Can the nuclear industry be trusted?

[Al68]

Wait. Isn't that the very kind of thing Ivan is complaining about?

"Oh this was unique. An aberration. Won't happen again."
Until the next cluster copulation...


I'm not suggesting I agree with Ivan's stance, but it seems to me that he gets to count these aberrations as valid points in favour of his case.

That depends on what his case is. The aberration referred to was a result of something that is not being advocated by anyone, but is included in the data presented nevertheless.

 

[DaveC426913]

That depends on what his case is. The aberration referred to was a result of something that is not being advocated by anyone, but is included in the data presented nevertheless.

His case (to paraphrase/mangle) is that these "results" are not being controlled by anyone trustworthy. The people responsible for the power stations cannot be trusted to ensure that they remain "aberrations" that should not be included in our data sets of risk - as opposed to becoming a routine risk/danger.


It's like a government saying "Our spending is trustworthy now. We fired a guy that was overspending. It could never happen again, so we don't count that one oversight of ours against our overall trustworthiness."

Again, not agreeing with the OP's stance, just saying he gets to count "aberrations" towards his case, IMO.

 

[Borek]

My point is that they cannot be trusted to operate nuclear power plants safely. This is why, for example, I have suggested in the past that if we must do this [I do think we have other options], the military should assume control of nuclear power. And for that matter, nuclear power plants should be protected like military installations.

Statistics say we can trust them. OTOH, I don't trust military, at least in my part of the world.

 

[drankin]

Statistics say we can trust them. OTOH, I don't trust military, at least in my part of the world.

I agree with this. The military isn't necessarily going to make a nuclear plant safer. My experience with the military is that you end up with kids running things during their 4yr stint. Not particularly vested in anything they are doing. I don't know how that will make it safer.

 

[FlexGunship]

Again, not agreeing with the OP's stance, just saying he gets to count "aberrations" towards his case, IMO.

Yeah, that's pretty much fair. I would still make the tiniest argument saying that Chernobyl is still kind of an "exception-to-the-rule." Frankly, it doesn't matter, though, when comparing total number of deaths caused by a particular source of power, Chernobyl works out to a rounding error when compared to oil, natural gas, and coal. (Even residential solar has a worse safety record than nuclear.)

 

[fireofenergy]

Toxic and long lived waste issues should void any further considerations for today's typical Light Water Reactor. The LWR uses less than 1% of uranium, a costly (and weapons provocative) endeavor. This current approach to nuclear energy is like more peak than peak oil and IS dangerous (as it requires way too many safeguards). The LWR system is just an old dinosaur that industry loves and the rest of us should hate.

The LWR should be banned!

Enter the way nuclear SHOULD be done: The liquid fluoride THORIUM reactor...
Had LFTR been the primary choice for our nuclear energy, we would not have 10,000 year waste storage issues and possible nuclear meltdowns. We would not have nuclear weapons either... We would have 100 times the energy from a kg of fuel (with 99 times less waste, whose waste decays to acceptable levels ~300 times faster).

With LFTR, we would have been totally energy independent, would not need to be concerned about peak oil (and uranium) and would have plenty of process heat to electrify "all the cars" at any time without need to convert billions of acres over to renewable energy.
We would have a lower CO2 count too, not to mention all the extra money drained for foreign oil and the human costs of oil wars...

I believe the wastes from the LFTR for a persons ENTIRE LIFETIME of power requirements adds up to a pea sized pebble. Multiply that by, say 15 times the human population, (assuming 1 cubic centimeter per person) and the total waste footprint would be about 1 km square by just over one meter high. That's for 100 billion people living at the Western standard! If that is still too much, such minute amounts could be rocketed to a single small crater on the moon for a fraction of total energy produced.

Search LFTR (and never promote LWRs again!)

Edit: They can't meltdown because they are already molten!

 

[DaveC426913]

I believe the wastes from the LFTR for a persons ENTIRE LIFETIME of power requirements adds up to a pea sized pebble. Multiply that by, say 15 times the human population, (assuming 1 cubic centimeter per person) and the total waste footprint would be about 1 km square by just over one meter high. That's for 100 billion people living at the Western standard! If that is still too much, such minute amounts could be rocketed to a single small crater on the moon for a fraction of total energy produced.

Well of course the physical dimensions of the waste are irrelevant; it's the toxicity that's important. A pebble of plutonium is more dangerous than a cubic metre of lead.

 

[FlexGunship]

A pebble of plutonium is more dangerous than a cubic metre of lead.

Depends on how high you drop it from.

Sorry.

 

[DaveC426913]

Depends on how high you drop it from.

Sorry.

Yes. I was going to add 'unless you're standing under it' myself, but I thought I'd leave that for someone else who needed it more.

 

[fireofenergy]

Ya, I was getting kinda excited about this better form of nuclear... because it seems there is no other choice besides massive renewables.

 

[Mech_Engineer]

Magnetic confinement isn't the only fusion power concept:

https://lasers.llnl.gov/about/missions/energy_for_the_future/life/benefits_challenges.php
[PLAIN]https://lasers.llnl.gov/about/missions/images/life_target_482x618.jpg

Unfortunately it's probably decades away from being a reality...

 

[Argentum Vulpes]

Good point. While Chernobyl has been included in the data to show nuclear power to still be much safer than alternatives, it's not really appropriate to do so, considering that no currently operating (or proposed) similar nuclear plants exist.

Actually the Chernobyl power plant had reactors 1-3 still operating till 2000, 1 shutdown in 96, 2 in 91 and 3 in 2000. Ignalina 1 and 2 were shut down in 04 and 09. Kursk 1-4 are still in operation. As is Leningrad 1-4 and Smolensk 1-3. With the exception of Ignalina 1 and 2 all of those reactors are RBMK 1000, the same design as Chernobyl 4. Ignalina is a RBMK 1500, just a up powered version of the RBMK 1000 reactor. As for no RBMK reactors being built Kursk 5 is a RBMK 1000 reactor and it is still under construction.

 

[nismaratwork]

His case (to paraphrase/mangle) is that these "results" are not being controlled by anyone trustworthy. The people responsible for the power stations cannot be trusted to ensure that they remain "aberrations" that should not be included in our data sets of risk - as opposed to becoming a routine risk/danger.


It's like a government saying "Our spending is trustworthy now. We fired a guy that was overspending. It could never happen again, so we don't count that one oversight of ours against our overall trustworthiness."

Again, not agreeing with the OP's stance, just saying he gets to count "aberrations" towards his case, IMO.

I think Chernobyl was an aberration in part because of the nature of the reactor design, and a government with NO responsiblity to its people. Even then, and I've said this before, I'd take another handful of Chernobyls over the constant slow-death of coal. My point is not Ivan's, because I'm not simply for or against something, I'm for nuclear against Coal, and for green above all. I don't believe that green is coming fast enough, nor the means to integrate it into the grid (storage, more efficient transmission).

You get an exclusion zone with nuke plants... coal is just everywhere you're up/down-wind.

@Mech_Engineer: Just decades? I hadn't pegged you for an optimist...

 

[Zryn]

Hold on, to say that the 19 mile exclusion zone is the only problem with Chernobyl is just as bad as the original article saying that 'deaths per TWh' is the only problem with nuclear power.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Chernobyl_radiation_map_1996.svg"

Radiation doesn't just go where you want it! If the reactor has problems, its because things aren't going to plan.

You get an exclusion zone with nuke plants... coal is just everywhere you're up/down-wind.

Current precipitators are 99.5% to 99.9% efficient, what aspect of coal is just everywhere you're up/down-wind?

Whats the current exclusion zone around Fukushima? 20km or 80km or something else depending on who you talk to? What happens if another earthquake damages something critically important, statistically improbable right? Even better, an aberration, let's discount it!

What would a Japanese person living within 20km (100km?, 500km?) of Fukushima say about a handful of Chernobyl's compared to a slow-death from coal I wonder.

 

[nismaratwork]

Hold on, to say that the 19 mile exclusion zone is the only problem with Chernobyl is just as bad as the original article saying that 'deaths per TWh' is the only problem with nuclear power.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Chernobyl_radiation_map_1996.svg"

Radiation doesn't just go where you want it! If the reactor has problems, its because things aren't going to plan.



Current precipitators are 99.5% to 99.9% efficient, what aspect of coal is just everywhere you're up/down-wind?

Whats the current exclusion zone around Fukushima? 20km or 80km or something else depending on who you talk to? What happens if another earthquake damages something critcally important, statistically improbable right? Even better, an aberration, let's discount it!

What would a Japanese person living within 20km (100km?, 500km?) of Fukushima say about a handful of Chernobyl's compared to a slow-death from coal I wonder.

If you're arguing for clean coal, see DaveC's post, and mine previously. Given the number of deaths that can GENEROUSLY be attributed to Chernobyl, and 3 Mile Island, you're still falling short of coal in one year by most estimates. I'm not impressed, not moved, but I appreciate your substitution of sarcasm for facts and discourse.

 

[Hurkyl]

What happens if another earthquake damages something critically important, statistically improbable right?

Er, so what? People really do consider improbable events when assessing risks.

Even better, an aberration, let's discount it!

I think you greatly misunderstand. At the risk of putting words in nismaratworks' mouth, the claim is not that we can ignore it because it's unlikely -- the claim is that can ignore it because it no longer fairly reflects the risks, due to improved safeguards against human stupidity.

Of course, people will always find new and creative ways to screw up. I refrain from judging the veracity of the claim one way or the other.

 

[nismaratwork]

Hurkyl, that is absolutely correct.

 

[Al68]

Actually the Chernobyl power plant had reactors 1-3 still operating till 2000, 1 shutdown in 96, 2 in 91 and 3 in 2000. Ignalina 1 and 2 were shut down in 04 and 09. Kursk 1-4 are still in operation. As is Leningrad 1-4 and Smolensk 1-3. With the exception of Ignalina 1 and 2 all of those reactors are RBMK 1000, the same design as Chernobyl 4. Ignalina is a RBMK 1500, just a up powered version of the RBMK 1000 reactor. As for no RBMK reactors being built Kursk 5 is a RBMK 1000 reactor and it is still under construction.

None of those currently operating plants qualify as "similar to Chernobyl" in this context, despite a similar reactor design. Design features that contributed to the Chernobyl accident were redesigned, including the control rods, fuel enrichment, and several others. Referring to them as the "same reactor design" as Chernobyl in this context is just incorrect.

Not to even mention that the reactor itself is only part of a nuclear plant.

 

[Argentum Vulpes]

None of those currently operating plants qualify as "similar to Chernobyl" in this context, despite a similar reactor design. Design features that contributed to the Chernobyl accident were redesigned, including the control rods, fuel enrichment, and several others. Referring to them as the "same reactor design" as Chernobyl in this context is just incorrect.

Not to even mention that the reactor itself is only part of a nuclear plant.

The design changes that were implemented to the RBMK 1000 series of reactors after the accident at Chernobyl 4 were mostly to give the reactor more stability at low power, to help lower the nasty positive void coefficient of the reactor, and to prevent mucking with the automatic safety systems.

The reactors still lack the full containment structures that western reactors have. Also the RBMK reactors still have a positive void coefficient. These changes made the RBMK reactor safer but it is still essentially the same reactor.

It is akin to taking a car and upgrading the breaks and tires, yes the car is now safer, however it is still the same car.

However this is all somewhat besides my point. My point is that a reactor design that caused one of the worst accidents in the nuclear power industry, has put up 25 years of operation without another similar accident.

I know that a reactor is only the heat source for running the generators, and that there is a bunch of support equipment related and unrelated to the operation of the core. Take the reactor out of the equation and a coal plant looks strikingly similar in build. However it was the core that in the end caused the problem at Chernobyl, not the support equipment.

 

[mugaliens]

Yes, and I wouldn't call it hysteria. While there is certainly some of that, every argument made in favor of nuclear power for the last twenty years will serve as evidence that the nuclear industry cannot be trusted. We were told the reactors were safe when they were built. We were told that new reactors are much safer now - you know, new and improved? Which means you were selling us the old crappy stuff the first time and still operating it? We couldn't trust you before but we can now?

What really sinks this for me is the cause of the failure. It is EXACTLY the sort of lame oversight that I have talked about in the past - the reason I don't trust any form of heavy or light industry. I have seen it too many times at too many levels. Nothing about the engineering can be trusted when industry can be so incredibly blind to the weakest link.

When we allow cost to compromise public safety or common sense, this is what we get. Those generators should have been tsunami proof, not tsunami resistant. This was caused by approximately the same mistake that sank the Titanic - the lame assumption was made that the water would never go over the wall. It was a pedestrian oversight. It was completely preventable. It wasn't a matter of failed nuclear engineering, this isn't rocket science, just as we saw in the Gulf last summer, it was a matter of failed responsibility. It is an unforgivable oversight and I seriously doubt the public trust can be recaptured. The spin masters will make mince meat of the pro-nuclear position, and at this point I have to agree with them.

I know that good people with good intentions build these systems to the highest standards. I understand that it is not a betrayal of good faith. I also know that we need nuclear power. But it is true at every level of industry that the almighty bottom line challenges reason and responsibility. What caused this disaster was the need to save a few bucks, nothing more. And for that, all of the grandiose statistics and calculations go right down the toilet. What people will remember are exploding nuclear power plants. Do I want that in my backyard? Hell no!

Public perception is I think a lost cause. It will be another thirty years before the public starts to buy into this again, and by then we may no longer need it.

And the nuclear Navy's safety record is stellar. :) Yes, it's a perception issue, to be sure. Not a reality issue.

 

[Al68]

The design changes that were implemented to the RBMK 1000 series of reactors...These changes made the RBMK reactor safer but it is still essentially the same reactor.

So the design was altered, in ways relevant here, but it's still the same design in the way relevant here? OK.

It is akin to taking a car and upgrading the breaks and tires, yes the car is now safer, however it is still the same car.

If we were discussing an accident caused by faulty tires, the car is not the same in the relevant way. It is the same in an irrelevant way.

However this is all somewhat besides my point. My point is that a reactor design that caused one of the worst accidents in the nuclear power industry, has put up 25 years of operation without another similar accident.

Yes, but again, the design was altered in ways very relevant to the odds of having an accident in those 25 years.

 

[Pattonias]

In the defense of the Chernobyl reactor design, several back-up safety measures were disabled while the idiots were running their experiment. Any improvements to prevent that aspect of the disaster would require your to make it impossible to override those safety measure. I assume that is what they did change in addition to other improvements.

Its hard to compare Chernobyl to the Japanese disaster because one was due to natural disaster and the other is due to semi-deliberate human negligence. It seems that the problem is probably more complex than just reconnecting a generator. If it was that simple surely they would have done it by now just flying in mobile industrial generators.

 

[nismaratwork]

In the defense of the Chernobyl reactor design, several back-up safety measures were disabled while the idiots were running their experiment. Any improvements to prevent that aspect of the disaster would require your to make it impossible to override those safety measure. I assume that is what they did change in addition to other improvements.

Its hard to compare Chernobyl to the Japanese disaster because one was due to natural disaster and the other is due to semi-deliberate human negligence. It seems that the problem is probably more complex than just reconnecting a generator. If it was that simple surely they would have done it by now just flying in mobile industrial generators.

I'd add, in Japan you have no blast, no huge fire lofting particulates incredibly high to precipitate over europe. In short, Chernobyl was unique for all the reasons you've said, and unlikely to happen again.

 

[FlexGunship]

It is akin to taking a car and upgrading the breaks and tires, yes the car is now safer, however it is still the same car.

I'm constantly trying to downgrade the "breaks" in my car. Shoot, I wish my car had no "breaks" at all!

We were told the reactors were safe when they were built. We were told that new reactors are much safer now - you know, new and improved? Which means you were selling us the old crappy stuff the first time and still operating it? We couldn't trust you before but we can now?

This argument feels particularly weak. My parents were told that their 1960s behemoths were safe because they could survive an accident without denting the chrome. Now we're told that our 2010s commuter go-karts are safe because they crumple like an aluminum can in an accident.

Understanding of technology and (specifically) safety evolves over time. The machinery my company sold 20 years ago was safe. As safe as could be! That doesn't mean newer technology isn't safer. And it certainly doesn't mean we were lying about the safety of our older products.

When it comes to things like nuclear power plants, I'm inclined to offer a little more understanding. It's not like they get to build prototypes and test them in different types of earthquakes and tsunamis. There's an implied risk (same as building a skyscraper or a fireworks factory) and so far, it seems that nuclear power has held up its end of the deal.

 

[FlexGunship]

In the defense of the Chernobyl reactor design...

First time I've seen those words.

 

[nismaratwork]

http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/03/22/wyoming.coal.mining/index.html?hpt=Sbin

Great... 758 MilTons of coal, and a token gesture toward nuclear energy. There's one lobby that doesn't sit on its hands and wait for events to play out.

 

[Pattonias]

Well, this deal probably would have happened anyway, but way to make a popular statement at any given opportunity Salazar.

 

[BobG]

In the defense of the Chernobyl reactor design, several back-up safety measures were disabled while the idiots were running their experiment. Any improvements to prevent that aspect of the disaster would require your to make it impossible to override those safety measure. I assume that is what they did change in addition to other improvements.

This would be an interesting trade-off - and extremely unlikely. What happens if a sensor starts malfunctioning and giving false readings?

I'm not that familiar with nuclear power facilities, but a malfunctioning sensor can always be a threat to a computerized program. Garbage in, garbage out. A good, safe program responds to problems that can be anticipated, but leaves unique malfunctions for humans to solve.

Interesting difference in approaches between Chernobyl and TMI. At TMI, the emphasis was on understanding the underlying problem causing the indications operators were seeing. Instead of focusing on safing the reactor in an anomaly, the operators focused on determining and correcting the underlying problem. The solution was to 'dumb down' operations and rely more on checklists that directed actions to avoid a disaster rather than fixing the underlying problem. At Chernobyl, the attitude all along was that the operators should follow directions (via checklists or engineers) and didn't require the knowledge to diagnose underlying problems.

When you're talking about humans and group dynamics (which is almost more important than the knowledge level of the operators), there are no perfect solutions. You minimize the chance of errors, but you never get the chances down to zero.

I don't enough of the details of either situation to make an authoritative comment about either's solution, but I generally prefer relying on knowledge than checklists. Regardless, all too often, organizations focus on only these two options, since they're easy to quantify, and miss the areas where they could truly make improvements.

It's hard to train teamwork, communication, discipline, and ownership. These qualities play a more important role in crew errors than most people give credit for. The crew that defers to the engineers conducting an important test, not realizing that the engineer is trusting the crew to stop his test if it creates an situation that the crew considers unsafe. The crew that misses the underlying problem because every single person on crew is looking at the same spectacular symptoms of the problem - i.e. a lack of discipline has reduced an entire crew into accomplishing no more than a single person could. The crew that just doesn't understand what they're saying to either because so much communication is unspoken and assumed - or because some crew members are bullied and unwilling to speak up, etc.

These aren't the type of things that are ever likely to be reduced to zero. A very good organizations at least gets them close to zero, while a dysfunctional organization has chronic problems like this. Those are also the type of things that would be hard to measure during a safety inspection.

 

[nismaratwork]

This would be an interesting trade-off - and extremely unlikely. What happens if a sensor starts malfunctioning and giving false readings?

I'm not that familiar with nuclear power facilities, but a malfunctioning sensor can always be a threat to a computerized program. Garbage in, garbage out. A good, safe program responds to problems that can be anticipated, but leaves unique malfunctions for humans to solve.

Interesting difference in approaches between Chernobyl and TMI. At TMI, the emphasis was on understanding the underlying problem causing the indications operators were seeing. Instead of focusing on safing the reactor in an anomaly, the operators focused on determining and correcting the underlying problem. The solution was to 'dumb down' operations and rely more on checklists that directed actions to avoid a disaster rather than fixing the underlying problem. At Chernobyl, the attitude all along was that the operators should follow directions (via checklists or engineers) and didn't require the knowledge to diagnose underlying problems.

When you're talking about humans and group dynamics (which is almost more important than the knowledge level of the operators), there are no perfect solutions. You minimize the chance of errors, but you never get the chances down to zero.

I don't enough of the details of either situation to make an authoritative comment about either's solution, but I generally prefer relying on knowledge than checklists. Regardless, all too often, organizations focus on only these two options, since they're easy to quantify, and miss the areas where they could truly make improvements.

It's hard to train teamwork, communication, discipline, and ownership. These qualities play a more important role in crew errors than most people give credit for. The crew that defers to the engineers conducting an important test, not realizing that the engineer is trusting the crew to stop his test if it creates an situation that the crew considers unsafe. The crew that misses the underlying problem because every single person on crew is looking at the same spectacular symptoms of the problem - i.e. a lack of discipline has reduced an entire crew into accomplishing no more than a single person could. The crew that just doesn't understand what they're saying to either because so much communication is unspoken and assumed - or because some crew members are bullied and unwilling to speak up, etc.

These aren't the type of things that are ever likely to be reduced to zero. A very good organizations at least gets them close to zero, while a dysfunctional organization has chronic problems like this. Those are also the type of things that would be hard to measure during a safety inspection.

The US Navy seems to manage... that or they're unreasonably lucky, which I doubt.

 

[BobG]

The US Navy seems to manage... that or they're unreasonably lucky, which I doubt.

Provided you're working with a mature system, manned by people that have grown up in the system and aren't intimidated by it, the military has a culture that encourages good group dynamics.

It still takes a conscious effort to achieve that - especially in fields that deal with new technology/concepts that can be intimidating to the new operator.

And whether you're training new nuclear operators, new satellite operators, or coaching kids' soccer teams, the hardest thing to do is to get the person to 'own' the knowledge or skill they learned. To get them to quit deferring to someone that may be an expert in their own job, but knows squat about crew operations; to get them to quit deferring to the team's star and to do something on their own, etc.

I used to have to investigate satellite anomalies and they were almost always caused by crew errors. And it was rare for the error to be due to a lack of knowledge or proficiency. Most errors were due to the fuzzy arts of communication, teamwork, and discipline - to the extent that many seemed almost comic in how they developed. Those type of errors always make the people involved look dumber than they really are (but at least make for incredibly funny stories). Hence, I think it's a mistake to write off Chernobyl as being due to Russia being less skilled in nuclear operations than the US or Japan or being simply due to a less safe design.

None the less, you have about 442 nuclear reactors in the world and you've had 3 incidents serious enough to get press coverage. And this is consdering that over 350 of those reactors are at least 20 years old, so that's a lot of operating time with few critical failures. You can meet a very high percentage for reliability - you just can't get to 100%.

 

[Ken Natton]

What happens if a sensor starts malfunctioning and giving false readings?

Sensors malfunctioning and giving false readings are not a problem. In systems where failures would have serious consequences, the usual solution is to employ something called triple redundancy. You don’t measure it once, you measure it three times. If two sensors agree and one disagrees you believe the two that agree. Techniques like this do tend to reduce the chances of serious failures to acceptable levels.

I’m not exactly sure of what is being suggested about the events at Chernobyl, but some of what is being said doesn’t accord with my understanding of it. I don’t know that there was anything invalid about the test they had intended to carry out, or the techniques to be used or any failures of ability among the actual team who were supposed to conduct it. The chronic part of the story as I understand it is that another conventional power station went off line unexpectedly and Chernobyl were asked to delay their test. The problem at the other power plant took longer to rectify than expected and by the time Chernobyl was given the go ahead the team assembled to conduct the test had gone home. There are some obvious questions about command and control structures that allowed the team that were left to take the decision to proceed with the test themselves, from there it was something of a soucerer’s apprentice situation. I suppose there are then also some valid questions about reactor control design that allowed them to keep withdrawing the control rods because of their misreading of the situation when they should have been inserting them. Isn’t there now some fly-by-wire type solution that would make that impossible I seem to recall hearing about?

 

[JaredJames]

This would be an interesting trade-off - and extremely unlikely. What happens if a sensor starts malfunctioning and giving false readings?

I'm not that familiar with nuclear power facilities, but a malfunctioning sensor can always be a threat to a computerized program. Garbage in, garbage out.

You're joking right? You don't believe they just have the one sensor doing the job? That would be madness.

This is the whole point of having redundant / parallel systems. We can't trust just one system so we put a few in. The chances of them all failing simultaneously are incredibly small in comparison to just relying on one. I don't know of any critical processes that rely solely on one system without backup / redundancy / parallels.

Naturally, you can't bring that down to zero risk, but any statement such as that you made above is going for the scare factor in my opinion.

EDIT: Beaten to it by Ken

 

[Pattonias]

To get a better grasp of the human involvement in Chernobyl here is a, pretty lengthy, wiki article that explains it rather well.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_involvement_in_the_Chernobyl_disaster"

 

[russ_watters]

Just curious, but what is the risk of coal power and why would a Chernobyl event once a year still be lower than with coal power

I haven't been back to the thread and haven't read past this (yet) so I haven't seen if anyone responded, but according to the EPA, coal power kills about 24,000 Americans a year, with almost all of them being preventable:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5174391/ns/us_news-environment/

That link includes an interesting "experiment" that happened during a long blackout, where a lifting of air pollution was very noticeable.

Note: This does not even address global warming. While discussion of global warming itself is not permitted here, I mention it because it is many of the same environmental activists who are against nuclear power and believe in a very bad situation coming due to global warming: a contradictory set of opinions.

Regarding Chernobyl: Estimates vary, but the WHO puts the number of deaths at around 4,000 (from the wiki). In other words, every two months, coal power kills as many people in the US as Chernobyl killed worldwide.

[edit: My citation wasn't exactly right: This report was not done by the EPA, but rather by "by a consultant often used by the Environmental Protection Agency"]

 

[nismaratwork]

I haven't been back to the thread and haven't read past this (yet) so I haven't seen if anyone responded, but according to the EPA, coal power kills about 24,000 Americans a year, with almost all of them being preventable:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5174391/ns/us_news-environment/

That link includes an interesting "experiment" that happened during a long blackout, where a lifting of air pollution was very noticeable.

Note: This does not even address global warming. While discussion of global warming itself is not permitted here, I mention it because it is many of the same environmental activists who are against nuclear power and believe in a very bad situation coming due to global warming: a contradictory set of opinions.
Regarding Chernobyl: Estimates vary, but the WHO puts the number of deaths at around 4,000 (from the wiki). In other words, every two months, coal power kills as many people in the US as Chernobyl killed worldwide.

re: bolding mine: This above all confuses me... that on one hand you want to save the environment from anthrogenic global warming, acid rain, etc... yet by default there is support for coal!

I sooooo don't understand that position, not even a little. Is radiation so much more frightening than lung cancer, asthmatic asphyiation, or other "fun" effects of coal? Hell, even mining Uranium can have the benefit of releiving Radon seams...

...I don't understand the anti-nuclear-by-default-pro-coal stance. There's no element of it that I understand, and I never have. Green energy is not happening right now, and it's not just for lack of funding; Pickens proved that.

I just... do not get it.

edit: clarification, not YOU russ, just "you" the general "they"