- #141
loseyourname
Staff Emeritus
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Les Sleeth said:I know exactly what you are talking about, do you know what I am talking about? No. Do you want to know? No. It's impossible to debate anyone determined to translate everything into their own frame of reference. If you guys want to have your own harmonious discussion, all of you relying on the same class of information to decide what's physical and nonphysical , I think I'll drop out and let you enjoy your mutual self-affirmation club.
Okay, before you go off again with your grumpy smilies, consider what I am saying. You are differentiating between two kinds of experiences, or at least two kinds of things that can be experienced. I'm simply asking why one category of experiential phenomena should be considered physical and the other non-physical? Why are you defining the word using this criterion alone? I'm going to quote here from the Rosenberg book we are discussing:
Physicalism is basically the position you would expect to be called materialism, except without the historical commitment to the existence of a material substance. In place of Descartes's substances, physicalism just commits itself to the existence of the basic physical properties and events, whatever they turnout to be.
I think this pretty well sums up what Status and I have been trying to tell you. I won't speak for him or anyone else, but I have no qualms with your reports of union. My qualm is with your using this one experience to define the word physical, by differentiating between that which you experience with your senses and that which you experience through union. That isn't the way the theory is constructed. You are essentially defining physical as "that which can be experienced, except that which can be experienced through union alone." That isn't fair. The definition of the word should stand alone. I am not trying to bring your experiences under the veil of physicalism. I don't know whether or not you are experiencing anything of a physical nature. All I am saying is that if the nature of what you are experiencing falls under the definition of the word physical, then it is physical. You're saying beforehand that it is not physical, and then tailoring a definition of "physical" to exclude what you experience. I think we should be differentiating along the lines of what can or cannot be studied by physics. Why should we differentiate along the lines of what can or cannot be experienced through union?
I'll never understand your brisk responses to this suggestion. You can completely retain your entire ontological theory, with all of the details in place, except that a single word might be used to refer to things that it previously wasn't used to refer to. What's the big deal? The character of the theory remains exactly the same. You are free to use whatever words you want to use in whatever way you want to use them, but let those who study physical relationships define the word "physical" when they use it. If this leads to a disparity in the usage of this word between parties, so be it. It won't be the first time it's happened. Just look at the use of the word "existentialism" and all of the different things it has been taken to represent by different parties.