Instrumentalism and consistency

[Fra]

I mean "unnatural" in a different sense.

I think that it is indeeed natural for humans to try to create a mental picture of the "reailty" out there, that exists when we close our eyes. In fact its how we navigate, relying on our map.

I do not see any contradiction between the empirical solipsism and the naturalness for humans to seek realism. On the contrary do i think they are a perfect match because it is the "strive" of all observers to understand the reality in the black box that eventually creates the effective reality. And i think of the reason for this is that is becomea sometimes the "best approximation" given than a simple observer can not endcode a complex map.

If i understand demystifier right i agree that it is unnatural in this sense.

/Fredrik

 

[Demystifier]

Yes, that's what I meant.

 

[Demystifier]

That simply means: Instrumentalists are not so naive to mistake the map for the territory.

That's true, and that's a good thing about instrumentalists. But they are naive in a different sense. They are naive when they think that they never mistake the map for the territory.

Realists, on the other hand, are aware that it can be cognitively useful to think of map as a territory. Therefore they make maps which look more realistic and much better resemble the territory.

 

[zonde]

Perhaps instrumentalists are being naive and inconsistent to the degree that despite certainly knowing that everything we perceive is an internal phenomenological mental construction, the instrumentalist attaches an external objective naive realism upon his internal mental phenomenological construction of a dial pointer.

I would say that the level of certainty with which instrumentalist attaches realism to internal mental construction is naive. As Demystifier said we attach reality to certain mental constructs, but this attachment is not absolute, just useful. Sometimes this attachment is so useful that there is not much point questioning it any more. But anyways this happens over time when we develop more useful models that relay on particular concept.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

That's true, and that's a good thing about instrumentalists. But they are naive in a different sense. They are naive when they think that they never mistake the map for the territory.

Realists, on the other hand, are aware that it can be cognitively useful to think of map as a territory. Therefore they make maps which look more realistic and much better resemble the territory.

Instrumentalism is a non-realist approach to quantum mechanics:
“From the early days of quantum mechanics, there has been a strain of thought that holds that the proper attitude to take towards quantum mechanics is an instrumentalist or pragmatic one. On such a view, quantum mechanics is a tool for coordinating our experience and for forming expectations about the outcomes of experiments.“ (from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-issues/)

Why should an instrumentalist ever mistake the map for the territory? What territory?

 

[Demystifier]

Why should an instrumentalist ever mistake the map for the territory? What territory?

Ideal persistent and consistent instrumentalist would never make such a mistake. But such an ideal instrumentalist does not exist in human species. Perhaps you could program an ideal computer instrumentalist, but there is no ideal human instrumentalist.

 

[Demystifier]

Let me use a simple analogy. Suppose that you watch your computer screen on which two windows are open, window 1 and window 2. And suppose that you see only window 1. Why don't you see window 2? A natural intuitive explanation is that window 2 must be behind window 1. And really, when you move window 1, you start to see window 2. There is nothing more intuitive for a human than to think that window 2 was there, behind window 1, even before you moved window 1. On the other hand, if you know something about how computer and monitor really work, you know that it isn't true. In reality, window 2 was "made" on the monitor at the moment when you moved window 1, it was not there before. And yet, even if you are a computer expert, even if you programed the computer that way yourself, you will still find cognitively natural and useful to think that window 2 was there all the time.

That's a hidden variable, or realist, interpretation. Even though there is no window 2 before you see it, you interpret that it is there even when you don't see it. And even though this interpretation is wrong, it is a very useful interpretation for a human.

In the same sense, a hidden variable interpretation of QM, such as Bohmian mechanics, can be useful as a thinking tool, even if Bohmian trajectories don't exist in reality. The point of Bohmian mechanics is not to restore determinism. Its point is to restore realism, that is the view that things are there even when we don't observe them.

 

[vanhees71]

Well, Window 2 "was there" in some sense already. Although not shown on the screen, the information provided by it was stored in "bits and bytes" in the Computer's memory (no matter, how this works in all technical detail). So in a sense the picture in Window 2 has been there. Of course, it's built up on the screen only at the moment you shift away Window 1, but in the sense of information it has been there before in the computer's memory.

I think this metaphor elucidates very well, the meaning of quantum states as providing (probabilistic) information about a system due to preparation, but that's again interpretation, and maybe provokes heated debates about "epistemic vs. ontic" interpretations.

 

[Fra]

(Apologies in advance for not linking to demystifiers papers.. typing this in from the phone and physicsforums app)

if you programed the computer that way yourself, you will still find cognitively natural and useful to think that window 2 was there all the time.
...
That's a hidden variable, or realist, interpretation. Even though there is no window 2 before you see it, you interpret that it is there even when you don't see it. And even though this interpretation is wrong, it is a very useful interpretation for a human.
...
Its point is to restore realism, that is the view that things are there even when we don't observe them.

I can't avoid observing that there is an abstraction here that makes realism as per Demystfier suspiciously alike what i call "rationality". Rationality that can be furher used in the inferential picture to explain the expected evolution.

This connection is even more interesting if you think of future possible ways to distinguish demystifiers solipsist hidden variables from regular QM.

The conceptual argument is that an observer (which we should think of as a PLAYER in an enviromment that offers both opportunities and dangers) that is behaving rationally will places his bets - according to his map - anything else is simply irrational, EVEN if the map is wrong as per another perspective. And in the exampl above we can argue that the best guess is indeed that the other window is below.

So what if what demystifyers "useful" interpretation" is simply a "rational expectation"?

Of course tere needs to be a formalism behind this, but i see a hope in the future discrimination D mentions in his solipsist paper. Namely that if we take this seriously (ie that alice actions depends only on her HV (to stick to D's terminology) and Bobs only on his. Then consider Observer3 that is bigger atr more domimant... observing/interacting with the "alice and bob interacting"-system... now in this pictute i see the chance for these ideas to distinguish themselves from just an interpretation by requiring that in O3's observers "rational expectaion" of composite Alice-Bob system the "internal interactions" between alice and bobs reflects this logic.

Thus this impacts unification! We are no longer "only" making reinterpretations.

Q. Demystifier, does this realism ~ rationality analogy make sense in conjuction with your journey?

(Hope this gets readable. Typing a lot on the phone is not ideal)

/Fredrik

 

[Demystifier]

I think this metaphor elucidates very well, the meaning of quantum states as providing (probabilistic) information about a system due to preparation, but that's again interpretation, and maybe provokes heated debates about "epistemic vs. ontic" interpretations.

The debates are heated when people discuss which interpretation is "right". What I propose here is that emphasis should not be on which interpretation is right, but on how various interpretations are useful as thinking tools. You often complain that you don't see how Bohmian view is useful (let alone true), and the analogy above should explain that. And just because Bohmian view is useful (at least for some users) doesn't mean that some more standard view is less useful.

 

[Demystifier]

Q. Demystifier, does this realism ~ rationality analogy make sense in conjuction with your journey?

I guess it does.

 

[vanhees71]

The debates are heated when people discuss which interpretation is "right". What I propose here is that emphasis should not be on which interpretation is right, but on how various interpretations are useful as thinking tools. You often complain that you don't see how Bohmian view is useful (let alone true), and the analogy above should explain that. And just because Bohmian view is useful (at least for some users) doesn't mean that some more standard view is less useful.

BM is ok for non-relativistic QT. It's at least not contradicting any fundamental laws. I personally consider it useless, because it doesn't provide any further insight compared to minimally interpreted standard QT. It's also hard to say, which interpretation is "right". It's, however, easy to say, which interpretational pieces are definitely wrong, among them the assumption of an instantaneous collapse in relativistic QFT. Then there is the category of interpretational items that are simply not testable within the realm of natural sciences as the assumption of a classical-quantum cut. At least so far there's no evidence for such a thing.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Ideal persistent and consistent instrumentalist would never make such a mistake. But such an ideal instrumentalist does not exist in human species. Perhaps you could program an ideal computer instrumentalist, but there is no ideal human instrumentalist.

If I understand you correctly: Of course, even an instrumentalist has – as a human being – the feeling that there is “some reality” or “some territory”. But the feeling that there is “some reality (territory)” emerges merely from the usefulness of our “mental concepts (map)”; the usefulness for finding our ways, for our thinking and for our communicating with others. The more useful the map the stronger is the feeling that we are really wandering through “some territory”. To my mind, however, the map isn’t able to tell us finally what the “TERRITORY” is: There are mental images, which are in our minds and not in the external world, and there is some kind of “counterpart” in the external world which is of inscrutable nature.

 

[Demystifier]

If I understand you correctly: Of course, even an instrumentalist has – as a human being – the feeling that there is “some reality” or “some territory”. But the feeling that there is “some reality (territory)” emerges merely from the usefulness of our “mental concepts (map)”; the usefulness for finding our ways, for our thinking and for our communicating with others. The more useful the map the stronger is the feeling that we are really wandering through “some territory”. To my mind, however, the map isn’t able to tell us finally what the “TERRITORY” is: There are mental images, which are in our minds and not in the external world, and there is some kind of “counterpart” in the external world which is of inscrutable nature.

Yes, you explained it very well!

The only thing I would add is this. Since those mental images can be very useful, science should not strive to avoid them. Just the opposite, in addition to making testable predictions (which is what pure instrumentalists tend to do), theoretical science should also strive to develop good mental images. To answer whether some mental image is "true" or not, it can be left to philosophers. But the construction of useful mental images is too important to be left to philosophers.

 

[akvadrako]

To answer whether some mental image is "true" or not, it can be left to philosophers. But the construction of useful mental images is too important to be left to philosophers.

I would like to add that I see something in between philosophically true and useful. Newtonian gravity and GR are both useful and perhaps Newtonian is even more so, depending on the use case. But I would say the question of which is more true also lies within science, not just philosophy.

I'm not sure of the precise criteria, but I can see some trends. When theory B is strictly a limiting case of theory A, we should say A is more true. Or when A has strictly less assumptions than B. Or when A is applicable in more general cases. I suppose finding exactly what criteria to use is part of the philosophy of science, because science can't be self-defining. But I don't think the search for truth can be left to philosophy.

 

[DrChinese]

Newtonian gravity and GR are both useful and perhaps Newtonian is even more so, depending on the use case...

I'm not sure of the precise criteria, but I can see some trends. When theory B is strictly a limiting case of theory A, we should say A is more true. Or when A has strictly less assumptions than B...

Your gravity example is good. I wouldn't use the word/attribute "TRUE" to compare theories though; because no model (theory) can be considered objectively "true". Models can be compared on the basis of utility, which ties back to your example.

 

[akvadrako]

Models can be compared on the basis of utility, which ties back to your example.

My point is that utility and usefulness are not the most important basis for comparison in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. At least I would not be very satisfied with a model which allowed me to manipulate nature quite well, yet didn't have a good mapping to reality.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Since those mental images can be very useful, science should not strive to avoid them. Just the opposite, in addition to making testable predictions (which is what pure instrumentalists tend to do), theoretical science should also strive to develop good mental images. To answer whether some mental image is "true" or not, it can be left to philosophers. But the construction of useful mental images is too important to be left to philosophers.

But that's the point! Physics isn’t able to construct useful mental images when addressing the quantum world. No resoned mental images exist for generic quantum objects which behave in their peculiar quantum manner. Is there a comprehensible idea of what is "out there"? Therefore, the instrumentalist’s approach:

„In science we study the linkage of pointer readings with pointer readings.“ (Arthur Stanley Eddington)

 

[vanhees71]

Physics provides utmost useful mental images of the quantum world. It's called quantum theory! Given that there's not a single example of any phenomeno where QT was wrong, I'd say it's among the most successful mental image of nature mankind has ever found.

 

[Demystifier]

Physics isn’t able to construct useful mental images when addressing the quantum world.

Maybe physics isn't, but physicists are. Bohm, for instance, constructed a mental image which is very useful (at least for me).

 

[Fra]

I think we talk three types of "mental images" here.

Two of them are

- the humans theory of our environment

- a human "mechanical" pictue of our world in terms of bullets flying around in a 3d space

I think vanesh talks about the first kind, but sometimes realists talk about the second kind.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

The third type of "mental image" I was metaphorically talking about is earlier in the thread.

- the physical observers theory/map of its physical environment

physical observer = is simply a ANY physical system, a quark, an atom, a single cell, or a human.
and this theory/map is IMPLICIT in the internal structure of the observer.
Example. the internal structure of a proton, reveals it "mental map" of its environment.

Let me explain why i repeat this:

To reconnect to the OT, that while Quantum Mechanics and QFT are no doubt are great achivements of science and an impressive "mental image" of the first kind, it is not satisfactory and lacks a coherent inferential line of reasoning.

But this is NOT just because it can not be explained in terms of chaotical dynamical classical mechanics, its because quantum mechanics presents a new inferential perspective to science, that i think is a GOOD thing (imo outperforming classical thinking in intellectual standards). It anchors the concept of measurements into the very laws of physics. BUT while doing so i find that it is not following consistent reasoning and it has bugged me badly since my mechanistic deterministic worldview was popped during my first QM course.

SOME things are subject to measurements, and SOME things(LAWS of physics for example) are subject to classical style realism and are timeless. Also, it is clear how measurements are attached to a classical observer frame, like a laboratory. When you think about this, and also think about cosmological theories, and ask yourself what is the difference between a quark looking out into the environment of a lab, and a human looking out into cosmological scales. Sure we have different complexity scales, but should the "laws of physics" be the same? This doesn't do it for me, as it is too obvious that something is missing. But let's not confuse this with the ideas of Einstein that QM was "incomplete" that was a totally different kind of missing thing.

Thus the third mental image, that would suggest the following radical views to the below questions.

I'm not sure of the precise criteria, but I can see some trends.

Your gravity example is good. I wouldn't use the word/attribute "TRUE" to compare theories though; because no model (theory) can be considered objectively "true". Models can be compared on the basis of utility, which ties back to your example.

In the view i hold, the whole notion of true and false in the objective sense are illdefined simply because there exists not external logical system to judge this. There are ONLY inside views.

Instead there are only degrees of belief, and each observer has its own RIGHT system. A kind of corollary of this, is that the "mental image" of the laws of physics MUST be fundamentally observer dependent. I know this sounds sick, and it is. And the question is how to make sense out this. But if this seems to be the logical conslusion? so what do we do? WE can not reject to answer the right question just because its too hard.

Anyway, this is IMO an alternative solution to the metalaw dilemma raise by Lee Smolin in his ides of evolution of law. Smolin envisions the laws to mutate at the big bang, but i rather thinkg that _in principle_ the evolve all the time, but that for all practical purposes the "evolution of laws" last no more than fractions of a second after big bang. His ideas are in various places. His most recent book is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_Reborn.

To make an analogy here if you still don't get the idea. What i am suggesting is that to ask which theory is right is just about as
meaningful as to ask which of the speices in the eco system that has implemented the RIGHT survival strategy? The obvious answer is : all of them! It is the idea that there necessarily exists and observer independent truth that is the deeply confused.

/Fredrik

 

[AlexCaledin]

. . . the idea that there necessarily exists an observer independent truth is deeply confused.

- but apparently some superior observers are able to fake it for us (remember Feynman's "chess")

 

[Fra]

- but apparently some superior observers are able to fake it for us (remember Feynman's "chess")

I don´t understand your association. You mean feymanns chess computer, evaluating all options??

What i suggested does not contradict the "naturalness" of trying to create an understanding of what is "out there" that was discussed earlier in the thread.
Neither does it imply total chaos.

Instead that tendency for an all observers to create a stable internal map of its environment, together with that fundamental lack of objective interaction rules, is they key to understand the emergence of effective "observer independent truth" by means of a kind of negotiation. A lame example of how you can create something from just expectations just look at the stock market. Collective expectations alone can create stable values. At a certain point it really doesn't matter was is "really real" anymore, the collectively harmonized expectations are as good as the real thing. However it is not possible to understand this emergence if you consider an isolated observer in a non-responsive enviroment. They key is that the environment is similary fellow observers (metaphorically speaking).

/Fredrik

 

[bohm2]

Physics isn’t able to construct useful mental images when addressing the quantum world. No resoned mental images exist for generic quantum objects which behave in their peculiar quantum manner. Is there a comprehensible idea of what is "out there"? Therefore, the instrumentalist’s approach:

What is the reason for there being no reasoned mental images for the quantum world? Is it because of us or because of what's "out there"? Could one not argue that the deeper we probe nature, the stranger it looks not because of us; instead, it's because we are straying further away from our common sense ideas of macroscopic objects (and human psychology) that were sculpted into our mind-brain by evolution, etc. So in some sense, the fact that we are unable to easily construct mental images, may actually be telling something very deep about what's "out" there.

 

[vanhees71]

We have a very precise "mental image" about the quantum world. It's called quantum theory!

 

[atyy]

Let me use a simple analogy. Suppose that you watch your computer screen on which two windows are open, window 1 and window 2. And suppose that you see only window 1. Why don't you see window 2? A natural intuitive explanation is that window 2 must be behind window 1. And really, when you move window 1, you start to see window 2. There is nothing more intuitive for a human than to think that window 2 was there, behind window 1, even before you moved window 1. On the other hand, if you know something about how computer and monitor really work, you know that it isn't true. In reality, window 2 was "made" on the monitor at the moment when you moved window 1, it was not there before. And yet, even if you are a computer expert, even if you programed the computer that way yourself, you will still find cognitively natural and useful to think that window 2 was there all the time.

That's a hidden variable, or realist, interpretation. Even though there is no window 2 before you see it, you interpret that it is there even when you don't see it. And even though this interpretation is wrong, it is a very useful interpretation for a human.

In the same sense, a hidden variable interpretation of QM, such as Bohmian mechanics, can be useful as a thinking tool, even if Bohmian trajectories don't exist in reality. The point of Bohmian mechanics is not to restore determinism. Its point is to restore realism, that is the view that things are there even when we don't observe them.

Such an instrumentalist view of BM!

 

[Fra]

We have a very precise "mental image" about the quantum world. It's called quantum theory!

But the problem is that the optimized machinecode that runs on your brain may not execute on other brains.

And i think we have yet to find the universal code that can be interpreted on arbitrary processors, like for example protons.

QM is not quite there yet. Ie. how can we define information, information processing and action in a hardware independent way?

/Fredrik

 

[vanhees71]

I don't know, what runs on my brain, but I think all (theoretical ;-)) physicists have a pretty proper understanding of quantum theory, and it's pretty much the same (despite the unphysical interpretational part, which is in my opinion not subject of science but rather to a kind of religious world view).

 

[Fra]

I don't know, what runs on my brain, but I think all (theoretical ;-)) physicists have a pretty proper understanding of quantum theory, and it's pretty much the same (despite the unphysical interpretational part, which is in my opinion not subject of science but rather to a kind of religious world view).

I think we can understand it at different levels. First there is the general confusion which is natural to someone who has not even taken a regular QM course. Like maybe you have read a popular book on the topic without a single calculation, trying to describe QM in words. This is a kind of beginners confusion.

But beyond that first obstable, to understand it as a tool, for experimental predictions is one thing. And i think this is what you refer to. But to try to understand it well enough so that you have a feeling for how we can modify this tool or apply it beyond its original domain, to a better tool is another one.

I also think that those interpretations that are "interpretations only", that does not aim to improve the theory, tend to be uninteresting to discuss if they do not add value of extra insight, that has implications for how we can solve the open problems.

But if attacking the foundational problems of physics - such as how to merge this with gravity and howto complete the unification program of HEP - somehow suggest that one way if "interpretting" quantum mechanics makes the next generation of the theory more clear, then that interests me and it think its relevant.

/Fredrik

 

[vanhees71]

Well, of course I'm referring to science and science only. It's a scientific theory, and it is not the aim of scientists to provide anybody with some adequate subjective worldview but to describe the objective facts of nature that can be observed and are reproducible with ever increasing accuracy. There is no way to describe scientific theories in another language than mathematics, and intuition, necessary to work with theories in an inventive way, builds buy applying the formalism to real-world experiments and observations. QT is a huge success story. There is non known contradiction between theory and observations yet. To the contrary, QT passed very hard tests over a huge domain of phenomena (both in system size reaching from the subatomic level to macroscopic condensed-matter systems and energies from ultralow high-precision experiments with "cold neutrons", atomic and molecular physics, condensed-matter physics to the highest available energies at relativistic particle colliders like the LHC). Another aspect is the successful use of the theory in the development of modern technology. Already the laptop, I'm typing this posting, is an amazing result of the application of modern physics!

Of course, there are still very fundamental elementary questions open, like the adequate QT of gravitational interactions, but that's not a metaphysical but a scientific issue, which won't be solved by philosophical speculations but only by ongoing experimental and theoretical research in physics. Most of the interpretational issues discussed here in this forum are, in my opinion, pretty unimportant from the point of view of natural science, although they are, of course, interesting for the philosophy of science.

 

[Fra]

I get your main point and largely agree, and indeed QM is a success
story. I also agree than many(not all!) interpretational issues on the
forums are not very "important".

But my impression is that your perspective attempts to simplify rather than elaborate the process of "theoretical research" in a way that is a bit inhibitory. This is why i defend these discussions and think that constructive thinking about these things is a good thing. But indeed, considering the rules of the forum, SOME of these discussions imo belong in the btsm section.

As the situation today is
- lack of a common constructing principles for QM and GR and
- theorists are under starvation of NEW unexplained data to play with

It is very clear that that constructing principles of most of todays
theoretical research is not the "ideal" direct feedback from experiment.
Theoretical research has a long process BEFORE they even get to the
point of producing a real falsifiable statement. In some cases it leads
to what is perceived as pathological excuses to some.

So what is the possible takeaway from this?

1) Theoretical business today has gone unhealthy and lost the connection
to the "scientific method". Just look at string theory - what falsifiable things have these
guys beeing doing for the last 30 years? Let's redirect funding from this
waste to building more powerful accelerators, where we feed "real
science". Then once we see NEW data, we can start feeding the theorists
again.

2) Poppers simplistic abstraction of the scientific process is not
adequate because it puts all focus on the falsification event, and not
elaboration on the method behind hypothesis generation - in CONTEXT of
evolving scientific knowledge.

IMO (1) is in a sense a possible stance, especially from the perspective
of society. After all, the world has many other things to spend money on
that must be leveled against physics research. Climate, world peace etc.
I could respect this view, even if i do not agree with it.

But I personally think (2) is the better takeaway. Note that (2) does
not say that (1) is WRONG, it just claims that its is an
oversimplification, that inhibits efficient hypothesis generation. Today
the COST of hypothesis generation has increased due to the complexity of
the scientific knowledge. In this picture, what you label philosophy is
a necessary PART of "theoretical research".

After all, look at history, and the original writings of founders of
various theories. Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr etc. They contain PLENTY of
"philosophical elements" that as you can see were necessary parts in the
process of COMING up with their theories. Once the theory is on the
table, it is a different matter to falsify or corroborate it (except
that it takes technical skills, physics engineering and money). But a hard part is the process that lead to the new theories. There the
falsification event, only explains when to kill a theory, it does not
help us to intelligently generate a wise set of hypothesis. In Newtons
days its CLEAR that these things was philosophy, but note that the
status of our understanding today HAS reached the state of "theory of
theory". Theory of theory is really as close to the philosophy of
science you can come, and i insist that not acknowledging this and discouraging discussions about is a mistake.

/Fredrik

 

[vanhees71]

I fully agree. Popper's attempt to clarify the scientific process is indeed oversimplified. However, there's some truth in it: As a theoretical physicist you have to create models (and rarely even theories) that make contact with observations, so that the model or theory can be tested. To create a new model or theory you need experimental input. For me it's pretty clear that only very rarely if not never there was a pure theoretical idea without empirical input that lead to a breakthrough in our understanding. E.g., the success of the Standard Model (Weinberg's paper "A theory of Leptons" has its 50th anniversary in these days; see the November issue of the CERN Courier) is based on both closely following the empirical findings and ingenious use of mathematical concepts underlying perturbative relativistic QFT, including the use of the Higgs mechanism (invented by Andersen in the context of superconductivity), finally leading to 't Hooft's and Veltman's famous proof of the renormalizability of Higgsed and un-Higgsed non-Abelian gauge models.

 

[zonde]

I fully agree. Popper's attempt to clarify the scientific process is indeed oversimplified. However, there's some truth in it: As a theoretical physicist you have to create models (and rarely even theories) that make contact with observations, so that the model or theory can be tested. To create a new model or theory you need experimental input. For me it's pretty clear that only very rarely if not never there was a pure theoretical idea without empirical input that lead to a breakthrough in our understanding.

As I see the question is how to encourage experimentalists to look out for observations that can't be explained by established theory.
I believe interpretations can help with that. But the current mess with many half baked interpretations based on a lot of hand waving won't do the trick. It would be better if there were some principles how to evaluate interpretations based on agreement with existing data, self consistency, alignment with scientific approach.

 

[Fra]

However, there's some truth in it: As a theoretical physicist you have to create models (and rarely even theories) that make contact with observations, so that the model or theory can be tested. To create a new model or theory you need experimental input

Yes of course.

However but as complexity increases the theoretical hypothesis i also what guides us WHICH experimental data to look for. So there is an important connection here.

Here my personal analysis of the situation from my perspective is that only looking for more extreme HEP or more extreme cosmological data seems seems lacking imagination.

We have plenty of complex system interactions whrere order emerges out of chaos in ways we can NOT predict that does not require superaccelerators and supertelescope. What that likely requires otoh is more powerful computers for modelling.

You might think that this is not fundamental physics but i disagree. The insight is that reductionism works only up to a certian complexity limit, where a new way of thinking is needed AND as i conjecture NATURE itself needs a new way of interacting, in ordeer to not see chaos. So i am proposing a connection with chaotical systems self organisation and laws of physics.

After all condensed matter physics IS a field of complexity, wehere analogies exists already. There is more if you look at social and ecnomical systems. If you see it the way i do, we arent talking about accidental analogies, i think it is the SAME fundamental laws but working at different scales.

I myself do not lack data. But wether you can breed on accessible data depends on your understanding and interpretations. HEP itself is the paradigm that the inferential system is always a classical macroscopic laboratory where we also tend to consider perturbations only. This abstraction fails badly if you picture an inside observer or cosmological observations. So no matter how successful qm and qft is, you can't consistenyly apply that paradigm to the genrral case. This was my understanding of the OT.

/Fredrik