have countries like Iran which have long traditions of sourcing the cities for leadership in national affairs and Pakistan and Afghanistan, where you have a starkly cosmopolitan national political culture set against deeply rooted and hardly fading tribal traditions.

In the near term, it would appear that Iraq will be an occupied state. In the longer term, it depends on what leader comes to power - as seems to be the case historically. And certainly there will be external pressures from outside interests.

Iraq hasn't been an occupied state since 2004. The duly elected government has saw fit to continue a relationship with the MNF to participate in reconstruction, institution-building and counterinsurgency efforts under regularized status of forces agreements; they're due for a new one in spring 2008. Nevertheless, for all legal purposes Iraq is a sovereign state, a status treated as legitimate by the international community.

BTW, Pelt, what is the basis of your comments?

A decade's worth of research and experience.

Please provide evidence to support one's statements.

Care to pick a few claims out? I don't intend to draft a paper for you, if that's what you're asking, but I'm more than happy to answers specific requests and point you to useful resources.

With respect to the Crimea, what is the "large Muslim continental power seeking hegemony over some strategic chokepoint"? Is this a reference to the Ottoman Empire or the Tatars?

The Ottomans. The Crimean Tatars wouldn't qualify as a power in any pertinent sense of the term, let alone a large one.

 

[Astronuc]

The definition of occupation -

Occupation - the holding and control of an area by a foreign military force c: the military force occupying a country or the policies carried out by it

would indicate this statement -

Iraq hasn't been an occupied state since 2004.

is incorrect.

The Blackwater fiasco and the inability of the Iraqi government to arrest, detain and hold a trial of the individuals involved indicates that the Iraqi Government is not in control, but the Bush administration through the US military is in control of the area. The immunity granted by the CPA still holds.

The duly elected government has saw fit to continue a relationship with the MNF to participate . . . .

The Iraqi government had no choice vis-a-vis the occupation. The Iraqis government cannot deal independently without tacit approval of the Bush administration.

Sovereignty implies - freedom from external control or influence, and Iraq is certainly not there yet.

On the other hand, I do agree with some, perhaps most of one's assertions.

 

[Pelt]

The definition of occupation -

would indicate this statement is incorrect.

How so? Neither the US nor MNF has legal authority to tell the Iraqis how to set policy, something that should be obvious to anyone moaning about the lack of an oil law over the past year.

The Blackwater fiasco and the inability of the Iraqi government to arrest, detain and hold a trial of the individuals involved indicates that the Iraqi Government is not in control, but the Bush administration through the US military is in control of the area.

By that reasoning, the US occupied Britain in 1942. Negotiating status of forces and the terms of visiting forces acts is part and parcel of of the forward deployed American national security policy. And like any such act between sovereign nations, it's subject to revision anytime a party sees fit. That said, Iraqis are http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BCD517FD-B1F3-41EB-8CFA-B28ABC40AAFC.htm of arresting and detaining contractors, and the government is presently looking into changing the law regarding visiting forces in order to try them. I'd argue in this case they have the upper hand when it comes to renegotiating SOFAs with the United States. After all, all they have to do is change the law, and all the US can do is threaten to leave prematurely.

The immunity granted by the CPA still holds.

As subject to Iraqi interpretation. If they were to abide by the letter and spirit of the SOFA, they could still file for immnunity waivers from the Sending State(s) in order to proceed without attaching a legal dispute. If they wanted to be *****y about it, they just go ahead and try contractors without consulting with the Sending State(s). Who's going to stop them?

The Iraqi government had no choice vis-a-vis the occupation.

Of course they didn't, the interim government was set up by the Occupying Forces. That obligation to follow the occupation authority ended on July 1, 2004.

The Iraqis government cannot deal independently without tacit approval of the Bush administration.

They seem to be dealing with Syria and Iran well enough without tacit approval from the Bush Administration.

Sovereignty implies - freedom from external control or influence, and Iraq is certainly not there yet.

Does it? The US is in the driver seat of its security relationships with South Korea and Japan. The former hasn't been able to negotiate a separate peace with its northern neighbor in 50 years and Japan still operates under Section 9 of its imposed constitution.

On the other hand, I do agree with some, perhaps most of one's assertions.

Whose assertions?

 

[Astronuc]

By that reasoning, the US occupied Britain in 1942.

The US did not invade Britain. The US military did not bomb the capital city of Britain, nor depose the government, nor did the US government exert influence in British elections. Again one's logic is faulty.

Does it? The US is in the driver seat of its security relationships with South Korea and Japan. The former hasn't been able to negotiate a separate peace with its northern neighbor in 50 years and Japan still operates under Section 9 of its imposed constitution.

Yep - it does. S. Korea and Japan are there, Iraq is not - yet.


Here's a good resource to mull over - particularly "Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned", Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec07/indexengnovdec07.asp

2 Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars
Michael Vlahos

Our enemies understand that “it is in the living of war’s mythic passage that identity will be truly realized.” We, for our part, blunder blindly on, fitting ourselves to their Manichean narrative.


13 The “Armed Reconciler”: The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Process
Michael W. Mosser, Ph.D.

Experience and logic suggest general principles of the AR2 process operate in an environment of interdependent dimensions common to all cultures. In any post-conflict society, an “armed reconciler” is likely the key to making those principles succeed.


20 The Law of Occupation and Post–Armed-Conflict Governance: Considerations for Future Conflicts
Colonel David A. Wallace, U.S. Army

According to international law, “regime change” necessarily entails interim responsibility for security and governance in Iraq. Here’s what we need to know now and for future operations involving “the ‘O’ word.”


38 Armed Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: A Primer for Military Professionals
Colonel Daniel Rice, U.S. Army Reserve, and Major John Dehn, U.S. Army

Practical military considerations play into any decision to use force to initiate humanitarian intervention. Two experts review the moral and legal tradition for military professionals who will have to help in weighing alternatives.


http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/indexengsepoct07.asp

2 Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, with Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army

Looking beyond the current wars, a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Corps-Iraq calls for significant changes to the way we train and fight.


16 Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve

As the “Anbar Awakening” suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject.


32 Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired

The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.


45 Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army

A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.

I call attention to - Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve - which is a excellent summary.
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/eisenstadtengseptoct07.pdf

Anthropology 101 for Soldiers: What is a Tribe?
A tribe is a form of political identity based on common claimed descent.2
it is not necessarily a lineage group, as tribal subunits (sections or subsections)
may manufacture fictive kinship ties or alter their tribal identity or
affiliations for political, economic, or security-related reasons.3 tribes may
also be of mixed sectarian or ethnic composition. Thus, Iraq’s Shammar and
Jubur tribes have Sunni and Shi’ite branches, while Qashqa’i tribesmen in
Iran are of Turkish, Persian, Arab, Kurdish, Lak, Luri, and Gypsy origin.4

There is no such thing as a “typical” tribe. Tribes may embody diverse
kinship rules, structures, types of political authority, and lifestyles (sedentary,
semi-nomadic, nomadic),5 which may be influenced by security and
economic conditions and government policies.6 Thus, for instance, the Arab
tribes of the arabian Peninsula, Levant, and north africa tended, at least
traditionally, to be relatively egalitarian and non-hierarchical organizations
lacking a well-developed leadership structure, while the turkic tribes of the
Central Asian steppes tended to be hierarchical, highly centralized organizations
ruled by powerful chieftains.7

Although Arab tribal ideology is relatively egalitarian,
in reality, major disparities in status, power,
and wealth exist within and between tribes.8 Among
settled tribes, sheikhly families and clans tend to
form dominant lineages that are better off and more
influential than other families and clans in the tribe.9
Bedouin tribes of “common” origin are looked
down on by those of “noble” origin, while smaller
(“weak”) settled tribes are often looked down on
by larger (“strong”) settled tribes.10

Tribal Values, Processes,
and Organization11
Tribal values remain deeply ingrained in Iraqi
society and have had a profound influence on Iraqi
social mores and political culture. (This observation
holds for much of the rest of the arab world as well.)
These values include the high premium put on ingroup
solidarity (‘asabiyya), which finds expression
in loyalty to the family, clan, and tribe,12 coupled
with a powerful desire to preserve the autonomy of
the tribe vis-à-vis other tribes, non-tribal groups,
and the authorities;13 personal and group honor
(sharaf); sexual honor (‘ird), which pertains to the
chastity of the family’s female members; manliness
(muruwwa), which finds expression in personal
traits such as courage, loyalty, generosity, and hospitality;
and pride in ancestry (nasb).14

Tribal processes include traditional forms of interpersonal
and group conflict such as the blood feud,
as well as mechanisms for regulating and resolving
such conflicts: the cease-fire (atwa), blood money
(fasl), and peace agreement (sulha).15 These processes
are conducted in accordance with tribal law
(‘urf), as opposed to Sharia (Islamic) or civil law, and
are applied mainly in rural towns and villages and
some urban areas, though the precise extent to which
tribal law is applied in Iraq today is not clear.16
Organizationally, the tribes of Iraq consist of
nested (vice hierarchically organized) kinship
groups (see table 1). There are thousands of clans,
hundreds of tribes, and about two dozen tribal confederations
in Iraq today, each with its own sheikh.
(Saddam Hussein’s regime officially recognized
some 7,380 tribal sheikhs.)17

The collapse of central-government authority and
the rise in political and sectarian violence in the wake
of OIF has caused many iraqis to fall back on the
family, tribe, sect, or ethnic group for support in confronting
the daily challenges of living in post-Saddam
Iraq. As a result, tribal identities have assumed greater
salience in iraq in recent years. It would, however, be
a mistake to overemphasize the role of the tribes or to
regard the tribe as the central organizing principle of
Iraqi society today. Large parts of Iraq are inhabited
by detribalized or non-tribal populations, and tribal
identity often competes with and is overshadowed
by other forms of identity (sect, ethnicity, class, or
ideological orientation). Moreover, the demise of
the old regime has led to the rise of new social forces
and actors in Iraq—particularly islamist movements,
militias, and parties, which are playing an increasingly
important role in Iraqi politics. Recent events in anbar
province, however, demonstrate that under certain
conditions, the tribes can still be decisive actors.
. . . . there has been no
systematic effort to assess the impact of violence and
coalition and Iraqi government policies on the tribes
and the state of relations between tribal and non-tribal
groups in Iraqi society.20
. . . .

Still, other sheikhs have adjusted well to the new
rules of the game, participating in Iraq’s conflict
economy and transforming themselves, for all practical
purposes, into local warlords. Perhaps the best
example of this new type of leader is sheikh ‘Abd al-
Sattar Biza’i al-Rishawi of the Albu Risha tribe, leader
of the anbar awakening. According to published
reports, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, sheikh
‘Abd al-Sattar led a band of highwaymen who operated
near Ramadi and worked as a facilitator for AQI
on the side, providing its operatives with cars, safe
houses, and local guides. But when the AQI operatives
he was helping started working as highwaymen
too—encroaching on his ‘turf,’ cutting into his profits,
and then killing his father and several brothers—the
relationship soured, prompting the sheikh to turn on
AQI and to ally himself with coalition forces.54

Reference numbers left in.

Interesting point about the collapse of the central government authority and basically the US-lead Coalition forces, which ostensibly include Iraqi forces now, still seem to be the ones calling the shots.

Hopefully Sahawah Al Anbar and Sahawah Diyala will be successful.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/the_awakening_al_qae.php

Nice map of Diyala - http://billroggio.com/maps/Diyala-South.JPG

http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/iraq-map-detailed.jpg


Still waiting for citations to support one's assertions. Please refer to -
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=113181
2) Citations of sources for any factual claims (primary sources should be used whenever possible).

 

[Pelt]

The US did not invade Britain. The US military did not bomb the capital city of Britain, nor depose the government, nor did the US government exert influence in British elections.

The only criteria you laid out was an agreement to grant criminal immunity to visiting forces. However, if you care to revise at this point, then by your new reasoning the US is presently occupying Germany.

Again one's logic is faulty.

Whose logic?

Yep - it does. S. Korea and Japan are there, Iraq is not - yet.

Are where?

Here's a good resource to mull over - particularly "Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned", Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve

As is this (a list of some of the canonical lit http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/coin-in-a-tribal-society-1/). There's lots of resources out there, but is there a particular point you're trying to make?

Interesting point about the collapse of the central government authority and basically the US-lead Coalition forces, which ostensibly include Iraqi forces now, still seem to be the ones calling the shots.

Yes, the increased relevance in tribal identity in everyday life following the Baathist fall from political authority is interesting. I broached the issue in a previous post: "Tribalism continues to hold sway in the governing classes while at the same time tribal identity is slipping away from the populace at large."

Eisenstadt makes no mention of the MNF calling any shots. Not sure where you got that from.

Hopefully Sahawah Al Anbar and Sahawah Diyala will be successful.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...ing_al_qae.php .

Nice map of Diyala - http://billroggio.com/maps/Diyala-South.JPG

Okay...

Still waiting for citations to support one's assertions. Please refer to -
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=113181
2) Citations of sources for any factual claims (primary sources should be used whenever possible).

Whose assertions and which ones? I asked you this before. You have any issue with anything I've position I've taken, I'm more than willing to shepherd you to the appropriate resources.

 

[Astronuc]

Tom Hayden about his book "Ending the War in Iraq."
http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/wamc/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=1199592&sectionID=231

Interesting perspective.

I'll address other questions when I have more time.

 

[Pelt]

I haven't followed much of anything Tom Hayden's put out in recent years, but I wonder if it expands upon his 2004 proposal http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/20571/.. According to this http://akashicbooks.com/endingthewar.htm , Hayden apparently subscribes to the "2006 midterms as Iraq war referendum" narrative and attributes its success to an antiwar movement whose strategic aim isn't merely an end to operations in Iraq, but (given his 2004 proposal) an end to the "occupation" on terms certainly unfavorable to the US. In Tom's words: "The strategy must be to deny the U.S. occupation funding, political standing, sufficient troops, and alliances necessary to their strategy for dominance."

 

[Astronuc]

I haven't followed much of anything Tom Hayden's put out in recent years, but I wonder if it expands upon his 2004 proposal http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/20571/.. According to this http://akashicbooks.com/endingthewar.htm , Hayden apparently subscribes to the "2006 midterms as Iraq war referendum" narrative and attributes its success to an antiwar movement whose strategic aim isn't merely an end to operations in Iraq, but (given his 2004 proposal) an end to the "occupation" on terms certainly unfavorable to the US. In Tom's words: "The strategy must be to deny the U.S. occupation funding, political standing, sufficient troops, and alliances necessary to their strategy for dominance."

Hayden is still an antiwar activist, and his statements are certainly a political statement rather than a practical solution to the situation in Iraq. It appears that his strategy would be to cut the funding the Bush administration wants in order to force a change in policy.

I need to read the book to understand what exactly he is getting at and whether or not he offers a practical solution.

 

[mheslep]

Tom Hayden about his book "Ending the War in Iraq."
http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/wamc/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=1199592&sectionID=231

Interesting perspective.

I'll address other questions when I have more time.

About 1/3 into the interview, Hayden says about the current Iraqi government

..people we installed in Baghdad...

? 70% turnout in the '05 elections, millions of people. The US didn't install these politicians.

 

[Pelt]

I need to read the book to understand what exactly he is getting at and whether or not he offers a practical solution.

Just remember that Hayden's view of the "problem" boils down to: "The US is a dangerous force in the world and must be contained until reformed" (presumably along some as yet to be determined line of new leftism more compatible with international norms).

? 70% turnout in the '05 elections, millions of people. The US didn't install these politicians.

Hayden's view is any government that owes any part of its survival to American military strength exists only as a puppet to the US. He made this clear in his views on the South Vietnamese leadership. He also holds that the star opposition, therefore, must be preferable, whether North Vietnam the first time around or http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0930-23.htm today.

 

[turbo]

Just remember that Hayden's view of the "problem" boils down to: "The US is a dangerous force in the world and must be contained until reformed" (presumably along some as yet to be determined line of new leftism more compatible with international norms).

It's tempting to throw around blanket labels like "leftism" but it's generally not productive to do so. There are a lot of fine people who believe that killing is wrong, except in self-defense, and that the Iraq War in particular had nothing to do with any of the Bush administration's stated goals. These people include a lot of vets, including many general officers, who are usually not liberals or leftists. Anti-war sentiment is not confined to the left or the right of the political spectrum (however you perceive that).

Regarding your assertion that Hayden thinks the "US is a dangerous force in the world", what is so wrong with that view? One retired general in particular warned us that the US was being taken over by a dangerous marriage of military contractors, military command, and Congress, though he edited out Congress before delivering the speech. That general was Dwight Eisenhower. The neo-cons in our administration and Congress, and in advisory positions, think-tanks, and lobbying groups have brought about the militaristic state that Eisenhower warned us about - a US whose foreign and domestic policies are driven not by the interests of the people, but by the interests of the war machine.

True conservatives would never waste our blood and treasure in an unnecessary war, nor would they want to see our military capabilities depeleted, or encourage foreign interventions. These are the actions of radical neo-cons, not conservatives. These snakes wrap themselves in flags and preach about freedom and democracy, while restricting both on domestic and international fronts. I don't know how we will manage to extricate ourselves from Iraq, but it's certain that the next president and the next president after that will have a big mess on their plates thanks to current administration.

 

[Pelt]

It's tempting to throw around blanket labels like "leftism" but it's generally not productive to do so.

It's generally not a good thing to through labels around willy-nilly, but I disagree that labels are useless. Political identity is a very useful concept in a variety of social sciences, and in this case Tom Hayden is an avowed leftist. If your concerned with the neutrality of the term, I'd argue it is more so than "liberal" or "progressive." On a side note, I wonder if anyone's studied why "conservative" hasn't had as nearly as interesting a semantic life as its leftist counterparts.

There are a lot of fine people who believe that killing is wrong, except in self-defense, and that the Iraq War in particular had nothing to do with any of the Bush administration's stated goals. These people include a lot of vets, including many general officers, who are usually not liberals or leftists. Anti-war sentiment is not confined to the left or the right of the political spectrum (however you perceive that).

We're talking about Hayden, however.

Regarding your assertion that Hayden thinks the "US is a dangerous force in the world", what is so wrong with that view?

I disagree with it, but I acknowledge that people hold that view. My intent wasn't to debate the merits of his sense of values, but simply to point out what values he holds as per the OP.

One retired general in particular warned us that the US was being taken over by a dangerous marriage of military contractors, military command, and Congress, though he edited out Congress before delivering the speech. That general was Dwight Eisenhower.

Eisenhower warned against the social risks accompanying a standing military and advocated vigilance to secure against the "potential" danger of what he himself acknowledged to be "vital element in keeping the peace." This is hardly an uncommon view, it's expressed by leftists and neoconservatives like Eliot Cohen alike. It's doubtful, however, that Eisenhower would calculate such danger had been realized at any point in America's post-WWII military history.

The neo-cons in our administration and Congress, and in advisory positions, think-tanks, and lobbying groups have brought about the militaristic state that Eisenhower warned us about - a US whose foreign and domestic policies are driven not by the interests of the people, but by the interests of the war machine.

This is one view, and it's a view that was held continuously particularly by the Old and later New Left throughout from the late-1940s onward. On the other hand, since Eisenhower's day the standing military has lost almost three quarters of its peak post-WWII manpower, seven percentage points of GDP in defense spending, half of its naval strength, half of its ground force strength, and even more of its airpower.

True conservatives would never waste our blood and treasure in an unnecessary war, nor would they want to see our military capabilities depeleted, or encourage foreign interventions. These are the actions of radical neo-cons, not conservatives.

Few people if any, including neoconservatives, would waste blood and treasure on an adventure they perceived to be unnecessary. Calculating what is or isn't necessary is a little trickier than simply repeating such an obvious sentiment.

These snakes wrap themselves in flags and preach about freedom and democracy, while restricting both on domestic and international fronts.

Well domestically, civil liberties in the US is no worse off than it was in 1978. Also, it's hard to argue that the people of Iraq and Afghanistan are less free and their governments more democratic today than under their previous regimes.

 

[turbo]

It's generally not a good thing to through labels around willy-nilly, but I disagree that labels are useless. Political identity is a very useful concept in a variety of social sciences, and in this case Tom Hayden is an avowed leftist. If your concerned with the neutrality of the term, I'd argue it is more so than "liberal" or "progressive." On a side note, I wonder if anyone's studied why "conservative" hasn't had as nearly as interesting a semantic life as its leftist counterparts.

You have Hayden's history to inform your label. My point is that you can't call someone a leftist because he or she thinks that the war is wrong and that the military-industrial complex and the neocons have hijacked our government. That view is not confined to liberals.

We're talking about Hayden, however.

We're not just talking about Hayden, though, unless you want to paint him as the poster-boy for the anti-war movement.

Eisenhower warned against the social risks accompanying a standing military and advocated vigilance to secure against the "potential" danger of what he himself acknowledged to be "vital element in keeping the peace." This is hardly an uncommon view, it's expressed by leftists and neoconservatives like Eliot Cohen alike. It's doubtful, however, that Eisenhower would calculate such danger had been realized at any point in America's post-WWII military history.

Your assertion is not supported by a reading of his speech. He had no problem with the existence of a strong standing military, but with the influence that the war industry could wield in our government.
http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

This is one view, and it's a view that was held continuously particularly by the Old and later New Left throughout from the late-1940s onward. On the other hand, since Eisenhower's day the standing military has lost almost three quarters of its peak post-WWII manpower, seven percentage points of GDP in defense spending, half of its naval strength, half of its ground force strength, and even more of its airpower.

Defense spending has been exploding. If you think our military is insufficient, you should direct your energies toward the war profiteers and the people who authorize wasteful spending.

http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp#USMilitarySpending

Few people if any, including neoconservatives, would waste blood and treasure on an adventure they perceived to be unnecessary. Calculating what is or isn't necessary is a little trickier than simply repeating such an obvious sentiment.

Again, a cursory reading of the facts do not support this assertion. Cheney and his neo-con buddies knew that taking out Hussein would destabilize Iraq and lead to a civil war and a quagmire from which we could not easily extricate ourselves. They wanted a war and were willing to spend US lives and money and Iraqi lives and infrastructure to get their war. Cheney had an understanding of the problems of a destabilized Irag in 1994, but conveniently "forgot" all that when he got a chance to promote a war that would enrich his former company.

Well domestically, civil liberties in the US is no worse off than it was in 1978. Also, it's hard to argue that the people of Iraq and Afghanistan are less free and their governments more democratic today than under their previous regimes.

Warrantless wiretapping, monitoring of emails, denial of habeus corpus for any person fingered as a "terrorist"? That doesn't sound like much of an improvement in our liberties, does it? As for the people of Iraq (the subject of this post) I don't have firm numbers on the numbers of people who were executed every day by militia squads, tortured with electric drills, blown up by bombs, etc during Hussein's rule, but I'll venture to guess that the numbers were a bit lower in the "bad old days". I guess the Iraqi people are now freer to get executed by Blackwater mercenaries - they didn't have that freedom under Hussein.

 

[Pelt]

You have Hayden's history to inform your label. My point is that you can't call someone a leftist because he or she thinks that the war is wrong and that the military-industrial complex and the neocons have hijacked our government. That view is not confined to liberals.

I can't see where I've ever labeled everyone in the antiwar movement as leftist. If you got that impression, I apologize.

We're not just talking about Hayden, though, unless you want to paint him as the poster-boy for the anti-war movement.

I'm certainly just talking about Hayden. Astronuc brought him up in an interesting tangent. I haven't expressed any views on an antiwar movement as a whole.

Your assertion is not supported by a reading of his speech.

It certainly is, since it's backed up by a direct quote from the speech.

He had no problem with the existence of a strong standing military, but with the influence that the war industry could wield in our government.
http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html

We're not in disagreement on that point. We do disagree on whether or not Eisenhower preceived the danger as realized or even imminent.

Defense spending has been exploding.

As a percentage of GDP, it hasn't.

If you think our military is insufficient, you should direct your energies toward the war profiteers and the people who authorize wasteful spending.

Ironically, the reverse is probably more true. In constant dollars, http://lilt.ilstu.edu/gmklass/pos138/datadisplay/images/New_Folder/divide2.gif since the start of the Cold War through past its end has steadily trickled up. At the same time, the quantity of deployable forces has gone down.

Again, a cursory reading of the facts do not support this assertion. Cheney and his neo-con buddies knew that taking out Hussein would destabilize Iraq and lead to a civil war and a quagmire from which we could not easily extricate ourselves.

That has nothing to do with whether or not they thought the effort was necessary enough to warrant the risk.

They wanted a war and were willing to spend US lives and money and Iraqi lives and infrastructure to get their war. Cheney had an understanding of the problems of a destabilized Irag in 1994, but conveniently "forgot" all that when he got a chance to promote a war that would enrich his former company.

Then why did he hesitate in 1991? What happened between 1991 and 2003 to change his thinking? The man was Secretary of Defense and knew full well the windfalls that contractors incur during extended deployments.

Warrantless wiretapping, monitoring of emails, denial of habeus corpus for any person fingered as a "terrorist"? That doesn't sound like much of an improvement in our liberties, does it?

As I said, we're not that much worse off than in 1978.

As for the people of Iraq (the subject of this post) I don't have firm numbers on the numbers of people who were executed every day by militia squads, tortured with electric drills, blown up by bombs, etc during Hussein's rule, but I'll venture to guess that the numbers were a bit lower in the "bad old days". I guess the Iraqi people are now freer to get executed by Blackwater mercenaries - they didn't have that freedom under Hussein.

I'll readily concede that the average Iraqi and Afghan is less secure today than he or she was prior to the invasion (by as much as 6 excess deaths more per 1,000 people going by Lancet). However, we were talking about freedom and democracy. We can debate when and by how much we should value security over liberty in another discussion.

 

[Astronuc]

There are certainly differences between Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam, as there are differences between Protestants, Catholics and Eastern Orthodox branches of Chrisitanity. The media and various political figures have played up that difference, and it seems some parties in Iraq have sought to exploit differences.

Perhaps Catholic vs Protestant (in N. Ireland) would be a more appropriate analogy.

Not sure how.

Well - let's see what an Iraqi says:

Abu Khaleel - A Glimpse of Iraq
http://glimpseofiraq.blogspot.com/2005/02/sunni-shiite-iraq.html

Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq - An Overview of Basics

Sunnah and Shi'a are two sects of Islam, very much like Catholicism and Protestantism.

It's not exactly the same, certainly not. But there is a divide, despite being of 'one religion'.

Let's not forget that the US Congress passed a resolution recently recognizing the Christian religion as the largest (one) religion (and ostensibly on behalf of all Christians) in the world - despite the various conflicts over the centuries - and despite significant differences in beliefs and practices.

Or we could point out the conflict between the Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodox. Apparently it was one of the motivations behind the Crimean War (1854–1856), when after "Napoleon III had his ambassador to the Ottoman Empire force the Ottomans to recognize France as the "sovereign authority" in the Holy Land", which was followed by Russian counterclaims that "insisting that Russia was the protector of the Christian faith in the Ottoman Empire". Ref - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_War

Now the reference to the Crimea is perhaps apt to the situation in Iraq - lots of external interested parties with competing interests. But the Crimea (Peninsula) was a side show in the larger Russo-Turkic conflicts which flared up periodically over the last 500 years. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Turkish_Wars

The Bosporus Straits are certainly a key choke point for commerce in the Black Sea area. The Genitchi Strait (Sea of Azov) are of lesser significance.

Europe of the last 500 years was frought with alliances and competing interests, and maybe that's the case with Iraq for the next many decades, centuries. I hope not.

 

[Astronuc]

As for the occupation - well certainly the Bush administration and supporters maintain that Iraq is not occupied. Well - apparently some/many/most ordinary Iraqis would disagree.

Thursday, December 13, 2007
Mobilizing the Sunni Tribes of Iraq
http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2007/12/mobilizing-sunni-tribes-of-iraq.html

Article by AFP's Hervé BAR

The new US strategy in Iraq to co-opt former rebels mobilized by traditional tribal chiefs to combat the insurgents grants the tribes a central role but their influence over the long term may jeopardize the stability of the country.

It is a risky wager, explains Father Nabil Mohammad Younes, who teaches Political Science at the University of Baghdad. Since the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the US military has been attempting to cooperate with the tribes, inspired by the example of the Ottoman and British empires.

In the October 2007 issue of Military Review, a US Army forum for intellectual inquiry, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Eisenstadt deplored, deplores the unrealistic expectations due to a lack of knowledge of local and tribal history and politics.

Omnipresent throughout the Ottoman Empire, and progressively marginalized by the British occupation, Iraqi tribes inevitably lost their power with the independence and modernization of the country.

Relegated to the background under the monarchy, then by the Baa'th Party, the began to recover some influence at the end of the 1980's when Saddam Hussein, who considered them untrustworthy, attempted to buy the allegiance of some of them.

Beginning with their arrival in Iraq, American military officers, knowing nothing of the complex world of tribes, made missteps and errors. They also overestimated the power of sheikhs in the rebel city of Fallujah, when, in the midst of fighting Sunni insurgents, they insisted that the sheikhs end the violence. Moreover, US command collaborated in certain regions with sheikhs who had been appointed by the former regime and who had no credibility with their tribes. But at the same time, "they have generally proven useful as sources of information and advice and as vectors of influence among their tribesmen."

. . . .

But the recourse to the tribes, distrustful of the central government, jealous of their independence and whose loyalty goes to the highest bidder is risky, experts warn. For Father Younes, the tribal policies of the US are grounded in the principal of divide and conquer and promote the fragmentation of the country by multiplying local powers to the detriment of a strong central government. "If the occupation continues, sooner or later the tribal militias will turn on the occupiers", warns Father Younes.

Strengthening the militias also risks undermining institutions and civil society, says Col. David Kilcullen, an Australian and one of the developers of his country's tribal policies under the Coalition, in his blog, Small Wars Journal. . . .

Even the US military offices I know will readily acknowledge that Iraq is an occupied state.

 

[Astronuc]

As for how to get out of this mess -

Learn from the mistakes (and there were plenty)

US Mistakes in Iraq (Abu Khaleel)

In this weblog, a number of the major mistakes made by the US administration after the occupation of Iraq are briefly outlined. The issues involved are so complex that any brief presentation of these issues has to be over-simplistic.

These mistakes not only led to the loss of “the hearts & minds” of the Iraqi people but actually led to “gaining" their animosity and resulted in considerable damage to Iraq and to America.

A lot of innocent blood was unnecessarily spilled!

http://usmistakes.blogspot.com/

Iraqi Letters
A blog from Iraq about Iraq, war, America, occupation, government, democracy, religion, terrorism... and politics.
http://iraquna.blogspot.com/

Khaleel has written to following letter to member of the US Congress.

Honorable Member of Congress,

I am writing this message to you as a leader who has the power to influence political decisions in America that may have enormous consequences on my country, Iraq. Please forgive me for being rather blunt. I don't think we can afford to be otherwise.

Iraqi and American blood is flowing every day. Millions of innocent people are suffering every single hour. My country is literally devastated. It saddens me to see the worst in my country being the dominant visible feature. It is also true that the worst in your country has been the dominant visible feature in the eyes of the world.

There is little doubt now that the major factor responsible for the present state of chaos and turmoil in Iraq was the course of action taken by the Administration. It has also been responsible for the loss of American blood and treasure and the reduced standing of the US in the eyes of the world.

Arguments of good intentions are refuted by facts on the ground and by results. Even if the forces now devastating Iraq were not intentionally created by the US intervention, an environment was created by that intervention that was extremely favorable for those forces to thrive and become more powerful.

America is therefore responsible for the current failed state of Iraq. The realization and admission of this responsibility is an important prerequisite for any progress towards any solution. Only then can steps be taken to rectify the situation.

I realize that the foreign policy of the US is mostly the domain of the Administration and that it is influenced by several major forces from within and from outside the Establishment. I also realize the difficulty any decent American politician faces and the various forces at play that have to be considered: human aspects, economic issues including the security of oil supplies, immediate and long term security concerns as well as the pressures that can be exerted by special-interest groups. I realize all that.

Within Iraq too, the array of forces present is truly astounding: in addition to patriotic or nationalistic forces, the forces of sectarianism, corruption, decay, crime and violence are predominant. Regional countries are pouring funds to allies and cronies.

The solution to all these problems cannot be easy. At present, I can see no painless solution to the 'Iraqi problem'. Whichever direction I turn, I can only see rivers of blood, instability and destruction. This is the present dilemma. There is no easy solution. Yet, a start can be made.

For the longer term:

Many of the forces that are fighting the States in Iraq are fuelled by animosity stemming in part from the way the campaign was conducted, but mostly from a deep sense of mistrust of US policies. That mistrust was confirmed by the post-invasion performance. And that widespread popular sentiment is a fertile breeding ground.

Most ordinary Iraqis now believe that America is determined to subdue Iraq, control its oil and fragment it into warring cantons. You may find this utterly groundless. They don't. This view is shared by hundreds of millions of people around the world. And as long as there are millions of people convinced that America is an invading country and an enemy, America will be resisted and fought fiercely.

The formidable task is to convince ordinary Iraqis that America is not an enemy. Given the long heritage of mistrust, this is not an easy task! It requires a firm, and a clear stand. And it requires drastic measures. It cannot be rectified by spending money on public relations campaigns or through rhetoric.

Practical steps in that direction may include: a clear statement of admission of errors and mistakes; admission that America is occupying Iraq; a clear strategy; a clear statement of the intention to withdraw and clear plans in that direction; a clear statement of having no intentions to have any permanent bases in Iraq; a clear statement of intentions regarding control of Iraqi oil. A tall order indeed!

Only a visible change of direction may be the first step in the right direction.

For the shorter term:

The political process in Iraq was born dead. It was based on sectarianism. No modern country can be built on sectarianism. Although ancient and complex, Iraq was and still is constantly portrayed as Sunni, Shiite and Kurd. The country is far more than that. In the early days after the invasion and while the people were still in disarray and in a state of shock, Iraqis were presented with mainly ethnic and sectarian blocs as their representatives.

A "White" party, a "Black" party, a Catholic party or a Jewish party would be ridiculous propositions in American politics. A party that is supported by a foreign power would be found repulsive by the American public. Why have similar things been allowed in the democracy tailored by the American administration of Iraq?

The other, nominally secular groups packaged and presented to Iraqis were led by a few 'imported' gentlemen including a convicted felon, a CIA asset described by his own controller as a thug and a tired, uncharismatic old man. They had little credit with the people. They were also out of touch with the country for more than three decades during which the country and society were subjected to, and distorted by, enormous stressful forces that included a harsh tyranny, three major wars and years of strenuous sanctions.

The indigenous Iraqi voices were choked. There were other forces of reason, moderation and reconciliation in Iraq. But, in that prevailing climate with the overwhelming strength of those divisive forces and lack of organization, funds and support, those forces of reason and construction did not have a fair fighting chance.

In the early days, my belief was that power should have been quickly given to local people (who, as elsewhere, are moderate, peace-loving and reasonable) and democracy built from the bottom up. However, that approach was not appealing to the Administration or to the Iraqi forces in favor at the time. They knew what was best! In any case, this is no longer immediately possible as the well funded and well organized fanatics of various colors have infiltrated deeply into the grassroots.

Free-flowing funding was allowed to the sectarian and religious parties and war lords from regional and international sponsors. Those parties have now entrenched. They engineered an election process and wrote a constitution to maintain this status quo.

The irony is that some of the most powerful political and armed segments that emerged under the American administration of Iraq are enemies of the United States or close allies of countries that are declared enemies of the United States. I fail to see how any American can see this as anything but total failure.

Suggested Options

"Staying the course" is not a realistic option. It has already led to failure. Applying 'cosmetics' to that course can only make matters worse. In this context, partitioning Iraq is a recipe for certain disaster. Several forces have already been attempting to do just that since the invasion. The results are already visible. Iraq has been a single country for more than 40 centuries. If such a scenario is forced, strife in Iraq would last for many decades and would certainly engulf the region, with unpredictable results.

What is needed is a fundamental change of course.

. . . . .

 

[Pelt]

There are certainly differences between Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam, as there are differences between Protestants, Catholics and Eastern Orthodox branches of Chrisitanity.

None are teleological, however. Islam lacks a comparable concept of universality that is embodied in Catholicism (by the very term "catholic," in fact). For this reason, disagreements over sunnah (tradition) are considered temporal. I suspect Abu Khaleel would find a more apt analogy to the split between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox rites--that Great Schism still left two churches in full communion with one another.

The media and various political figures have played up that difference, and it seems some parties in Iraq have sought to exploit differences.

In Iraq, it's also important to note that the Shia-Sunni conflict is largely an Arab one from the Shia point of view, with Sunni Turkmen and Kurdish populations almost entirely ignored by Dawa and the Seminary. The Salafis, however, are going after everybody who doesn't buy into their extremely streamlined view of tradition.

Well - let's see what an Iraqi says:

It's not exactly the same, certainly not. But there is a divide, despite being of 'one religion'.

Sort of. Protestants and Catholics generally both subscribe to the Ncene Creed and it's universal claim as catechism, but deny one another common authority over Scripture. This leads to a strong teleological divide broadly over the matter of salvation and a temporal one over the role of the Holy See in securing it for mankind. Islam, on the other hand, has a dispute over which traditions of a universally agreed upon authority are best (basically, the fight is over some ahadith and who in Muhammad's company qualifies as a good imam). This is why I think the Roman/Greek split is more apt as an analogy than the Catholic/Protestant one.

Let's not forget that the US Congress passed a resolution recently recognizing the Christian religion as the largest (one) religion (and ostensibly on behalf of all Christians) in the world - despite the various conflicts over the centuries - and despite significant differences in beliefs and practices.

Well every world religion has divisions and many of them have gone through some very violent periods. Christianity isn't special in that regard.

Or we could point out the conflict between the Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodox. Apparently it was one of the motivations behind the Crimean War (1854–1856), when after "Napoleon III had his ambassador to the Ottoman Empire force the Ottomans to recognize France as the "sovereign authority" in the Holy Land", which was followed by Russian counterclaims that "insisting that Russia was the protector of the Christian faith in the Ottoman Empire". Ref - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_War

A good point, but...

Now the reference to the Crimea is perhaps apt to the situation in Iraq - lots of external interested parties with competing interests. But the Crimea (Peninsula) was a side show in the larger Russo-Turkic conflicts which flared up periodically over the last 500 years. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Turkish_Wars

...it's not ideal to magnify the Catholic-Orthodox dispute's role in the Crimean conflict. The war was principally over control of the Black Sea.

The Bosporus Straits are certainly a key choke point for commerce in the Black Sea area. The Genitchi Strait (Sea of Azov) are of lesser significance.

Exactly.

Europe of the last 500 years was frought with alliances and competing interests...

Far more than 500 years, we're talking millenia worth of wheeling and dealing to get to Westphalia and then four centuries more to the European Union. But the clear trend of history in Europe mirrors that of the rest of the world. Improved lines of communication increase interdependency which fosters republican democracies that prefer peaceful relationships with one another to violent competition.

and maybe that's the case with Iraq for the next many decades, centuries. I hope not.

Well Iraq is just one part of a broader region that contains over a billion people in dozens of countries, but that region isn't divorced from the rest of the world. Most of East Asia's come into modernity in lockstep with the Europeans; there's no structural reason why Near Eastern, Central and South Asia can't do the same.

 

[Pelt]

Even the US military offices I know will readily acknowledge that Iraq is an occupied state.

I readily concede that occupation is a trendy term in some quarters for the MNF mission, especially in the antiwar camp. However, it's meaning is solely perjorative and therefore inaccurate. The MNF has no governing authority or responsibility in Iraq whatsoever.

This distinction isn't flippant. It's an operational and legal one that defines a visiting forces relationship with the host country. It means the MNF has no authority to impose an oil sharing regime, halt or reverse de-Baathication, or even prevent the central government from negotiating deals with Syria and Iran.

 

[mheslep]

As for the occupation - well certainly the Bush administration and supporters maintain that Iraq is not occupied.

Where are you getting this?
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040413-20.html"

...they're not happy they're occupied. I wouldn't be happy if I were occupied either...

 

[dst]

Where are you getting this?
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040413-20.html"

...they're not happy they're occupied. I wouldn't be happy if I were occupied either...

Sorry but I have to e-laugh
That explains so much...

 

[Gokul43201]

This distinction isn't flippant. It's an operational and legal one that defines a visiting forces relationship with the host country. It means the MNF has no authority to impose an oil sharing regime, halt or reverse de-Baathication, or even prevent the central government from negotiating deals with Syria and Iran.

I agree with this - they have no legal authority. But what they do have is a whole lot more arm-twisting power. It's this which is likely being sensed by Iraqis that feel that they are under occupation. Likely though, a good chunk of Iraqis that call the MNF an occupying force are heavily influenced by religious leaders that gain by denouncing the west.

The biggest mistake since the invasion, IMO, was the delegation of responsibilities to uncredentialed (and wanting Roe v. Wade overturned is not a credential for someone about to oversee financial rebuilding) incompetents, based on irrelevant ideologies.

 

[Pelt]

I agree with this - they have no legal authority. But what they do have is a whole lot more arm-twisting power.

Arm-twisting power that is never used is no power at all. Otherwise, we'd be forced to say the same about other host countries with large allied deployments. At the end of the day, the Iraqi government is doing what it wants on political reconciliation, revenue sharing, Iran, and de-Baathication regardless of the MNF.

It's this which is likely being sensed by Iraqis that feel that they are under occupation. Likely though, a good chunk of Iraqis that call the MNF an occupying force are heavily influenced by religious leaders that gain by denouncing the west.

The latter more so than the former. The http://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf shows surprisingly high confidence in the central government and native security institutions, but little to no confidence in the MNF. While ungrateful, it's not unsurprising or necessarily unwelcome. Basically, it shows the Kurds understand what the MNF is trying to do, the Shia Arabs are feeling their oats and feel ready to take over as the dominant political broker in Iraqi politics, and the Sunni Arabs have finally accepted that their not going to be top dogs anymore. In this environment, the MNF is viewed as increasingly irrelevant to the ultimate objective of security. That is, of course, the aim of counterinsurgency conducted by a visiting force.

The biggest mistake since the invasion, IMO, was the delegation of responsibilities to uncredentialed (and wanting Roe v. Wade overturned is not a credential for someone about to oversee financial rebuilding) incompetents, based on irrelevant ideologies.

There isn't a single piece of evidence to CPA's underperformed in its reconstruction tasks. Just a lot of hoopla and mean-spirited Monday morning quarterbacking from people who didn't even bother to assume the risks their alleged inferiors did.

 

[Gokul43201]

Arm-twisting power that is never used is no power at all. Otherwise, we'd be forced to say the same about other host countries with large allied deployments. At the end of the day, the Iraqi government is doing what it wants on political reconciliation, revenue sharing, Iran, and de-Baathication regardless of the MNF.

It's not like the US hasn't been able to twist any arms at all. Left to himself, al-Maliki would not have dared say a word against al-Sadr, much less, sanction raids on his strongholds. I'm not sure what eventually happened to the oil bill that was going through their legislature a year(?) ago, but if it did go through looking anything like it was initially drafted, that would have taken some considerably twisting. Some areas are more amenable to persuasion than others. Besides, the reconstruction money comes from here, so at least in theory, the US does have the power to influence things.

The latter more so than the former. The http://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf shows surprisingly high confidence in the central government and native security institutions, but little to no confidence in the MNF. While ungrateful, it's not unsurprising or necessarily unwelcome. Basically, it shows the Kurds understand what the MNF is trying to do, the Shia Arabs are feeling their oats and feel ready to take over as the dominant political broker in Iraqi politics, and the Sunni Arabs have finally accepted that their not going to be top dogs anymore. In this environment, the MNF is viewed as increasingly irrelevant to the ultimate objective of security. That is, of course, the aim of counterinsurgency conducted by a visiting force.

I recall from an earlier Brookings report that the people had very little confidence in the al-Maliki government and viewed it as a pawn of the US.

There isn't a single piece of evidence to CPA's underperformed in its reconstruction tasks.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2936
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,129489,00.html
http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/reports/061504.shtml