- #71
WarrenPlatts
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See, this is where you lose me. Thinking of morals as "insubstantial" entities is ontologically extravagant and epistemologically otiose. On the principle of Ockham's razor, it is much better to think of morals as actual sentences as concrete and meaningful as the pixels on your computer screen that you are reading at this moment. Therefore, since moral sentences--we can call them "morals" if you like--are as meaningful as any other sentence written down or spoken in English, then such sentences are either true or false.Dawgard said:The inherent properties of morals, i.e. their insubstantiality, make them impossible to prove. Therefore no one moral can be completely proven to be absolute.
Here, we can agree that foundations are necessary. The advantage of moral realism, however, is that it offers a concrete foundation, whereas moral absolutism rests on a "spooky" or, as you say, insubstantial foundation.Dawgard said:We have certain foundations and we learn from there, as does everything in human history.
If we grant that morals are a type of sentence, then let us further grant that moral sentences must include a moral predicate of some kind, at a minimum, one of these four words: 'right', 'wrong', 'good', or 'evil'. Thus, 'All men are created equal' should, strictly speaking, be rewritten as something like 'it is right that x treats y and z equally' where x, y, and z are all fellow humans. Thus, the question is, how are moral predicates to be defined?
We can't define moral predicates in nonmoral terms. That would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy of G. E. Moore. Indeed, if we could so define moral predicates in nonmoral terms, it would be possible to completely eliminate moral predicates from the language--and we agree that we can't do that.
Furthermore, it is useless to define moral terms circularly, as if we could say 'moral' means the same as 'right' which means the same as 'good' which means the same as 'ethical' which means the same as 'moral', etc.
So, one alternative is the one that you (and Moore) propose, that morals are insubstantial and can only be accessed through a spooky faculty of moral intuition.
Or, we can learn the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' ostensively, like we learn the definition of 'yellow'. It does no good to explain to a person blind from birth that yellow is the color of egg yolks and ripe lemons. To know the meaning of 'yellow', yellow must be experienced. Similarly, for the moral predicates. So, if you had an alien friend who wanted to learn English, you might show him a grown man extinguishing a cigarette on the skin of a baby, and then say 'That is wrong!' And so your friend might be confused at first, so then you show him some teenagers setting fire to a cat, and you say again 'That is wrong!' The alien then begins to see the common thread.
An example from English literature of this process comes from Dickenson's A Christmas Carol. Scrooge has forgot the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' that he learned as a child because of decades being a ruthless capitalist pig. So the various spirits out to teach him a lesson don't tell him the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong', they instead show Scrooge various scenes where Scrooge is able to experience right and wrong for himself, and Scrooge thereby regains his humanity--and indeed, what other defining mark is there for humanity, other than our capacity to be moral, i.e., to be humane?
With the ostensive definition of 'wrong' now in hand, it is possible to theorize about the wrongness of situations where the wrongness is far from obvious. For example, stealing a $10 item from a WalMart store would have the consequence of reducing the annual earnings of WalMart by 0.00000000001%, or whatever, so that the harm is negligible--yet we probably still want to say that it is wrong that someone shoplifts, other things being equal.
And so we proceed, historically, and our theories are bound to evolve as society evolves, but now morality is built on the firm foundation of empirical experience rather than an insubstantial pie-in-the-sky that can only be accessed through extrasensory perception.
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