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This is an offshoot of another open thread where this came up. We've discussed it before, but I'm not sure I ever laid out the complete logic behind the reason not negotiating is generally the logically correct course of action. It is a business decision and it is analyzed with a decision matrix and cost-benefit analysis.
This logic works for all sorts of hostage-like situations and explains Israel's reasoning behind the current conflict.
The decision matrix itself is straightforward because the choices and outcomes are largely binary and directly related. Kidnappers/hostage takers have two Choices:
KC1: Take a hostage
KC2: Don't take a hostage
Law enforcement has two Choices:
LC1: Negotiate for release
LC2: Pursue the hostage takers
Negotiating with hostage takers does one key thing: it let's the hostage takers win. In the risk/cost-benefit analysis, if people always negotiate, then hostage taking has little downside and people will do a lot of it. In many countries in Africa and Central America, it is so widespread, it is practically an industry because people are willing to pay and police are unwilling/unable to pursue the hostage takers. With no negative consequences, there is no downside and no reason not to do it.
Now, "pursue" has different meanings for different types of kidnapping, obviously (and sometimes, you negotiate as a stall tactic in support of the pursuit). For the FBI in the US, it means capturing, arresting, and convicting an exceedingly high fraction of kidnappers in the US (95% vs 3% for Columbia). For Israelis, it means storming planes and killing hijackers. But in both cases, the result is the same: the hijackers lose big a very high fraction of the time and as a reult, the cost and risk of hijacking/kidnapping is so high that kidnapping for ransom in the US and hijacking planes for ransom in Israel are now quite rare.
The pitfall is obvious: in order for this logic to work, you must have a very high success rate in pursuing hostage-takers. In the US, for kidnapping and in Israel for that is the case, so it is logical to pursue the kidnapper. In many places in the world, it isn't, so it is logical to negotiate. It wasn't always this way, though. In my research here, I read an article excerpt that said kidnapping was so rampant in the '30s that the NYT actually put a box-score on their front page and kept running tallies. In the '80s, many Israeli planes were hijacked for ransom. Improving the odds in pursuit made the difference.
A quick note about the "reward" - for a traditional kidnapper, the reward is money. The kidnapper doesn't really want to kill anyone (it ups the stakes too much). For Israel, the "reward" is a little different: airplane hijackers and soldier kidnappers are perfectly happy just killing their hostages. Both are good outcomes. Because of that, the risk of pursuit (the risk that the pursuit may cause the hostages' deaths) is substantially lower than, say, if you get kidnapped in Columbia. The Israelis essentially consider the hostages to be already dead and see the pursuit as an attempt to save a few.
Now, the relationship to the current situation in the ME should be clear: this little war started with a hostage taking and Israel choose the pursuit option. This may be a change in tactic, and this tactic does suffer a little from the pitfall outlined above in that the specific hostage-takers here are unlikely to be caught, but Hizbollah is a coherent terrorist organization and the individual hostage-takings are centrally planned. Because of that, the cost-benefit analysis goes on at the upper levels of the organization. Hizbollah actually made a statement that they didn't expect this kind of response. So the equation has changed and if they realize that as a general rule their actions will have severe negative consequences, they'll stop what they are doing, just like the (or their cousin organizations) stopped hijacking planes. That's why Israel has chosen this course of action.
Info/stats on worldwide hostage-taking.
http://www.urmia.org/Report/1&2-00-ExperiencetheUnexpected.htm
This logic works for all sorts of hostage-like situations and explains Israel's reasoning behind the current conflict.
The decision matrix itself is straightforward because the choices and outcomes are largely binary and directly related. Kidnappers/hostage takers have two Choices:
KC1: Take a hostage
KC2: Don't take a hostage
Law enforcement has two Choices:
LC1: Negotiate for release
LC2: Pursue the hostage takers
Negotiating with hostage takers does one key thing: it let's the hostage takers win. In the risk/cost-benefit analysis, if people always negotiate, then hostage taking has little downside and people will do a lot of it. In many countries in Africa and Central America, it is so widespread, it is practically an industry because people are willing to pay and police are unwilling/unable to pursue the hostage takers. With no negative consequences, there is no downside and no reason not to do it.
Now, "pursue" has different meanings for different types of kidnapping, obviously (and sometimes, you negotiate as a stall tactic in support of the pursuit). For the FBI in the US, it means capturing, arresting, and convicting an exceedingly high fraction of kidnappers in the US (95% vs 3% for Columbia). For Israelis, it means storming planes and killing hijackers. But in both cases, the result is the same: the hijackers lose big a very high fraction of the time and as a reult, the cost and risk of hijacking/kidnapping is so high that kidnapping for ransom in the US and hijacking planes for ransom in Israel are now quite rare.
The pitfall is obvious: in order for this logic to work, you must have a very high success rate in pursuing hostage-takers. In the US, for kidnapping and in Israel for that is the case, so it is logical to pursue the kidnapper. In many places in the world, it isn't, so it is logical to negotiate. It wasn't always this way, though. In my research here, I read an article excerpt that said kidnapping was so rampant in the '30s that the NYT actually put a box-score on their front page and kept running tallies. In the '80s, many Israeli planes were hijacked for ransom. Improving the odds in pursuit made the difference.
A quick note about the "reward" - for a traditional kidnapper, the reward is money. The kidnapper doesn't really want to kill anyone (it ups the stakes too much). For Israel, the "reward" is a little different: airplane hijackers and soldier kidnappers are perfectly happy just killing their hostages. Both are good outcomes. Because of that, the risk of pursuit (the risk that the pursuit may cause the hostages' deaths) is substantially lower than, say, if you get kidnapped in Columbia. The Israelis essentially consider the hostages to be already dead and see the pursuit as an attempt to save a few.
Now, the relationship to the current situation in the ME should be clear: this little war started with a hostage taking and Israel choose the pursuit option. This may be a change in tactic, and this tactic does suffer a little from the pitfall outlined above in that the specific hostage-takers here are unlikely to be caught, but Hizbollah is a coherent terrorist organization and the individual hostage-takings are centrally planned. Because of that, the cost-benefit analysis goes on at the upper levels of the organization. Hizbollah actually made a statement that they didn't expect this kind of response. So the equation has changed and if they realize that as a general rule their actions will have severe negative consequences, they'll stop what they are doing, just like the (or their cousin organizations) stopped hijacking planes. That's why Israel has chosen this course of action.
Info/stats on worldwide hostage-taking.
http://www.urmia.org/Report/1&2-00-ExperiencetheUnexpected.htm
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