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dubina
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I believe this question is grounded in math. It will seem more a psychometric question at first.
A person has a particular experience. It creates a subjective impression, but it could also be described in terms of attributes. Attributes might include "danger", "speed", "beauty", "comfort", "happiness", "admiration" and so on...semantic terms applicable to the experience. Attributes might have semantic or numeric values: eg. "speed" might be "40 miles per hour". Thus, the real experience could be characterized in terms of its abstract attributes and attribute values. (The fitness of the selected attributes and their values to describe the real exerience is not an issue here.)
Later, the person would have another experience. It would similar in some ways to the first experience, but different: some different attributes, some of the same attributes, some different attribute values for shared attributes, and so on. Even so, the second experience would immediatly remind the person of the first experience.
Now suppose the two relatively comparable experiences are described to an observer in literal terms rather than by direct personal experience. Furthrmore, the observer does not receive the two descriptions together in time, and his choice for association would be confused by other literal experiences, each of which would have more cognitive distance in their attributes and attribute values than the first two experiences described above. In theory, the second experience should still remind the observer of the first experience, but the observer's choice would now be more difficult due to multiple instances and random order of acquisition.
This exercise to be reminded of one thing by another would be similar to a WAIS Simlarities subtest question: eg. "How is an apple like a pear?" but more elaborate, testing for deep insight and pattern recognition abilites as much as for similarities and differences. I am trying to associate the problem of how one thing reminds a person of something else to the most fitting field / topic in math or some adjacent field. I think the foregoing example of pattern comparison and recognition might have something to do with categorical classifiers and algorithms that find regularities in data. I am not a mathematician, so I am seeking judgment and advice.
Thanks,
******
I found the following to further elucidate my question: If an observer's association of one thing to another is an example of insight, it can be explained to some extent in terms of layered processing units.
Creative Insight: The Redistribution Theory
For the purpose of explaining insight, the key point is that the subjective experience of seeing an object or a situation is the result of a number of rapid and unconscious but nevertheless real choices, constrained and biased by the prior experience encoded in the relative strengths and activation levels of the vertical and horizontal links. The existence of an outgoing link from processing unit U in layer N to unit W in layer N+1, the activation of that link, the activation of excitatory and inhibitory links within a layer and the activations of the feedback links from higher to lower levels are determined by prior experience as well as by current perceptual input. The biases residing in the relative strengths and activation levels jointly produce the visual system’s best guess as to the nature of the perceived situation. The final percept – the working memory content – is a projection of prior experience onto the situation at hand.
Stellan Ohlsson (Deep Learning: How the Mind Overrides Experience, 2011-01-31)
A person has a particular experience. It creates a subjective impression, but it could also be described in terms of attributes. Attributes might include "danger", "speed", "beauty", "comfort", "happiness", "admiration" and so on...semantic terms applicable to the experience. Attributes might have semantic or numeric values: eg. "speed" might be "40 miles per hour". Thus, the real experience could be characterized in terms of its abstract attributes and attribute values. (The fitness of the selected attributes and their values to describe the real exerience is not an issue here.)
Later, the person would have another experience. It would similar in some ways to the first experience, but different: some different attributes, some of the same attributes, some different attribute values for shared attributes, and so on. Even so, the second experience would immediatly remind the person of the first experience.
Now suppose the two relatively comparable experiences are described to an observer in literal terms rather than by direct personal experience. Furthrmore, the observer does not receive the two descriptions together in time, and his choice for association would be confused by other literal experiences, each of which would have more cognitive distance in their attributes and attribute values than the first two experiences described above. In theory, the second experience should still remind the observer of the first experience, but the observer's choice would now be more difficult due to multiple instances and random order of acquisition.
This exercise to be reminded of one thing by another would be similar to a WAIS Simlarities subtest question: eg. "How is an apple like a pear?" but more elaborate, testing for deep insight and pattern recognition abilites as much as for similarities and differences. I am trying to associate the problem of how one thing reminds a person of something else to the most fitting field / topic in math or some adjacent field. I think the foregoing example of pattern comparison and recognition might have something to do with categorical classifiers and algorithms that find regularities in data. I am not a mathematician, so I am seeking judgment and advice.
Thanks,
******
I found the following to further elucidate my question: If an observer's association of one thing to another is an example of insight, it can be explained to some extent in terms of layered processing units.
Creative Insight: The Redistribution Theory
For the purpose of explaining insight, the key point is that the subjective experience of seeing an object or a situation is the result of a number of rapid and unconscious but nevertheless real choices, constrained and biased by the prior experience encoded in the relative strengths and activation levels of the vertical and horizontal links. The existence of an outgoing link from processing unit U in layer N to unit W in layer N+1, the activation of that link, the activation of excitatory and inhibitory links within a layer and the activations of the feedback links from higher to lower levels are determined by prior experience as well as by current perceptual input. The biases residing in the relative strengths and activation levels jointly produce the visual system’s best guess as to the nature of the perceived situation. The final percept – the working memory content – is a projection of prior experience onto the situation at hand.
Stellan Ohlsson (Deep Learning: How the Mind Overrides Experience, 2011-01-31)
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