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muppet
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Maanelli: Reilly's central point is that orthodox QM has given us a tool of astonishing predictive power, and if BM is going to be taken seriously then it has to be able to replicate that. Before anyone invests much effort in acheiving mastery of the Bohmian formulation, they want to see evidence that it can reproduce calculations such as those Reilly cited.
Reading http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0611/0611032v1.pdf I quote:
This was taken from the conclusion of the link you provided. Most of the discussion on relativistic variations in that paper was about what constituted a Bohm-like interpretation. If the state of BM is really as advanced as you claim, that doesn't seem like the most salient point to be discussing. The thing I found most striking in both that document and in http://www.iqc.ca/~qipcourse/interpret/lectures/lec-09-10-dBB.pdf... Agreed, all these models have a "cooked up" flavor, but this is due to the fact that their task is (in general) to reproduce the predictions of existing theories. These exising theories work FAPP (for all practical purposes) and the ambition of Bohm-like formulations is not to extend their predictive powe but to put them on a conceptually firm basis.
is the problem of quantum equilibrium. As far as I can see, even non-relativistic BM cannot claim to be substantially conceptually superior to orthodox QM until that question is resolved satisfactorily. It may just be because of the imperfect english in which the second is written, but it looks to me like the probabilities in BM currently just piggy-back the successes of othodoxy. In any event, conceptual coherence is not enough for a theory to become accepted; it needs to explain the experimental facts. It might do this better than classical mechanics, but when current research is into QFT, explaining the two-slit experiment is not enough. Additionally, the impression those links give me is that a great deal of BM research involves coercing it in such a way that it can borrow successes from the orthodox approach. This doesn't drive science forward, and until a coherent picture emerges of the role of probability in the theory (apart from loose language about it being epistemic rather than ontological) it doesn't even give us a physically interesting picture.
Don't get me wrong. I think the central idea is an extremely interesting one. But until it's substantially more sophisticated and conceptually robust, it cannot be championed in anything other than a tentative way.
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