Is the Hard Problem Just Silly?

[Fliption]

You're off-base in some cases, but not all.

In a sense much of this is a no-brainer hahaha. We already know there is a correlation between brains and consciousness. Lesions in the brain should impact how it operates, including it's relationship to consciousness. Does this necessarily say anything about whether consciousness emerges from brain processes or is a fundamental aspect of nature that simply manifest itself within this physical process? My friend comes over everytime I cook steak. Is my friend emerging from the process of cooking steak? I think so because whenever I don't cook steak, he's no where to be found! Obviously, from this behavior alone, all we know is that there is a correlation. We know nothing about what emerges from what.

These examples don't really tackle the problems that Hypnagogue is talking about. They simply draw a correlation between brains and consciousness and we already know they're correlated so we shouldn't be surprised. I'm still leaning heavily that neuroscience in this paradigm cannot bridge the gap.

 

[RingoKid]

just quickly, I'm with self adjoint on this one

I do think though that we have already made AI humans in the form of your average PC that mimic the prerequisites for solutions to the easy problems...

...as for the hard problem. We are to the computer what our mind is to our brain

I think ?

 

[hypnagogue]

From what selfAdjoint wrote, it would seem that Dennett has started on the kind of path I envisioned ... a detailed look at what a subjective experience actually is, in terms of brain stuff, begins to make the hard problem look like an illusion.

This is a conceptual mistake that seems to be common in materialist positions about consciousness. We analyze the brain, don't see anything that really seems to resonate with our first person experiences, and conclude that we should thus disregard that first person experience, as it is obviously shown to be flawed intuition, or pure illusion, or whatever.

But the task before us is to bridge the chasm between our understanding of objective nature and our understanding of subjective experience. It is no help to say that subjective experience simply is brain activity, if we don't show exactly how that stuff we look at with an fMRI is doing that stuff we directly experience. We cannot write the latter off just because it doesn't seem to jive with what we know about the former; in effect, that is nothing more than a distorted restatement of the hard problem. Likewise, we cannot grant the objective brain priveledged existential status over subjective experience, because then we wind up studying just the brain, rather than studying the nature of the relationship between the brain and subjective experience. A real solution to the hard problem will not deny subjective experience, but unify it with what we know about nature and the brain.

I'd like to quote a couple of lucidly written paragraphs here, taken from http://home.comcast.net/~johnrgregg/ :

Some people argue that what I call subjective consciousness is some kind of illusion. As attempts to dismiss consciousness go, this one does not stand up to much scrutiny. What is an illusion? It is something that seems one way but is really another. My claims rest on the observation that that red really seems red to me. The counter claim that this is an illusion boils down to, "red doesn't really seem red, it only seems that it seems red." But seeming, like multiplying by 1, is idempotent - inserting more "seeming" clauses into my claim does not change it one bit. Whether red seems red, or seems that it seems that it seems that it seems . . . red, the Hard Problem stands before us. The Hard Problem consists of the fact that anything seems like anything at all. If subjective consciousness is an illusion, then who or what exactly is the victim of that illusion, and how can it be such a victim without the Hard Problem being a problem for it?

My seeing of red is not a philosophy; it is not a way of thinking about or interpreting some theory or idea; it is not an abstraction; it is not an inference I have drawn or some metaphysical gloss I have put over reality. It is a brute fact about the universe, a fact of Nature. It is really, really there. It is not a theory - it is explanandum, not explanation. As such, it is incumbent upon our natural science to explain it. If my seeing of red is not amenable to the currently accepted methods of natural science, then so much the worse for the currently accepted methods. Those who deny the existence of qualitative consciousness remind me of the church officials who refused to look through Galileo's telescope because they did not want their neat and tidy theological world upset by what they might see.

I'm still curious to hear from those who think the problem is merely 'hard', or are uncertain ... any thoughts? (to repeat, if you, dear reader, feel it's impossible, then by all means tell us why ... but please also state clearly under no circumstances would you consider anything any physicalist - or scientist - could make or show as any kind of solution).

See my response to selfAdjoint's original post. Asserting that the hard problem cannot be solved by traditional scientific methods alone is essentially asserting that facts about structure and function can only entail further facts about structure and function, and that the facts about p-consciousness are not exhausted by structural and functional facts.

I like selfAdjoint's idea - at the start of this thread ... if an AI could be built that behaved just like a human, would that solve the problem?

Although such an AI would presumably represent a terrific solution to all the 'easy' problems of consciousness, it would not solve the hard problem. For one thing, we wouldn't be able to tell if it really was p-conscious in the first place. For another, even if we assume that it would be p-conscious, there is no guarantee that constructing such a thing would give us an understanding of the bridging principles between objective nature and subjective experience (for the same reason one could take apart and put back together a radio or somesuch without understanding how it works). The hard problem is about finding and understanding these bridge principles.

After all, the AI would state that it was conscious, and could hold a very 'human' dialogue with you about its subjective experiences. IIRC, this is quite similar to a 'zombie'. But if there were such a thing as a zombie, how could you - gentle reader - tell the difference between one and, say, Fliption?

You couldn't. If you could, the hard problem would not be so hard.

 

[loseyourname]

Subjective experience appears to present us with problems above and beyond just structure and function.

Subjective experience is the only phenomenon in nature that appears to present us with intrinsic properties directly.

I'm going to agree with you about this, but highlight the instances of the verb "to appear" and "to present." In these instances, all we can know is the way things seem to us. We have good reason to believe intuitively that subjective experience is not divisable, but it remains nothing more than an appearance. We can draw no deductive conclusions from this evidence.

Consider a subjectively experienced visual field whose only 'content' or property is a uniform and unchanging shade of red. What is structural or functional about this visual field? As it presents itself experientially, there is nothing structural or functional about it at all.

You see, this idea of the "content" of a visual field is a folk concept. Granted, we still have no theoretical framework in which to work visual perception, but the closest attempts I've seen to explaining such phenomena is the tensor network idea, which postulates such sensor input being represented in the mind as a vector, the dimensions of which are recognition factors (how many we have no idea). In the case of color perception, we have a pretty good idea that there are at least three different dimensions of perceptual recognition that go into the composition of any given color experience. There may be many others, not all of which are directly related to illumination or EM frequency. You take away any of these and you take away the experience of red, but if anything is left behind, there will still be experience of some kind.

At this point, you will want to object that this may just be a misguided intuition; after all, it could be that this redness is actually some kind of emergent phenomenon and is really just a conglomeration of relational properties. But all other emergent phenomena of this type, such as liquidity, present themselves on the 'emergent scale' as a novel set of structural and functional properties, not as intrinsic properties. How can it be that redness, or subjective experience in general, is an exception to this rule? How can even the appearance of intrinsic properties arise from structural and functional properties alone?

I'm again highlighting your own usage of language here. There must be some reason that you continue to say that experiences present themselves or appear to be a certain way. It is because you cannot be sure what they actually are. What we experience is not always in line with what exists in nature. Even feelings and beliefs that we are convinced we have are not always in line with the way feelings and beliefs manifest themselves in our actions and reasoning.

 

[loseyourname]

My seeing of red is not a philosophy; it is not a way of thinking about or interpreting some theory or idea; it is not an abstraction; it is not an inference I have drawn or some metaphysical gloss I have put over reality. It is a brute fact about the universe, a fact of Nature. It is really, really there. It is not a theory - it is explanandum, not explanation. As such, it is incumbent upon our natural science to explain it. If my seeing of red is not amenable to the currently accepted methods of natural science, then so much the worse for the currently accepted methods. Those who deny the existence of qualitative consciousness remind me of the church officials who refused to look through Galileo's telescope because they did not want their neat and tidy theological world upset by what they might see.

I'm going to run with this, because this is where I see John veering into messy territory. The assumption that our experience of "red" is unencumbered by theoretical abstractions is not necessarily true. There is strong evidence to suggest that all perception, whether it be of the intelligence of blondes with large breasts or simply of the color red, only obtains within a folk theoretical framework that is learned. This isn't to say necessarily that a newborn infant cannot experience red (although the possibility does exist), but there is evidence to suggest that the experience would not be anything like the experience we have aside from the fact that it is elicited from congruent external inputs.

Addendum: We seem to be at a bit of an impasse here, in that one camp is accusing its contrary of clinging to their notions of physical theory, while the other camp is accusing its contrary of clinging to folk intuitive notions of what subjective experience is. Nobody seems to be considering the possibility that maybe both sides are clinging a bit to frameworks that are not entirely true. When I say that a complete explanation of subjective consciousness is likely to be highly counterintuitive and difficult to grasp, it is entirely possible that both physicalists and antiphysicalists will need to budge a bit in their convictions. The simple fact is, when we approach such a hard problem, it is probably best to approach it with little to no convictions of any kind.

 

[Hellburner]

On subjective experience, it is the interaction of your objective environment seen through the lens of the synaptic weights imparted by the entirety of the time series representing your past.

 

[Nereid]

Lol, was that a shot? Fliption, I only think you vaguely resemble a zombie. Just kidding.

Out here, in orbit around Neptune, one has rather little human company, and - partly as a result? - one's attempts at humour are often misinterpreted (even to the point of upsetting the master of humour, tribdog ). Perhaps I should have "Les"?

But here's my answer to your "what if." Do it, and then let's talk about it. Same with life. Demonstrate it, and then make the claim chemistry alone is responsible. It is science that requires sense observation, not philosphy. Anyone in the mode of being a philosopher gets to trust what one feels and experiences inside oneself, and not just what can be expressed as sense data and math (although I'd agree conclusion derived from the two modes shouldn't contradict one another).

So, "show me", right? Hmm, I thought you lived in CA Les, not some state further east?

Mais oui, mon ami!

For the avoidance of doubt, allow me to clarify and repeat - unless and until a materialist, physicalist, scientist, reductionist, [insert your own favourite here] can, step by step show this, in excruciating detail, then the 'problem' remains a problem. Wrt 'life', Les has kindly described how high that bar is (for him); many have noted that life's origin is still far from being satisfactorily elucidated ...

So look at what I'm asking from the POV of a science junkie sugar daddy ... I'm dying to allow my ill-gotten squillions to be spent on research into the most challenging problems today, and this nonsense about spin-foams, Mbranes, etc doesn't turn me on (and being an ex-hippie, I have a jaundiced view about the importance of pseudo-problems of the New Age). So I've been convinced that there's a 'hard' problem of consciousness, and that its resolution will earn me - the generous benefactor of the key research - a place in history that my squillions won't. Being a businessperson, I think in terms of RFPs (request for proposal) ... come one physicalist, come all holists ... propose a research programme that will crack this nut!

 

[hypnagogue]

We have good reason to believe intuitively that subjective experience is not divisable, but it remains nothing more than an appearance. We can draw no deductive conclusions from this evidence.

I don't think framing the problem in terms of divisible or indivisible properties is the way to go. The important duality here is not divisible/indivisible, but intrinsic/extrinsic.

Note that these two are not equivalent. For the moment, lay down any potential objections and assume that redness is an intrinsic property. This implies that redness is not just a composite of relation properties, but it doesn't imply that redness is indivisible. Perhaps redness is in fact a composite of some more fundamental kinds of intrinsic properties that stand in certain relationships to each other.

You see, this idea of the "content" of a visual field is a folk concept.

I realize that the idea of contents of consciousness is not unproblematic, which is why I put it in scare quotes. I used it just to try to get the general idea across quickly. Replace it with 'characteristic' or 'quality' if you wish.

Granted, we still have no theoretical framework in which to work visual perception, but the closest attempts I've seen to explaining such phenomena is the tensor network idea, which postulates such sensor input being represented in the mind as a vector, the dimensions of which are recognition factors (how many we have no idea). In the case of color perception, we have a pretty good idea that there are at least three different dimensions of perceptual recognition that go into the composition of any given color experience. There may be many others, not all of which are directly related to illumination or EM frequency.

This is a structural/functional approach to visual consciousness, which will certainly have its uses, but still will only get us so far. Suppose that an advanced alien race were to study our brains to discover the nature of our subjective experience. Also suppose that these aliens do not have any kind of subjective experience analogous to human color qualia. What could these aliens deduce about human visual experience?

They would certainly be able to deduce that we process visual input from the environment along three main channels. From this and other information about the brain, they might even deduce that our perception of the visible light spectrum is not entirely continuous, but is divided into roughly seven discrete bands, each of which is represented in p-consciousness as a different quale.

Now, this is nothing to sneeze at, but so far our aliens have not cracked the hard problem; their understanding of our visual subjective experience is still limited to structural and functional terms. They would know that we do not see red and blue as continuous extensions of each other, as we do with (say) light and dark shades of red. They would roughly know the (fuzzy) boundaries along the spectrum of visible light where the visual 'continuity' of one color ends and a novel class of color begins. But this is just a relational account of differences and co-variances. What our aliens would not have the slightest understanding of is exactly what fills in the 'slots' of that relational structure in our own first person experience. They would know that we see 450nm-wavelength light as distinct from 650nm-wavelength light in a way entirely different from the way we see 650nm-wavelength light as distinct from 700nm-wavelength light, but they would not know that the qualia that instantiate this difference structure in visual p-consciousness look like this and this.

They could not deduce this because their understanding is entirely in terms of structure and function. This understanding gets them to the point where they know that red and blue are perceived differently, and they have some clues as to how this difference compares to other differences that obtain in visual perception. From here, it's up in the air what kind of qualia actually instantiate these differences. If phenomenal redness and blueness were to be swapped, the situation would be no more and no less consistent with what the aliens could observe.

I'm again highlighting your own usage of language here. There must be some reason that you continue to say that experiences present themselves or appear to be a certain way. It is because you cannot be sure what they actually are.

I am using the word 'appear' so as not to write off your argument offhand. But at the same time, I must admit it would take quite a lot to convince me that subjective experience is not intrinsic in nature. To me there is very strong reason to believe it is, and little to no reason to believe it is not. I can appreciate that you want to be conservative and not label this an open and shut case, but I do not and have not seen much hope for the counterarguments.

By the way, I have not intended to use the word 'present' to imply a similar kind of hedging.

What we experience is not always in line with what exists in nature.

I agree, but there is a special qualification we must consider for subjective experience. This is where John Gregg's great comments about illusion and the idempotent nature of the verb "to seem" comes in. Let me expand a bit on what he wrote.

Our subjective experience serves as a kind of model or representation of the objective aspects of nature. In normal waking conditions, the brain constructus a mapping from various structural and functional phenomena in the environment onto p-consciousness. Illusions occur when this mapping somehow breaks down, and the properties of subjective experience do not agree with the properties of the objective environment. It is easy and uncontroversial to suppose that a model of some phenomenon that is exterior to/different from the model itself can be wrong in this way.

But can a model incorrectly model itself? This is essentially the kind of claim we make when we say that we can be illusioned about subjective experience, as opposed to being illusioned about (say) the physical dimensions of a room. Restating your above statement as it relates to p-consciousness, we get the claim, "What we experience is not always in line with what we experience." But that is no better than saying that one does not equal one. There is no room for illusion here because there is no room for an incorrect mapping.

 

[Fliption]

There is no room for illusion here because there is no room for an incorrect mapping.

This is exactly why I responded to Self Adjoints assertion that consciousness was an illusion by asking the question "Who is experiencing the illusion? Another Illusion?"

 

[selfAdjoint]

My last post before I go. I have already responded to Fliptions question, and I don't think its cricket for him to bring up his question as if I hadn't.

Hypnagogue's post is just a rehash of the usual arguments; those aliens are just another version of "what it's like" and Mary, that knowing how things work doesn't equal experience. But I assert the sum total of things working in our brains is the the experience.

So long, have a happy holidays, and I'll see you in January.

 

[Fliption]

My last post before I go. I have already responded to Fliptions question, and I don't think its cricket for him to bring up his question as if I hadn't.

I almost mentioned your response to my statement but my mother always said if I couldn't say anything nice, don't say anything at all. To be honest, your response sounded as if you didn't understand what I'm saying. Dennett's argument tries to eliminate the infinite regress of a viewer. You created an infinite regress by insisting consciousness is an illusion. So I'm confused as to how you think you have respond to this point at all.

Hypnagogue's post is just a rehash of the usual arguments; those aliens are just another version of "what it's like" and Mary, that knowing how things work doesn't equal experience. But I assert the sum total of things working in our brains is the the experience.

I can hear the faint echoes of a foot stomping. It's real easy to make claims. Backing them up is another story. And it is very "hard" to do. I assert that the sky is made of blue grass! STOMP!

 

[loseyourname]

I don't think framing the problem in terms of divisible or indivisible properties is the way to go. The important duality here is not divisible/indivisible, but intrinsic/extrinsic.

Note that these two are not equivalent.

Call it what you will. Intrinsic, fundamental, indivisable. I think they are basically the same thing. For instance, to say that a superstring is indivisable is not to state a relational property of a string; it is to state that the string is not the results of relational properties. In short, the property of being indivisable is an intrinsic property. There remains the possiblity that reducing qualia will only lead us to smaller, but nonetheless irreducable entities without a good explanation. I'll admit that much. This is part of the reason that I think Rosenberg is probably on the better track than Chalmers.

This is a structural/functional approach to visual consciousness, which will certainly have its uses, but still will only get us so far. Suppose that an advanced alien race were to study our brains to discover the nature of our subjective experience. Also suppose that these aliens do not have any kind of subjective experience analogous to human color qualia. What could these aliens deduce about human visual experience?

This is where we run into problems. As adjoint points out, this only a variation on the Mary argument, except this time you are appealing to aliens with no color qualia experience at all. For one thing, if Chalmers is right, then any alien with the information-processing capacity to understand the structure and function of human color perception will also experience color qualia. For a second thing, you run into the same problems that the Mary argument runs into. You're assuming to begin with that facts about structure and function - physical facts - are not enough to explain qualia and then using that premise to prove that physical facts are not enough to explain qualia. It's still a circular argument, no matter how many different spins you want to put on it. The argument form remains the same each and every time.

They could not deduce this because their understanding is entirely in terms of structure and function.

Here it is again. Facts about structure and function don't explain experience, therefore facts about structure and function can't explain experience.

Note that I'm not saying you are wrong, or that Rosenberg is wrong, or that Chalmers is wrong. I'm only saying that your arguments demonstrate nothing other than that you and they are very clever at concocting arguments.

But at the same time, I must admit it would take quite a lot to convince me that subjective experience is not intrinsic in nature. To me there is very strong reason to believe it is, and little to no reason to believe it is not.

Well, heck, it would take quite a lot to convince me too! It's also going to take more than circular arguments to convince me that a physical account must fail. For now, I'll keep my mind open to both possibilities.

But can a model incorrectly model itself? This is essentially the kind of claim we make when we say that we can be illusioned about subjective experience, as opposed to being illusioned about (say) the physical dimensions of a room. Restating your above statement as it relates to p-consciousness, we get the claim, "What we experience is not always in line with what we experience." But that is no better than saying that one does not equal one. There is no room for illusion here because there is no room for an incorrect mapping.

There are still assumptions being made here about the unity of self and indivisability of qualitative experience. There is also an implicit appeal to the idea of the Cartesian Theater. Gregg's argument rests on the assumption that the words "we" and "experience" are well-defined in the context he is using them and clearly mean exactly the same thing in each instance. Well, I'd say that this isn't quite so clear as Mr. Gregg believes.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Out here, in orbit around Neptune, one has rather little human company, and - partly as a result? - one's attempts at humour are often misinterpreted (even to the point of upsetting the master of humour, tribdog ). Perhaps I should have "Les"? So, "show me", right?

Snoop Dog has been a bit stressed lately, being oppressed by the gov’t and all. As for me, my attempts at humor are misinterpreted all the time too. (Did you see, right near your comment, Boulderhead thought I might be dissing selfAdjoint?) Our kind hearts usually pull us through our social faux pas, don’t you think? (HOPE? )

Hmm, I thought you lived in CA Les, not some state further east?

Actually I was raised near St. Louis (Illinois side), does that count?

For the avoidance of doubt, allow me to clarify and repeat - unless and until a materialist, physicalist, scientist, reductionist, [insert your own favourite here] can, step by step show this, in excruciating detail, then the 'problem' remains a problem. Wrt 'life', Les has kindly described how high that bar is (for him); many have noted that life's origin is still far from being satisfactorily elucidated ...

My sense of what you are implying there is that I am stubborn, and that the height of the “bar” I’ve set is unreasonable. (Even if you are not implying that, it gives me a chance to explain myself a little.) Here's something I don't feel I get enough credit for: I am not committed to any metaphysical position, spiritual or physicalist or any other. Hard to believe?

When I first started thinking about the nature of reality decades ago I was physicalist. I was in school at the time working toward a degree in biology, and very certain any and all spiritual notions were a combination of myth, wishful thinking, brain washing, and delusion. My faith in science and physical explanations was absolute (even though I didn’t know enough to make that judgment).

I remember the day my faith was shaken. What shook me was seeing for the first time the problem I am always arguing here, the lack of an organizing principle(s) that would explain the organization of life. It happened in a class on comparative anatomy. It was a great course, with the two women professors who ran the class considered leaders in the field. The class was talking about the cats we were all dissecting (sorry Math is Hard, that was before my pussycat sensitivity training ), and what different anatomies indicated about evolution. That somehow led to a discussion on how it all got started (life), and an in-depth debate of the abiogenesis explanation (supported as usual by the Miller-Urey experiment).

I went home that day very disturbed, not yet knowing why. Over the next few weeks my work suffered much as it slowly dawned on me what had bothered me. I’d learned enough about physical principles to know that the thus far observed self-organizing potential of matter fell way short of what was needed for it to explain abiogenesis. I eventually dropped out that semester, tried again the next semester, but found my heart wasn’t into biology any longer. (THEN I moved out of the Show Me state to sunny CA. Oh, and I wanted to say from the depths of sincerity, I feel really, really bad for all you guys freezing your tails off today while I’m sitting here in 65 degree flawless weather. )

In CA I began seriously exploring meditation, and through that was able to have an additional type of experience added to my conscious life. New information! That experience eventually convinced me there is “something more” behind the physical appearances of reality. My certainty about the “something more” is unshakable because I’ve experienced so often. In contrast to that certainty however is the fact that I don’t really know what role “something more” plays.

It seems to be an underlying foundation which all the physical stuff, and my consciousness, arises out of. And after studying others who’ve become proficient at the inner experience, my sense of it is consistent with what those experts reported. Even so, the realm the experience exposes isn’t one you can get at with tools or eyeballs to really see what is going on. So in terms of what/how the “something more” is actually causing, it seems that must remain mostly an impression.

My point is, my position today on how life and consciousness comes about is still one of trying to understand it. I am not like most of the people I debate who seem already committed to a position, and are looking for ways to justify and explain what they already believe. In fact, (and this might sound like--and maybe is--self-deception) but so far in my life I am the most objective person I’ve met. I honestly don’t care what the truth turns out to be. Why should I? There is nothing I can do about what it is. I mean, I will still exist, still be conscious, still get to live for awhile, still get to enjoy life as fully as I am willing.

Today I would be open to a physicalist explanation if it can show what it needs to for the theory to make sense. So far I don’t see it, plus I can see the a priori beliefs of the debaters here and what it is doing to their objectivity. I also have other information (i.e., inner experience) which indicates physicalists are modeling without a key component. Until physicalist theorists stop trying to gloss over the organizational problem and really work to demonstrate that is a real potential of physicalness, it is hard for me to either have much faith in physicalism, or confidence that physicalists are after the unvarnished truth.

So look at what I'm asking from the POV of a science junkie sugar daddy ... I'm dying to allow my ill-gotten squillions to be spent on research into the most challenging problems today, and this nonsense about spin-foams, Mbranes, etc doesn't turn me on (and being an ex-hippie, I have a jaundiced view about the importance of pseudo-problems of the New Age). So I've been convinced that there's a 'hard' problem of consciousness, and that its resolution will earn me - the generous benefactor of the key research - a place in history that my squillions won't. Being a businessperson, I think in terms of RFPs (request for proposal) ... come one physicalist, come all holists ... propose a research programme that will crack this nut!

You know, if it there is a non-physical component to life and consciousness, no amount of physical research is going to reveal it. It might just have to remain a mystery to science. But maybe on a personal level we can learn to develop our experiential capabilities. Now there’s a wild and crazy idea . . . prioritize exploring and developing our experiential potential right up there with exploring and developing the world! Maybe sense experience is just the tip of the experiential iceberg. Maybe the answer we are looking for is in the opposite direction we are looking, and not “out there” in the clutter of creation at all. . . Naaaaaaaaaaaaaa

 

[RingoKid]

where is this "something more" in the physical universe Les and if not then where in the non physical universe is "something more" ?

you know my answer. Now let's hear yours and apologies if you have already given it elsewhere

peace

 

[Les Sleeth]

where is this "something more" in the physical universe Les and if not then where in the non physical universe is "something more" ?

you know my answer. Now let's hear yours and apologies if you have already given it elsewhere

I don't mind answering it again since it is a simple concept. In case you've not see it before, I often suggest a type of monism would help explain some of the mysteries we face. The idea is that there is some basic stuff which has always existed, and always will, and which resides in an infinite continuum. That would be the "something more."

If so, then this physical universe might be seen as (theoretically speaking now of course) a compressed form of the primordial existential stuff, and radiation and the expansion of the universe, for instance, as decompression of the existential stuff. We too are forms of the stuff, both because of the biology we inhabit, and as consciousness. Physcial, then, is simply the existential stuff in a more dense condition (add: structure and oscillatory dynamics too). Once the stuff that is now forming physicalness is free of being tied up in that, it will return to being its formless self, or nonphysical.

So where is the "something more"? It is everywhere; in fact, according to monistic theory, there is no place it isn't. It is the fabric of space, of matter, of consciousness. We can't see it with physical devices or organs because it is too subtle. But (according to something else I've suggested) we can experience the essence of our own consciousness, which is that existential stuff, and thereby possibly experience its/our connection to the infinite continuum.

 

[RingoKid]

thanx Les

Could you please tell me more of this infinite continuum...How do you see that working in a physical universe or not ?

By physical i mean locked into a percievable 4d model.

 

[Les Sleeth]

thanx Les

Could you please tell me more of this infinite continuum...How do you see that working in a physical universe or not ?

By physical i mean locked into a percievable 4d model.

Your first question was simple, but this one . . . . . . you'll have to read my book (when it's done). Translating monism into a viable theory is not simple.

 

[Hellburner]

Levels of consciousness, few will argue a generally escalating consciousness with increasing brain complexity. Humans have cognition loops that extend worldwide via social, cultural, and of late technological extension of consciousness. Higher primates have repeatedly demonstrated some human-like social and cultural loops within their cohort and surrounding cohorts. Mammals and birds have various levels of volitional/non-autonomic communication and social behaviors. Reptiles, amphibians, and fish demonstrate rudimentary local communication with other organisms, the invertebrates have even lower level interaction with each other and their environment. I like to conceptualize these relations as involving increasing numbers and layers of nodes in a recursive neuralnet (NN).

The size and depth of the NN's start small at the lower level invertebrates, with things like basic photophobic reflexes emerging in earthworms and such. As the complexity increases to something like flies, you get a more complex sensorium and range of responses including an emergent ability to learn. The vertebrates expand complexity as the body gets more complex and the resolution of the sensorium increases. Learning ability rises, situational awareness increases, and discrimination/response based on environmental factors greatly expands. Warm blooded vertebrates, with the increased availability of energy and somewhat more complex bodies have an even greater perception/response repertoire, and behavior mostly recognized as volitional emerges. Adding on the next layer of neural complexity presents the higher primates and man. Recognition of self, and subjective experience emerges, is this emergent property really such a leap from volition emerging? We are on the cusp of adding another layer to our cognitive existence by way of integrating our technology with our brains and the global collective. Some call it the Singularity. Care to hypothesize on what will emerge from that? That's the "Hard Problem"