Is life a matter of evolving chemistry?

[Feeble Wonk]

Those are probabilities and unpredictability, since you said you don't have freedom. The image infers a definite geometry but infinite random freedom. So as, primes, they are random. Then, don't tell me, that we are fixated.

We could get off on a tangent and debate whether prime numbers are truly random (because the complete set of prime numbers is easily defined), but that is entirely off point. It does not at all address the issue of causation.
IF you believe that your conscious experience is purely the result of neurological activity in your brain, and that activity is the "cause and effect" result of an arbitrarily long sequence of physical events, then your conscious experience is similarly determined by the preceding physical events. In that case, you have no "free will", and the biology to neurology to consciousness emergences simply designate higher orders of systemic physics.

 

[Ronie Bayron]

We could get off on a tangent and debate whether prime numbers are truly random (because the complete set of prime numbers is easily defined), but that is entirely off point. It does not at all address the issue of causation.

Prime are defined but still unpredictable. You could easily find a prime number from 1~100, but for millions and billions in the real number line, I bet none have succeeded the prediction to determine a prime number yet. Terence T, devoted his life studying this.

IF you believe that your conscious experience is purely the result of neurological activity in your brain, and that activity is the "cause and effect" result of an arbitrarily long sequence of physical events, then your conscious experience is similarly determined by the preceding physical events. In that case, you have no "free will", and the biology to neurology to consciousness emergences simply designate higher orders of systemic physics.

"no free will" - this is rather an odd idea and I wonder if there are studies accepted on this topic. The ultimate question that needed to answer for this type of presumption is " if we do not have the will, then who wills us?" . I am totally convinced that I have my own power over my choice in any circumstances or situations. And, freedom whatever to pick or pursue. There is more to life that is still uncovered than rather pointing it to the reason that it is caused by physical stimuli (cause and effect stuff)

I wonder, what is your definition of freedom and choice. We don't seem to connect with the terminology.

I understand, that somehow you want to determine what caused intelligence. If I am right, your quest entangles with, which come first stuff

• thinking or will of the mind
  
• the physical stimuli that caused (the thinking and the will)

That's sure pretty interesting question to answer and test.

 

[jerromyjon]

I wonder, what is your definition of freedom and choice. We don't seem to connect with the terminology.

I understand him perfectly well. Deterministic properties imply definite predictable outcomes. Say you instantly have a double clone identical separated would have identical responses you have no choice but to respond how all the processes add up in your brain to respond. This culminates in a world full of people destined to go where their brains lead them but then so would free will.

 

[Ronie Bayron]

I understand him perfectly well. Deterministic properties imply definite predictable outcomes. Say you instantly have a double clone identical separated would have identical responses you have no choice but to respond how all the processes add up in your brain to respond.

I somehow think, the topic is a little too much for me. You people really had a depth of pondering things. But, anyhow, I would insist even clones may be has different way of thinking, perhaps( I don't know-never involved in test like that).

Looking back at Lorentz attractor, say what are the chances in your lifetime that there be any human born on a different parent that looks and thinks exactly like you? - My answer to this is none, even if that would be from the same parents.

 

[jerromyjon]

My answer to this is none, even if that would be from the same parents.

I remember something long ago about twins having a shared mental connection but that isn't quite what you are referring to although would the same go 3 ways for triplets? Would they identify them positively?

 

[Ronie Bayron]

I remember something long ago about twins having a shared mental connection but that isn't quite what you are referring to although would the same go 3 ways for triplets? Would they identify them positively?

They might look the same or act in someways the same, but they would matter in perspective, generally.
I have a twin classmate before, one is not so brilliant and the other is an average. I can say they have different perspective or choice. They like different type of girl.

 

[jerromyjon]

They like different type of girl.

Perhaps humans act more randomly and have exponentially more random thoughts based on moods, conditions, etc. and the probability of them maintaining parallel paths is zero.

 

[jerromyjon]

Do you REALLY have that freedom?

Or more to the point of the topic could it be possible that physics COULD someday model the human brain predictably (or any being for that matter) and determine responses to pertinent stimuli to predict their intentions or is it the "top down" thing that I'm not certain what means but I take it as the "soul" for simplicity sake makes the machinery move... I think since the larger and more "squiggly" the brain is the more the diverse the range freedoms as evidenced by humans who "malfunction" in many different ways in significant portions where smaller creatures have increasingly more predictable and reliable creatures.

 

[Pythagorean]

@Ronie Bayron ,

Yes, there are free will experiments, Libet is the classic, but there are many since.

Also, the Lorentz Attractor is a deterministic system. It seemed like you were making the opposite point, which is the only reason I mention that. In the other hand, @jerromyjon is not quite correct. Chaotic systems are the example of a deterministic system that is not predictable (because of sensitivity to initial conditions and perturbation).

 

[Ronie Bayron]

@Ronie Bayron ,

Yes, there are free will experiments, Libet is the classic, but there are many since.

Also, the Lorentz Attractor is a deterministic system. It seemed like you were making the opposite point, which is the only reason I mention that. In the other hand, @jerromyjon is not quite correct. Chaotic systems are the example of a deterministic system that is not predictable (because of sensitivity to initial conditions and perturbation).

Exactly, if you carefully examine the tangents on Lorenz and prime numbers, you would get what I meant about freedom and choice. The mind is without limit. An AI should be capable of doing that to be more human like.
Initial conditions to respond to a stimuli could be the collective learning to date of the AI.(may be) Since attractor is sensitive to initial conditions. Two AI units(with the same learning and experience) might have a similar or close response. (I don't know) Perhaps.

 

[Feeble Wonk]

@Ronie Bayron ,

Yes, there are free will experiments, Libet is the classic, but there are many since.

Also, the Lorentz Attractor is a deterministic system. It seemed like you were making the opposite point, which is the only reason I mention that. In the other hand, @jerromyjon is not quite correct. Chaotic systems are the example of a deterministic system that is not predictable (because of sensitivity to initial conditions and perturbation).

Exactly, if you carefully examine the tangents on Lorenz and prime numbers, you would get what I meant about freedom and choice. The mind is without limit. An AI should be capable of doing that to be more human like.
Initial conditions to respond to a stimuli could be the collective learning to date of the AI.(may be) Since attractor is sensitive to initial conditions. Two AI units(with the same learning and experience) might have a similar or close response. (I don't know) Perhaps.

As Pythagorean has suggested, it's not about "predictability", it's about determinism. Due to the complexity of the chaotic system, with incalculable variables and multilevel feedback mechanisms, the neuronal "output" of consciousness is largely unpredictable. But that does not mean that it's not deterministic.

So, IF your consciousness is DIRECTLY the result of neuronal function, what argument can you make that suggests the demonstration of "free will" dictating behavior?

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1210.6301v1.pdf

I don't want to cause you undue existential anxiety. There ARE plausible escapes from the trap of deterministic consciousness, but they require scientific and philosophical positions that are somewhat controversial. Discussing those ideas in this forum is problematic. By necessity, the conversation moves along the slippery catwalk between science and philosophy, so the thread will frequently be shut down by the moderators.

 

[Ronie Bayron]

So, IF your consciousness is DIRECTLY the result of neuronal function, what argument can you make that suggests the demonstration of "free will" dictating behavior?

Similar to us humans, an ultimate GOAL perhaps(in the case of AI, it's programmed like in the DNA and values and ideology acquired later on), that enables us to compromise and deny some rewarding stimuli and preferred a worst. A federal agent who has it's mission priorities would sacrifice something, endure the odds and run the maze just to succeed, likewise the same with terrorist, are good examples of that.

 

[Feeble Wonk]

Similar to us humans, an ultimate GOAL perhaps(in the case of AI, it's programmed like in the DNA and values and ideology acquired later on), that enables us to compromise and deny some rewarding stimuli and preferred a worst. A federal agent who has it's mission priorities would sacrifice something, endure the odds and run the maze just to succeed, likewise the same with terrorist, are good examples of that.

Let's try this a different way. Your computer program running the AI is a logical set of instructions. But, it operates by means of the electrical excitation of the circuits... right? So, every electrical impulse running the program is initiated as a result of the inciting stimuli, which in turn was incited by it's own causative stimuli. It's a physical process, regardless of the overlying logical frame work. It's not predictable because of the complexity of the system, but deterministic none the less.

 

[jerromyjon]

but deterministic none the less.

I was just thinking of an example that might demonstrate AI free-will in a manner of speaking... but it also relates to the AlphaGo AI because I was thinking of basing my model off of the decision whether to attack or defend based on available moves, that it can adapt the values of in a complex manner, in essence responding to the stimuli of the opponent when tactics aren't working. Would that be a form of "free will"?

 

[Feeble Wonk]

I was just thinking of an example that might demonstrate AI free-will in a manner of speaking... but it also relates to the AlphaGo AI because I was thinking of basing my model off of the decision whether to attack or defend based on available moves, that it can adapt the values of in a complex manner, in essence responding to the stimuli of the opponent when tactics aren't working. Would that be a form of "free will"?

You can look at this from two perspectives.

I think the most fundamental perspective, relative to our discussion so far, would suggest that "free will" in this case is not demonstrated because you can delineate the chain of physical events leading up to the development and execution of the software program. It's still the endless chain of "cause and effect".

From the other perspective, there is the more philosophical/logical conundrum discussed in the paper I cited earlier. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1210.6301v1.pdf
The logical algorithm of the software program dictates the decisions made, even if the conditions are fluid. According to the authors (and I would agree), for "free-will" to exist on a fundamental level, something "extra-physical or mind-like" must be manifest.

This is where we need to be careful not to slip back over the edge into philosophy. Let's agree to prohibit use of the word "soul", or appeals to any religious/spiritual concepts, values or deity. We need to strictly adhere to logical positions that are scientifically defendable.

 

[jerromyjon]

This is where we need to be careful not to slip back over the edge into philosophy.

I absolutely agree. I am only trying to make the case that if any single facet of life (free will) can be proven to defy deterministic explanation then we can reach a logical conclusion that there is more to life than science can predict or explain. Otherwise from my moderate understanding of biochemistry I'd be inclined to believe life is just the culmination of evolution of "calculator" controlled type life into "computer" controlled type life. The dead-end answers of Turing and Godel that say we can never prove it on principle alone (as does the link I comprehend most of) says to me the best we will ever have is observation and common sense to indicate the most likely answers. I'm still on the fence but I have a direction in mind to head at least...

 

[Pythagorean]

Ilya Prigogine is an example of a researcher who's scientific work presents challenges to determinism (particularly, his address to irreversibility and instability in physical systems, which includes biological processes).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilya_Prigogine#The_End_of_Certainty

But ultimately, the questions isn't whether our biology or brains themselves are deterministic, but whether our actual behavior and decision-making process is. For instance, a basketball is made up of a large ensemble of inherently non-deterministic processes (if you consider quantum mechanics non-deterministic). But we can still reliably model the trajectory of a basketball without fail as a deterministic system.

 

[jerromyjon]

But we can still reliably model the trajectory of a basketball without fail as a deterministic system.

Does that equate realistically to neural density? When you model a bunch of random things that probably stick together is much different than a bunch of impulses which all have unique pathways. I'd imagine you could equate it better to probability distributions and have a more realistic representation but like quantum mechanics and the basketball in a statistical model you get NO details of individual thoughts in a series or atoms in the basketball. We know it has to have more to it between the connections, more to it than can even be rationalized locally. That right there fundamentally proves determinism could only be obtained globally if it were possible making the problem "too big to solve" even for minuscule systems. That's why we approximate everything because it simply gives us predictable results. That is nature's trap. Keep it simple large scale but it seems impossible from the bottom up...

 

[mfb]

The logical algorithm of the software program dictates the decisions made, even if the conditions are fluid. According to the authors (and I would agree), for "free-will" to exist on a fundamental level, something "extra-physical or mind-like" must be manifest.

This is just shifting the decision around. Is the "extra-physical or mind-like" deterministic? If not, what distinguishes it from randomness (with potentially predictable probabilities)? Is there any test that can distinguish between free will and perfect randomness (again, with some predictable probabilities) for an object? I don't see one.

 

[Pythagorean]

Does that equate realistically to neural density? When you model a bunch of random things that probably stick together is much different than a bunch of impulses which all have unique pathways. I'd imagine you could equate it better to probability distributions and have a more realistic representation but like quantum mechanics and the basketball in a statistical model you get NO details of individual thoughts in a series or atoms in the basketball. We know it has to have more to it between the connections, more to it than can even be rationalized locally. That right there fundamentally proves determinism could only be obtained globally if it were possible making the problem "too big to solve" even for minuscule systems. That's why we approximate everything because it simply gives us predictable results. That is nature's trap. Keep it simple large scale but it seems impossible from the bottom up...

Statistics makes calculations easier in some cases. You can take the formulation of particle kinetics that treats it as an N body system with collisions, but that gets very tedious tracking each particle in a million+ particle system. Formulating the problem from a statistics perspective is simpler calculations-wise. It's not necessarily more accurate, you don't know the actual position and velocity of each particle like you do with the N body system, but you've saved yourself a lot of accounting work and if all you're interested is is ensemble behavior than this simplification can make asking questions about the ensemble more intuitive.

 

[jerromyjon]

You can take the formulation of particle kinetics that treats it as an N body system with collisions, but that gets very tedious tracking each particle in a million+ particle system.

The dynamics of our neurons differ inherently from particles which most are doing the same thing, although the statistics might lead you to miss the subtle differences, or even the major ones! The simplest way I can think to say what I mean is suppose you have millions of different pathways and we just think of these as just "options" and many options lead this way and many options lead that way, do we weigh how many options have common paths or do we jump to an obscure lone path because it has some special priority value. It would be like the basketball being hit by a relativistic massive particle and most of its particles switch direction successively and suddenly, bouncing the other way. A laymen's example would be standing at a campfire flaming quite highly and there are very few thoughts you have to go into that fire but if your child was about to enter the other side suddenly you might jump through that fire against all other impulses not to. At the same time it is a typical response across a diverse spectrum of threatening conditions which all funnel into a "deterministic" and predictable outcome...

 

[Feeble Wonk]

This is just shifting the decision around. Is the "extra-physical or mind-like" deterministic? If not, what distinguishes it from randomness (with potentially predictable probabilities)? Is there any test that can distinguish between free will and perfect randomness (again, with some predictable probabilities) for an object? I don't see one.

This is one of the logical dilemmas addressed by the authors. My understanding was that this lead to their conclusion that IF free will exists, it would require the existence of the "extra-physical" effect. I interpreted that to mean an effect that is not "caused" (and is therefore not deterministic), but can initiate cause "by intention" (and is therefore not random).

 

[mfb]

And what is intention?
Sounds like a game of words. "No, it is not X, it is [random other word]." "What is [random other word]?" "It is [again another word]".

 

[Feeble Wonk]

I would think "intention" would mean what it implies... that an act of "free will" would require a consciously participatory CHOICE in volition. The act is not "determined" by initial conditions and physical laws, and is not a randomly obtained outcome.
In short, IF "free will" exists, it requires a primacy of consciousness as a causative entity... hence the "extra-physical" designation by the authors.

 

[mfb]

That is just saying "free will is free will", but replacing one "free will" by "intention". What determines the choice "intention" will do? And please don't say "free will".

 

[Feeble Wonk]

That is just saying "free will is free will", but replacing one "free will" by "intention". What determines the choice "intention" will do? And please don't say "free will".

I'm sorry, but I don't understand where the confusion is. You're asking "What determines" the choice of free will, but you ask me not to respond "free will". If there is a DETERMINING factor in the action of "free will" (aside from free will), then it is not free will... it is a continuing chain of cause and effect that is part of the physical process.

Again... IF fundamental free-will actually exists, it requires a primacy of consciousness (the "extra-physical" effect) as a causative entity.

 

[jerromyjon]

What determines the choice "intention" will do?

it is a continuing chain of cause and effect that is part of the physical process.

Exactly. It's rather like all the inputs and outputs, no matter how experience causes you to react, are channeled through a common mold. That mold is obfuscated by the chaotic turmoil it develops in. It works by some means because it happens. This seems like "we think therefore we are here arguing how we got here..." The paths must develop from the obvious duplication of cells that are hammered into every nerve in every thought in our brains. It exists. We are here thinking how to distinguish some sort of evidence, I guess? Not words backing up more words.

 

[Feeble Wonk]

Exactly. It's rather like all the inputs and outputs, no matter how experience causes you to react, are channeled through a common mold. That mold is obfuscated by the chaotic turmoil it develops in. It works by some means because it happens. This seems like "we think therefore we are here arguing how we got here..."

I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Could you clarify that? If I understand you, you're arguing that the complexity of the physical system is so chaotic that it makes clear determination of cause and effect difficult to elucidate, but it exists none the less. Therefore, you don't believe that fundamental free-will actually exists.

 

[mfb]

Again... IF fundamental free-will actually exists, it requires a primacy of consciousness (the "extra-physical" effect) as a causative entity.

Back to the previous question: which test can distinguish this "free will" from randomness? If there is no such test, where is the point? We can equally assume invisible unicorns somehow involved in the process then.

 

[Feeble Wonk]

Back to the previous question: which test can distinguish this "free will" from randomness? If there is no such test, where is the point? We can equally assume invisible unicorns somehow involved in the process then.

I'm not sure where the invisible unicorns came into the picture here. I have sited a paper that makes the argument that there are fundamental logical restrictions that prohibit free will from being a causative agent unless it has an "extra-physical" effect. It's simply a question of causation.

 

[mfb]

Well, my point is that this '"extra-physical" effect' is just an invisible unicorn. It does not answer anything, it is just shifting the question around.

 

[Feeble Wonk]

I suppose that you could hypothesize the Invisible Unicorn Theory that posits the primacy of "IU" causation. It would be consistent with the concept that ANYTHING that breaks the physical chain of cause and effect... anything that is causative but uncaused... would have to be an "extra-physical" process/entity. The paper's authors might agree with the logic, but I suspect they would be somewhat sceptical of the causative agent hypothesized. On the other hand, I suspect that they might be sceptical that free will is endowed with causative agency as well.

 

[Torbjorn_L]

is life a matter of constantly evolving chemistry?

I suppose that you could hypothesize the Invisible Unicorn Theory that posits the primacy of "IU" causation. It would be consistent with the concept that ANYTHING that breaks the physical chain of cause and effect... anything that is causative but uncaused... would have to be an "extra-physical" process/entity. The paper's authors might agree with the logic, but I suspect they would be somewhat sceptical of the causative agent hypothesized. On the other hand, I suspect that they might be sceptical that free will is endowed with causative agency as well.

This is an unnecessary side show, since evolution (making life emerge through biochemistry) is known to be a completely natural process.

"Free will" is by the way an odd gap to try to stuff magic in, since it exists as an effective theory and as a philosophic idea of no natural consequence. Our minds can pretend that they choose, not the larger body that they embed in, since a) it is a post facto reconstruction and b) biology is emergent and complex. And the philosophic idea is equivalent to religious dualism.

So nature is known to be a monism ever since thermodynamics could study closed systems. If it wasn't, thermodynamics wouldn't work. (Or more quantitatively, having 3000+ closed systems behave naturally is enough for a binomial test @ 3 sigma. We have described way more such systems...)

Since inflation goes back as far as we can look, there is no sense making an extraordinary claim of magic (or having 'nothing' appear out of everything going back in time, as the religious like to claim). There would be no evidence, far less extraordinary such. (Also, in religious/philosophical magic terms, the magic agents/philosophies would be Last Thursday liars, pretending that the universe is entirely natural but it wasn't at one time. The magic believers probably wouldn't like that! On the other hand scientists know that minds lie about themselves making choices, because we evolved that way. =D)

 

[Feeble Wonk]

Free will is based on our thoughts! Free will is not so free, as it usually favors our own interests. We almost never choose (without forced by inner pathologic tendencies) to do something against our interests. Since thinking is merely a biochemical process taking place in the brain, and on the same time is a weapon to promote our survival and our interests, one can say that it is in a way an aspect of metabolism and a weapon for our self-sustainance, exactly as the respiratory or the cardiovascular system, or any other metabolic process…

This seems very reasonable. I can't make a compelling argument that you're not absolutely correct. But I'm frequently astounded by the fact that people who understand this on a cognitive level don't seem to fully appreciate the gravity of the implications.
For example, you said "We almost never choose... to do something against our own interests." But if you are right, and you quite possibly are, there is no "choosing" about it. It's not as if you weighed your options and decided on the appropriate action, whether for your interests or not.

 

[rootone]

This seems very reasonable...

I agree it largely does, however there are some situations like for example purchasing a car, (or anything else).
The eventual decision can be based on unquantifiable variables like 'looks', 'coolness' and all kinds of ego satisfaction,
regardless of the physical measurable performance of various features of the car etc.
Is that free will?.
Is ego satisfaction a measurable property of an object?