How can brain activity precede conscious intent?

[StatusX]

I thought that should be simple enough. The conscious mind can perfectly have power over matter if the mind is also made of matter, just like a 150 lb. driver can impose his will on a 40 ton truck.

All atoms have equal standing. We only say the man is driving the truck because we know the particular arrangement of atoms in that man allow him to do complicated, intelligent tasks like drive, but the atoms themselves are nothing special.

My position is that concepts only have meaning if both the concept and its opposite exist, not only as concepts but also as real entities. For instance, the concept "man" is only meaningful because it is the opposite of "woman". If every human being were described as "man", we would have no way to know what "woman" means, even if we defined it as "the opposite of man". Such a definition is meaningless if it has no counterpart in reality.

If we can imagine a concept, it is valid. Why place unnecesary restrictions on our thought?

The opposite of freedom is constraint, and it is wrong to argue that either "freedom" or "constraint" can be meaningful if its opposite doesn't exist. That is, if the universe is all deterministic, then the concept of determinism is meaningless. Likewise for freedom. As such, out of logical necessity both freedom and constraint must be real in order to be meaningful. This is a very powerful line of reasoning as it allows us to know for sure that both freedom and constraint can be found in reality, and the only task left is to find out exactly what the two concepts mean.

I don't know about powerful. Maybe a better word would be "useless". Determinism and freedom are both meaningful concepts, and the question of which one accurately describes the universe is a valid one. I can't imagine what you mean by both concepts being "real" in any stronger sense then as abstract tools to help us describe reality. In that sense, every concept is real. Do you think numbers exist? Obviously they do, because I'm talking about them right now. " ...if the universe is all deterministic, then the concept of determinism is meaningless" Do you really believe that way of looking at things is helpful?

 

[StatusX]

I mean, if there is an inherent selection mechanism, why wouldn't there be an equally inherent mechanism to be able to bend the rules slightly by behaving randomly (by design or by error), which would normally lead to destruction but occasionally isn't, and keep any bonus find (serendipity)?

What makes you think the rules are being bent? If you can point out a case where the laws of physics aren't being followed exactly, you should publish it.

If you look at scientific progress, there are oodles of instances where the final product is (at least) as much a result of random trial and error as intentional design.

I find most people tend to forget that memory is a very strong tool against repetition, too. Both in the sense of being able to remember errors and good practice, but also in the sense that by starting with a clean slate, as every human has to do up to a point, gives the opportunity for novelty.

I'm not saying randomness can't contribute to progress, or creativity, or intelligence. I'm saying it can't open the door to free will.

 

[plover]

If everything is atoms, then "we" are also atoms. Why is it that some atoms cannot be in control of other atoms? And if the behaviour of atoms is not deterministic, what's wrong in saying atoms have free-will?

I don't know what you mean by some atoms not being in control of others.

The conscious mind can perfectly have power over matter if the mind is also made of matter, just like a 150 lb. driver can impose his will on a 40 ton truck.

How is this not begging the question? Okay, so by performing the requisite "driving actions", the atoms in the driver act on the mechanism of the truck to make it stay on the road, and by the requisite electrochemical impulses, the atoms of the driver's brain act on the mechanism of the driver's body to produce the aforementioned "driving actions". These electrochemical impulses are the result of ordinary thermodynamic motions among molecules in a complex biological system constructed without conscious intervention. So where is consciousness or "will" in any of this? You appear to be simply defining them into place—perhaps to correspond with some perceptual experience. Your construction hinges on the meaning of the phrase "in control of", but as far as it goes, there doesn't appear to be any way to distinguish a driver "in control of" a truck and a star "in control of" the bodies which orbit it.

I'm not arguing here in favor of a deterministic view; I'm just noting that your argument, as presented, does not appear to introduce consciousness or "will" as anything more than an a priori conviction.

I mean, if there is an inherent selection mechanism, why wouldn't there be an equally inherent mechanism to be able to bend the rules slightly by behaving randomly (by design or by error), which would normally lead to destruction but occasionally isn't, and keep any bonus find (serendipity)?

While this introduces consciousness as the result of a selection process, i.e. provides a role for consciousness, I don't see how it really does any more than the previous construction to provide a meaningful way to distinguish being "in control" from a deterministic process.

My position is that concepts only have meaning if both the concept and its opposite exist, not only as concepts but also as real entities.

Well, concepts, of necessity, are defined relationally, i.e. a given concept is what it is only because it is not a whole bunch of other concepts. But trying to work out this kind of idea based on some idea of "opposites" seems absurd. What's the "opposite" of the Pythagorean theorem? Does one arrive at better sense of the idea of "love" by knowing it is the "opposite" of "hate", or by knowing the distinctions between "love", "affection", "adoration" and "admiration"? Also, what do you mean when you distinguish between "concepts" and "real entities"? I'm not saying there's no difference, but without a definition that's more specific than whatever intuitive sense of that distinction a given person brings to the discussion, there's no way to know just how your construction is supposed to operate on things like e.g. love or the Pythagorean theorem.

This is also why I criticize Doctordick's attempt to deny the reality of causality.

I can only assume that you are referring to Doctordick's statement that "it is a very important aspect of Einstein's theory that this reordering does not ever violate the issue of causality". If so, you either misread or do not understand his point. What Doctordick is referring to here is that it is integral to Relativity Theory that events which (whether or not they actually are) could be causally related (which to a physicist means: in sufficient spacetime proximity that a lightspeed signal could travel from one to the other) are not seen out of order by observers in any frame of reference. Relativity theory in no sense whatsoever denies the "reality of causality". However, it is only events which can not affect each other for which the reference frame affects the order in which they are observed.

 

[loseyourname]

You know, we're getting into Hume territory here. We're being presented with two options in this thread: (1) The universe is deterministic and, given the initial state of being that we had, no event that occurs could have occurred differently. (2) The universe is not deterministic. Some events are utterly random and cannot be completely entailed by past events.

How exactly does either of these options leave room for free will? If we accept (1), then we are saying every action we take is the determined result of past events and so we are not free to act otherwise. If we accept (2), then we are saying that some of our actions might be the result of no cause whatsoever. In some sense, I suppose these actions can be called free, but can they really be called willed events? How can you be said to be in control of a completely random event?

 

[selfAdjoint]

You know, we're getting into Hume territory here. We're being presented with two options in this thread: (1) The universe is deterministic and, given the initial state of being that we had, no event that occurs could have occurred differently. (2) The universe is not deterministic. Some events are utterly random and cannot be completely entailed by past events.

How exactly does either of these options leave room for free will? If we accept (1), then we are saying every action we take is the determined result of past events and so we are not free to act otherwise. If we accept (2), then we are saying that some of our actions might be the result of no cause whatsoever. In some sense, I suppose these actions can be called free, but can they really be called willed events? How can you be said to be in control of a completely random event?

Well exactly. That's why there's so much fuss about these results! If they hold up, it's hard to see any reasonable way for free will to be saved. Compatabilism, including the involuted form that Dennett was plugging in Freedom Evolves seems to be the only way to save Truth, Justice, and the American Way.

 

[lyapunov]

[1] What makes you think the rules are being bent? If you can point out a case where the laws of physics aren't being followed exactly, you should publish it.

[2] I'm not saying randomness can't contribute to progress, or creativity, or intelligence. I'm saying it can't open the door to free will.

[1] Bent in the sense that if you keep the normal downward flow of entropy in mind, life has quite a distinct knack of trying to violate that trend. I also acknowledge that on a larger scale the 2nd law does not get violated, I'm not trying to go outside physics here in any way, but you will have to grant that there is a difference between just going with the flow and going against it.

[2] Ah, but if one extreme is not likely, how about the other end? Would you say on the contrary that everything is predetermined to the last iota? That would imply quite a few hard nuts to crack too, in my opinion.

 

[lyapunov]

While this introduces consciousness as the result of a selection process, i.e. provides a role for consciousness, I don't see how it really does any more than the previous construction to provide a meaningful way to distinguish being "in control" from a deterministic process.

They once performed an experiment on our close cousins, the chimpanzee, where they gave shocks to the animal with timed intervals. The animal developed stress syndrome with ulcers etc pretty quickly.

Then they gave the next batch a button to call this shock upon themselves, which hurt equally, but was by their own hand. If they failed to press the button, they would still get the 'normal' timed shock, so no cheating there.

Amazingly, the chimps that could decide to press the button, never developed such extreme stress syndrome with ulcers and all.

So what is control, indeed. It apparently can make a great deal of difference, but how to measure its existence, or degree...

 

[Tournesol]

As the links make clear, Libet's own defense of free will is that the individual can "veto" the brain's action after it has begun and before the actual physical action begins. This seems to me as much sheer desperate invocation of magic as every other explanation of strong free will.

Libet's "free-won't" is not a purely theoretical posit, it is based on evidence
where readiness potentials occur, but actions do not. You are also
overlooking objections based on timing (as given by Dennett in Freedom Evolves), and making the "no tactical input, therefore no strategic input"
assumption. (Even if conscious thought is not involved in momen-by-monment
decision making,it could still set the 'policy' by which unconscious reflexes
happen. Bosses are still said to run their companies, even though they
often do not know about the decisions of their subordinates until after
they have happenned).

 

[StatusX]

[1] Bent in the sense that if you keep the normal downward flow of entropy in mind, life has quite a distinct knack of trying to violate that trend. I also acknowledge that on a larger scale the 2nd law does not get violated, I'm not trying to go outside physics here in any way, but you will have to grant that there is a difference between just going with the flow and going against it.

The second law of thermodynamics isn't a law at all, but a statistical trend. Every single interaction in a living thing obeys the laws of physics, and as you noted yourself, the second law is not violated if you include its waste. You seem to think the laws of physics are like civil laws, and the atoms mainly follow them but sometimes get a little rebellious. They are always followed.

[2] Ah, but if one extreme is not likely, how about the other end? Would you say on the contrary that everything is predetermined to the last iota? That would imply quite a few hard nuts to crack too, in my opinion.

Quantum uncertainty puts an inherent limit on how well we can predict the future, so no, not everything is predetermined. But I don't see your point. What extreme?

 

[Tournesol]

If everything is atoms, then "we" are also atoms. Why is it that some atoms cannot be in control of other atoms? And if the behaviour of atoms is not deterministic, what's wrong in saying atoms have free-will?

Probably because FW needs to be distinguished from mere randomness--
it must include things like being able to rationally count for your actions.
The question is whether a complex system like the brain can utilise
randomness to obtain "elbow-room" (the ability to have done otherwise)
without sacrificing rationallity. Given the limits on de-facto rationallity,
Ithink the answer is yes.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Libet's "free-won't" is not a purely theoretical posit, it is based on evidence
where readiness potentials occur, but actions do not. You are also
overlooking objections based on timing (as given by Dennett in Freedom Evolves), and making the "no tactical input, therefore no strategic input"
assumption. (Even if conscious thought is not involved in momen-by-monment
decision making,it could still set the 'policy' by which unconscious reflexes
happen. Bosses are still said to run their companies, even though they
often do not know about the decisions of their subordinates until after
they have happenned).

Yes, Dennett says things like that in Freedom Evolves too, but I am not persuaded. Bosses cannot foresee everything, nor can consciousnesses. Did I issue my general ukase yesterday that I should be hitting these keys today? Or when? Strategy without tactics and "boots on the ground" is just gas.

 

[lyapunov]

[1] The second law of thermodynamics isn't a law at all, but a statistical trend. Every single interaction in a living thing obeys the laws of physics, and as you noted yourself, the second law is not violated if you include its waste. You seem to think the laws of physics are like civil laws, and the atoms mainly follow them but sometimes get a little rebellious. They are always followed.



[2] Quantum uncertainty puts an inherent limit on how well we can predict the future, so no, not everything is predetermined. But I don't see your point. What extreme?

Oh, I see that. I'm a true believer in physics fascism vs. democracy.

Seriously, if it is a statistical trend, we still try to go against the stream, I hope you will grant me *that*, at least. We'll do anything to try and prevent its effects, high and low. Now why would that be?

[2] The extremes of Free Will and Total Predetermination. I seriously think that if you are consequent about determinism, and see no role for Free Will, you should not accept (even temporarily) the uncertainties of Quantum Mechanics. That would be just a lack of knowledge, for now. Free Will can only be ruled out if the opposite reigns supreme.

Otherwise you would create a kind of region where Blind Fate would rule, and I think that would be equally unacceptable as a solid scientific concept as Free Will is now.

Some people say it straight-up: randomness, even quantum, does not really exist:

http://peabody.vanderbilt.edu/depts/tandl/mted/thompson/PDFversions/PME02Randomness.pdf&e=9847

 

[Doctordick]

Yes, Dennett says things like that in Freedom Evolves too, but I am not persuaded. Bosses cannot foresee everything, nor can consciousnesses. Did I issue my general ukase yesterday that I should be hitting these keys today? Or when? Strategy without tactics and "boots on the ground" is just gas.

Ah, but cannot evolution create built in rules of behavior? Deer run when they are startled and possums collapse. Now it is pretty well accepted that behavior like that leads to successful survival and very few would attribute it to free will. Now businesses are under exactly the same kinds of pressures; some survive and some don't. From what I have observed, businesses where the bosses tell the employees, "I don't care, do what ever you want!", don't seem to survive as well as those where the bosses are more involved.

My point is, why is it necessary to invent this concept "free will" in order to justify the success of those who "squink" they have it? There are very complex things going on here! Perhaps "free will" is no more than a label which is eminently suitable to specify a characteristic behavior (i.e., a very complex dependence on circumstance) which is quite successful.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[StatusX]

Seriously, if it is a statistical trend, we still try to go against the stream, I hope you will grant me *that*, at least. We'll do anything to try and prevent its effects, high and low. Now why would that be?

What are you talking about? Grant you what? I'm saying everything in the universe, living or not, obeys the laws of physics. You can read whatever you want into the fact that life exists. Maybe there was intelligent design. But if so, the "design" was making the laws of physics what they are, which allowed life to flourish.

The extremes of Free Will and Total Predetermination. I seriously think that if you are consequent about determinism, and see no role for Free Will, you should not accept (even temporarily) the uncertainties of Quantum Mechanics. That would be just a lack of knowledge, for now. Free Will can only be ruled out if the opposite reigns supreme.

This is wrong. Just because there isn't total predetermination, that doesn't mean the undecided portion is up to our will. It's completely random, like I've said.

 

[lyapunov]

[1] You can read whatever you want into the fact that life exists. Maybe there was intelligent design. But if so, the "design" was making the laws of physics what they are, which allowed life to flourish.



[2] This is wrong. Just because there isn't total predetermination, that doesn't mean the undecided portion is up to our will. It's completely random, like I've said.

[1] Before we stomp off in search of 'intelligent design' or introduce anthropic principles, I'd really like to know why life does not give up the ghost willingly, ever. We could just accept our fate right from the start and give into our eventual fate. We don't, and with a vengeance. Why? That's all I ask.

[2] OK, let's see. I must say your position is one I do not encounter often. Most see it through to the bitter end and renounce true randomness. Mmm.

But if a portion is undecided, like you say, or guided by Blind Fate, as I did earlier, what's preventing us from trying to outguess or outsmart it? Successfully, even? I mean, we're not doomed to eternal blissful ignorance, I hope? I see 'progress' as a distinct possibility, which would also be ruled out, wouldn't it?

(BTW my 'devil' quotes are not to troll or anything, I use them if I think a term is in itself something open to debate - hope you can be comfy with that)

 

[Doctordick]

We could just accept our fate right from the start and give into our eventual fate. We don't, and with a vengeance. Why? That's all I ask.

Why? Because those who behave that way make very little contribution to the population.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[StatusX]

But if a portion is undecided, like you say, or guided by Blind Fate, as I did earlier, what's preventing us from trying to outguess or outsmart it? Successfully, even? I mean, we're not doomed to eternal blissful ignorance, I hope? I see 'progress' as a distinct possibility, which would also be ruled out, wouldn't it?

How exactly would you outsmart quantum uncertainty? I don't even know where to begin explaining what's wrong with that. And again, we're not talking about progress, we're talking about free will.

 

[Math Is Hard]

There's still something bugging me. If we think about the original experiment, a patient has been instructed to record a memory of a picture that is shown at the same time he/she decides to perform an action.
In advance of the experiment, the patient has already decided to perform an action at random intervals. This is a free choice to decide to perform these actions and was made by the patient before the experiment began. The patient could have decided not to do anything. I don't see any conflict with free will because of this. There was some thought, planning, and decision making that occurred before the action took place - and it was before the experiment even began.

Here is another interesting finding from neuroscience that I came across today that I thought you folks might enjoy (this may or may not be relevant - just thought it was intriguing):

http://newsroom.ucla.edu/page.asp?RelNum=5903

 

[Tournesol]

Yes, Dennett says things like that in Freedom Evolves too, but I am not persuaded. Bosses cannot foresee everything, nor can consciousnesses. Did I issue my general ukase yesterday that I should be hitting these keys today? Or when? Strategy without tactics and "boots on the ground" is just gas.

All that mean is that the system would be imperfect and "you" would be sometimes do things
unconsciously that "you", consciously, don't approve of. But then the
the system is imperfect and "you" will sometimes do things
unconsciously that "you", consciously, don't approve of.
What do you mean by "strategy without tactics" ? The tactics are supplied
by unconscius reflexes, following consious "policy". What would be the alternative ? Making a fully consious choice about every keystroke ?
That would be just as inefficient as a company where the president
takes every phone call and types every letter.

 

[Tournesol]

My point is, why is it necessary to invent this concept "free will" in order to justify the success of those who "squink" they have it?

The simplest explanation for why people think they have it is that they
do in fact have it.

There are very complex things going on here! Perhaps "free will" is no more than a label which is eminently suitable to specify a characteristic behavior (i.e., a very complex dependence on circumstance) which is quite successful.

Why can't FW be both what it is traditionally assumed to be and a "succesful behaviour" ?

 

[Tournesol]

This is wrong. Just because there isn't total predetermination, that doesn't mean the undecided portion is up to our will. It's completely random, like I've said.

Just because there is a undetermined ingredient to decision-making does not mean the whole thing is random -- any more than random mutation means evolution as a whole is random.

 

[lyapunov]

How exactly would you outsmart quantum uncertainty? I don't even know where to begin explaining what's wrong with that.

Maybe take a look at this, then (.pdf, bit slow download):

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/researchreports/248cris.pdf

because quantum randomness is not so clear-cut as you seem to think.

 

[Doctordick]

Why can't FW be both what it is traditionally assumed to be and a "succesful behaviour" ?

Ok! Presume that is possible and give me a single consequence (other than the "feel good about it" attitude the concept produces) that you can "squink" up. And that "squat" we can think about.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[antfm]

I'm probably wrong about my understanding of Libet's experiment. But from what I understand it measures the delay between neuronal readiness to perform an action and the thought of having the intention to perform it. Perhaps the experiment is showing a gap betwwen two different features of consciousness, one of the "raw consciousness", so to say, of some event and the other of the "thought consciousness" or thinking process about that event. What I mean is that being conscious of our action might not exactly mean being thinking of them.
As an example, if you asked me how I walked home today after work, I should admit that I was not thinking about it when I just walked. I wonder if this, as many other actions along the day that one performs without "thinking of them" have something to do with this Libet's effect.

 

[lyapunov]

How exactly would you outsmart quantum uncertainty?

Step by step. Here's some more fun:

http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/qubits.htm

 

[Tournesol]

Ok! Presume that is possible and give me a single consequence (other than the "feel good about it" attitude the concept produces) that you can "squink" up. And that "squat" we can think about.

if we did not have FW we would have two options

1) to solve problems by some a-priori pre-programmed instinct [*]

2) not to solve them at all

With FW, we have the further option to

3) Solve problems by trial-and-error experimentation

(which is an also an example of a successful strategy, or rather meta-strategy).

[*] You could claim that we can solve problems with strategies we learn
from our elders, rather than intinctively, but such strategies have to originate
from somewhere, so this is a variation on (3)

 

[selfAdjoint]

if we did not have FW we would have two options

1) to solve problems by some a-priori pre-programmed instinct [*]

2) not to solve them at all

With FW, we have the further option to

3) Solve problems by trial-and-error experimentation

(which is an also an example of a successful strategy, or rather meta-strategy).

[*] You could claim that we can solve problems with strategies we learn
from our elders, rather than intinctively, but such strategies have to originate
from somewhere, so this is a variation on (3)

Not at all. Our brains, even if deterministic,, can have access to a pseudorandom number generator, which will stand in for a fair coin toss for all
practical purposes, and thus randomized strategies become available. Computer systems, which I don't suppose you consider to have free will, do this all the time. See genetic programming, monte carlo simulation, etc. etc.

 

[Doctordick]

With FW, we have the further option to

3) Solve problems by trial-and-error experimentation

Now please explain why FW is necessary to solve problems by "trial-and-error"? To my mind "trial-and-error" is the very definition of evolutionary elimination of failure.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

Not at all. Our brains, even if deterministic,, can have access to a pseudorandom number generator, which will stand in for a fair coin toss for all
practical purposes, and thus randomized strategies become available. Computer systems, which I don't suppose you consider to have free will, do this all the time. See genetic programming, monte carlo simulation, etc. etc.

It all depends what you mean by FW. For compatiblists like Dennett, PRN's are enough. OTOH, there is objective evidene of real randomness, and the
subjective feeling of elbow room -- why not use th eone to explain the other ?

 

[Tournesol]

Now please explain why FW is necessary to solve problems by "trial-and-error"?

You need some way of settling what to do next in the absence of a pre-programmed methodology. Whether that is 'real' FW is matter of defintion -- see my other reply.

To my mind "trial-and-error" is the very definition of evolutionary elimination of failure.
Have fun -- Dick

Well, I was suggesting that FW is an evolutionary [ meta] strategey, asn't I?

 

[selfAdjoint]

It all depends what you mean by FW. For compatiblists like Dennett, PRN's are enough. OTOH, there is objective evidene of real randomness, and the
subjective feeling of elbow room -- why not use th eone to explain the other ?

Well, because there is no real basis for doing so. Strong free will is just a desire we have, and making up reasons for your desires to be true is deluding yourself.

 

[antfm]

I try again to get some help from someone reading this thread to understand a bit better Libet's experiment. My doubt is the delay it is actually measuring, as I said in earler post.
I guess it is a delay between the neuronal firing that indicates the beggining of a, supposedly intentional, action and the thought of having the intention to start that action.
Ok, it seems we start the action half a second before the thought of having the intention to.
But, in my view, perhaps a basic or raw feeling of having the intention is prior to the thought of having that intention. I mean, I can start an action when "I feel like doing something", as language says, which could be before "I think I feel like doing something".
An example: the athlete could start running when he hears the shot, not when he thinks "I've heard the shot" (it would be too late); the athlete starts running half a second before the thought, but not half a second before hearing the shot (otherwise he would be disqualified).
Something like that. I'd appreciate some help. Thanks.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, because there is no real basis for doing so. Strong free will is just a desire we have,

That isn't even correct as a definiton of FW. The feature of FW that creates problems
with regard to determinism is the ability-to-have-done-otheewise.

and making up reasons for your desires to be true is deluding yourself.

That is back to front. If you have reason to believe FW is impossible (such as
reason to belieive in determinism and to reject compatiblism) , then
you have reason to conclude FW can only be an illusion. But
you are cetainly not entitled to start off on that basis.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I have strong reason to believe the universe, including ourselves, is random where it isn't deterministic. This, as everybody agrees, destroys free will if we take it seriously and apply it to our conscousness. As a monist I do so. And Libet's experiment stands as an empirical demonstration of it.

 

[Tournesol]

I have strong reason to believe the universe, including ourselves, is random where it isn't deterministic. This, as everybody agrees, destroys free will if we take it seriously and apply it to our conscousness.

There are a few exceptions to that rule, such as Robert Kane, and yours truly

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones