Exploring Free Will: Would Your Choice Be Different if You Could Choose Again?

[moving finger]

Unless you advocate some form of dualism, this free will (if it exists) supervenes on the physical world. Thus, if we reset the physical world back to the way it was before it follows that this free will will also be reset to the way it was before. The only way to avoid such a conclusion is to argue that this free will does not supervene on the physical world, which takes us to dualism. But in your last post you say that you are not advocating dualism….. so something in your approach is (appropriately) "out of whack".

You are leaving the topic of your experiment and making various assertions on the nature of the mind and the universe. This is a whole other area of debate that can take us far, far away. I do not want to address these because they do not fix the fundamental design flaw in your experiment which you continue to disregard.

With respect, you are the one who has suggested that the mind cannot be reset – I am simply taking this suggestion and looking at the implications. One implication is dualism. You may ignore this implication if you wish, but that doesn’t make it go away.

I am not suggesting anything about the nature of the mind or the universe since this has nothing to do with what I repeatedly tried to explain.

It has everything to do with it. Your suggestion that the mind cannot be reset only makes rational sense in a dualistic universe (but whether dualism itself makes any sense is another matter). You perhaps prefer not to get drawn into this conclusion, but that is the conclusion that follows from your suggestion.

What I am stating is that your experiment can only be applied to a mind that you can control. The inevitable conclusion of resetting both a mind and its environment is that the same decisions will be made the second time. The experimental flaw is that you cannot apply this test to a free mind because you cannot control a free mind. Simple as that.

Which only applies if dualism is true. If some form of monism is true (eg physicalism) then your suggestion that the mind cannot be (in principle) reset has no basis in physical reality.

 

[out of whack]

With respect, you are the one who has suggested that the mind cannot be reset

With respect in return, you are inadvertently editing my statements. What I said is that a *free* mind cannot be reset. The adjective is central to your experiment, you have used it from the start and it has a meaning that cannot be dismissed when it becomes troublesome. In the rest of your comments, triggered by the above misunderstanding, you discuss possible philosophical implications of the concept of a free mind. These considerations may be interesting in their own right but they remains extraneous to the design of your experiment. The design of your experiment, to repeat myself, is what I am objecting to. The step where you reset a mind (which may or may not be free) can only be done on a controllable mind, not on a free one. This makes the experiment unusable for any purpose of differentiating between free and controlled minds.

 

[moving finger]

With respect in return, you are inadvertently editing my statements. What I said is that a *free* mind cannot be reset.

I apologise for misquoting you - but my comments remain essentially unchanged. If a "free mind" cannot be in principle reset then it follows that this "free mind" must exist in some kind of dualistic universe (why? because in any monistic universe the mental supervenes on the physical, and there is no reason in principle why the physical cannot be reset, at least in terms of a thought experiment). Conclusion : The universe must be dualistic if "free minds" are to exist.

 

[out of whack]

Conclusion : The universe must be dualistic if "free minds" are to exist.

Your conclusion may be correct, I will not dispute it or debate it because my argument does not hinge on an implementation method for free will. Free will enthusiasts may also have various explanations besides dualism with different degrees of creativity and surely some crackpot theories as well. I would use the term "magic ingredient" as a generic label for any principle that permits free will in a mechanistic universe that otherwise denies it. Then we can account for the possibility or impossibility of such a magic ingredient in your experiment and see what happens.

If we assume the existence of a magic ingredient (perhaps dualism) then different decisions will be made after we reset the universe since we cannot also reset whatever magic lies beyond mechanism. Even if we could, resetting something non-mechanistic would not do us any good. So the test would show that free will exists.

If we deny the existence of a magic ingredient then resetting the universe will reset the will and the same decisions will always be made in the second case, showing with increasing statistical certainty that free will does not exist.

Either way, the experiment echoes what we postulate in the first place, it provides no new knowledge.

 

[octelcogopod]

IMO free will as we know it inside is simply our lack of insight into the workings of the physical events that makes of capable of making the choice.
Like I said in another thread, I think that free will is dependant on our brains way of quantifying events into time and motion, where we try to create visual imagery in our heads about how something worked or happened to make us able to make the choice.

The logical trap in this lies with the fact that we have no control over the events that happen that enable us to make the choice, for instance we can't control our brains neural net directly / physically to alter our choice.
This to me means that we simply have no idea how the choice was made to begin with, we got an impulse, a sensory stimuli, or a thought/emotion, and that set in motion tons of other things in our brain which made us make the choice.
In other words I do believe in determinism.

If you think about it, we have very little control over anything, humans are pretty basic creatures.

 

[Doctordick]

If you think about it, we have very little control over anything, humans are pretty basic creatures.

I agree with you one hundred percent!

However, selection has indeed created a mechanism which seems very much to display what we call intelligence. Much as the wind erosion in the desert west has created rocks with an astounding balance in the face of day to day weather. Clearly, all the ones which weren’t balanced have fallen long ago. I think this is an excellent explanation of intelligent behavior. Mechanisms exist which can display such behavior and the behavior leads to success. Is there really anything more to say?

Have fun -- Dick

 

[LightbulbSun]

moving finger:

Why is it so hard for you to understand that control is the antithesis of being free? Your experiment is useless because you're already assuming that you can control another's mind by reseting it. Also take into account that a lot of people rely on whims so I don't see how a different decision a second time around implies determinism at all. A free mind can have whims.

 

[octelcogopod]

I agree with you one hundred percent!

However, selection has indeed created a mechanism which seems very much to display what we call intelligence. Much as the wind erosion in the desert west has created rocks with an astounding balance in the face of day to day weather. Clearly, all the ones which weren’t balanced have fallen long ago. I think this is an excellent explanation of intelligent behavior. Mechanisms exist which can display such behavior and the behavior leads to success. Is there really anything more to say?

Have fun -- Dick

I agree yes..
But I do think that our free will really stems from some sort of lack of insight.
If you think about it, when I decide to walk through the forest instead of on the road to my destination, I don't really understand WHY, oh a physical level. I understand on a gut level and emotional/thought level that I might like to see beautiful scenery and see the forest/clean air etc, but these are all 'after effects' of the physical things that happened before these feelings.

I highly doubt you can have an emotion before the physical events that control that emotion, like with thought.
This again leads to me thinking that seeing as we can't see into the future, and if the universe is deterministic, then all physical events will always happen before we sense the emotion.
And not only that but on a physical level the chemical and electrical signals probably take some time to register in our subjective conscious mind the emotion we are having, which means we are at the core at mercy of those signals.

But I claim no knowledge of how consciousness arises in the physicality etc :P

 

[Rade]

... then all physical events will always happen before we sense the emotion...

This comment is supported by experiment that all perceptions and sensations are first processed by the unconscious (the limbic system). It takes about 500 millisec for a perception that enters the limbic system (unconsciousness) to reach the cortex which is the seat of consciousness (that is, before you "sense" the event). Physical events are always a priori to the mind being aware of the events. Reason and emotion from the cortex (consciousness) inform the limbic system (unconsciousness) via feedback any value, purpose, or desire the I of you wants to place on physical events thus perceived.

 

[Doctordick]

I agree yes..
But I do think that our free will really stems from some sort of lack of insight.
If you think about it, when I decide to walk through the forest instead of on the road to my destination, I don't really understand WHY, oh a physical level. I understand on a gut level and emotional/thought level that I might like to see beautiful scenery and see the forest/clean air etc, but these are all 'after effects' of the physical things that happened before these feelings.

I highly doubt you can have an emotion before the physical events that control that emotion, like with thought.
This again leads to me thinking that seeing as we can't see into the future, and if the universe is deterministic, then all physical events will always happen before we sense the emotion.
And not only that but on a physical level the chemical and electrical signals probably take some time to register in our subjective conscious mind the emotion we are having, which means we are at the core at mercy of those signals.

But I claim no knowledge of how consciousness arises in the physicality etc :P

It seems to me that you are assuming "consciousness" is a valid representation of something real and not just a logic toggle in your mind. Can you prove such an assumption is necessary?

 

[octelcogopod]

Well, the doctor got banned it seems. I would write up a reply but I'm not sure what a "logic toggle" is, if anyone could explain I would be glad..

 

[moving finger]

moving finger:

Why is it so hard for you to understand that control is the antithesis of being free? Your experiment is useless because you're already assuming that you can control another's mind by reseting it. Also take into account that a lot of people rely on whims so I don't see how a different decision a second time around implies determinism at all. A free mind can have whims.

Free in this context is (to my mind) just another word for random. I have no problem with there being random or indeterministic events in the world - but if that's the basis for free will then its no more attractive than a completely deterministic world.

Please define what you mean by a "whim"? Presumably a "whim" is something which is not "controlled" in a deterministic sense by anything else - in which case what's the difference between a "whim" and a random or indeterministic event?

 

[moving finger]

Your conclusion may be correct, I will not dispute it or debate it because my argument does not hinge on an implementation method for free will. Free will enthusiasts may also have various explanations besides dualism with different degrees of creativity and surely some crackpot theories as well. I would use the term "magic ingredient" as a generic label for any principle that permits free will in a mechanistic universe that otherwise denies it. Then we can account for the possibility or impossibility of such a magic ingredient in your experiment and see what happens.

"magic ingredient" in this context is not an explanation "besides dualism", it is yet another form of dualism (ie it posits some special force or agency which does not supervene on the physical). Sorry, out of whack, but no matter how much you wriggle on the hook, no matter how much you want to call it "something else", all roads eventually and inevitably lead the same way - back to dualism.

Either way, the experiment echoes what we postulate in the first place, it provides no new knowledge.

Incorrect. As we have seen, it shows that belief in free will also entails belief in some form of dualism.

 

[out of whack]

what's the difference between a "whim" and a random or indeterministic event?

Precisely, here lies the correct argument against free will. The concept is a contradiction in terms with regards to the wishes of free will proponents. Our consciousness is either deterministic or indeterministic. There is no third option. And either way, there is no basis to claim more control over the changes happening within our mind than the apple has control over its fall.

"magic ingredient" in this context is not an explanation "besides dualism", it is yet another form of dualism (ie it posits some special force or agency which does not supervene on the physical). Sorry, out of whack, but no matter how much you wriggle on the hook, no matter how much you want to call it "something else", all roads eventually and inevitably lead the same way - back to dualism.


Incorrect. As we have seen, it shows that belief in free will also entails belief in some form of dualism.

As we have seen? You state without proof that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical. You need to rule out any possibility of any misunderstood principle of the physical world that would allow for it. Or you need to pinpoint some logical contradiction of the principle, which you probably tried to do with your thought experiment. But by claiming that free will implies dualism, your experiment contains this implicit assumption. Given dualism, all sorts of things should happen differently the second time, including the decision in question. Denying dualism, we also deny the possibility that the decision was free and everything will repeat the same way, including this decision. So what do we learn? Nothing that we do not assume or deny at the start. The experiment only repeats its premises. It may illustrate but it does not prove.

I think you need to address the issue directly instead, as in your reply to LightbulbSun. Since free will appears to be a misunderstanding, debunking it becomes a matter of clarifying terms.

 

[Moridin]

You state without proof that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical. You need to rule out any possibility of any misunderstood principle of the physical world that would allow for it.

P1: Part with libertarian free will cannot be subject to causality (def).
P2: All matter is subject to causality (def).
C: Part with libertarian free will is not material.

Denying dualism, we also deny the possibility that the decision was free and everything will repeat the same way, including this decision.

Only free as libertarian free, not as compatibilist free.

 

[out of whack]

P1: Part with libertarian free will cannot be subject to causality (def).
P2: All matter is subject to causality (def).
C: Part with libertarian free will is not material.

The conclusion follows from your premises but these premises are debatable. You would need to prove P2 in particular, it is not true by definition. A number of quantum theorists would argue it and philosophically, causality is unproven (and possibly unprovable). But this is not my point of contention of course. Even if we believe that free will must be immaterial and that dualism must apply, the thought experiment will just illustrate this premise. A proof must still be made some other way.

Only free as libertarian free, not as compatibilist free.

Right. Compatibilism is a deliberate effort to restrict the definition of free will to only what is compatible with determinism. Fair enough. From the wording of the initial post I don't think this is moving finger's interpretation of the topic. It's not the interpretation I have been using either.

 

[Moridin]

A number of quantum theorists would argue it and philosophically, causality is unproven (and possibly unprovable). But this is not my point of contention of course. Even if we believe that free will must be immaterial and that dualism must apply, the thought experiment will just illustrate this premise. A proof must still be made some other way.

Quantum effects are negligible on our level. Besides, random does not give you free will. To claim that causality is invalid on our level destroys the scientific project.

 

[moving finger]

As we have seen?

I was referring to the many attempts that you made to show that free will might entail something other than dualism - and each time I argued that what you were describing was simply dualism in another guise (eg your reference to "magic ingredient").

You state without proof that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical.

Incorrect. I have never said "that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical". In fact just the opposite is true - what most people mean by a belief "free will" entails a belief in some form of dualism (ie something which does not supervene on the physical).

Given dualism, all sorts of things should happen differently the second time, including the decision in question.

Agreed

Denying dualism, we also deny the possibility that the decision was free and everything will repeat the same way, including this decision.

Thus you agree that belief in free will entails belief in dualism. Excellent.

'nuff said.

 

[out of whack]

Quantum effects are negligible on our level. Besides, random does not give you free will. To claim that causality is invalid on our level destroys the scientific project.

I don't know at what level consciousness arises. I agree with your second sentence but not your third: science gives scientific certainty and not irrefutability, it is useful even without philosophical proof of causality.

I was referring to the many attempts that you made to show that free will might entail something other than dualism - and each time I argued that what you were describing was simply dualism in another guise (eg your reference to "magic ingredient").

Ah, our brilliant version of an "Is too!" "Is not!" debate. No proof was given either way.

Incorrect. I have never said "that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical". In fact just the opposite is true - what most people mean by a belief "free will" entails a belief in some form of dualism (ie something which does not supervene on the physical).

I think you are using the word "supervene" to mean its opposite. If dualism does not supervene on the physical then it does not occur as something additional or extraneous to the physical. It would have to be of the same kind as everything else that is physical, but you seem to take the opposite stand.

Thus you agree that belief in free will entails belief in dualism. Excellent.

'nuff said.

You conveniently skipped the sentence just before the one you quoted: "But by claiming that free will implies dualism, your experiment contains this implicit assumption." It is your claim, not mine, and is not even relevant. I'll say it again: I do not care how you decide that free will must be implemented because my argument is a different one, which you prefer to ignore.

'nuff heard.

 

[moving finger]

I think you are using the word "supervene" to mean its opposite. If dualism does not supervene on the physical then it does not occur as something additional or extraneous to the physical. It would have to be of the same kind as everything else that is physical, but you seem to take the opposite stand.

I have no idea what you mean here. If X does not supervene on Y then by definition a change in X does not entail a change in Y; whereas if X supervenes on Y then by definition any change in X entails a change in Y (this is my understanding of the term supervenience).

You seem to be suggesting the opposite; please tell me I have misunderstood your above post?

Substitute "human choices" for X, and "the physical" for Y in the above.

IF human choices supervene on the physical then my suggested "play it again" experiment would (from the definition of supervenience) result in the same outcome each time (ie no free will). The only possible reasons why there might be a different result each time in such an experiment (ie possible evidence of "free will" in human choice) is either because human choices do NOT supervene on the physical (which lack of supervenience implies dualism, no matter how much you wish to call it something else) or because quantum indeterminism is true (but such indeterminism is no source of free will).

 

[out of whack]

I have no idea what you mean here.

We must read a different dictionary, or read it differently. Random House Webster:

su-per-vene (sue puhr veen') v.i. <-vened, -ven-ing>
1. to take place or occur as something additional or extraneous

I think you were saying that what permits free will requires something that [take place or occur as something additional or extraneous] to the physical, and call this situation dualism.

[Substitutions mine:]

If X does not [take place or occur as something additional or extraneous] on Y then by definition a change in X does not entail a change in Y; whereas if X [take place or occur as something additional or extraneous] on Y then by definition any change in X entails a change in Y (this is my understanding of the term supervenience).

Your conclusions do not follow from the definition. Whether X occurs either as part of or in addition to Y, X may or may not still have an effect on Y. If X has no effect of any kind on any Y that is considered real, then X could not be considered real (a concept beyond the concept of being extraneous or additional, or even part of).

Clearly we understood the word differently.

 

[moving finger]

We must read a different dictionary, or read it differently. Random House Webster:

su-per-vene (sue puhr veen') v.i. <-vened, -ven-ing>
1. to take place or occur as something additional or extraneous

Clearly we understood the word differently.

Clearly one of us is out of whack.
This is a philosophy thread. I suggest you maybe check the philosophical meaning of supervenience, rather than the common English usage. Wikipedia is a good place to start (though you will find the same definitions in most good philosophical texts).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience

Wikipedia gives an example directly relevant to our discussion:

"if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state."

Which, as you will see, is in perfect agreement with my interpretation of supervenience.

 

[vanesch]

To the OP:
imagine that we can physically analyse the brain and body of the person making a "free choice" in such a way, that we can *predict* what he will do as a function of a certain stimulus: that is: if we have a good enough description of all his neurons, nerves, physico-chemical states of these neurons and so on, it is conceivable that we know that when we are going to apply a certain set of vibrations to his ear (which sound like "do you like coffee, or would you like tea ?"), and we analyse the propagation of the resulting nerve pulses throughout his brain, that we can come up with several possibilities:

1) the nerves going to the throat and so on are going to be fired to say "I'd like some tea please!"
2) they are going to make the person utter: "Coffee please!" ;
3) most probably they are going to say "could you please get all those wires and electrodes out of my brain !"

Joking aside, it might be that the brain configuration is clearly such that it will be 1) or 2). But it might also be that the model we have of the brain will give us RANDOMLY 1) or 2) depending on some sensitive initial conditions, such as the exact Na/K ratio in an axion or something like that, and that, with the precision we have, we cannot determine whether it will be 1) or 2). It could even be so chaotic, that we have to go down to quantum-mechanically forbidden precision to be able to decide between 1) and 2).

So I'd say, if we ever can have brain modeling such that we CAN find out, given the structure of the brain, with certainty, that it is 1) or 2), then for sure our brain is a "deterministic machine", like a computer.

But even if we are in the "chaotic case", are we now going to say that our free will is dependent on "very small changes in initial conditions, beyond the physically measurable ?" Is that "free will" or "random choice" ? Did we "freely decide", or "threw some dice and acted upon that ?"

Isn't the "sensation" of having choosen what the physics of our brain "did", not just a mental illusion ? EVEN if it is "random" ? Because it is difficult to consider that our "free will" resides in the ultra-precise dose of Na/K in an axion, no ?

So EVEN if we "rewind" and have the universe "identical" we have a problem in interpretation. But there's an extra difficulty with the concept itself of "rewinding the universe":

Consider that we throw a dice. We find 5. Now "rewind the universe" and throw the dice again. Do we find 5 again ?

Now do the same with a quantum-mechanical system. Consider a radioactive atom during one half-life time. Imagine it decays during this time. Now, "rewind the universe" and do that again. Is it going to decay again ?

 

[moving finger]

To the OP:
imagine that we can physically analyse the brain and body of the person making a "free choice" in such a way, that we can *predict* what he will do as a function of a certain stimulus: that is: if we have a good enough description of all his neurons, nerves, physico-chemical states of these neurons and so on, it is conceivable that we know that when we are going to apply a certain set of vibrations to his ear (which sound like "do you like coffee, or would you like tea ?"), and we analyse the propagation of the resulting nerve pulses throughout his brain, that we can come up with several possibilities:

1) the nerves going to the throat and so on are going to be fired to say "I'd like some tea please!"
2) they are going to make the person utter: "Coffee please!" ;
3) most probably they are going to say "could you please get all those wires and electrodes out of my brain !"

Joking aside, it might be that the brain configuration is clearly such that it will be 1) or 2). But it might also be that the model we have of the brain will give us RANDOMLY 1) or 2) depending on some sensitive initial conditions, such as the exact Na/K ratio in an axion or something like that, and that, with the precision we have, we cannot determine whether it will be 1) or 2). It could even be so chaotic, that we have to go down to quantum-mechanically forbidden precision to be able to decide between 1) and 2).

So I'd say, if we ever can have brain modeling such that we CAN find out, given the structure of the brain, with certainty, that it is 1) or 2), then for sure our brain is a "deterministic machine", like a computer.

But even if we are in the "chaotic case", are we now going to say that our free will is dependent on "very small changes in initial conditions, beyond the physically measurable ?" Is that "free will" or "random choice" ? Did we "freely decide", or "threw some dice and acted upon that ?"

Isn't the "sensation" of having choosen what the physics of our brain "did", not just a mental illusion ? EVEN if it is "random" ? Because it is difficult to consider that our "free will" resides in the ultra-precise dose of Na/K in an axion, no ?

So EVEN if we "rewind" and have the universe "identical" we have a problem in interpretation. But there's an extra difficulty with the concept itself of "rewinding the universe":

Consider that we throw a dice. We find 5. Now "rewind the universe" and throw the dice again. Do we find 5 again ?

Now do the same with a quantum-mechanical system. Consider a radioactive atom during one half-life time. Imagine it decays during this time. Now, "rewind the universe" and do that again. Is it going to decay again ?

I do not disagree with anything you say here.

But what you are saying boils down to :
EITHER everything is deterministic (in which case where does Free Will start?)
OR some things are indeterministic (as per quantum indeterminacy) - but in that case are we saying that free will arises from quantum uncertainty? - no surely not.

 

[Q_Goest]

If every atom or molecule is only affected by some deterministic or indeterminate event, then what is the purpose of ‘free will’ and why does it seem to correspond to the sensation of making a choice?

Let’s simplify for a second and postulate a computational model. Switches in the deterministic machine all do what they’re supposed to, due to electric currents that cause them to change state. However, we could also postulate a random switch such that it may at any time switch states with no input whatsoever. We could make a sentient machine that was deterministic or we could make one that was not deterministic depending on which switches we chose to build the machine from.

With either of these machines, I have to wonder, “What is the purpose of free will?” Does either machine use this phenomena to change the state of one of it’s switches? No, obviously not.
- The switches in the deterministic machine change because there is an electrical voltage applied to it.
- The switches in the random machine change without cause.

For the simplistic case of random or deterministic switches, we have no reason to suppose that free will is anything but an epiphenomena with no causal influence over the physical substrate it supervenes on. Since this is true, why does free will seem to correspond with making a choice?

We have this idea that our mental representation should correspond to reality for some reason, but there’s no reason whatsoever to presuppose that sensations should reliably correspond to anything given this simplistic computational model. Any mechanism made up of deterministic and random switches is driven by the actions and applied voltages of the switches, not some sensation that we have a choice to make.

This is another one of those categorical errors many (not all) philosophers seem to consistently make. They make the ungrounded assumption that the sensation of free will should correspond to making choices, but there’s no reason they should correspond. By that I mean there is no reason to have the sensation of free will as opposed to some other sensation. If the sensation of free will does not influence anything, just as any qualia can’t influence any action of any switch given the above computational model, why should any of these sensations correspond to our behavior?

In answering that, you have to accept all qualia such as the sensation of free will are epiphenomena that have no influence but for some reason these epiphenomena always seem to correspond to the behavior. I could equally well say that I experience the color red or feel a sharp pain in my foot when I have to make a choice since any sensation of qualia has no influence whatsoever over the physical substrate. Free will is no different. There is no reason to postulate that free will has an influence given the above model and thus there is no reason it should correspond to making a choice. I have to conclude that the model is faulty.

 

[moving finger]

If every atom...

I take it from the above that you do not believe in the (philosophical) Libertarian form of Free Will (as opposed to the Compatibilist form)? If so, that accords with my belief.

 

[vanesch]

This is another one of those categorical errors many (not all) philosophers seem to consistently make. They make the ungrounded assumption that the sensation of free will should correspond to making choices, but there’s no reason they should correspond. By that I mean there is no reason to have the sensation of free will as opposed to some other sensation. If the sensation of free will does not influence anything, just as any qualia can’t influence any action of any switch given the above computational model, why should any of these sensations correspond to our behavior?

In answering that, you have to accept all qualia such as the sensation of free will are epiphenomena that have no influence but for some reason these epiphenomena always seem to correspond to the behavior. I could equally well say that I experience the color red or feel a sharp pain in my foot when I have to make a choice since any sensation of qualia has no influence whatsoever over the physical substrate. Free will is no different. There is no reason to postulate that free will has an influence given the above model and thus there is no reason it should correspond to making a choice. I have to conclude that the model is faulty.

Exactly !

In other words, it seems that we can take it that free will is an illusion. Now, we can of course also define free will to be "the subjective illusion to have free will", and in that case, we have free will

 

[MrXow]

you would definitely choose the coffee again because the first time you obviously wanted it more than the tea and if time was reset you would still want it more

 

[out of whack]

Clearly one of us is out of whack.

Hey, hey, you're not allowed to use the same crack twice in the same thread. There's got to be a forum rule about that somewhere...

This is a philosophy thread.

It's in English.

I suggest you maybe check the philosophical meaning

I counter-suggest you maybe say which meaning you use when it departs from common English. I will read the reference you posted.

But to end on a positive note, I also agree with you, vanesh and Q_Goest that free will does not dictate our actions. It appears to be an after-the-fact sensation instead.

 

[Q_Goest]

movingfinger, Vanesch – My point is only that the computational model seems to be faulty, and any model of reality based on computationalism will similarly be faulty. If we are to hold onto our model of computationalism, regardless of whether or not we assume deterministic or random causation, we must explain why we should have a reliable correspondence between qualia (such as the sensation of free will) and behavior. If you agree that everything I’ve pointed out is true, then how does one reconsile the seemingly inescapable observation that qualia reliably correspond to behavior?

The only way I know is provided by elimitavists like Dennett who states, “So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all.” (Ref: Quinning Qualia) However, Dennett’s logic lacks rigor.

Instead, try this:

Liking to ask questions that confound common sense, philosophers have asked: does consciousness confer any advantages that could explain why evolution would so carefully have nurtured it? And if not, do we really have to trouble ourselves with consciousness? Common sense responds, "Try driving behind a guy who’s asleep, and see if consciousness has any advantages."

Philosophers (ROCs in particular)* reply: "Oh, we didn’t mean that kind of advantage; or if we did, we didn’t mean conscious as opposed to being asleep. A zombie keeps his eyes on the road, and his visual computational center contributes to his driving safely, which his prudential computational center mandates." And the ROCs continue: "What we meant was, does a perfect driver who is experiencing the trip have any survival advantage over a perfect driver who is not experiencing anything? And our answer is No."

Well, right – if that was the choice put before Evolution. Makes you wonder, why are there not more computers in our planet’s illustrious history? Why all these conscious beings? According to a neglected screenplay called Valley of the Lost Microchips, long ago a fertile vale in South America was in fact riddled with computers, dumped there by an alien civilization that had grown weary of technology. The problem was, they just sat around. They were of no use to anyone until the dinosaurs came along and ate them.

Ref: Kearns, “Could Daniel Dennett be a Zombie?”
* ROC = Reducer Of Consciousness of whom Dennett takes this position.

For any computational model with only deterministic or random elements, there is no evolutionary advantage whatsoever. This should be self evident since for such a computational model, qualia, including the sensation of free will, has no influence whatsoever.

I’m merely trying to point out that I disagree with this model. It doesn’t work. The computational paradigm of mind has more holes in it than a dam made from Swiss cheese with a million mice using it for a home. Computationalism relies on functionalism which doesn't rely on any physical laws, but is a concept created by Hillary Putnam in the 1960's whom now disavows the concept. If the originator of functionalism says he was wrong, and if functionalism is only a concept without basis on physical law, then computationalism is in a lot of trouble.

I'd contend that the original question presented by the OP is faulty. I believe that there is a reason for qualia, a reason for the sensation of free will, and we can’t model these phenomena using a computational model.

Try this model instead. Strong emergence, downward causation. The phenomena of consciousness is strongly emergent and is causal. For example, let’s just say it is actually our DNA and it’s interaction with ribosomes which is the physical substrate on which consiousness supervenes, and as these molecules are used to manufacture hormones that affect our behavior, they can do so in a non-deterministic way which is caused by the phenomena of consciousness and all of our qualia. Such a model would then predict that the generation of hormones is not random, not deterministic, but caused by the phenomena created by that physical substrate as a whole. This is just one example of strong emergence and downward causation that would eliminate the computational model of deterministic and random switches and put some meaning back into such things as free will and qualia. Further, such phenomena would confer an evolutionary advantage over the computational model using only deterministic and random elements.

Ok, running for cover now! lol

 

[moving finger]

It's in English.

I guess that's why I referred to an English version of the philosophical definition.

I counter-suggest you maybe say which meaning you use when it departs from common English. I will read the reference you posted.

Sorry, I guess I took it for granted that participants in a philosophy thread would understand the philosophical meaning of supervenience. My mistake.

But to end on a positive note, I also agree with you, vanesh and Q_Goest that free will does not dictate our actions. It appears to be an after-the-fact sensation instead.

We all seem to agree on this at least.

 

[vanesch]

movingfinger, Vanesch – My point is only that the computational model seems to be faulty, and any model of reality based on computationalism will similarly be faulty. If we are to hold onto our model of computationalism, regardless of whether or not we assume deterministic or random causation, we must explain why we should have a reliable correspondence between qualia (such as the sensation of free will) and behavior.

Ha, that's the one-million-dollar question of course. It is also known as the "hard problem" or as "the mind-brain problem".

For the moment, it is still a philosophical discussion, but we will soon run into very practical problems because of it: when we will have build intelligent machines which "seem to have qualia". It is impossible to find out whether a physical structure has a subjective world "attached" to it or not, except for your own. It is impossible to know whether a machine is behaving "as if" it had qualia (but is "just a machine") or REALLY has qualia. It is impossible to know whether a stone "feels pain" when we break it.

Our hypothesis of other people having qualia (and not being zombies) simply comes about because of analogy: because they seem to behave in very similar ways as you do yourself. And as you, yourself KNOW that you have a subjective experience (have qualia), you assume somehow that the situation must be symmetrical.

But it is entirely possible that you (I ?) are (am) totally alone. That everybody, and everything, around you never had the slightest bit of subjective experience except yourself. This then solves the issue in a certain way. There are no qualia, except for your own.

It might also be that only CERTAIN physical structures have subjective experience emerge. For instance, only men. Not women. They are zombies. It can't be the opposite because there's at least one guy having subjective experiences (me - although to you, I could be a zombie trying you to trick you into thinking that I do have subjective experiences). Or only those men which are born on an even date. Or whatever other arbitrary criterium. But there is no observational way to find out, ever.

 

[moving finger]

This is another one of those categorical errors many (not all) philosophers seem to consistently make. They make the ungrounded assumption that the sensation of free will should correspond to making choices, but there’s no reason they should correspond. By that I mean there is no reason to have the sensation of free will as opposed to some other sensation. If the sensation of free will does not influence anything, just as any qualia can’t influence any action of any switch given the above computational model, why should any of these sensations correspond to our behavior?

In answering that, you have to accept all qualia such as the sensation of free will are epiphenomena that have no influence but for some reason these epiphenomena always seem to correspond to the behavior. I could equally well say that I experience the color red or feel a sharp pain in my foot when I have to make a choice since any sensation of qualia has no influence whatsoever over the physical substrate. Free will is no different. There is no reason to postulate that free will has an influence given the above model and thus there is no reason it should correspond to making a choice. I have to conclude that the model is faulty.

You seem to assume that "the sensation of free will" does not influence anything (ie is an epiphenomenon).
But its not clear to me why you assume this?
Can you defend your assumption here?

 

[Q_Goest]

Vanesch said: It is also known as the "hard problem"

Actually, what I’m talking about is reliable correlation, not the hard problem. The hard problem only asks why we should have any experience at all, not why that experience should reliably correlate.

For both Vanesch and movingfinger or anyone else willing to discuss…

The sensation of free will, just like any qualia, is not objectively measurable in any way. There is nothing we can measure which says “here is free will” or “here is the color red” or pain, or any qualia.

I would like to propose that anything that is not measurable can have no measurable affect on that which is measurable. Just too much like magic, right? (Note: There is a way around this by suggesting strong emergence and downward causation as given in my previous post, but for now, let’s focus on computationalism.)

Let’s look at what our basis is for consciousness.
1) For the case of a computational model, switches for example (or any classical interaction which can be duplicated in a control volume*) are influenced not by qualia, but by the voltage applied to them.

I take statement 1 to be undeniable. I don’t see any way to argue that some unmeasurable phenomena is causing switches to operate. That’s just absurd. Hence, the qualia are an epiphenomena which are impotent in causing any physical change given the computational model.

That fact isn’t so bad as what gets derived from this conclusion. The real kicker. The one everyone here is overlooking, though there are many people who DO see this next issue as a real problem. It is sometimes as hard to understand as trying to explain to a 5 year old that the color red doesn’t exist as a property of a color of paint. I’m taking this time to point out this is a hard thing to understand so anyone reading can give this some real consideration.

Since qualia can’t influence any physical change, why should they correlate to what we sense? The odds they should “reliably correlate” with an experience are stacked against us. In fact, the odds they should reliably correlate are so astronomically low, we should be sitting here dumbfounded. There is no reason for them to reliably correlate (meaning that pain should feel like something that we should try to avoid or that free will should relate to making a decision).** For example, a person with synesthasia may experience the quale “turquoise” when hearing the sound “one” (ie: the number one). They associate color with numbers. This is very unusual of course, because we all associate color with some wavelength of light. Similarly, we associate pain with a negative experience such as a cut or a burn. We could equally associate the color turquoise with a cut or burn since regardless of what quale we experience, we will still try to avoid what caused that particular quale. We could equally experience an orgasm, but the end result would be identical, in that we would try to avoid what caused the orgasm – the behavior can not be influenced by what we experience!

Because regardless of what quale we experience, in the case of computationalism, there is no influence whatsoever as stated in 1) above. To calculate the odds that any given quale should correlate to a given behavior, we only need to take the actual number of experiences, which is 1, and divide by the number of possible experiences, which is an extremely large number. In fact, there is no real limit to the number of possible experiences we should have, so the odds that there is a reliable correlation between some quale and the experience approaches zero. That’s (just another) problem that computationalism has no way to avoid. Note that I’m not the only one pointing this out. Dennett seems to recognize this as I’ve quoted Kearns above, but Dennett would rather eliminate all qualia than admit there is an issue.

* Control volumes in the sense of a volume of space which has a distinct boundary or surface on which boundary conditions can be applied. The control volume concept is a specific concept used by engineers in fluid mechanics and thermodynamics to describe what is occurring within some volume of space, but the same concept can, and has been expanded upon in one form or another to consider any classical mechanical interaction. Note this concept can’t be used below a certain scale.

** The standard objection to this is that they simply do, and we don’t know why any more than we know why qualia exist. However, the issue isn’t that simple to dismiss as I point out the odds for reliable correlation are astronomically low.

 

[vanesch]

Let’s look at what our basis is for consciousness.
1) For the case of a computational model, switches for example (or any classical interaction which can be duplicated in a control volume*) are influenced not by qualia, but by the voltage applied to them.

I take statement 1 to be undeniable. I don’t see any way to argue that some unmeasurable phenomena is causing switches to operate. That’s just absurd. Hence, the qualia are an epiphenomena which are impotent in causing any physical change given the computational model.

Yes, I subscribe to this. Well, it is possible to subscribe to this, at least.

I understand what you are saying, I think. The question is: why are qualia, which cannot influence the physical state, determined by the physical state. A kind of violation of action-reaction.

Because regardless of what quale we experience, in the case of computationalism, there is no influence whatsoever as stated in 1) above. To calculate the odds that any given quale should correlate to a given behavior, we only need to take the actual number of experiences, which is 1, and divide by the number of possible experiences, which is an extremely large number.

... unless you go to a many-worlds situation, where to each thinkable set of qualia, also corresponds an existing world in the multiverse Then, as I try often to point out, the problem of "why ?" becomes "which ?" or a problem of haecceity: "why THIS one? "

It is also one of the reasons for my preference of MWI, although I have to say that I fully recon that it is totally speculative, but I like the idea that a physical theory finally points our nose in an ignored philosophical problem... even if it turns out not to be right in the end, it was in any case a fun idea.