Does Omniscience Negate Free Will?

[Simon 6]

Apologies Brother Jerry, I've been away from this thread for a couple of weeks.

You've come up with plenty of intriguing propositions to analyse, though some of what you said appears to involve one or two leaps of faith.

Before I respond, I should say that when it comes to omniscience, I haven't been arguing either for or against the notion of any being that possesses it. I view the existence of such a being as something that in itself entails no contradiction. In other words I think omniscience is logically self-sustaining as a concept. I'm not so sure the same can be said of free will - but that is another subject. I do maintain that the two are imcompatible.

I'll begin with two descriptions of existence, only one of which can be true. (I define existence as the totality of everything and everyone, past and future. This includes the possible existence of an omniscient being, if applicable.)

1) In the whole of existence, everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

2) In the whole of existence, not everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

The first description of reality allows omniscience, the second does not.

More contraversially, I would say the first description denies free will, while the second allows it.

I will focus on your most challenging paragraph:

Simon one thing that you fail to recognize in the argument you stated is that the omniscient being would have experienced/known/had all possible experiences. You were correct in that for free will to exist, some experiences must be denied the individual. That does not mean the experience was denied the omniscient being. Only the individual.

Clearly you favour the first description, but with a sub-category that allows the second. In other words, you would say that my first description applies to God, whereas my second description applies to us. Since we all belong to the whole of existence, we can all fit into my first description - but qualified.

You would say: "In the whole of existence, everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced by God, but not by us."

Now we're into those deeper waters. What you're describing is a being that has/knows, in every last detail, individual experiences that we could have had but didn't. These possible experiences, known in full to God, would have been had from our individual points of view. Every thought we would have had, every blade of grass we would have interacted with, every intimate emotion and every sensation - God would know them all in their entirety. In other words: on our behalf, God has all those individual experiences we never had. It follows that our unique identities, such as they would have been, are also assumed by God.

What you're describing is a multiverse of realities, with alternative versions of ourselves, contained within God - so complete and so detailed that the quality of reality in what God knows and experiences is no less than the qualtiy of reality in what we experience. I am perfectly at ease with that description. But since all these unique, detailed and personal experiences are real and known in their entirety, what distinguishes some as having the stamp of our identity, while others do not? To know an individual experience in full is to possesses the identity of the individual that has it. To know a possible individual experience to the same degree as an actual one is to possesses the identity of the individual that could have it. If so: there is, albeit through God, all our possible experiences and all possible versions of ourselves that experience them. These individuals contained within God must be as real as we are - for if there was even the slighest detail of reality lacking in them, something would be missing from God's knowledge/experience.

As I've previously argued: in a multiverse where everything that can happen does happen, and everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced - then every permutation of reality must in fact occur. If you like, you could describe God as the multiverse in it's entirety. In my view, a multiverse is the only condition of existence that can make omniscience logically possible.

I would also argue, the multiverse is a condition of existence that makes free will logically impossible. The only possible rescue for free will is to take away the one condition required for omniscience.

So now I return to those two mutually exclusive descriptions of existence with the same position.

1) In the whole of existence, everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

2) In the whole of existence, not everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

The first does allow omniscience. The second may allow free will. Neither allows both.

That's all for now.

Regards
Simon

 

[z3hr]

I have read the following argument as proof that if an omiscient being can see the future, free will does not exist.

1. An infallible, omniscient, being exists. [Assumption]
2. This being has foreknowledge that event 'A' will occur. [Definition of omniscience]
3. 'A' must occur. [Definition of infallible]
4. I cannot choose to do any action which would make it so that 'A' does not occur. [Points, 1, 2, 3]
5. I lack free will. [Point 4]

Does this argument hold water?

For the sake of the above argument, please forget what quantum mechanics may or may not prove, etc. Before given the information above, if we assume that free will can exist, do the points above alone prove that it can not. Thanks.

An omniscient being does not disprove free will. It exists in the sense that we can never know what event 'A' will be; therefore, we cannot change it. We can choose whatever we want, the omniscient being would determine event 'A' based on what we choose. The omniscient being would have to remain separate from the non-omniscient being. It is not ever possible to know event 'A' because if anyone ever found out what event 'A' was, it would no longer exist. By this you can determine that only a completely arbitrary being could know what event 'A' is, because their knowledge of it would not falsify its existence.

 

[JoeDawg]

1. An infallible, omniscient, being exists.

Is this being also omnipotent? This is important, because if the being simply knows all, but has no power to affect anything, then they are basically just watching a recording. Their knowledge is unchangeable, but the events would not be constrained.

3. 'A' must occur.

In a sense this is no different than someone who has post-knowledge of the event. An omniscient being is just in the position of 'remembering' the future.

5. I lack free will.

Freewill and determinism are not mutually exclusive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

The real problem with freewill would occur if the being in question had both omniscience and omnipotence. It would then know all that occurred and is essentially responsible for everything that occurs... either by its action or lack of action.

 

[octelcogopod]

Freewill and determinism are not mutually exclusive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

A big point in this is that we as humans cannot directly control our brain or our inner workings.
We are indirectly controlling the functions of our brain with our mind.
Free will is always going to be one layer behind reality, in that even the mind of an omnipotent being would still need its own world that it would not have control over.
A mind will forever be a slave to the workings it cannot see or control.
The moment you create a mind, you separate it from the fundamental reality it is built upon. How or why this happens seems impossible to prove physically, but mentally it makes complete sense.

 

[WaveJumper]

I would argue that Proconsul did not have a free will, but homo sapiens had acquired it. The moment those ape-like animals started to make drawings in the caves(70 000 years ago??), something really tremendous had happened(the arrival of art and language and of awareness). I call that emergent free will.

 

[JoeDawg]

We are indirectly controlling the functions of our brain with our mind.

Is there really a difference between brain and mind?

 

[DaveC426913]

Is there really a difference between brain and mind?

Absolutely. That's his point.

You can control your thoughts (mind). You cannot control your neurons/blood flow (brain).

 

[kote]

Absolutely. That's his point.

You can control your thoughts (mind). You cannot control your neurons/blood flow (brain).

That's definitely arguable. Most philosophers believe that we have free will and that our brains are determined. Many separate mind and brain, but not all, and I don't know of anyone who would say we control our minds but not our brains.

If we control our mind but not our brain then our mind does not have a one-to-one causal (or identifying) relationship with our brain. Beyond that, it means that there is no causal link between our mind and our brain. It also would mean that our thoughts are not determined by our brain processes.

Surely there is some causal link between our mind and our brain, in which case either both are free or both are determined. If my free mind has any effect on my brain, my brain is not determined. If my free mind has no control over my determined actions, in what way can it be said to be free?

 

[Duquin]

Hmm...for the comments that we don't control our brain in my opinion that is not true. With years of training one can use the mind to influence the brain to command our body to do many things such as slow the heart rate and enter a temporary self induced coma of sorts.

As for free will and an all-knowing being, just because it knows everything that will happen does not mean we do not have free will. While it is possible everything was set and chosen by this being, it's also possible it was not and we can still have free will and it is the fact that we have free will that the being knows event A will happen.

I would assume this being would be in tune with all life and non-life in the universe and would therefore know every thought and action being taken and upon that can come up with precise predictions of the future. Free will is a tricky thing some speak of destiny and preordained futures however is it not the fact that we have free will that allows these futures to be so solidly in place? This makes me think of a classic see into the future archetype where a person see's their future and does much to try and change it, when it turns out their resulting actions are what cause said future in the first place. It was because they made the choice to act on their vision of what had yet to happen that it did indeed happen, where if they had been content with their future it never would have happened. Could it be that free will itself is a tool to ensure the future this being knows of?

I believe I read that free will was something we evolved into having although I personally think it's something all life is born with. While thinking functions may be different for animals of various species, if you get a pet and over the course of a week expose it to 2 new treats and then hold both up and ask it which it likes, at first it may simply jump to try and get a treat but sooner or later it realizes it's being given a choice and chooses it's favorite...at least that is what my dog did about 3 months ago, is that not free will? Heck since I've done that she's learned to pick right away but doesn't always go for the same thing and seems to like to switch it up now and again. I find that sort of whimsical "Lets try something new today" rather free will-like if that makes any sense.

Humans, animals, I think even plants have their own form of free will to an extent albiet not to the level a human might consider to be free will. But that delves more into beliefs and I won't stray off into that, my point I guess would be that an omnicient being can still know everything that is going to happen while humans retaining free will.

 

[WaveJumper]

Hmm...for the comments that we don't control our brain in my opinion that is not true. With years of training one can use the mind to influence the brain to command our body to do many things such as slow the heart rate and enter a temporary self induced coma of sorts

I was going to say the same thing. There seems to be a contradiction - if we can control our heart-beat by forcing our brain to send a modified signal to the heart muscles, what exactly is the 'entity' that forces the brain to send modulated signals? It's clear an Australopithecus or a Proconsul wouldn't be able to do that.

It's not unreasonable to think that in a few thousand years, we'd be even much more in control of ourselves. I highly doubt an Australopithecus could restrain himself as much as present day human can. We can fight and resist urges, instincts and all sorts of bio-chemical drives to an extent unthinkable for an animal-like creature. This doesn't seem like a typical deterministic process(in the regular use of the word 'deterministic').

 

[OB 50]

There are so many problems with the concept of an omniscient being:

1. In order to "know" something, the being in question has to have an accurate mental model of the object of knowledge. In order to know literally everything, the being would have to possesses an accurate model of the entire universe, down the the Planck scale. The problem here is that a completely accurate model of the universe at this level of detail basically is the universe. There would be no way to distinguish between the "real" universe and the model.

2. This doesn't even take into account the mechanism by which this being would observe the universe. How does it gain knowledge of the universe without affecting it through the act of observation? If this being is able to observe the entire universe at the Planck scale, then it is also able to affect it at this level as well, which is effectively omnipotence. It doesn't seem logically possible to have one without the other.

3. In order to know literally everything, the being would also have to know and understand itself at the same level of detail. This presents a major recursive problem. Assuming this being possesses a mind capable of modeling the entire universe, it would then need to model its own mind, which already contains an entire universe, within itself. This is an obvious paradox, yet an essential requirement of a truly omniscient being.

In short, the basic assumption of an omniscient being is logically impossible due to the fact that the being could never possesses full knowledge of itself. If the premise is logically impossible, then the debate about its implications on free will is inconsequential.

 

[WaveJumper]

3. In order to know literally everything, the being would also have to know and understand itself at the same level of detail. This presents a major recursive problem. Assuming this being possesses a mind capable of modeling the entire universe, it would then need to model its own mind, which already contains an entire universe, within itself. This is an obvious paradox, yet an essential requirement of a truly omniscient being.

In short, the basic assumption of an omniscient being is logically impossible due to the fact that the being could never possesses full knowledge of itself. If the premise is logically impossible, then the debate about its implications on free will is inconsequential.

The human mind is as much capable of modeling and understanding an omniscient and omnipowerful god, as it is capable of comprehending infinity. I wonder if there are still people who treat the human mind as something all-powerful, because that would be a new form of religion. I'd say that the fundamental limitations of the human mind are far greater than most people are comfortable to acknowledge(though what many may claim).

 

[OB 50]

The human mind is as much capable of modeling and understanding an omniscient and omnipowerful god, as it is capable of comprehending infinity. I wonder if there are still people who treat the human mind as something all-powerful, because that would be a new form of religion. I'd say that the fundamental limitations of the human mind are far greater than most people are comfortable to acknowledge(though what many may claim).

I'm not sure if you're agreeing with me or not, but those are generally good points. However, if you're saying that an omniscient being is inherently "unknowable", and therefore exempted from any requirements of logic, then I respectfully disagree.

One thing to note is that we are only obliged to "understand" those things that actually exist. If omniscience, omnipotence and infinity are merely concepts created by the human mind, then there is nothing objective to understand. They are what we say they are.

 

[WaveJumper]

One thing to note is that we are only obliged to "understand" those things that actually exist. If omniscience, omnipotence and infinity are merely concepts created by the human mind, then there is nothing objective to understand. They are what we say they are.

Space, time, free will, emergent properties, singularities, entanglement, uncaused quantum events, just to name a few, are all concepts that exist, yet we don't understand them. We may feel obliged as you say, but neither reality nor the structure of the human mind would feel obliged to bow down to our human wishes. We are not gods, we are lucky to even have made it that far, as far as progress and knowledge is concerned. It's so amazing that you get to wonder if there is some deeper connection between the human mind and reality. Then you think about those few examples above and get a cold shower.

 

[JoeDawg]

Absolutely. That's his point.

Its a point.

You can control your thoughts (mind). You cannot control your neurons/blood flow (brain).

What is this 'you' thing you speak of, if not the brain/mind.

Unless you believe in some sort of supernatural soul, I'd say separating the two doesn't make much sense. Neuroscience, although it is in its infancy, shows quite a correlation between brain and mind.
The mind is what the brain does.

 

[DaveC426913]

What is this 'you' thing you speak of, if not the brain/mind.

Unless you believe in some sort of supernatural soul, I'd say separating the two doesn't make much sense. Neuroscience, although it is in its infancy, shows quite a correlation between brain and mind.
The mind is what the brain does.

My keyboard affects my computer processor. My computer processor does not affect my keyboard. While there is a strong correlation, they are distinct.

And the processor does not need to have a "supernatural" processor to acknowledge that keyboard and processor are different (there are no memory registers dedicated to - or output paths to - the keyboard, for example. It is an input-only device.)

 

[JoeDawg]

My keyboard affects my computer processor. My computer processor does not affect my keyboard. While there is a strong correlation, they are distinct.

Actually, your keyboard needs to 'recognized' as an input device; without some kind of processing, your keyboard won't receive any power, and certainly won't be useful as an input device.

On top of that, both processor and keyboard, are hardware. Neither represents a good comparison to any idea of 'mind as distinct from brain'. If anything, in a computer, the running operating system is a good example of mind... and it can both affect hardware and disappears when power is cut off.

 

[FayeKane]

Of course not.

The question is another example of people taking the names of things as more important than the things themselves.

Look, this question is identical to:
Look back in time and observe what someone did. It's fixed. It can't change. Their world-line is frozen in time.

So did the person have free will?

Yes. Not only that, but most of what happened was chaotic or completely random. Certainly all quantum events that day were.

Just as acceleration in three dimensions is rotation in four, there is no difference between "free will" and "predestination"; they are just names of two places to look at the same action from: inside the system and outside of it.

-- faye

 

[Mattara]

Of course the existence of an omniscient being would disprove free will. It will also prove it. It will even prove that all cheese on the moon is blue or that Obama is part of an elaborate alien conspiracy. Perhaps we are presupposing that omniscience is a coherent concept?

 

[DaveC426913]

Of course the existence of an omniscient being would disprove free will. It will also prove it. It will even prove that all cheese on the moon is blue or that Obama is part of an elaborate alien conspiracy. Perhaps we are presupposing that omniscience is a coherent concept?

It would do none of these things. Why do you say this?

 

[Sorry!]

Of course not.

The question is another example of people taking the names of things as more important than the things themselves.

Look, this question is identical to:
Look back in time and observe what someone did. It's fixed. It can't change. Their world-line is frozen in time.

So did the person have free will?

Yes. Not only that, but most of what happened was chaotic or completely random. Certainly all quantum events that day were.

Just as acceleration in three dimensions is rotation in four, there is no difference between "free will" and "predestination"; they are just names of two places to look at the same action from: inside the system and outside of it.

-- faye

Hmmm... this leads me to question if in the Quantum world there is such a 'history' timeline...

I'm actually going to go look that up.

 

[DaveC426913]

Look back in time and observe what someone did. It's fixed. It can't change. Their world-line is frozen in time.

So did the person have free will?

Yes.

That is a very illuminating way of looking at the problem.

 

[Zantra]

"you've already made the choice, you just have to understand it"

Omniscence does not negate free will- here's why. You've seen all possible futures- many worlds theory, etc, so you know the outcome of every choice, and based on that, you chose a path. The key word here is "choose" Assuming many worlds there's always an opporunity to choose a different path, even knowing all of your outcomes- emotion could come into play-aka the choice of NEO to save his girlfriend instead of Zion. You know saving many lives is the best move, but you make the "emotional choice" anyhow.
It's the human paradox. Of course if you make every choice based solely on unemotional criteria, you're following "rules". You know which of the paths you'll choose, and why, and as a omniscent being, you choose not to make a decision based on anything other than those rules. However, since you are omniscent, you've made these rules and if you choose to break them based on emotion, it brings free will back into play.

If many worlds is untrue, then you see a straight line back and forth- you see one possible future, and the path you've chosen, regardless of any changes you make between here and there, you know that is where you end up. all roads lead to one future. In this case free will is not possible because there is only one outcome- THE future.

 

[DaveC426913]

And the whole 'emotional choice' argument is a total red herring. Why you choose a different outcome is irrelevant to whether you can choose a different outcome. You're starting to talk about which choice is right or wrong. You've sort of gotten lost in your own argument on that one.

If many worlds is untrue, then you see a straight line back and forth- you see one possible future, and the path you've chosen, regardless of any changes you make between here and there, you know that is where you end up. all roads lead to one future. In this case free will is not possible because there is only one outcome- THE future.

Your conclusion does not follow.

The fact that the only possible future will show which face of the penny DID land face-up does not mean I have no free-will over which face I DECIDE to place face-up.

I wonder if you are making an implicit assumption that the person whose free-will is in question is the same person who has the omniscience. That is not a given.

If there is a single entity anywhere that is omniscient, then the paradox begins to rear its head for anyone and everyone everywhere.

 

[Zantra]

And the whole 'emotional choice' argument is a total red herring. Why you choose a different outcome is irrelevant to whether you can choose a different outcome. You're starting to talk about which choice is right or wrong.

I went off on a tangent there... but I was making the point that:

1.Knowing the future impacts your choice, so the choice you make based on knowing the future is possibly not the same one you would have made not knowing the future.

2. Being omniscient doesn't negate free will- you have much more information about the choices you make and how your decision will impact events, BUT it is still a choice. It's still a decision to be made, and all your changing with omniscience are the circumstances.

You like chocolate ice cream. If given a choice between vanilla and chocolate you will invariably choose chocolate. If you're omniscient and you see that down the line choosing chocolate leads to a tragic event, choosing vanilla does not- you will choose vanilla. Does that change the fact that you like chocolate? No. Let's say you see all permutations of the ice cream choice, and it has zero impact on your existence- it's a completely neutral event. you're going to CHOOSE chocolate, not based on your omniscience, but based on a preference you have. you've just made a choice.

Or let's take a step further. You're omniscient, but you get bored, and you decide to discontinue seeing into the future. You now have to make decisions based on a blind choice. Does that mean as a omniscient being you're turning free will on or off? no it means you're making a "choice" based on less information. It's possibly a different choice than you'd make if you turned it off. What if you decide to turn it off and you doing percieve the ice cream choice-then you choose chocolate because it's tasty. tragedy occurs. Would this have happened if you weren't bored?

Your conclusion does not follow.

The fact that the only possible future will show which face of the penny DID land face-up does not mean I have no free-will over which face I DECIDE to place face-up.

I wonder if you are making an implicit assumption that the person whose free-will is in question is the same person who has the omniscience. That is not a given.

If there is a single entity anywhere that is omniscient, then the paradox begins to rear its head for anyone and everyone everywhere.

One possible future means you learned about your future, you reacted based on that knowledge, and so your choices inevitably led to that future. You made choices base on knowing the future, but if you are seeing it, that future is one based on the inclusion of your foresight of the events. hence you see that the penny is heads. You try to "choose" to make it tails, but it doesn't matter, because whatever choices you make DO eventually lead to heads- that is the inescapable fact of a single time line- no deviation because it is a single, unchanging timeline that only gives you the illusion of choice.

Now, if you're omniscient, you understand this anyway, and don't try to fight the flow of events, because it's unchangable. If you're suggesting they can change it, then it defies the laws of a single universe- So we accept that omniscient beings can only exist in a multiverse with infinite deviations.

As far as omniscient beings implying a paradox, it implies a multiverse by virtue of the nature of the omniscience. Or are we talking about a being who can observe but not change the future? The assumtion is that omniscence=ability to change the future.

But define the rules of this being- I for instance, assume he is unique- you sound like you're inferring that this being is an eventuality that can be achieved by all- I assume a unique set of circumstances that created him, cannot be duplicated, and thus, no one else be like this singular individual. he/she is the only one to ever exist wit this ability.

 

[DaveC426913]

Or are we talking about a being who can observe but not change the future?

That is the definition of omniscient.

You may be confusing omniscient with omnipotent.

The assumtion is that omniscence=ability to change the future.

That is an assumption and it is not granted.

But define the rules of this being- I for instance, assume he is unique- you sound like you're inferring that this being is an eventuality that can be achieved by all- I assume a unique set of circumstances that created him, cannot be duplicated, and thus, no one else be like this singular individual. he/she is the only one to ever exist wit this ability.

I do not see any of this as relevant. One omniscient being or many, you get the same result.

The issue I see is that you seem to assume the omniscient entity and the subject in question about free will are the same entity (i.e. it is his own future he is seeing). That is not a given.

 

[Mattara]

It would do none of these things. Why do you say this?

If omniscience exists, then surely the set of all true propositions must exist. If it could be shown that this set has contradictory properties, then it follows that omniscience cannot exist.

Let T be the set of all true propositions so that T = {x(1), x(2), x(3), ..., x(n)}, where x(1), x(2), ..., x(n) are true propositions. From this set, we can form the power set U that consists of all combinations of the elements in T. Thus, U contains more elements than T, since U both contains all elements of T plus additional elements that are the combinations of elements in T. Naturally, if X and Y are both true, then then the statement X AND Y (and so on through all combinations) is also true. So all elements in U are also true propositions. However, since T is the set of all true propositions, U must contain the same or less number of elements than U.

Thus assuming that the set of all true propositions exist, we get the result that U is both a subset of T and not a subset of T. This is an absurd result, so the initial premise of the possibility of omniscience has to be rejected.

Perhaps you have noticed a mistake in this line of reasoning? If so, please share it with me.

 

[w3390]

I know of one good argument that says that a supreme being cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent because of the problem of evil. However, this argument can be resolved by saying that evil is caused by free will, which would have to be present from a supreme being which must create the best possible universe.

 

[DaveC426913]

If omniscience exists, then surely the set of all true propositions must exist.
If it could be shown that this set has contradictory properties, then it follows that omniscience cannot exist.

Let T be the set of all true propositions so that T = {x(1), x(2), x(3), ..., x(n)}, where x(1), x(2), ..., x(n) are true propositions. From this set, we can form the power set U that consists of all combinations of the elements in T. Thus, U contains more elements than T, since U both contains all elements of T plus additional elements that are the combinations of elements in T. Naturally, if X and Y are both true, then then the statement X AND Y (and so on through all combinations) is also true. So all elements in U are also true propositions. However, since T is the set of all true propositions, U must contain the same or less number of elements than U.

Thus assuming that the set of all true propositions exist, we get the result that U is both a subset of T and not a subset of T. This is an absurd result, so the initial premise of the possibility of omniscience has to be rejected.

Perhaps you have noticed a mistake in this line of reasoning? If so, please share it with me.

I don't suppose you would translate this into layperson's language for those of us who did not study logic in post-sec...

 

[Zantra]

I know of one good argument that says that a supreme being cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent because of the problem of evil. However, this argument can be resolved by saying that evil is caused by free will, which would have to be present from a supreme being which must create the best possible universe.

good and evil are human concepts. You're presupposing that this being is bound by a code, or rules, which is unlikely. You're projecting a human concept onto a being that doesn't know any punishment, consequences or restrictions. It assumes emotions like empathy, regret, compassion, and fear, which this type of being probably wouldn't posess.
It's far more likely that "the best possible universe" is whatever this being sees fit to do.

Or is that not the argument?

 

[DaveC426913]

good and evil are human concepts. You're presupposing that this being is bound by a code, or rules, which is unlikely. You're projecting a human concept onto a being that doesn't know any punishment, consequences or restrictions. It assumes emotions like empathy, regret, compassion, and fear, which this type of being probably wouldn't posess.
It's far more likely that "the best possible universe" is whatever this being sees fit to do.

Or is that not the argument?

Well, he did stipulate 'omnibenevolent', which means, yes, a moral code.

 

[Zantra]

Well, he did stipulate 'omnibenevolent', which means, yes, a moral code.

I missed that part..loophole... nice

 

[Zantra]

OK I confess I didn't read the whole thread, so I missed X-ray's post here:

1. An infallible, omniscient, being exists. [Assumption]
2. This being has foreknowledge that event 'A' will occur. [Definition of omniscience]
3. 'A' must occur. [Definition of infallible]
4. I cannot choose to do any action which would make it so that 'A' does not occur. [Points, 1, 2, 3]
5. I lack free will. [Point 4]

This is just a variation on the God and an immovable boulder fallacy.

First, #3 is not necessarly granted if the implication is that omniscience means infallibility. Infallibility implies mistakes. Mistakes require rules. I submit that an omniscient being isn't necessarily subjected to "rules" to guide them. They just do what they do. I think people are thinking of God, and omniscience doesn't necessarily mean God. If we are talking about God,which goes back to benevolence, then the above 5 statements can hold up- otherwise no.

So the assumption is that an omniscient being cannot exist because it cannot fully know itsself.

The problem with that is that this is an assumption. why can't an omniscient being know itsself? It's not necessarily an infinite loop. You know everything, including how you exist, and how you function, the sum of your knowledge, and how you came to posess it.

If you're omniscient, you can IMPLY that this being's mind is infinite- this doesn't necessarily imply that he's omnipotent, just that his mind is infite, which is another human concept. Maybe it's just of a capacity that's incomprehensible to us. We make assumptions about boundaries that we can't see beyond, because it helps us convince ourselves that we're on top.

Again, everything above is only proven IF you make certain assumptions.

 

[Mattara]

I don't suppose you would translate this into layperson's language for those of us who did not study logic in post-sec...

It would perhaps loose some of its precision, but I will give it a try. If omniscience is possible, then it seems reasonable to conclude that there exists a collection of all truths (T). This would exist in the mind of the omniscient entity. By combining all of the truths in this collection, you could make a collection (U) that has all of the same truths as the original (T), plus all of the combinations of all the truths in the original collection. Thus U is larger (contains more truths) than T. However, since T is defined as containing all truths, U must contain the same number or fewer truths than T. This is a logical contradiction, so the assumption of the possibility of the existence of T, and thus the possibility of omniscience has to be rejected.

 

[DaveC426913]

It would perhaps loose some of its precision, but I will give it a try. If omniscience is possible, then it seems reasonable to conclude that there exists a collection of all truths (T). This would exist in the mind of the omniscient entity. By combining all of the truths in this collection, you could make a collection (U) that has all of the same truths as the original (T), plus all of the combinations of all the truths in the original collection. Thus U is larger (contains more truths) than T. However, since T is defined as containing all truths, U must contain the same number or fewer truths than T. This is a logical contradiction, so the assumption of the possibility of the existence of T, and thus the possibility of omniscience has to be rejected.

Yeah, that's what I gathered after reading it through. It wasn't as cryptic as I thought it was (or I'm better than I thought I was).

It seems to me, your logic is self-contradictory, having nothing to do with omniscience.

"it seems reasonable to conclude that there exists a collection of all X"
"By combining all X in this collection, you could make a collection (U) that has all of the same X, plus all of the combinations of all X in the original collection."
etc. etc.

You see, the contradiction occurs on your logic, not in its application to omniscience. The contradiction is that you start with a premise which you then immediately prove false.