Dennett's predecessor brings it all together

[Mentat]

I'm sure we all know that Dennett was not the first Materialist philosopher of the mind. His theory is unique, but it is not without precedent. One example of a previous Materialist philosopher, who (I think) may shed considerable light on the issues that have been discussed in many previous threads, to do with consciousness and subjective experience.

The philosopher was David Hume. I think I mentioned him briefly before, on another thread.

Hume's ideas on consciousness seem integral to Dennett's philosophy, yet I don't think Dennett ever mentioned Hume in his books...this is perhaps because Dennett came up with his theory on his own, and certain parts just happened to have already been discovered by Hume in the 18th century.

Anyway, there are (at least) three points that were addressed by Hume, in his writings, that I feel are relevant here. Before we get to those, I need to do some preliminary defining of terms.

In Hume's philosophy, the term "impression" refers to those stimuli which immediately impress themselves on our sensory organs (e.g. the pain of being poked in the finger is an impression). On the other hand, there are also "ideas" (notice how he avoided the trap that Locke had fallen into, of lumping all sorts of thought and experience into "ideas"), which are either "simple" or "complex", and which are defined (basically) as those thoughts that are not impressed upon us by external reality, but which are purely subjective (produced inside the brain without external stimulus). A "simple idea", by Hume's definition, is (basically) one that is identical (except in degree) to a previous impression. A "complex idea" is one that is not identical to a previous impression, but which can be reduced into many "simple ideas" which can be traced back to some past "impression". Indeed, all thought, in Hume's paradigm, could either be traced directly back to an identical (except in degree) impression, or to a simpler "idea" - which could then be traced back to an impression.

He put a bit of (IMO, unnecessary) effort into proving that all simple ideas are identical (except in degree - what I mean by this, btw, is that (for example) when you imagine being kicked in the gut, you don't actually feel pain (no matter how vivid the imagination); ergo, the degree is different, but you would still not be able to imagine being kicked in the gut, if it had never been "impressed" upon you) to previous impressions, and that the impression must always precede the idea, but I don't think I need to dwell on that too much, for now.

Now to the three relevant points:

1) From Hume's paradigm, we get that any "idea" (a subjective experience that is not equal to a previous "impression") can be reduced, and eventually traced back to some objective phenomenon. Even my use of the English language, in such a manner as to explain these things to all of you, is a complex "idea" that can be broken up into simpler "ideas", which can be traced back to impressions.

2) From Hume's paradigm, we get that, when one strips away all "impressions" and innate behavior (i.e. nature and nurture) one does not have some naked "self" left over, but has nothing, since there is nothing more to the self or the mind than these things.

3) (My favorite) From Hume's paradigm, we get that questions of the form "how/why did the 'impression' get comprehended as it did in the first place?" are completely moot. The famous example of different shades of blue...one might easily be convinced that the "impression" of each different shade is necessary for the "ideas" of different shades, in later life. However, some may still ask "how did the mind ever see 'blue' in the first place?" or "how did that particular wavelength translate to 'blue', when first 'impressed' in the viewer?". Hume's answer (in a nutshell), "how else should it have looked?". Think about it, if that wavelength of light didn't look that way, it would have to look some other way, and we'd still be asking the same question. So, it looks the way it does because it doesn't look any other way. Simple as that.

The other senses are much easier to deal with than sight, which is why I chose a visual example. But it seems rather simple, that the visual cortex does what the visual cortex is supposed to do: process incoming stimulus from the retina - which has already done some processing of its own - and categorizing for future reference (whether as an "idea" or another "impression" of the same color).

Take all of this and tie it in with all of the other philosophy and theory that I've discussed in previous threads (that of Dennett, Calvin, and Edelman to name a few), and I just don't see the "hard problem" as having any weight anymore.

P.S. Those other threads, if you haven't been there yet, are:
"Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness", "'What makes a liquid liquid?' questions, and The Flaw in the Definition of Consciousness

And those are just the ones I've started. There are plenty more of them.

 

[hypnagogue]

I still think you are missing the entire point, but it's probably a lost cause anyway.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I still think you are missing the entire point, but it's probably a lost cause anyway.

I think he gets your point, and feels that it is irrelevant...all of this is a lost cause, but we seem to get some sort of enjoyment from it anyways.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I still think you are missing the entire point, but it's probably a lost cause anyway.

I think I get your point. At the heart of the matter, in your mind, is the eventual linking of all these computational processes to the workings of the brain. After all, the maple syrup I'm imagining right now doesn't look anything like synchronously-firing neurons. But what is it, exactly, that you don't think I've understood yet?

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by Mentat
I think I get your point. At the heart of the matter, in your mind, is the eventual linking of all these computational processes to the workings of the brain. After all, the maple syrup I'm imagining right now doesn't look anything like synchronously-firing neurons. But what is it, exactly, that you don't think I've understood yet?

I'm not going to take hypnagogue's spot to explain himself, but I will give my shot at the disagreement.

I think, maybe——you are forgetting to consider the experience of the consciousness argument. I'll define it this way. You are imaging maple syrup, so naturally you know what maple syrup smells and tastes like, even if you never had it, you still subjectively allow your firing neurons from the neural brain signals to do the computational methods for you. This is experience. This is what is the heart of the matter. If you can see it in your mind, you can taste it, you can feel it, then, afterall this must be the experience that your brains tells you that experience happened before. And those same synchronously-firing neurons are their to match up the unidentified object to the object that you are imagining. So, in conclusion what I'm saying is: experience is its own individual experience and those neurons are their own individual experience on how subjectively define that object——imaginatively.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Jeebus
I'm not going to take hypnagogue's spot to explain himself, but I will give my shot at the disagreement.

I think, maybe——you are forgetting to consider the experience of the consciousness argument. I'll define it this way. You are imaging maple syrup, so naturally you know what maple syrup smells and tastes like, even if you never had it, you still subjectively allow your firing neurons from the neural brain signals to do the computational methods for you. This is experience. This is what is the heart of the matter. If you can see it in your mind, you can taste it, you can feel it, then, afterall this must be the experience that your brains tells you that experience happened before. And those same synchronously-firing neurons are their to match up the unidentified object to the object that you are imagining. So, in conclusion what I'm saying is: experience is its own individual experience and those neurons are their own individual experience on how subjectively define that object——imaginatively.

One problem: there is no "maple syrup" in my mind. It isn't an object, it's a collection of previous "impressions" (or, to go without Hume for a second, it's a collection of previous memories, which happen to fire together to produce almost exactly the same effect as if I were eating maple syrup (I say "almost exactly" because it can never reach the same degree as the actual "impression")).

 

[Mentat]

Just wanted to add...

I just wanted to add a bit of reasoning that I thought would be obvious from what I posted originally, but I think I was mistaken...

The philosophies of Hume and Dennett (and their followers) lead to a logical framework which allows us to get rid of the idea that there are neural firings, and then there is an experience. After all, the synchronous firings never meet up at anyone place (thus the experience is "smeared" out among different parts of the brain (as Dennett would put it)) and one perceives one coherent picture, while the firings occur at different times (thus the experience is "smeared" out temporally as well as spacially). So, trying to explain how the experience eventually comes to be (evolves) is like trying to explain how a natural disaster evolves...there is no one point in time or space wherein the whole disaster occurs, it takes a long time, and the end result (when the catastrophe subsides) is not a disaster, but is a world that has been ravaged by that disaster. Yet, one can't say that the disaster didn't happen, just because there was no exact place, nor any exact time, when/where it occured, you simply look back and lump all the events together so that, in retrospect, the whole set of occurances = a natural disaster.

 

[Canute]

Ok. But saying brain states are distribited in time and space is not contentious. It is precisely what gives rise to the binding problem. That is, it is part of the problem, part of what needs explaining, not the solution. It is a statement of fact and explains nothing.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Ok. But saying brain states are distribited in time and space is not contentious. It is precisely what gives rise to the binding problem. That is, it is part of the problem, part of what needs explaining, not the solution. It is a statement of fact and explains nothing.

Well, you would be 110% right (extra 10% for eloquency in presentation...something I'm trying to learn from your example) if there was an eventuality to these brain states, as so many philosophers have assumed. But, if they just keep going on, and re-stimulating themselves, without ever meeting up, then there is no "hard problem" of how they ever form a complete picture, they just don't.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, you would be 110% right (extra 10% for eloquency in presentation...something I'm trying to learn from your example) if there was an eventuality to these brain states, as so many philosophers have assumed. But, if they just keep going on, and re-stimulating themselves, without ever meeting up, then there is no "hard problem" of how they ever form a complete picture, they just don't.

I don't think you have a good grasp on what the hard problem is-- or at least, you are misrepresenting it here. Brain processes never meeting up-- that's still the binding problem, which asks how perceptual experiences are tied together to form the perception of single, coherent objects.

The hard problem deals with how it is that subjective experiences exist at all, and need not invoke the binding problem. Someone in a ganzfeld setup, for example, visually experiences only a uniform (say) red field; in this scenario, there are no diverse visual experiences to bind together, so the binding problem is irrelevant. But we still may ask why the person experiences redness at all (in the sense that a blindsighted person does not). Why shouldn't the person just be a zombie, with no experience of redness, yet still be able to process information from the visual stimulus? That's the hard problem. I hope the difference is clear.

 

[olde drunk]

Mentat

you report information very well and grasp heavy concepts.

what i don't understand is your 'point'. what have you learned studing these philosophers and what can you add?

who and what is Mentat?? when you go outside on a clear spring day, do you smell the air? can you feel the natural renewal of life?

what do you believe? not what hume or dennett wrote.

do you believe in sunny days and baseball?

peace,

 

[selfAdjoint]

In Consciousness Explained Dennett has a beautiful passage where he's sitting on a patio under rustling trees, immersed in the balmy air and the birdsong -- and he brings it all home with his account of his own consciousness, with nothing of what he calls "skyhooks" and I call "magic" . Let me be clear about that; I don't mean ritual magick or literal magic, but rather appeals to something that is beyond empiricism and analysis.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
In Consciousness Explained Dennett has a beautiful passage where he's sitting on a patio under rustling trees, immersed in the balmy air and the birdsong -- and he brings it all home with his account of his own consciousness, with nothing of what he calls "skyhooks" and I call "magic" . Let me be clear about that; I don't mean ritual magick or literal magic, but rather appeals to something that is beyond empiricism and analysis.

I don't understand why more people don't see the elegance and beauty of a "machine"( the human body, including the brain) working in glorious harmony to engage the natural world of which it is a small part.

 

[hypnagogue]

That might be elegant and beautiful, but it fails to explain all the phenomena that need explaining.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't think you have a good grasp on what the hard problem is-- or at least, you are misrepresenting it here. Brain processes never meeting up-- that's still the binding problem, which asks how perceptual experiences are tied together to form the perception of single, coherent objects.

But they never do...that's the only reason Dennett thinks the Materialistic paradigm can work: The perceptual experiences (whatever those are) never have to meet up and become a singular, coherent experience (whatever that is) because it works just as well for the information to be integrated (as in a computer) such that, in retrospect, it seems like a coherent experience (and "seems like" can be replaced with "is processed as").

The hard problem deals with how it is that subjective experiences exist at all, and need not invoke the binding problem.

How do you know that they do exist at all, if they aren't even defined?

Someone in a ganzfeld setup, for example, visually experiences only a uniform (say) red field; in this scenario, there are no diverse visual experiences to bind together, so the binding problem is irrelevant. But we still may ask why the person experiences redness at all (in the sense that a blindsighted person does not).

A blind-sighted person does experience the color, otherwise they wouldn't know what the color was later. But then, I don't know anything about blindsight studies, and don't pretend to...I just know what you've told me so far, and it seems as though the subject can report the color that they saw, later, while not having experienced it at the time...is that right?

Why shouldn't the person just be a zombie, with no experience of redness, yet still be able to process information from the visual stimulus? That's the hard problem. I hope the difference is clear.

Yes, it is. You're better at this explaining than I am, and I appreciate your ability as well as your use thereof to teach me.

The problem still remains, as stated in my little quote (at the end of each post): How else do you expect a visual cortex to process visual stimuli? It doesn't "know" any other way, besides visual experience. If you get a silicon machine that does the same things as a visual cortex, it will experience visual stimuli also, that's what they're made to do.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
That might be elegant and beautiful, but it fails to explain all the phenomena that need explaining.

What phenomenon does it leave out (note: please do not include any undefined terms in your answer)?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by olde drunk
you report information very well and grasp heavy concepts.

Thank you.

what i don't understand is your 'point'. what have you learned studing these philosophers and what can you add?

I don't have a "point", except to "report information well and grasp heavy concepts". I have learned nothing conclusive from these philosophers and can add nothing conclusive to them, and I like it better that way (viz a viz changing primary belief with each new philosophy).

who and what is Mentat?? when you go outside on a clear spring day, do you smell the air? can you feel the natural renewal of life?

what do you believe? not what hume or dennett wrote.

do you believe in sunny days and baseball?

peace,

I prefer rainy days and reading...but I understand what you mean. You're wondering how I can maintain the joi de vive if I see reality only through the eyes of materialistic philosophers, right? The truth is, I have a set of core beliefs that have no entered the picture here. I right down what Dennett and Hume say, because what I believe myself is both irrelevant to the conversation and a potential obstruction of logical discussion.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
The problem still remains, as stated in my little quote (at the end of each post): How else do you expect a visual cortex to process visual stimuli? It doesn't "know" any other way, besides visual experience. If you get a silicon machine that does the same things as a visual cortex, it will experience visual stimuli also, that's what they're made to do.

I think everything else you addressed in this post of yours is being addressed elsewhere, and this may be too, but I'll reply again anyway.

Here is your explanatory method as applied to H2O molecules and water fluidity:

Say we have a set X of H2O molecules under certain circumstances. Such a set is always observed to correspond to macroscopic fluidity. How else do you expect it to be? That is just the way it is.

This is an impoverished explanation because it has not yet made explicit any a priori logical ties between the properties of H2O molecules and the fluidity of water. It has no bridge principle. To have a good explanation, we must provide a bridge principle that makes explicit the logical ties, such that one could predict a priori from the description of X its macroscopic properties. Such a bridge principle is easy enough to construct in this case, but it is not so obvious in the case of the relationship between brain processes and subjective experience. Until we find such a bridge principle we can't be satisfied with brute correlation as an explanatory mechanism.

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by Mentat
One problem: there is no "maple syrup" in my mind. It isn't an object, it's a collection of previous "impressions" (or, to go without Hume for a second, it's a collection of previous memories, which happen to fire together to produce almost exactly the same effect as if I were eating maple syrup (I say "almost exactly" because it can never reach the same degree as the actual "impression")).

That previous colletion of images, nonetheless, would form the object in your mind imaginatively to make that memory of what maple syrup is. And how do you know it isn't in your mind? What does that mean exactly to your reference of the imaginary effect on the degree of actual impression of maple syrup?

 

[olde drunk]

Originally posted by Mentat
Thank you.



I don't have a "point", except to "report information well and grasp heavy concepts". I have learned nothing conclusive from these philosophers and can add nothing conclusive to them, and I like it better that way (viz a viz changing primary belief with each new philosophy).

I prefer rainy days and reading...but I understand what you mean. You're wondering how I can maintain the joi de vive if I see reality only through the eyes of materialistic philosophers, right? The truth is, I have a set of core beliefs that have no entered the picture here. I right down what Dennett and Hume say, because what I believe myself is both irrelevant to the conversation and a potential obstruction of logical discussion.

why cheat the universe of your unique views?? if you can undersatand these concepts, you must have an opinion on what is really happening in our reality. i would rather discuss views and ideas, not debate what someone else said or wrote.

to each his own, peace!

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
What phenomenon does it leave out (note: please do not include any undefined terms in your answer)? [/B]

Complete answers have to undefined terms in them otherwise they will be trivially self-referential. This is the mathematical equivalent of the hard problem. It's worth understanding why this is so because it is directly relevant.

A theory is equivalently a set of definitions. Any non self-referential set of definitions must contain an undefined term. Consciousness is science's ultimate undefined term, the final term in its theory that cannot be defined. This is what Max Planck was implying in that quote I posted to you.

It does not take a Sherlock Holmes to interpret the evidence. Ex hyothesis science cannot explain subjective experience or ultimate reality, and we know any theory of everything must have an undefined term in it. This is the hard problem from a mathematical perspective.

BTW this is why it is incorrect to take Buddhism as being based on theory. If it was it would suffer from the same problem. This issue is what led Einstein to make his well known comment that insofar as as a mathematical system describes reality it is not provable, and vice versa.

It is arrogant of you, IMHO, to dismiss all these arguments as if their proponents were stupid philosophers rather than infallible scientists. I do not feel that as yet you have grasped the issues.

I thought that you were trying to this, but I'm becoming less and less certain. If the problem was as simple as you assert it to be then we would have solved it, in outline at least, in the 18th Century, and probably much earlier.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Canute


However it seems fairly obvious since ex hyothesis science cannot explain subjective experience or ultimate reality, and since we know that any theory of everything must have an undefined term in it. This is the hard problem from a mathematical perspective.

"Subjective experience" and "ultimate reality" are null phrases, from my standpoint. There is no reason to assume the existence of either as being somehow "apart" from the mechanistic operation of the human brain, and the universe as a whole. The desire to believe there is something beyond the mechanistic and material is an emotional stance, not a logical one.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
"Subjective experience" and "ultimate reality" are null phrases, from my standpoint. There is no reason to assume the existence of either as being somehow "apart" from the mechanistic operation of the human brain, and the universe as a whole. The desire to believe there is something beyond the mechanistic and material is an emotional stance, not a logical one.

How's this for logic:
1) All mechanistic processes are objectively observable.
2) Subjective experience is a mechanistic process.
3) Subjective experience is not objectively observable.

hmm

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
How's this for logic:
1) All mechanistic processes are objectively observable.
2) Subjective experience is a mechanistic process.
3) Subjective experience is not objectively observable.

hmm

Are you sure about #3? I'll admit that our ability to track the operation of the mind is at its infancy, but already we can see how certain parts of the brain produce certain "subjective experiences", and can even use electrodes to create those experiences directly.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Are you sure about #3? I'll admit that our ability to track the operation of the mind is at its infancy, but already we can see how certain parts of the brain produce certain "subjective experiences", and can even use electrodes to create those experiences directly.

Those things might be something like the objective footprints of subjective experience, but they are not subjective experience itself. Surely this is a useful tool for getting a better understanding of consciousness, but the fact remains that I cannot literally see what you see-- I cannot observe your subjective experience. If what you see literally is a mechanistic process, I should be able to literally see it in your brain. If you propose rather that subjective experience is some kind of 'aspect' of your brain processes, the fact remains that this aspect is completely hidden from my objective observation of you.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Zero
"Subjective experience" and "ultimate reality" are null phrases, from my standpoint. There is no reason to assume the existence of either as being somehow "apart" from the mechanistic operation of the human brain, and the universe as a whole. The desire to believe there is something beyond the mechanistic and material is an emotional stance, not a logical one. [/B]

This is not the case, and it is provably not the case. Hypno has shown this above, and there are many other ways of showing it. Your view also contradicts the view of just about every well known philsopher or scientist that ever lived except Ayn Rand, who, not by coincidence, has not been able to construct a coherent Objectivist metaphysic.

However I agree with you in as much as subjective experience and ultimate reality must always, ex hypothesis, be 'null phrases' for science.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Those things might be something like the objective footprints of subjective experience, but they are not subjective experience itself. Surely this is a useful tool for getting a better understanding of consciousness, but the fact remains that I cannot literally see what you see-- I cannot observe your subjective experience. If what you see literally is a mechanistic process, I should be able to literally see it in your brain. If you propose rather that subjective experience is some kind of 'aspect' of your brain processes, the fact remains that this aspect is completely hidden from my objective observation of you.

That doesn't seem to follow. It seems more like you go out of your way to define(subjectively, of course, and without evidence) the terms of the debate so that "subjective experience" cannot under any circumstances result from mechanical processes.

Of course, the difficulty arises with the utter complexity of the brain. We start with something like 100 billion neurons, each capable of making up to 15,000 connections. That figures out to about...ummm...one hell of a lot of neural pathways. Insisting that "subjective experience" cannot be created by that sort of network is acceptable, I guess, even if it is not logical. Insisting that the only evidence you will accept is that we track every single one of those pathways, in real time, is ridiculous.

Further, the claims of a "soul" are like claiming "my car runs on invisible gremlins...oh, and I guess that the engine and battery and gas and stuff might have a little to do with it, but mostly its the gremlins. Oh, yeah, I know the engine has to be running, and the condition of the car appears to affect the performance, but it HAS to be gremlins! Yes yes yes, I know the car has to have gas in it, but that is because gasoline emits gremlin radiation that the gremlins convert to horsepower"

IOW, you have a perfectly rational explanation, and decide to tack an unsupported claim on top of it, for what I take to be purely emotional reasons.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Zero
That doesn't seem to follow. It seems more like you go out of your way to define(subjectively, of course, and without evidence) the terms of the debate so that "subjective experience" cannot under any circumstances result from mechanical processes.

Hypnogogue states only the facts. It's not his fault if experiences are subjective.

Of course, the difficulty arises with the utter complexity of the brain. We start with something like 100 billion neurons, each capable of making up to 15,000 connections. That figures out to about...ummm...one hell of a lot of neural pathways. Insisting that "subjective experience" cannot be created by that sort of network is acceptable, I guess, even if it is not logical. Insisting that the only evidence you will accept is that we track every single one of those pathways, in real time, is ridiculous.

In this context the brain is perfectly simple. It is a physical entity the functioning of which affects our subjective experience.

It doesn't matter what the brain is, or how complex it is, the problem is one of explaining how somenting physical gives rise to something non-physical, Call the brain a rock if you like, or the most complx thing in the universe, the basic problem remains the same.

Further, the claims of a "soul" are like claiming "my car runs on invisible gremlins...oh, and I guess that the engine and battery and gas and stuff might have a little to do with it, but mostly its the gremlins. Oh, yeah, I know the engine has to be running, and the condition of the car appears to affect the performance, but it HAS to be gremlins! Yes yes yes, I know the car has to have gas in it, but that is because gasoline emits gremlin radiation that the gremlins convert to horsepower"

Did someone mention 'souls'? I missed that.

Also you miss the fact that a car does not do anything at all unless there is a gremlin driving it.

 

[Zero]

That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
IOW, you have a perfectly rational explanation, and decide to tack an unsupported claim on top of it, for what I take to be purely emotional reasons.

Ad-hominem

It's easier to just assume someone is biased and irrational so that you don't have to address the issues than it is to lay out exactly why you hold the opinion you do. Don't worry, you don't have to do anything. I'm just pointing it out in case some reader might be lead astray.

Also I see this thread (once again) dangerously getting into this physical/nonphysical distinction. I think the problems with consciousness can be communicated without having to go into that mess. Be careful with that word Canute. Next you'll find out that Zero thinks Physical means "Everything that exists". So naturally there is nothing non-physical to him. By definition it must be so. The problems of consciousness are real and shouldn't be side-stepped because someone creates a semantic mess by defining things as they see fit without proper inquiry into the philosophical issue being discussed.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

I'm not sure what logic or evidence you're referring to but I'm sure you could list it all out if I asked you to. But instead of doing that, why don't you relate this logic to some of the key issues laid out by hynagogue? Specifically address where the hard problem lies. That would be helpful. Mentat is actually trying to do just that. It just seems he isn't quite able(or willing) to grasp the problem. Perhaps you can help.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

The evidence does support it.

Evidence 1: I subjectively experience.
Evidence 2: No one can observe my subjective experiences but me.
Definition: All things physical must be objectively observable.
Conclusion: Subjective experience is not physical.

or

Definition 1: Subjective experience is defined at least partially intrinsically.
Definition 2: Physical phenomena are defined exclusively extrinsically.
Postulate: Intrinsic phenomena cannot be derived from extrinsic phenomena (follows from the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic).
Conclusion: Subjective experience cannot be derived from physical theory.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
Ad-hominem

It's easier to just assume someone is biased and irrational so that you don't have to address the issues than it is to lay out exactly why you hold the opinion you do. Don't worry, you don't have to do anything. I'm just pointing it out in case some reader might be lead astray.

Also I see this thread (once again) dangerously getting into this physical/nonphysical distinction. I think the problems with consciousness can be communicated without having to go into that mess. Be careful with that word Canute. Next you'll find out that Zero thinks Physical means "Everything that exists". So naturally there is nothing non-physical to him. By definition it must be so. The problems of consciousness are real and shouldn't be side-stepped because someone creates a semantic mess by defining things as they see fit without proper inquiry into the philosophical issue being discussed.

Not ad hominem at all...as far as I know, being emotional isn't an insult, and to my way of thinking I can discern no other reason to embrace mysticism over materialism.

Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined. The basic argument for non-physical seems to be "because it has to be there, it just has to!" That sounds more emotional than logical to me. On the other hand, I say that while the non-physical might "exist"(whatever that means for something with no existence), there is no evidence or logical need to assume it.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
The evidence does support it.

Evidence 1: I subjectively experience.
Evidence 2: No one can observe my subjective experiences but me.
Definition: All things physical must be objectively observable.
Conclusion: Subjective experience is not physical.

or

Definition 1: Subjective experience is defined at least partially intrinsically.
Definition 2: Physical phenomena are defined exclusively extrinsically.
Postulate: Intrinsic phenomena cannot be derived from extrinsic phenomena (follows from the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic).
Conclusion: Subjective experience cannot be derived from physical theory.

It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.

It'd be nice if you could back that up. I could just as well say that it does follow, except that you don't want it to follow in order to hold onto your worldview.