How much of science is faith based?

[Hurkyl]

See, this is what I have a problem with. Why must you BELIEVE in that the scientific method works? Why must you accept this as a belief rather than based on valid observation? Are there no empirical evidence at all to justify the acceptance of it? You made it sound as if one has to accept this and that's it, without any justification! That's baloney!

Sure there's empirical evidecnce that justifies the acceptance of it -- but why did we decide to listen to empiricial evidence in the first place?

 

[ZapperZ]

Physics doesn't make the ball fall; it merely predicts that it will. And why does physics make that prediction? Because we had a theory, empirically verified that it worked in a gazillion situations, and inferred that it will work in this situation too. Is that not an accurate summary? That's exactly what inductive reasoning is...

Induction in mathematics requires you to make an "indirect" logical conclusion. You can, for instance, assume that something is true, and carry it out to the end to show that the result is logically nonsensical or self-contradictory to prove that it is false.

I do not see adopting that the ball will fall as such a step. It is very direct in accepting that the ball WILL fall based on the observation of the surrounding facts.

Maybe we are arguing semantics here, but even if you categorize it as inductive reasoning, it certainly isn't based on "faith", as has been mentioned in this thread. My certainty that the ball will fall has nothing to do with having "faith".

Zz.

 

[Hurkyl]

Induction in mathematics requires you to make an "indirect" logical conclusion.

I'm not talking about mathematical induction.

 

[ZapperZ]

Sure there's empirical evidecnce that justifies the acceptance of it -- but why did we decide to listen to empiricial evidence in the first place?

I dunno.. I wasn't around back then when the caveman saw the first falling ball.

I accept valid empirical evidence because it is reproducible. And as a physicist, I can see how an empirical evidence can be verified in many different ways by different methods, and different people that have varying backgrounds. This means that such evidence is independent of how or who is observing it. And then when I see that such evidence works all the time under the same condition, I will begin to trust that this is something as part of Nature, and not someone's imagination. that's what we want in the end.

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

I'm not talking about mathematical induction.

I was.

Zz.

 

[Hurkyl]

I was.

So, large parts of you've been saying simply isn't applicable to what everybody else has been talking about?

 

[ZapperZ]

So, large parts of you've been saying simply isn't applicable to what everybody else has been talking about?

Which large part?

Zz.

 

[JoeDawg]

No, I'm observing that you are standing on the ground. That is what I meant as a "fact". This proves to me that F=ma and gravity are still valid.

Gravity is an rule derived from past experience. In fact that is all the theory of gravity is, a description of what has occurred in the past.

If I see gravity work once, I wouldn't develop a rule.
If I see it work 10...100... 10000... times then I see a pattern in 'past experience'.

When I apply that rule of past experience, that pattern I see in past events, to future events, that is inductive reasoning.

I understand your frustration, this is not the easiest thing to get your head around. But once you do, its quite profound.

 

[Hurkyl]

Which large part?

All of the parts where you talk about induction.



*takes step back*

ZZ -- as far as I'm concerned, the main points I am trying to make here is:

(1) Science is not "pure reason" -- it cannot be deduced from deductive logic.
(2) The justification for accepting Science is circular -- we accept science because we have empirical confirmation.

 

[JoeDawg]

Maybe we are arguing semantics here, but even if you categorize it as inductive reasoning, it certainly isn't based on "faith", as has been mentioned in this thread. My certainty that the ball will fall has nothing to do with having "faith".

Agreed, the faith argument is nonsense.
It conflates 'faith' with reasoned belief.
Its an equivocation error.

 

[ZapperZ]

Gravity is an rule derived from past experience. In fact that is all the theory of gravity is, a description of what has occurred in the past.

If I see gravity work once, I wouldn't develop a rule.
If I see it work 10...100... 10000... times then I see a pattern in 'past experience'.

When I apply that rule of past experience, that pattern I see in past events, to future events, that is inductive reasoning.

I understand your frustration, this is not the easiest thing to get your head around. But once you do, its quite profound.

I'm sure it is. What you have described is what I've been telling everyone - it is a phenomenological law, i.e. heavy on observations. But at the same thing, it is what saves it from being based on "faith". Thus, with all the situation being identical, you know what's going to happen next.

Maybe it is called "inductive reasoning". I was using "induction" as in mathematics, which I had assumed to be the same in philosophy. It has a series of strict logical sequence.

However, to never have seen even one case where such the situation fails, does this require that one make an any kind of "reasoning" to accept that that situation will occur?

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

ZZ -- as far as I'm concerned, the main points I am trying to make here is:

(1) Science is not "pure reason" -- it cannot be deduced from deductive logic.
(2) The justification for accepting Science is circular -- we accept science because we have empirical confirmation.

I believe, and I'm sure you have read it too, that these are the points that I've been trying to make as well. I don't for a second accept the notion that standard science is based on faith.

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

BTW, and I think I will have hammered this to death already by now, so this may be the end of my participation here, https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=149923", former president of the APS, in a thread on PF a while back. She wrote an article in Physics Today titled "Belief and knowledge—a plea about language" (the link to that article can be found in the thread I pointed to). She has clearly indicated on why, as scientists, we ought to be careful in choosing the words we use, because as can be clearly seen in this thread, those who are outside of it cannot judge clearly what these words mean beyond the pedestrian usage of it. This is especially true in the use of the word "believe".

Zz.

 

[Pythagorean]

I always thought the quote about the nth try (10^6 + 1) or whatever it was had to do with hidden variables or unknown external forces.

The reason the ball might not drop the last time is not because the core physics changes, but because our perception of the problem was wrong (we thought the ball and gravity were an isolated system)

What if there's a time-dependent dirac delta function that expresses some external force that acts every m years, and we just got around to the 18mth interval as we throw the ball the (10^6 + 1)th time?

That, to me is where the uncertainty comes in. Not that the physics changes, but that as scientists, we don't have absolute control of our observations.

As for "faith" in science, I can't deny it's existence, and in some cases it may even help us to reach out and try new things... BUT, I don't think it should be confused with religious faith. They're definitely held to much different standards, and faith in religion is a lot more rampant than "faith" in science.

 

[Hurkyl]

As for "faith" in science, I can't deny it's existence, and in some cases it may even help us to reach out and try new things... BUT, I don't think it should be confused with religious faith. They're definitely held to much different standards, and faith in religion is a lot more rampant than "faith" in science.

Well, really, what is the difference? Belief in science is justified upon scientific grounds, is it not? And belief in Unitarianism is justified upon Unitarian grounds, is it not? What makes the former "better" than the latter? It's cheating to use empiricism (especially the strict variety) as an a priori for making this judgement!

 

[JoeDawg]

Well, really, what is the difference? Belief in science is justified upon scientific grounds, is it not? And belief in Unitarianism is justified upon Unitarian grounds, is it not? What makes the former "better" than the latter? It's cheating to use empiricism (especially the strict variety) as an a priori for making this judgement!

You don't have to be unitarian for science to apply to you.

 

[Moridin]

As a side note, the ball falling the n:th time can be established by deduction as well (implicitly stated earlier). Imagine you are standing there, ready to drop it the n:th time. If it will not fall to the ground, then all sorts of uncomfortable consequence should occur. Since ~[uncomfortable consequence] we can be sure that the ball will fall. The same argument can be made for the rise of the sun etc. I'd say this is a strict modus tollens, but I could be wrong.

 

[Moridin]

Well, really, what is the difference? Belief in science is justified upon scientific grounds, is it not? And belief in Unitarianism is justified upon Unitarian grounds, is it not? What makes the former "better" than the latter? It's cheating to use empiricism (especially the strict variety) as an a priori for making this judgement!

Everyone has to start with experience as their core epistemological standpoint. Only then comes method and attempts to justify method through experience. Empiricism is a method with experience as its main theory of knowledge.

 

[Hurkyl]

As a side note, the ball falling the n:th time can be established by deduction as well (implicitly stated earlier). Imagine you are standing there, ready to drop it the n:th time. If it will not fall to the ground, then all sorts of uncomfortable consequence should occur. Since ~[uncomfortable consequence] we can be sure that the ball will fall. The same argument can be made for the rise of the sun etc. I'd say this is a strict modus tollens, but I could be wrong.

Actually, that's a textbook logical fallacy; it's an appeal to consequences.

(Unless, of course, you can actually prove ~[uncomfortable consequence], which you haven't...)

 

[Hurkyl]

Everyone has to start with experience as their core epistemological standpoint.

Why is that so? Why can't they start with their religious teachings, or possibly strict rationalism? A quick wikipedia search also suggests constructivism.

 

[Moridin]

Why is that so? Why can't they start with their religious teachings, or possibly strict rationalism? A quick wikipedia search also suggests constructivism.

Strict rationalism is just another possible conclusion of experience. The same goes for religious teachings. When it comes down to it, you can only start from your experience (not necessarily the same as empiricism as there can be other ways of experience, such as revelation etc.). Then you can choose empiricism, rationalism or religious scripture etc. based on certain criteria or arguments, such as effectiveness in practice for your experience (ie. prediction power) etc. Empiricism is therefore based on and justified based on experience, not by itself and experience is something everyone must start with. So, in essence, empiricism is a conclusion, not the foundation of the things being discussed. Then the different types of epistemologies are investigated by the prediction power on your experience and then you move on to method, such as science.

Of course, then experience can be questioned with all sorts of though experiments, such as a Cartesian demon etc.

Actually, that's a textbook logical fallacy; it's an appeal to consequences.

(Unless, of course, you can actually prove ~[uncomfortable consequence], which you haven't...)

I seem to have been a bit fuzzy: By the [uncomfortable consequence], I means how the sudden disappearance of gravity would effect you. As long as you do not experience those effects, gravity works.

Take the whole sunrise tomorrow argument for example. If the sun will not rise tomorrow, we would all walk inclined, experience massive earthquakes and pretty much most of Norther Europe would be under water. As long as this does not occur, we can say that we know that the sun will rise tomorrow.

 

[Tony11235]

It seems ZZ shares Feynman's frustration with philosophers.

"Philosophers say a great deal about what is absolutely necessary for science, and it is always, so far as one can see, rather naive, and probably wrong"

"We cannot define anything precisely! If we attempt to, we get into that paralysis of thought that comes to philosophers, who sit opposite each other, one saying to the other, 'You don't know what you are talking about!' The second one says 'What do you mean by know? What do you mean by talking? What do you mean by you?', and so on."

Funny observation.

 

[turbo]

It seems ZZ shares Feynman's frustration with philosophers.

"Philosophers say a great deal about what is absolutely necessary for science, and it is always, so far as one can see, rather naive, and probably wrong"

Feynman also made some rather derogatory statements about the ways that science was conducted, in general. He called it "cargo-cult science", likening it to the behavior of some South Pacific islanders who built replica air-strips after WWII, complete with "control towers" and staff, to try to coax cargo planes to land there and bring back the "good times" they experienced when the US based troops and aircraft there.

Feynman's point was that if you don't understand the fundamentals of the field you are working in, you are taking the work of your predecessors as gospel, going through the motions, and may not be producing real science. I think that he would regard such scientific pursuits as "faith-based" since they rely more on form than function. Einstein insisted on the importance of epistemology and used this argument as the subject of his memoriam on the death of Ernst Mach - no small affair.

 

[Evo]

It seems ZZ shares Feynman's frustration with philosophers.

"Philosophers say a great deal about what is absolutely necessary for science, and it is always, so far as one can see, rather naive, and probably wrong"

"We cannot define anything precisely! If we attempt to, we get into that paralysis of thought that comes to philosophers, who sit opposite each other, one saying to the other, 'You don't know what you are talking about!' The second one says 'What do you mean by know? What do you mean by talking? What do you mean by you?', and so on."

Funny observation.

I think that people that are highly logical and that prefer that things are expressed clearly and get to the point do not have the patience for "philosophy". Not saying there's anything wrong with those that do, I just know that I'm not one of them.

 

[Pythagorean]

Well, really, what is the difference? Belief in science is justified upon scientific grounds, is it not? And belief in Unitarianism is justified upon Unitarian grounds, is it not? What makes the former "better" than the latter? It's cheating to use empiricism (especially the strict variety) as an a priori for making this judgement!

I don't mean to "justify" science upon "scientific grounds". I don't really know what that means, I don't think the existence of religion or science requires any justification. What requires justification is impeding on my rights. I generally don't accept religious doctrines as justification for such a situation. I require hard, physical proof.

I am not a raised atheist/scientist so my judgment/justifications aren't based on science, they're based on my mystical experiences as a teenager. I feel like I have a much better grasp of the world through physics than through Christianity. I can't speak for all of religion and all of science, but I have experience with those specific cases (and even some experience in other religions) and physics makes the most sense to me.

Christianity is absolutely more faith-based than physics. I'm not standing down on my statement that physics (as a science) has some faith in it... but it's generally clearly marked (by the words like 'phenomenological' and 'anecdotal' usually)

I think Christianity and physics both handle their faith differently too. For Christianity, it's the meat of the community... for physics, it's handled carefully like a radioactive substance... useful, but dangerous.

 

[Sorry!]

woah my quote started quite the debate :D haha nice nice.

I think that people should step back and just think 'what does faith MEAN' because after skimming through the arguments for BOTH sides it seems that no one is denying science has faith they just assign it different names or they are using a completely different definition of faith and assigning it to belief of the supernatural etc. etc. (which if you look at the definition i think on page 10 ISN'T what faith means at all...)

 

[JoeDawg]

Take the whole sunrise tomorrow argument for example. If the sun will not rise tomorrow, we would all walk inclined, experience massive earthquakes and pretty much most of Norther Europe would be under water. As long as this does not occur, we can say that we know that the sun will rise tomorrow.

You have not addressed the problem of induction here. You have simply stated the conditions which would occur if your understanding of the past is correct and if that past does indeed predict to the future. This is just another probability argument and that is not the issue.

 

[Moridin]

You have not addressed the problem of induction here. You have simply stated the conditions which would occur if your understanding of the past is correct and if that past does indeed predict to the future. This is just another probability argument and that is not the issue.

I have used deduction, not induction. In fact, I have never appealed to inductive reasoning at all. It is basic modus tollens:

A -> B
~B
Therefore, ~A

 

[JoeDawg]

it seems that no one is denying science has faith

I am denying that. Its puerile rhetoric meant to equivocate religion and science.

Reasoned belief is not faith, calling it such is just dishonest. Redefining 'faith' to include reasoned belief is no better than redefining science to include the god-magic that is 'intelligent design'.

And I think the reason scientists have failed in the PR war against religious propaganda is plain to see in this thread. Without an understanding of the history of ideas... philosophy... its easy for the religious apologists to equivocate and play with definitions.

The problem of induction does not mean 'faith is necessary'. It simply sets limits on 'certainty'. This is important, because scientific method is designed to address our limited view on the universe, science is not about 'truth', its about what is observed.

 

[JoeDawg]

I have used deduction, not induction. In fact, I have never appealed to inductive reasoning at all. It is basic modus tollens:

A -> B
~B
Therefore, ~A

I'm a big fan of falsification, but it doesn't really address the problem of induction.
Obviously I'm not explaining it well enough though, so... its still not faith...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Popper
"As Stephen Hawking explains, "No matter how many times the results of experiments agree with some theory, you can never be sure that the next time the result will not contradict the theory."[8] While it may be pragmatically useful to accept a theory until it is falsified, this does not solve the philosophical problem of induction. As Bertrand Russell put it, "the general principles of science . . . are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed."[9] In essence, Popper addressed justification for belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, not justification for the fact that it will, which is the crux of the philosophical problem. Said another way, Popper addressed the psychological causes of our belief in the validity of induction without trying to provide logical reasons for it. In this way, he sidesteps the traditional problem of trying to justify induction as "proof.""

 

[Hurkyl]

Reasoned belief is not faith, calling it such is just dishonest.

So just how did you solve the regress problem?

 

[JoeDawg]

So just how did you solve the regress problem?

Was that on page 10 too?

 

[Moridin]

JoeDawg, read what I have posted: I do NOT make use of induction, but deduction.

 

[Hurkyl]

Was that on page 10 too?

No, I'm referring to the famous philosophical problem where you give a justification for your beliefs, which prompts you to justify the principles upon which that justification was based. And then you're prompted to justify the principles upon which that justification is based, and so forth.

If, as you claim, you have only "reasoned belief", then that suggests you have solved the regress problem -- despite the best efforts of millenia of philosophers.

 

[JoeDawg]

No, I'm referring to the famous philosophical problem where you give a justification for your beliefs, which prompts you to justify the principles upon which that justification was based. And then you're prompted to justify the principles upon which that justification is based, and so forth.

If, as you claim, you have only "reasoned belief", then that suggests you have solved the regress problem -- despite the best efforts of millenia of philosophers.

Oh, actually I was thinking you meant the god-infinite-regress problem.

I think Descartes did a good job on the epistemological side, at least in the beginning of his meditations. Which part are you disagreeing with?