Exploring the Mystery of Consciousness: Why Am I Born This Way?

[Les Sleeth]

Please prove this statement.

He means that it is theoretically possible; i.e., there are no laws of physics which prohibit it from happening however unlikely it is to occur. Your requirement for proof could be turned toward your assertion too. That is, prove it is impossible, which of course no one can do.

But, I don't understand why you would say that even if possible, two identically wired brains would create the same "me." Even if we are just a brain, the "me" in there is much more the result of personal experience isn't it? Since even with identical wiring the individual units would walk around in different settings from different perspectives, I can't see how they would have the same "me."

 

[Paul Martin]

The Essential Question: What exactly is this "me"?

Even if we are just a brain, the "me" in there is much more the result of personal experience isn't it?

Given the premise of the question, then the "me" is nothing but a combination of the physical state of the body which is a result of its history of experiences. If this premise is true, then all animal behavior would be identical with the behavior of complex robots or automatons.

But I think this premise is an unsupported assumption. If we accept the possibility that consciousness is something non-physical that is outside the brain, then it seems to me that that consciousness would naturally qualify as the "me" that we wonder about. I think the car-driver analogy is a good illustration of what the relationship might be. The car is a specific physical object with structure and function and which obeys the strict laws of physics. But without a conscious driver, the car cannot behave much differently than a rock. With a driver, however, although still obeying all the laws of physics, the car can exhibit seemingly purposive and improbable actions -- the same kind of actions live animals exhibit.

It seems to me that even a casual observation of human and animal behavior suggests purposive behavior rather than robotic behavior.

Paul

 

[Kerrie]

please indulge me Kerrie

I think a study which can account for what determines someone to be the person that they are in line with anubis question is very much on topic. If you would like to go on discussing astrology within the context I'm sure no one would mind, well at least i wouldn't anyway

Maybe you could just cut and paste or link to the files in the archive. I would love to but am currently pressed for time

please see your private message spicerack. an astrological discussion started in this thread is not the focus.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Given the premise of the question, then the "me" is nothing but a combination of the physical state of the body which is a result of its history of experiences. If this premise is true, then all animal behavior would be identical with the behavior of complex robots or automatons.

I understand your overall point Paul, but what you say above doesn't seem right.

Let's just take two robots who each have identical AI brains and sensory apparatus, and both retain what they experience exactly the same way so a personal history is built up for each. What they experience is dependent on the receipt of information, but it is impossible for both to receive the same information. Reality is incessantly changing, and so the information available from it is also different from one moment to the next. Also, they cannot both occupy the same space and therefore simultaneously experience from the same perspective.

So, each is going to retain a different collection of information even if they process, interpret, respond, etc. to identical information exactly the same.

 

[Faustus]

Let's just take two robots who each have identical AI brains and sensory apparatus, and both retain what they experience exactly the same way so a personal history is built up for each. What they experience is dependent on the receipt of information, but it is impossible for both to receive the same information.

It is not really impossible. I can think of a planet, exactly like ours, with an exactly identical history, located in a position in space where the night sky looks exactly the same...

(boy, this philosophy business makes winning the lottery seem as easy as stealing candy from a kid)

But in that hypothetical scenario, I believe we no longer have two persons, two "me"s. If someone else is living a life exactly like mine, having exactly the same experiences, I think that would also be me. That is, unless we can have different subjective experiences that have no physical correlates in our brains.

Makes you really wonder what is the point of this exercise, doesn't it?

 

[Les Sleeth]

It is not really impossible. I can think of a planet, exactly like ours, with an exactly identical history, located in a position in space where the night sky looks exactly the same...But in that hypothetical scenario, I believe we no longer have two persons, two "me"s. If someone else is living a life exactly like mine, having exactly the same experiences, I think that would also be me.

I am still going to disagree with you. The universe might appear the same on that planet, but it really isn't. That means you here on Earth, and your clone on that planet, have taken in information from two completely different perspectives. Appearing the same doesn't equal actual sameness.

See, I am arguing this because I think a hugely important aspect to individuality is the "point" we each occupy which no one else can.

Makes you really wonder what is the point of this exercise, doesn't it?

Well, I was tempted earlier to give my opinion on what the point of this particular argument is, but I thought I'd let it go for awhile first. However, I do believe it is important.

I think that experience is a major part of what establishes the self, along with the unique collection of experiences each perspective, or "point," acquires. So I questioned Integral's idea that only wiring determines the individual because I don't think wiring creates the self. It's just what allows information to reach us, decides the neurons we use to think and remember with, etc.

 

[learningphysics]

I am still going to disagree with you. The universe might appear the same on that planet, but it really isn't. That means you here on Earth, and your clone on that planet, have taken in information from two completely different perspectives. Appearing the same doesn't equal actual sameness.

See, I am arguing this because I think a hugely important aspect to individuality is the "point" we each occupy which no one else can.

Well, I was tempted earlier to give my opinion on what the point of this particular argument is, but I thought I'd let it go for awhile first. However, I do believe it is important.

I think that experience is a major part of what establishes the self, along with the unique collection of experiences each perspective, or "point," acquires. So I questioned Integral's idea that only wiring determines the individual because I don't think wiring creates the self. It's just what allows information to reach us, decides the neurons we use to think and remember with, etc.

What if we had a virtual environment... we feed the identically wired brains exactly the same data.

 

[Les Sleeth]

What if we had a virtual environment... we feed the identically wired brains exactly the same data.

At the same time? If so, then they have to be in two different places, which means there is an actual difference in the perspective, even in a virtual environment.

Alternatively, are you going feed the info first to one brain, move the other brain to the exact same spot, and then feed it the exact same info? Okay, you've solved the "point" problem, but by the time you feed info to the second brain the first brain has aged, so they are not identical.

That's why I said earlier that the only way to solve the problem is if time travel is possible (which I don't believe is . . . but that's a whole other can of worms ).

 

[learningphysics]

At the same time? If so, then they have to be in two different places, which means there is an actual difference in the perspective, even in a virtual environment.

Yes, I meant at the same time. Are you saying that the brain is receiving different information due to the sole reason that it's in a different point in space?

 

[Integral]

He means that it is theoretically possible; i.e., there are no laws of physics which prohibit it from happening however unlikely it is to occur. Your requirement for proof could be turned toward your assertion too. That is, prove it is impossible, which of course no one can do.

But, I don't understand why you would say that even if possible, two identically wired brains would create the same "me." Even if we are just a brain, the "me" in there is much more the result of personal experience isn't it? Since even with identical wiring the individual units would walk around in different settings from different perspectives, I can't see how they would have the same "me."

My apologies, I make this sort of post at the end of my day, when my poor brain only wants sleep.


So, given that the human brain consists of approximately $1 x 10^9$ neurons and each neuron can be connected to up to $2 x 10^5$ other neurons, you can come up with an estimate of the possible number of brains using.

$$\frac {n!} {n -m!}$$

Where n is the number of neurons and m is the number of connections. Due to the magnitude of these numbers, most calculators cannot give a meaningful answer. Special methods can be used, perhaps someone will grace us with the number. Given the number of possible brains we then need to assume a rate of generation and compare this time (how long to generate all of them) to the life time of the universe. If the time required exceeds the life time of the universe then it must be considered impossible. If the time required is less then the life time of the universe then it is improbable. I did a brief search for the life of the universe but did not find a usable number, perhaps someone can find that?

I still maintain that if the simple patterns of a finger print are considered unique to an individual. To even consider the possibility of duplication, of the vastly more complex connections and patterns, that from a human brain is ludicrous.

As you imply brain connections are not fixed, they change through out your life. An individual starts with a unique set of connections and every life experience forges new connections. The brain is ever changing and never the same. How could 2 possibly be the same.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Yes, I meant at the same time. Are you saying that the brain is receiving different information due to the sole reason that it's in a different point in space?

Yes. Location is unique, time is unique. Remember, you are claiming that there is NO difference. It doesn't matter how minute or trivial the difference is, any difference whatsoever still constitutes the uniqueness required for individuality.

I say, there is no way to escape this.

 

[Les Sleeth]

My apologies, I make this sort of post at the end of my day, when my poor brain only wants sleep.


So, given that the human brain consists of approximately $1 x 10^9$ neurons and each neuron can be connected to up to $2 x 10^5$ other neurons, you can come up with an estimate of the possible number of brains using.

$$\frac {n!} {n -m!}$$

Where n is the number of neurons and m is the number of connections. Due to the magnitude of these numbers, most calculators cannot give a meaningful answer. Special methods can be used, perhaps some will grace us with the number. Given the number of possible brains we then need to assume a rate of generation and compare this time (how long to generate all of them) to the life time of the universe. If the time required exceeds the life time of the universe then it must be considered impossible. If the time required is less then the life time of the universe then it is improbable. I did a brief search for the life of the universe but did not find a usable number, perhaps someone can find that?

I still maintain that if the simple patterns of a finger print are considered unique to an individual. To even consider the possibility of duplication, of the vastly more complex connections and patterns, that from a human brain is ludicrous.

As you imply brain connections are not fixed, they change through out your life. A individual starts with a unique set of connections and every life experience forges new connections. The brain is ever changing and never the same. How could 2 possibly be the same.

Lol. You are clearly a realist. In the real world, you are correct to assume that it will never happen even if theoretically possible. In philosophy, once something is deemed possible, no matter how unlikely, then that becomes a subject of discussion.

But I still have to challenge your assumption that it is the uniqueness of brain wiring that most determines "me."

If you review your life, can't you trace most of what has established you as an individual to your particular experiences? If you hadn't had children, would you be the same person? If you hadn't (I'm guessing) gone to school, moved to Oregon, gotten married, fought in Viet Nam, had parents that treated you a certain way, slipped on that banana peel and injured yourself for life, been the target of teasing in school, been a great athelete or muscian . . .

So I don't see how brain wiring is even close to having the impact that life experience has on creating individuality.

 

[spicerack]

please see your private message spicerack. an astrological discussion started in this thread is not the focus.

Thanks Kerrie. I read through that thread and decided to post here with a link to it as you are correct in surmising astrology has little relevence within the focus of this thread

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=2294&page=7&pp=15

Free will implies a choice between at least two options. Is a baby aware of the options enough to consciously choose ? It has a latent ability to develop the notion of free will but this ability is present from the time of it's conception.

If as i postulated (in the other thread) a thread of "primordial consciousness(PC)" is fixed in an entity that then becomes it's "template for an identity/personal consciousness(pc)", then it happens at conception and that until a baby learns to exercise the ability to choose of it's own free will, it is operating on instinct and intuition in line with the PC acting as the driver of its physical body until such time as the entity can assume manual control and resign it to a passenger

I'm struggling to think of examples where a baby might exercise it's free will if it doesn't have the ability to use reason and logic to determine its choices.

As you can see I am in favour of pelastration's premise which would suggest a more relevant astrological chart would be developed from the time of conception as opposed to birth. It is the position/state of the universe at the moment a "thread of PC" entered the entity that will become you (pc), that i think has more bearing than the time at which you start to breathe oxygen and separate from your mother.

The latter premise would suggest that until birth a baby has only a shared "personal consciousness" with it's mother and no consciousness of it's own.

However i do not think we have past spiritual memories of previous incarnations but perhaps a memory inherited from antecedent threads of consciousness woven into the primordial consciousness or a strong connection to the primordial consciousness which deteriorates over time by exercising of free will and the feeding back of pc to the PC. This deterioration in effect hardwires our brain to patterns based on logic and reason which many find hard to override.

It appears there is a bit of parapharsing of each other going on in this thread. Strategic dependence on initial conditions present at conception determine the uniqueness and individuality of a template for an identity, which we then customise and adapt using free will and the experiences we choose to let affect us that then becomes the individual we think of as us.

what thinks anybody else ? should i have posted in the other thread instead.

 

[hypnagogue]

Integral, I don't think your objection is germane here. We're concerned here with analyzing a logically possible situation here in order to evaluate a metaphysical claim, which is not uncommon in philosophy. Extremely unlikely events are not logically impossible-- they're just extremely unlikely.

But I still have to challenge your assumption that it is the uniqueness of brain wiring that most determines "me."

If you review your life, can't you trace most of what has established you as an individual to your particular experiences?

This is not really an effective counterargument, since experiences in the world have the effect of changing our brain wiring, and brain wiring/activity has certainly been shown to have a direct impact on thoughts, feelings, and actions.

Look at it this way: suppose it's possible for Bob to go about experiencing things in the world, but that these experiences do not affect the structure of his brain. Is Bob changed or influenced by his experiences in any meaningful long term sense?

 

[Integral]

Lol. You are clearly a realist. In the real world, you are correct to assume that it will never happen even if theoretically possible. In philosophy, once something is deemed possible, no matter how unlikely, then that becomes a subject of discussion.

But I still have to challenge your assumption that it is the uniqueness of brain wiring that most determines "me."

If you review your life, can't you trace most of what has established you as an individual to your particular experiences? If you hadn't had children, would you be the same person? If you hadn't (I'm guessing) gone to school, moved to Oregon, gotten married, fought in Viet Nam, had parents that treated you a certain way, slipped on that banana peel and injured yourself for life, been the target of teasing in school, been a great athelete or muscian . . .

So I don't see how brain wiring is even close to having the impact that life experience has on creating individuality.

Indeed but all of those life experiences are stored in and effect the neural patterns of the brain. It is the wiring of the brain which determines how you react to those experiences. This is really getting close to the "nature vs nurture" arguments. I stand firmly on the fence in that issue.

Since the brain is the processing center and storehouse for all life experience it remains in my mind the definition of the individual. Certainly your life experiences create the neural networks so it is some where between difficult and impossible to separate the two as the source of individuality.

I guess it comes down to the question of, is it the experiences, or the memory of the experiences, which create the individual?

 

[Integral]

Integral, I don't think your objection is germane here. We're concerned here with analyzing a logically possible situation here in order to evaluate a metaphysical claim, which is not uncommon in philosophy. Extremely unlikely events are not logically impossible-- they're just extremely unlikely.



This is not really an effective counterargument, since experiences in the world have the effect of changing our brain wiring, and brain wiring/activity has certainly been shown to have a direct impact on thoughts, feelings, and actions.

Look at it this way: suppose it's possible for Bob to go about experiencing things in the world, but that these experiences do not affect the structure of his brain. Is Bob changed or influenced by his experiences in any meaningful long term sense?

I disagree with this, at least in this case. While it has been many years since I formally studied Philosophy, I do recall that the only real requirement is sound logic. In logic, if any of your premises are invalid, then your conclusions will be unreliable. Even in logical arguments we must allow the existence of impossible. I believe that a common definition of impossible is the one I provided.

Given a working definition of impossible then, it is possible to differentiate between "improbable" ie could occur within the life time of the universe, vs impossible will not occur within the life time of the universe.

 

[Les Sleeth]

This is not really an effective counterargument, since experiences in the world have the effect of changing our brain wiring, and brain wiring/activity has certainly been shown to have a direct impact on thoughts, feelings, and actions.

A few posts ago I acknowledged the role of experience in shaping neural pathways. But I can't see how your counter-counterargument holds water.

The vast majority of neural pathways are established early in life. Long before you reach my age, not only are most all of the neural pathways established, if they are destroyed the brain cannot regenerate them.

Unless you are going to concede that individuality cannot develop after neuronal pathways are in place, then it must be that the individual uses the old pathways to absorb and be developed by new experiences.

Look at it this way: suppose it's possible for Bob to go about experiencing things in the world, but that these experiences do not affect the structure of his brain. Is Bob changed or influenced by his experiences in any meaningful long term sense?

Yes! I can't tell if we agree or disagree. If you say yes, then that's exactly what I was saying. Brain architecture does not reflect every single experiece we've had or been influenced by.

 

[learningphysics]

I disagree with this, at least in this case. While it has been many years since I formally studied Philosophy, I do recall that the only real requirement is sound logic. In logic, if any of your premises are invalid, then your conclusions will be unreliable. Even in logical arguments we must allow the existence of impossible. I believe that a common definition of impossible is the one I provided.

There is a vast difference between impossibility and improbability... even infintesimal improbability.

If I scan a person's brain now... suppose it has configuration A. Now if you asked the question before this person was born... Is it possible for someone to be born with configuration A? According to your reasoning the answer would have to be no right? The probability is 1/(n!/(n-m!)) according to your formula.

It was impossible for a configuration A person to be born... yet it happened. Doesn't seem like a plausible definition of impossible to me.

You can repeat for 2 or more brains... with the probability becoming less and less. Yet these "impossible" configurations or sets of configurations keep happening.

 

[Integral]

There is a vast difference between impossibility and improbability... even infintesimal improbability.

If I scan a person's brain now... suppose it has configuration A. Now if you asked the question before this person was born... Is it possible for someone to be born with configuration A? According to your reasoning the answer would have to be no right? The probability is 1/(n!/(n-m!)) according to your formula.

It was impossible for a configuration A person to be born... yet it happened. Doesn't seem like a plausible definition of impossible to me.

we are talking about duplication aren't we? The odds that a given brain will have SOME set of neural connections is very nearly unity. I would put it at less then 1 because it is possible that a given pattern will not sustain life, therefor is nonviable. So a brain WILL have a pattern, just what that pattern IS, is what is impossible to predict or duplicate.

 

[learningphysics]

we are talking about duplication aren't we? The odds that a given brain will have SOME set of neural connections is very nearly unity.

Yes.

I would put it at less then 1 because it is possible that a given pattern will not sustain life, therefor is nonviable. So a brain WILL have a pattern, just what that pattern IS, is what is impossible to predict or duplicate.

Would you say it is reasonable to assume that any configuration is equally probable (when a person is born let's say)? Is the probability of a particular configuration dependent on whether or not somebody else has the same configuration?

What I'm getting at is... suppose we have two humans being born and we're seeing the probability of neural configurations. Clearly the probability that both of the brains have some neural configuration is 1 (or very close to 1).

If you say that config A followed by config A is impossible... then wouldn't you have to say the same for config B followed by config A (if not, please explain why)... and so on for any two possible configurations? If you insist one sequence such as A, A is impossible, then the rest are also impossible leading to the conclusion that it is impossible for both brains to have some neural configuration. Which contradicts the fact that the probability that both brains have some neural configuration is 1.

 

[hypnagogue]

I disagree with this, at least in this case. While it has been many years since I formally studied Philosophy, I do recall that the only real requirement is sound logic. In logic, if any of your premises are invalid, then your conclusions will be unreliable. Even in logical arguments we must allow the existence of impossible. I believe that a common definition of impossible is the one I provided.

Given a working definition of impossible then, it is possible to differentiate between "improbable" ie could occur within the life time of the universe, vs impossible will not occur within the life time of the universe.

To say that something is impossible in this context would mean that either 1) the laws of logic or 2) the laws of physics prevent it from occurring, even in principle. I think it's clear that neither of these conditions hold; there is no logical contradiction in assuming that two identical brains could exist, and nor would any physical laws be violated by such an occurrence (assuming that location in spacetime is not a condition of identicalness). Certainly, in practice, the likelihood of two identical brains existing is vanishingly small, but that's irrelevant for our purposes; all we need is an in principle possibility.

From a slightly different angle: Your argument would have a lot more bite if were wondering about the possibility of two identical brains actually existing. But we're not. We're supposing that two identical brains exist, in order to evaluate a claim about identity. What is important in this evaluation is what we could say if two identical brains were to exist, not whether two identical brains are likely to exist in actuality.

 

[Paul Martin]

If this premise is true, then all animal behavior would be identical with the behavior of complex robots or automatons.

I understand your overall point Paul, but what you say above doesn't seem right.

Let's just take two robots who each have identical AI brains and sensory apparatus, and both retain what they experience exactly the same way so a personal history is built up for each. What they experience is dependent on the receipt of information, but it is impossible for both to receive the same information. Reality is incessantly changing, and so the information available from it is also different from one moment to the next. Also, they cannot both occupy the same space and therefore simultaneously experience from the same perspective.

So, each is going to retain a different collection of information even if they process, interpret, respond, etc. to identical information exactly the same.

I think what I said above doesn't seem right because I wrote it badly. 'Identical' was a bad choice of word. I should have said "If this premise is true, then all animal behavior would look just like the behavior of complex robots or automatons."

My point was that there is a characteristically different look to the behavior of robots and the behavior of conscious animals. IMHO, no matter how much robotic technology improves, this difference will still be discernable. I think the only way to make a robot appear to be conscious is to equip it with a two-way communication link so that a conscious operator could be aware of the robot's environment via the robot's sensors, and that the conscious operator could control the robot's movements remotely. As you probably know by now, that's how I think all animals operate and why they appear to be conscious.

I totally agree with you that no two robots could behave identically for the reasons you gave. But I maintain that they will still act like robots.

Paul

 

[hypnagogue]

The vast majority of neural pathways are established early in life. Long before you reach my age, not only are most all of the neural pathways established, if they are destroyed the brain cannot regenerate them.

Learning and the formation of long term memories are subserved by changes in neural architecture.

It was once believed that as we aged, the brain’s networks became fixed. In the past two decades, however, an enormous amount of research has revealed that the brain never stops changing and adjusting. Learning, as defined by Tortora and Grabowski (1996), is “the ability to acquire new knowledge or skills through instruction or experience. Memory is the process by which that knowledge is retained over time.” The capacity of the brain to change with learning is plasticity. So how does the brain change with learning? According to Durbach (2000), there appear to be at least two types of modifications that occur in the brain with learning:

1. A change in the internal structure of the neurons, the most notable being in the area of synapses.
2. An increase in the number of synapses between neurons.

Initially, newly learned data are "stored" in short-term memory, which is a temporary ability to recall a few pieces of information. Some evidence supports the concept that short-term memory depends upon electrical and chemical events in the brain as opposed to structural changes such as the formation of new synapses. One theory of short-term memory states that memories may be caused by “reverberating” neuronal circuits -- that is, an incoming nerve impulse stimulates the first neuron which stimulates the second, and so on, with branches from the second neuron synapsing with the first. After a period of time, information may be moved into a more permanent type of memory, long-term memory, which is the result of anatomical or biochemical changes that occur in the brain (Tortora and Grabowski, 1996).

Additionally, it is not the case that brain damage implies permanent loss of function. If a certain function is lost to brain damage, in certain cases, other neurons can reorganize their structure so as to reproduce the old function.

During brain repair following injury, plastic changes are geared towards maximizing function in spite of the damaged brain. In studies involving rats in which one area of the brain was damaged, brain cells surrounding the damaged area underwent changes in their function and shape that allowed them to take on the functions of the damaged cells. Although this phenomenon has not been widely studied in humans, data indicate that similar (though less effective) changes occur in human brains following injury.

http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/plast.html

Yes! I can't tell if we agree or disagree. If you say yes, then that's exactly what I was saying. Brain architecture does not reflect every single experiece we've had or been influenced by.

I disagree completely, actually. Bob could have short term memories, but he could never learn any new skills or form long term memories. Those are changes that result from change in the actual neural architecture.

 

[Les Sleeth]

. . . it is not the case that brain damage implies permanent loss of function. If a certain function is lost to brain damage, in certain cases, other neurons can reorganize their structure so as to reproduce the old function.

Why are you saying I implied that? I never suggested any such thing. I am not claiming the brain can't develop new neuronal pathways at any age, and that it can't adjust to damage.

I disagree completely, actually. Bob could have short term memories, but he could never learn any new skills or form long term memories. Those are changes that result from change in the actual neural architecture.

Did you site this ". . . an enormous amount of research has revealed that the brain never stops changing and adjusting" to suggest that every, single, individual bit of learning we do is accompanied by some brain development? If that is so, I would love to see the study that proves that.

Personally, I believe I learn certain things that are brain independent, and which the brain cannot possibly develop anything to help with. And given your claim that consciousness is not purely physical, it would seem you believe that too.

In any case, I didn't say the brain stops changing. You seem to be equating memory with the development of individuality. All I've claimed is that experience develops individuality, and that that development is not totally dependent on new neuronal pathways.

And it isn't so that Bob can't learn new skills. Studies have shown that someone who has lost short term memory will forget the specifics of a piano lesson shortly after being taught. But over time, they seem to play tunes without the slightest idea of how they learned them.

 

[hypnagogue]

Did you site this ". . . an enormous amount of research has revealed that the brain never stops changing and adjusting" to suggest that every, single, individual bit of learning we do is accompanied by some brain development? If that is so, I would love to see the study that proves that.

It would be practically impossible to prove something like that conclusively even for a single person; you'd have to keep track of the structure of every single neuron in that person's brain over the course of his lifetime. Still, it seems to me overwhelmingly likely that that is how all learning and memory works. If an instance of learning does not result in a change in neural architecture-- i.e., if its effect is not somehow physically stored-- how could it go on to have discernible effects down the road? The only metaphysics in which such a thing is even comprehensible is interactionist dualism, which IMO is not a terribly appealing worldview.

Personally, I believe I learn certain things that are brain independent, and which the brain cannot possibly develop anything to help with. And given your claim that consciousness is not purely physical, it would seem you believe that too.

Not at all! Following Chalmers, I believe physicalism cannot crack the hard problem, but it does just fine with the 'easy' problems. Learning and memory are among the easy problems-- they are just functional entities, and so are amenable to the kind of structural/functional account physicalism can provide.

In fact, according to the view I currently favor, there is nothing more to the mind than the brain; the trick is that the physical account of the brain is not a complete account. What is missing is the intrinsic basis of the extrinsic phenomena described by the physical account, and subjective experience fills in as that intrinsic basis. This view covers up for the failure of physics to entail subjective experience, but it honors the physical account as telling the complete structural/functional story; furthermore, since subjective experience performs the role of underpinning extrinsic phenomena, it is not causally irrelevant and so epiphenomenalism is avoided as well.

In any case, I didn't say the brain stops changing. You seem to be equating memory with the development of individuality. All I've claimed is that experience develops individuality, and that that development is not totally dependent on new neuronal pathways.

Learned skills and long term memories are underpinned by neural processes; long term changes and developments through these faculties are accompanied by long term changes in the accompanying neural architecture. I don't know exactly what you mean by individuality, but I find it likely that for whatever aspect you could name, the same general sort of story would hold.

For instance, it's been well established that personality is underpinned by neural processes in cortex. It's been shown that damage to cortex can drastically change one's personality; considering this and the facts about learning and memory, it's a small step to believe that more benign long term changes in personality are also reflected in long term changes in neural architecture (in this case, somewhere in the cortex).

And it isn't so that Bob can't learn new skills. Studies have shown that someone who has lost short term memory will forget the specifics of a piano lesson shortly after being taught. But over time, they seem to play tunes without the slightest idea of how they learned them.

That's not a counterexample. I don't know the extent to which they've studied these subjects, but almost certainly their learning of new skills has been accompanied by changes in their neural architecture. That they have no short term memory does not at all imply that their brains are no longer plastic. Bob, by definition, cannot have anything about the structure of his brain change.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think the only way to make a robot appear to be conscious is to equip it with a two-way communication link so that a . . . conscious operator could control the robot's movements remotely.

I would just add that people can behave completely from programming (conditioning) and appear like robots. I think a lot of what persuades physicalists is observing that.

But I also see that people can escape that, which so far a robot is utterly incapable of. I don't think the effort to say everything we do is mechanistically/genetically/conditionedly determined comes from an unbiased comprehensive look at all humanity.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It would be practically impossible to prove something like that conclusively even for a single person; you'd have to keep track of the structure of every single neuron in that person's brain over the course of his lifetime.

That's correct. So it is premature to claim anyone knows what goes on there.

Still, it seems to me overwhelmingly likely that that is how all learning and memory works.

Overwhelmingly? It seems likely to those who already are committed to some stance. If one looks only at carefully selected facts, then one can create "overwhelmingness" rather facilely.

If an instance of learning does not result in a change in neural architecture-- i.e., if its effect is not somehow physically stored-- how could it go on to have discernible effects down the road?

It's not that hard to hypothesize an alternative. I can't see why you are suggesting that's the only conclusion one must come to. If we are not 100% brain dependent, for instance, then learning could get through to the inner being. IF you first assume total brain dependencey, THEN you must conclude all facts support that a priori belief.

For instance, it's been well established that personality is underpinned by neural processes in cortex. It's been shown that damage to cortex can drastically change one's personality; considering this and the facts about learning and memory, it's a small step to believe that more benign long term changes in personality are also reflected in long term changes in neural architecture (in this case, somewhere in the cortex).

Another explanation is that we are "general" consciousness before we enter biology, and so individually unconscious when we enter into biology. The CSN individuates us, it compartmentalizes consciousness skills, provides computing skills, etc. Because we are so dependent on it for individuation, any and all manipulation of the brain sends us in some direction. But it doesn't mean that once we are free from the brain we've not learned anything, and that we cease to exist as consciousness.

The only metaphysics in which such a thing is even comprehensible is interactionist dualism, which IMO is not a terribly appealing worldview.

Nonsense. Check out my monism thread. No dualism is necessary.

Not at all! Following Chalmers, I believe physicalism cannot crack the hard problem, but it does just fine with the 'easy' problems. Learning and memory are among the easy problems-- they are just functional entities, and so are amenable to the kind of structural/functional account physicalism can provide.

That's your opinion, which I respect, but it is nothing more than an opinion. Some aspects of memory are quite easy to explain, but other's seem to defy brain physiology.

In fact, according to the view I currently favor, there is nothing more to the mind than the brain; the trick is that the physical account of the brain is not a complete account.

We must disagree. But I hope you aren't going to insist that I line up behind what you "currently favor." Nobody understands what consciousness is.

I don't know the extent to which they've studied these subjects, but almost certainly their learning of new skills has been accompanied by changes in their neural architecture.

First "overwhelmingly, and now "most certainly"? How do you know that when no one else does? Seems like hyperbole to me.

I don't know exactly what you mean by individuality, but I find it likely that for whatever aspect you could name, the same general sort of story would hold.

Well, let me be blunt. I have information you don't have, you can't get it until you investigate consciousness as I have, and that means you are modeling without that information. Maybe I am deluded, but I've spent 30 plus years trying to master the approach, so you aren't going to convince me there is nothing to it too easily.

Don't you think it might be best if we just each work on our respective models and not try to fight about it (since we can't agree)? I don't like your model, I don't like the rationalist approach you favor, I don't think Chalmers or Rosenberg know the slightest thing about consciousness . . . but I respect all y'all's right to try to make your case.

 

[hypnagogue]

Overwhelmingly? It seems likely to those who already are committed to some stance. If one looks only at carefully selected facts, then one can create "overwhelmingness" rather facilely.

Given what we know about the principles upon which the brain works, as well as physics and information theory, we arrive at a compelling picture that memory and learning are completely subserved by neural architecture. There is certainly not any in-principle difficulties with such a stance. There are blanks to be filled in, of course, but I think you're being more of a skeptic than is warranted. For instance: how do we know that every part of every person's body is composed of cells? Maybe in some people, in some parts of the body, there are small blobs of gelatin in place of small clusters of cells. We don't have enough information to disprove that hypothesis conclusively, but do you really give it much credence?

Another explanation is that we are "general" consciousness before we enter biology, and so individually unconscious when we enter into biology. The CSN individuates us, it compartmentalizes consciousness skills, provides computing skills, etc. Because we are so dependent on it for individuation, any and all manipulation of the brain sends us in some direction. But it doesn't mean that once we are free from the brain we've not learned anything, and that we cease to exist as consciousness.

So what happens in the case where brain damage wipes out a person's memories or ability to perform a skill? Their damaged brain makes them act as if they've forgotten, but really on some super-physical level somewhere the skill/memory is retained? I don't see the motivation for such an incredible view.

That's your opinion, which I respect, but it is nothing more than an opinion. Some aspects of memory are quite easy to explain, but other's seem to defy brain physiology.

Such as what? What aspect of memory, modulo subjective experience of it, fundamentally eludes an explanation given in terms of neural structure and function?

We must disagree. But I hope you aren't going to insist that I line up behind what you "currently favor." Nobody understands what consciousness is.

I hope that's not what you really think I'm getting at. I was explaining my view, in my response to your speculation about what my view must be.

First "overwhelmingly, and now "most certainly"? How do you know that when no one else does? Seems like hyperbole to me.

Why would long term learning of skills function any differently for a person who has no short term memory? Admittedly, the specific mechanisms might be different, but really, given that it's well-established that normal people learn by means of having their neuarl architecture reshaped, why would it be any different for a person without short term memory? Your skepticism here is unreasonable.

Well, let me be blunt. I have information you don't have, you can't get it until you investigate consciousness as I have, and that means you are modeling without that information. Maybe I am deluded, but I've spent 30 plus years trying to master the approach, so you aren't going to convince me there is nothing to it too easily.

To be equally blunt, although I respect and value your first-person approach, I don't see how anything you could have experienced would really justify the kind of claims you're making here. Does introspection allow you to know which neurons change in response to which stimuli and which don't? If not, you have insufficient grounds for your claim. We can't keep track of every neuron for every person for every event, but in the cases where we have looked, we've seen learning accompanied by change in neural architecture. Have you ever looked at the objective activity of your own neurons?

 

[Integral]

hypnagogue,
I am sorry but your desire to completely separate your "philosophical" rambling from the physical world has lead you down a path to no where. You must remember that the brain and the human body are biological systems completely determined by the laws of Physics. While you can claim that there is no physical reason no 2 brains are the same, it does not make it so. I believe that you will have better luck coming up with sound physics explaining why they CANNOT be duplicated (dare I say non linear dynamical system AND Heisenberg?) then finding any physical evidence that the can be. So you must validate your claims. You must keep in mind that we are discussing physical systems. As much as you would like, you are NOT free to make any claim no matter how outrageous to prove a point.

The fact is, while we really do not understand consciousness or the reason for life, we do understand the processes which sustain life and great deal about the function of the brain. To deny that it is the seat of our ability to think, remember and reason, indeed the seat of our personality is simply arguing for the sake of argument while denying the results of several centuries of the accumulated knowledge of mankind.

 

[hypnagogue]

hypnagogue,
I am sorry but your desire to completely separate your "philosophical" rambling from the physical world has lead you down a path to no where. You must remember that the brain and the human body are biological systems completely determined by the laws of Physics. While you can claim that there is no physical reason no 2 brains are the same, it does not make it so. I believe that you will have better luck coming up with sound physics explaining why they CANNOT be duplicated (dare I say non linear dynamical system AND Heisenberg?) then finding any physical evidence that the can be. So you must validate your claims. You must keep in mind that we are discussing physical systems. As much as you would like, you are NOT free to make any claim no matter how outrageous to prove a point.

Again, I'm not claiming that we'd ever have two identical brains, even for the entire lifespan of the universe. But that's irrelevant to the argument. Consider this claim: "If I ever saw a giant pink unicorn with tentacles coming out of its eyeballs, I would be shocked and frightened." That conditional statement, I think, is undoubtedly true, even if something like a giant pink unicorn with tentacles coming out of its eyeballs never existed for the duration of the life of the universe. Claims like "If two people had identical brains, they would be identical people" or "If two people had identical brains, they would not be identical people" are of the same status. They help us get a grasp on what we mean by identical; whether or not two identical brains could ever exist is besides the point.

The fact is, while we really do not understand consciousness or the reason for life, we do understand the processes which sustain life and great deal about the function of the brain. To deny that it is the seat of our ability to think, remember and reason, indeed the seat of our personality is simply arguing for the sake of argument while denying the results of several centuries of the accumulated knowledge of mankind.

Nowhere have I denied that the brain is the seat of thought, memory, and reason; in fact, I agree with that statement.

 

[Kerrie]

what thinks anybody else ? should i have posted in the other thread instead.

if you want to continue this discussion, you will need to start a new thread. judging by the way it is headed (which i think is very productive at this point), it will be necessary to move your discussions to a new topic. this is my last reply to you.

 

[Tournesol]

It [ exactly duplicating a human brain is] not impossible -- there's no law against it -- just very unlikely.

Please prove this statement.

#

Prove a negative ? Surely it is for you to specify the law of phyisics that prevents there being two identical material structures. (Bearing in mind that as far as science is concerned any two ground-sate hydrogen atoms are identical, etc, etc)

 

[Tournesol]

But, I don't understand why you would say that even if possible, two identically wired brains would create the same "me." Even if we are just a brain, the "me" in there is much more the result of personal experience isn't it? Since even with identical wiring the individual units would walk around in different settings from different perspectives, I can't see how they would have the same "me."

An identical duplicate of you would almost certainly start to diverge from
the original you from the moment of creation, but that doesn't mean it wasn't identical at the moment of creation.

 

[Tournesol]

Let's just take two robots who each have identical AI brains and sensory apparatus, and both retain what they experience exactly the same way so a personal history is built up for each. What they experience is dependent on the receipt of information, but it is impossible for both to receive the same information.

This too is merely highly unlikely. Science-fictionally a mad scientist could
duplicate the real you, and place the duplicate in a duplicated environment
(al la "Truman show").

(And if he universe is infinite, that has already happened!)

 

[Tournesol]

What if we had a virtual environment... we feed the identically wired brains exactly the same data.

At the same time? If so, then they have to be in two different places, which means there is an actual difference in the perspective, even in a virtual environment.

.

There aren't going to be differences which are noticeable to the brains in
question, since all they have to go on is their artificial data feed.