- #36
disregardthat
Science Advisor
- 1,866
- 34
Pythagorean said:In an earlier post, I brought up the definition that refers to a situation in which all events are equally probable, then all events are random (even in the causative perspective) I think this is mathematically rigorous enough as a definition. I also tend to think it's highly unlikely that any real system has a chance of all it's states being equally probable because real systems can't be perfectly isolated from perturbation and entropy.
Why does it have to be equally probable? Suppose you are throwing a dice with 5 blue and 1 red side. Is not the outcome (side facing up) random even though it is 5 times more probable that the red side faces up?
Probability in common language is always used when we lack the ability to predict. So if something is 'really' random, does that mean it is impossible to predict, no matter what information you have? I can easily imagine that we can come up with a sort of event for which there are quantum mechanical principles which disallows us to collect the necessary amount of information to predict. But does this mean the event was 'really' random?
It's important to distinguish between 'true' causality, 'true' randomness, and just causality and randomness in models. If a phenomenon was 'really random', but behaved according to certain tendencies, we can have causal models of it (e.g. thermodynamics, given that microscopic movement is 'truly' random). And the other way, if a phenomenon is causal, we can just as well have probabilistic theories of it. Any pseudo-random phenomenon is an example of this.
So models cannot determine whether a phenomenon is 'truly' random or 'truly' causal, and I suggest that these as intrinsic properties does not even make sense. When we speak of a phenomenon, we are not merely labeling observations, we are extracting generality from individual observations. The generality extracted is a way of thinking of the phenomenon, and it is in this way of thinking terms like causal and random really make sense, and these terms are only meaningful in the sense of our ability to predict. So it is meaningless to apply these terms as intrinsic to examples of phenomena in themselves. Does this not become a question of our own ability to think of phenomena? I believe Kant argued that causality is one of our cognitive categories in which we interpret all sensory experience.
EDIT: Oh, look; this is my 777'th post. How random.
Last edited: